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Introduction

Geo-political demarcation is replete in International Relations. Beginning with the hemispherical East and West, to First World and Third World that delineates the level of economic development of countries to the predictive “Asian Century” that props the entire Asian continent as spearheading economic progress in the 21st century the terminologies have been taken up by a wide variety of fields. It is in this context that we pause to examine one specific aspect of a newly-coined geographic limitation “Indo-Pacific region”. It includes countries of East Africa, West Asia and island countries of Indian and Western Pacific Oceans as well as East Asian littoral nations. While its usage in the environmental area is well known, the significance of this term from the international relations angle has been highlighted only recently.

The most glaring reality about this pan-region is that it is predominantly ocean-based. As a corollary maritime security or the safeguarding of sea-based and connected assets with the employment of national resources including economic and military is paramount. This issue of POLITICO seeks to delve deeper into the Maritime Security aspect of the newly interested region. The usage of the Indo Pacific nomenclature in the strategic context has been highlighted by many of the contributors. Countries in this region extensively depend on the seas for their trade and commerce. This implies that the safety and security of lines of communication over waterways is vital. The increased globalisation of economies only means that such reliance is bound to heighten. From the strategic point of view, there have been growing concerns regarding non-traditional challenges in the form of terrorism, illegal trafficking of goods and human as well as piracy, environmental issues like pollution. There are also competing maritime territorial claims in this region of global importance.

In an attempt to expand the contours of theoretical debate over the strategic context of the Indo-Pacific region, Anuradha tries to point out the neglect of maritime strategic thought in specific countries and the need for a relook. She indicates the importance of the maritime realm to the national life of specific countries like India, Japan and Australia. Despite being ocean-going economies these countries witness maritime strategic thought at levels, rudimentary at best or absent at worst. She brings out the “land-based” approach of their prevailing defence thinking

to be the principal reason for this apparent neglect. She urges that in view of transforming nature of maritime security challenges the time is ripe for a closer look at strategic thinking in the maritime realm.

With a pan regional view Lalitha Ramadorai seeks to locate the environmental aspect of the Indo-Pacific region in its overall security domain. She clearly points to the immense contribution this “largest ecological system in the world” has on the ecological health of the world. She outlines the supply and demand dynamic for natural resources as the single most important regional binding factor. She brings to our notice the damage that the unique ecosystems of this region, namely mangroves, coral reefs, wetlands and the associated biodiversity suffer due to maritime and coastal activities. The industrial development and the expansion of urban infrastructure along the coasts are often unsustainable and cause havoc on the marine environment of the Indo-Pacific region. The pollution seriously depletes biodiversity and even destroys precious ecological systems like mangroves and coral reefs. With illustrative example she explains how overfishing is proving to be a bane of this region. This is shown to result in regional security challenges in the form of food and energy insecurity and climate change effects.

Taking a bird’s eye view on the non traditional challenges to Indo-Pacific maritime security, Ajay Sood and Jai Kishan Chawla delve deeply on the need for securing the sea lines of communication. They elucidate the point by highlighting the importance of the various chokepoints in the Indo-Pacific region and the commercial significance of SLOCs in every country’s economy. The article also lists out the other threats like piracy, trafficking and occurrence of disasters. Their illustration of the regional effort to counter each challenge brings out the essence of this journal special issue’s aim.

The issue looks into specific sub regions and important issues like piracy, port security, maritime territorial contestation and on-going regional, bilateral and other efforts. From a regional perspective the East China Sea maritime territorial disputes deserve special mention. Besides being the locale of sea lanes of global economic and strategic importance, the unresolved competing claims over ownership of islands pose maritime security concerns. The article by Joshy Paul clearly enunciates the contours of contention and highlights the need for amicable resolution of one particular dispute over the Senkaku also called Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. The author also describes the historical baggage of animosity between the two Asian powers China and Japan that accentuates the fragile regional situation. The article indicates its

effect on economic development, maritime security, energy supplies, sovereignty and ambition for regional hegemony. The estimated natural wealth of the area surrounding the islands is seen to be a vital factor in the refusal of either country to give up their claim. This is because of the external dependence on energy for both nations – one due to the insatiable demand of a growing economy and population and the other due to an intrinsic resource deficit. Instead, at times, they have showed belligerence over this issue, especially China. The article finds enough evidence of the East China Sea dispute being more than an Indo-Pacific regional issue possessing far reaching ramifications that encompass the world at large.

The issue of Piracy has been one of the most important threats to maritime security in this Indo-Pacific region. In his article, Venkataraman makes a detailed case study of Somalia as a source of piracy that seeks to destabilize the maritime security of the vast region. He links the concept of a failed state to the emergence of piracy with Somalia as a test case. By explaining the historical and political factors that shaped Somalia to turn into a failed state, the author lays a firm basis for the reasons that led to the rise of piracy in this conflict-ridden land. He provides caveats regarding the transformation of the nature of piracy after its possible linkage with maritime terrorism. He examines the economic and regional costs of piracy on the Indo-Pacific community at large. He prescribes a holistic solution to the issue of statelessness rather than dealing with piracy incidents piecemeal.

Yet another article dwells specifically on Japan's vulnerability on the energy front being the primary force that has enhanced the chances of involvement of Japan's Self Defence Forces far from their shores. Charting the rise of Japan's need for external energy sources concomitant to its economic growth, Prakash Pillai rightly picks out the piracy concerns that seriously hamper Japan's energy imports. The author illustrates the point further by citing piracy attacks encountered by Japanese ships over the past decade both in the neighbouring Southeast Asian region as well as the far flung Indian Ocean reaches. The threat of Somali pirates affecting the movement of ships from the source of energy supply in West Asia and challenge of possible terrorist link to piracy is further worrisome. Japan responded by allowing its self defence forces to operate in the Indian Ocean region. It also provided financial assistance and technical upgradation for global efforts to curb piracy. The author clearly explains the various steps taken by Maritime Self Defence Force of Japan towards this end and emphasises the military aspect of MSDF required for it.

Remaining on regional efforts at tackling maritime security concerns, Mathew, Karthikeyan and Suresh focus on multilateral and bilateral initiatives to shore up maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. While Mathew chooses to point out the mechanisms and organisations that are in place for Indonesia, Japan and South Korea to cooperate in this issue, Karthikeyan brings out India's attempts to involve regional powers like Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia that have significant stakes in Indo Pacific maritime security.

Suresh specifically deals with justification for the requirement of enhancing the bilateral arrangements between India and Australia, the region's two big maritime powers, to strengthen maritime security. He highlights the factors of altering geopolitics, presence of non traditional security threats and the policy level changes in Indian and Australian approach to maritime security in a sub region of Indo-Pacific namely, Indian Ocean region that propel the need for deepening cooperation. Comparing and contrasting Cold War stance of both India and Australia towards the Indian Ocean, the author underlines the present altered geo political situation that offers greater scope for convergence of interest and hence propulsion for increased cooperation. He further highlights the individual stakes for each country in Indian Ocean's security. In it he also includes the policy approach India and Australia have chosen to address the issue. The article enunciates the various attempts both countries have taken at the bilateral and multilateral levels to address maritime security.

Mathew examines the stakes in the Indo-Pacific region for each of the countries that warrant increased interest in its security. South Korea has been concerned with its northern neighbour, but has come to not regard its maritime security with equal importance. Normalisation of relations with Japan could pave way for increased cooperation to enable security of SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific region. The author indicates that the relative strengths of Japan and South Korea in economic and technological fields together with the Indonesian asset of natural resources could be harnessed for the greater maritime security of the Indo-Pacific region. Disaster mitigation and higher business investment by Japan and South Korea together with energy supply by Indonesia could be used as a bargaining chip to further this aim. However the article acknowledges that confidence building mechanisms would form a significant part of any trilateral effort to contribute to Indo-Pacific maritime security.

Karthikeyan in his article that looks at the Indo-Pacific maritime region not just as a domain that requires securing, but allowing countries to

forge economic and security relationships in a win-win format. He emphasises the geo strategic position of each of the countries, India, Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia which he calls “vantage points” that have huge stakes in cooperating with each other. The author also brings the “China factor” in the argument for cooperative imperative among these countries. The article further lists out a variety of fields that warrant cooperation namely, naval exercises, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief, search and rescue operations, joint maritime patrolling and joint investments. The benefits that India could derive from strengthening maritime security of the Indo-Pacific are quite evident.

One more article that examines the Indian experience is Ramakrishnan Ramani’s on Private sector in port security. In it his analysis of the role of port security equipment suppliers offers valuable insight for the region as a whole. With growing emphasis on building up port related security that has been propelled by new and emerging threats like terrorist attacks, the author turns our attention to the potential for private manufacturers to tap this huge market. From the Indian experience lessons could be drawn for wider implementation. The article views positively the predicted increase in the Indian market size and assesses the market dynamics and competitive environment and offers suggestions and recommendations on how the private sector catering to India’s seaport can view this growing market segment. The author also provides areas that need added attention like port management and integration of technology into existing labour-intensive port infrastructure.

Finally Anushree Chakraborty’s article seeks to understand why cooperation and not confrontation might be the optimal choice for Southeast Asian countries to address the challenges that their maritime domain faces. The author highlights the huge stakes involved in the region’s stability due to the mere interest and often rivalry and influence of the great powers in it. The article is right in appreciating the ASEAN efforts to forge a security community with marked focus on cooperating mechanisms that are already in place to deal with the maritime realm. Lastly, the paper peruses the institutional architecture for strengthening maritime cooperative security of the Southeast Asian region, and considers the extra-regional players’ complex involvement here. In emphasizing the significance of China factor in determining the balance in the region, the author is right in providing a caveat for preventing single power domination in the area. It would be only logical to think that success in addressing economic and socio-cultural issues through the employment of regionalism could extend to the region’s maritime security too.

In all, the newly discussed area of Indo-Pacific region in the strategic context the authors have dealt with the significance of this geographical limitation at length. They indicate the vital position the overlapping or confluence of two seas (Indian and Pacific Oceans) has on the economic prosperity and maritime security of individual countries that assume some form of regional importance. The contributors are unanimous in their requisition of cooperative mechanisms to deal effectively with challenges that these nations confront. Some writers have also analysed existing structures and organisations fostering cooperation and make a case for further strengthening them. In examining maritime security milieu of the Indo-Pacific special focus on India is mandatory. This is highlighted in many of the articles that outline India's attempts at addressing the threats at the individual level (like the case of port security), bilateral level (with Australia) and multilateral level (with countries like Indonesia, Vietnam and Australia and ASEAN). Issues of concern such as marine environment, piracy, safety of sea lines of communication and maritime territorial disputes that directly impinge on the region's maritime security have also been addressed. The articles also make practical suggestions to shore up counter measures while simultaneously laying caveats regarding future challenges in implementation of such measures. They make a marked departure from the usual discourse that prioritises China's status in the Indo-Pacific region though not neglecting it.

Imperative for maritime strategic thought in Indo-Pacific Region

C.S. Anuradha

Article abstract

While most countries of the Indo-Pacific region are littoral countries implying that they are dependent on the oceans for their economic survival, strategic thought of the maritime nature is few and far between. This article aims to highlight the significance of oceans to these countries and in turn, the pressing need to think of utilisation of national resources in furthering maritime objectives. It would also provide the advantage such thinking has offered to countries that have travelled this path.

Introduction

The usage of the term “Indo-Pacific Region” in the geo political context refers generally to the geographic area covering the shores of East Africa, West Asia, South and East Asia. Though this region has long been identified as a biogeographic region in the field of marine science, it has only recently assumed prominence as a geo political entity. In both an economic and a strategic sense, the Indo-Pacific is “a valid and objective description of the greater regional system”^[1]. The strategic importance has been further emphasised in the mention in the speeches, press reports, government documents and think-tank reports of various countries. Thus Indo-Pacific can be taken to mean “an emerging Asian strategic system that encompasses both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, defined in part by the geographically expanding interests and reach of China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of the United States in both.”^[2]

The term received official mention in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s address to the Indian Parliament in August 2007. He mentioned that “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity”^[3]. The Japanese term such confluence “*futatsu no umi no majiwari*”^[4]. Australia’s White Defence Paper 2013 acknowledges the strategic significance of the newly

imagined region when it talks of the need for a Defence White Paper due to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a “single strategic arc”.^[5] The US looks at the Indo-Pacific Region as ‘the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia’.^[6] In India, ever since the mention of the region in Indian strategic analyst Gurpreet Khurana’s article ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ in the January 2007 issue of the Strategic Analysis journal (Routledge/ IDSA), the term has figured in the strategic lexicon. This is the most active and challenging maritime expanse in the whole world.

Unlike the terminology of “Asia-Pacific” that conspicuously negated India’s rightful role in the regional calculus, Indo-Pacific accords her the well-deserved integrity if not centrality. The focus on India and China can only be seen to rise with their ever increasing economic and consequent political and strategic significance in the world. For India, economic relations with ASEAN, China, Japan and Australia have rapidly increased with a proportional growth of maritime traffic creating “a seamless stretch of ocean space linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans”^[7].

Oceans and the Indo-Pacific nations

Most of the countries in the Indo-Pacific region are littorals and thus have huge stakes in the maritime realm. Their trade and commerce are principally sea-borne lending vital importance to the safety and security of their immediate and even far-flung oceanic expanse. With economic growth and resource dependency increasing, the Indo-Pacific countries are looking at a larger role of the sea-scape in their national prosperity. Not only is the marine zone significant in economic terms but also strategically. The growing threats to sea-based assets from non-traditional sources like terrorists or illegal movement of goods and human traffic have factored in the strategic aspect of maritime Indo-Pacific region. Added to this, are the competing claims over islands that hold strategic currency.

Interestingly countries that are expected to exhibit appreciable progress in the economic front namely, China, India, Southeast Asian nations are mainly located in this geopolitical sub area of the world. Their rising trade volumes would indicate augmented need for shipping and consequently, SLOC safety. Hitherto dormant areas like Africa – a resource rich mega region and energy-deficit nations like China, India and Japan have vastly improved their contacts. This has also brought focus of big powers like the US on this major sub region.

Some of the countries are island nations with burgeoning requirements for supply of raw materials. The sea dependence in such cases is complete with nutritional, business and geopolitical elements derived from the surrounding waters. It also serves as the first line of defence from existential threats posed by opposing powers.

Let us elaborate the argument further by noting the intrinsic strength and at times vulnerability obtained from the oceans over a few countries in detail. The cases in point are Japan – an island nation, India – a peninsula and Australia – a continent.

Japan

In the case of Japan, it is well known that the country is a resource-strapped nation. Historically, industrial and economic development of this major world economic power has been fuelled by imported oil. In 1973, when the Arab-Israel conflict broke out, Japan realised that it “remains extraordinarily susceptible to serious disruption in supply or increase in the price of raw material”.^[8] To offset such difficulty in the future, Japan began to look at nuclear energy and LNG in a big way. In 2009, Japan’s total dependence on oil (including LPG) was approximately 47 per cent.^[9]

Yet today, Japan remains the second largest importer of oil after China. Moreover, the Great Eastern Earthquake and the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Station significantly reduced public trust on nuclear power.^[10] This has resulted in a sharp rise in LNG utilisation that was 87.49 million tonnes in 2013.^[11] The increase in the overseas dependence for oil and gas makes Japan’s SLOC vulnerable. This could in turn seriously affect its security. The safety of the choke points namely the major straits is another concern. Almost 99.7 per cent of the trade with foreign countries is sea-bound, carried out by sea-going vessels. Subsequently, Indian Ocean gained major importance in Japanese politics as the energy and trade route was being affected by piracy activity off the Somali Coast.

Also Japan’s strategic environment with imminent threats from ocean neighbours like Korea, China and her Pacific orientation warrant that the country balance its interests in both Indian and Pacific Oceans. Being an island nation it must look to defend at sea and absence of strategic depth^[12] with the widest expanse being 160 miles makes maritime deployment inevitable. Also Japan has far flung island territories under its control, the furthest being Miyako Islands, near the Tropic of Cancer. The geography of this country brings it into

collision course with ambitious mainland powers.^[13] While at present Japan only has a modest force named Self Defence Force, increasing threats to its maritime interests would warrant expansion of the current levels which would in turn have far reaching regional and global ramifications.

Despite these factors strategic thought of the maritime realm has not received due importance in this island nation.

India

In the case of India which is a peninsula, there is a contiguous coast of about 7200 kms. There are also the Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar Island groups. She is strategically placed on the northern corner of Indian Ocean. As a sea faring nation it has a huge population dependent on the ocean directly for livelihood; the maritime trade – the lifeline of Indian economy; and maritime security issues ranging from boundary disputes, sovereignty problems over island territories, concerns like piracy, narcotics trafficking, maritime terrorism and regional strategic developments point towards a link-based approach to managing oceans for profit and security.^[14]

Indian Ocean as the only all-weather navigable ocean, remains a source of untapped natural resources both living and non-living. Not only does the Indian Ocean consist of abundant marine life but also holds forty per cent of offshore oil reserves, 65 per cent of strategic minerals like uranium, and 31 per cent of gas. The control of strategic choke points to the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Malacca Straits along the oil routes is strategically vital to powers within and out.

Strategically too the Indian Ocean has remained the mainstay of Indian naval ambitions. In fact, the publication of India's new *Maritime Doctrine* is quite explicit on the central status of the Indian Ocean in India's strategic thought and on India's determination to constitute the most important influence in the region as a whole^[15]. India has a long coastline with an Exclusive Economic Zone of 2.02 million sq. km. As a maritime nation India has derived enormously from this stretch of water both culturally and economically. India once reigned over these countries and its cultural influence continues to this day.^[16]

Now as the rising power India looks to expand its interest to the Pacific Ocean. The Indian Navy has conducted port visits and naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean in the recent years. In 2014 India and Russia held the INDRA naval exercises in the Sea of Japan.^[17] During this exercise,

Indian warships namely the INS Ranvijay destroyer, the INS Shivalik frigate and the INS Shakti fleet tanker, with the Russian fleet comprising the Varyag guided-missile cruiser, the Admiral Vinogradov destroyer and the Peresvet participated.^[18] Later in July of the same year, US, Japan and India participated in the MALABAR exercises in the Pacific Ocean. The 2007 edition of the exercises were the first time it was held off the Okinawa coast of Japan. The 2009 and 2011 trilateral exercises were also conducted in the Pacific Ocean. Earlier too, India has had interactions with Pacific Islands as early as 1879 when Indians went to work in the plantations of Fiji and other islands. With trade from and to Asia increasing the Pacific Islands could regain their importance^[19]. The focus on Western Pacific is also seen as a future imperative when United States would have waning influence.^[20] India could be seen playing a balancer alongwith Japan against Chinese expansionism in the region.

One of the most recent significant events that reawakened India's need to think about maritime security was the 26/11 incident. On November 26, 2008 a dectet of terrorists landed on Mumbai's shores using inflatable boats and attacked hotels and train stations. It exposed the soft underbelly of India's coastal security. The government announced major revamping of marine related security infrastructure in its aftermath. This included command and control decisions, equipment modernization and purchase as well as "creation of new institutions and mechanisms that could continually man India's vast coastline"^[21].

Technology upgradation to strengthen maritime security is also underway. Static radars will cover the entire coast of Indian mainland as well as the far flung island territories to track even small vessels. The protection of land-based marine assets in the form of ports which handle 90% of India's total trade volume has been attempted to be addressed with the raising of an elite commando force to guard each of the 12 major ports that are vulnerable to terrorist threats with the latest communication and ammunition^[22].

A separate dedicated wing of marine police stations to protect all coastal states has also been created. As of 2014 there are 131 marine police stations in India.^[23] There is also a proposal to fit transponders on fishing boats and coastal radar stations. The national AIS (automatic identification system) network to dynamically detect and track suspicious vessels entering Indian waters is yet to see the light of day^[24]. Apart from local elements there is an international element to maritime security too. However all such measures are only reactive to emerging

threats and do not form part of any institutionalised or other thinking on maritime strategic thought.

Australia

This island continent-sized nation flanks the two major oceans – the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The importance of Australia besides being an American ally has rapidly been rising. The simultaneous visits of the Chinese and Indian premiers in November 2014 acknowledge in the words of Australia's daily *Financial Review* that Australia is, "no longer an appendix to Asia, but as a core Indo-Pacific power."^[25] In recent years Australia has reversed its nuclear policy towards India and agreed to "supply uranium for Indian reactors".^[26] Australia is also asserting its place in the Asian region what with rapid strides in trading volumes with China and ASEAN nations. In fact it is perhaps the first country in the world to include the "Indo-Pacific" region in the official White Paper on Defence 2013 according the newly mentioned region much needed strategic import. In it, Australia delineated a stable Indo-Pacific as as one of Australia's four key strategic interests^[27], while the armed forces would counter challenges in this region in a quartet of principal tasks.

What is of further interest is that the Indo-Pacific can be treated as a "super region in which the sub-regions still matter".^[28] The growth of both India and China and subsequently, their competition, is "an Indo-Pacific dynamic"^[29] affecting Australia directly. With the island nation seeking to deepen its involvement in the immediate neighbourhood and Indian Ocean region acknowledgement of the Indo-Pacific calculus is logical.

Altering power equations in the Asian region could result in the clash of interests of United States, China, Japan, India and Russia. Australia could be caught in the crosshairs. This is especially significant in view of the perceived relative "declining influence of the United States"^[30] *vis-a-vis* the ascent of China. Increasing reliance on energy supplies from areas other than the nearby Asian countries could also pose a serious concern for Australia.

Non-traditional threats that affect Australia's sprawling 36,000 kms coastline and its vast offshore island territories are also of special concern. Human and Drug trafficking are significant threats. Special concerns like environmental threats to pristine Australian marine world have enlisted the services of Australian Maritime Service Authority (AMSA). This organisation aims to prevent pollution caused by ships

and also “provides maritime safety services in Australia and Australia’s allocated area of SAR responsibility”^[31] In an aim to augment maritime related security, Australia has implemented the Maritime Security Identification Card Scheme (MISC). Under this, people who work in maritime related fields of shipping, transportation, oil drilling and fishing are subjected to background checks with regard to criminal record etc and certified that they meet minimum security requirements.^[32] While Australia has introduced new technology and management systems like Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS)^[33] to synthesise, analyse and assess threats; the theoretical basis of a broader strategic thought specifically catering to the maritime aspect has long been found wanting. It is only recently that a maritime school of strategic thought has been mooted.^[34]

Whence maritime strategic thought

The problem with all three countries is that despite their historic and even current reliance on maritime realm for economic prosperity, food security and overall health of national life, the focus on ideas and thinking or strategic thought specifically catering to maritime security has long been neglected. Even in a purely militaristic sense, the approach is only continental and not littoral. With greater economic integration with the outside world and higher stakes in procuring, or in the case of Australia supplying, energy sources from other countries, Japan, India and the island-continent of Australia stand to lose a lot by maintaining a sense of “sea blindness”.

In the case of Japan, non-existent or mere rudimentary maritime strategic thought could seriously affect “Tokyo’s ability to act outside the confines of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance”^[35]. This could be a definite possibility what with the rise of a belligerent China. The geographic insularity of this small, resource-starved island from mainland Asia and the positioning of its populace mostly towards the Pacific Ocean pose a policy dilemma. Also the country possesses no strategic depth which forces a sea-based forward defence. There is the ever present challenge of neighbours aspiring for greater maritime stature be it China, Russia or the Koreas. If Japan moves towards reinforcing its maritime capabilities, there would be reactions from its neighbours too.

While an entire body of literature acknowledges the impact of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s thinking on prewar Imperial Japanese Navy, there are many who dispute it too. Thinkers like Akiyama Saneyuki, Suzuki

Kantaro and Sato Tetsutaro are notable. Sato recommended *riko o sake, umi o susumu* (avoiding the continent and advancing on the seas) giving a southern orientation to strategy that could bring Japan into direct confrontation with European powers that were ruling Southeast Asia. But after 1945, Japan only responded to the “demands of its occupiers”. It was only after the 1952 restoration of sovereignty that Japan looked at expansion of maritime responsibilities. Even then there was a great mismatch between the actual capabilities of the Japanese Self Defence Force and maritime strategy. In taking on a China and preparing for a reduced US presence in Asia, Japan urgently requires deep look into maritime strategic thought.

For India there has been an ancient maritime tradition that fostered connections with civilisations across the world. Her sea power also enhanced her influence on far flung territories during the middle ages. K.M.Pannikar’s thesis that neglect of the sea was the principal reason for subjugation to the colonial powers clearly illustrates the need for reorientation of India’s approach towards its maritime realm. Sadly, in the post independent era, the emphasis on strategic thinking along maritime lines has been a non starter. With India aiming to assume a bigger role in the global scheme of things and for its very own national strength, maritime security of this vast region is imminent. Competition from China and other powers accentuate her focus on the Indo-Pacific in the present and near future too. Though there were some maritime security thinking in the Kargil Committee report these pertain only to preparedness and not ideas regarding the wider canvas. The Indian Navy’s Maritime Doctrine looks at expansion of India’s arc of interest but does not offer how to employ national resources to firm up maritime security.

In the case of Australia a continental-sized coast to safeguard alone could be a principal cause for training eyes on maritime strategic thought. However, the strategic discourse exhibits a “land-centric mindset”^[36]. Though Australia is a naturally-endowed country, the grains it produces; the oil and gas it prospects on and off-shore; the ores and coal it mines from its land can benefit the island nation only when there is “free and uninterrupted movement of bulk carriers”.^[37] Thus there is all the more requirement for a Michael Wesley characterised “well developed maritime imagination”^[38] which factors in the 60,000 km long coastline and 12,000 islands. Thus maritime strategic thought would be “a logical outcome for a maritime region in a maritime century”^[39]. Australia is now debating on a maritime school of thought.

Conclusion

As a predominantly maritime area, countries of the Indo-Pacific region ought to structure their national security discourse around maritime strategic thought. But this article highlights the glaring lacuna in the approach to national security by some maritime nations of this vitally important region. The apparent neglect is despite the enormous dividends each of the countries taken as illustration namely, Japan, India and Australia have either already derived or are currently deriving or have the potential to do so in the future. While economically, the larger Indo-Pacific region comprising of various significant sub regions is intrinsic to the prosperity of these individual countries, the area's strategic import cannot be lost. To even sustain their economic growth and progress the three regional powers must take into cognisance the centrality of safety of sea lanes and the concomitant challenges to their safety through non traditional challenges like piracy, maritime-based terrorism, illegal trafficking of all kinds and unsustainable fishing. Persistent territorial disputes among neighbours in the maritime realm are also of special concern. Global issues like climate change further emphasise the stakes the countries have in maritime security. A maritime approach to ideas and philosophies that aim at safeguarding a nation's assets and furthering its interests is thus the need of the hour for all three countries.

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Marine Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region and Security

Lalitha Ramadorai

The Blue Planet: Oceans Valuable Yet Vulnerable

Planet Earth is often referred to as the 'Blue Planet', a reference to how it appears from space, with the blue colour obviously imparted by the oceans and seas that cover almost three-fourths of earth's surface. Oceans are the largest ecosystem on earth. No wonder life on the planet is so much dependent on them!

Oceans in fact form an indispensable element of earth's life support system. They control a vast majority of ecological processes - hydrological cycle, global nutrient cycle, climate pattern - to name a few and are also a trove of important resources. They provide us food from fishes, molluscs, crustaceans, mammals, edible seaweeds and salt to flavor the food as well as to preserve substances. The oceans are the source of number of minerals, precious materials like pearl, red coral and sea ivory and offshore oil deposits - the most valuable ocean resource in present times. The ocean beds carry submarine pipelines and cables. And of course, the surface of the oceans are used for transportation and for thousands of year, they have been our conduit of trade and commerce.

Globally, ocean ecosystems have been calculated to provide ecosystem goods and services worth some USD 21 trillion annually^[1]. But whether they will continue to provide these critical resources and services to sustain lives in the future remains a question as they face a multitude of threats, unprecedented in history. Commercial fishing has depleted stocks in coastal waters. Mining and dredging have altered or completely destroyed natural landscapes. The pressures of developmental and recreational activities have degraded shores and coastal waters. Landfills and wastes have covered wetlands. The situation aptly described by pioneer marine biologist Rachel Carson in her 1951 book *The Sea Around Us*:

“It is a curious situation that the sea, from which life first arose should now be threatened by the activities of one form of that life. But the sea, though changed in a sinister way, will continue to exist, the threat is rather to life itself.”

This paper examines the various threats to marine environment, with a special focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The paper argues as to why ecological deterioration in the region should be treated as a serious issue that threatens international security and ultimately human lives.

The Indo-Pacific and its Ecological Significance

The Indo-Pacific (also known as Indo-West Pacific) is a biogeographic region, comprising of the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Ocean and the seas connecting the two. It extends longitudinally more than halfway around the world and through more than 60 degrees of latitude. It encompasses 3 marine realms - the Western, Central and Eastern Indo-Pacific, comprising of 78 ecoregions.^[2] This enormous marine space, stretching from the Horn of Africa, through the Iranian plateau, the Arabian Sea, the Indian subcontinent, the Bay of Bengal, the Indonesian archipelago and all the way up to the volcanic islands of the central Pacific is seen as strategic centre based on current demographic and economic trends.

Table 1. Realms, Provinces and Ecoregions in the Indo-Pacific Biogeographic Region

| Western Indo-Pacific | Central Indo-Pacific |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Red Sea and Gulf of Aden | 14. South China Sea |
| 1. Northern and Central Red Sea | 39. Gulf of Tonkin |
| 2. Southern Red Sea | 40. Southern China |
| 3. Gulf of Aden | 41. South China Sea Oceanic Islands |
| 2. Somali/Arabian | 15. Sunda Shelf |
| 5. Arabian (Persian) Gulf | 42. Gulf of Thailand |
| 6. Gulf of Oman | 43. Southern Vietnam |
| 7. Western Arabian Sea | 44. Sunda Shelf/Java Sea |
| 8. Central Somali Coast | 45. Malacca Strait |
| 3. Western Indian Ocean | 16. Java Transitional |
| 9. Northern Monsoon Current Coast | 46. Southern Java |
| 10. East African Coral Coast | 47. Cocos-Keeling/Christmas Island |
| 11. Seychelles | 17. South Kuroshio |
| 12. Cargados Carajos/Tromelin Island | 48. South Kuroshio |
| 13. Mascarene Islands | 18. Tropical Northwestern Pacific |

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14. Southeast Madagascar
15. Western and Northern Madagascar
16. Bight of Sofala/Swamp Coast
17. Delagoa
4. West and South Indian Shelf
18. Western India
19. South India and Sri Lanka
5. Central Indian Ocean Islands
20. Maldives
21. Chagos
6. Bay of Bengal
22. Eastern India
23. Northern Bay of Bengal
7. Andaman
24. Andaman and Nicobar Islands
25. Andaman Sea Coral Coast
26. Western Sumatra
- Eastern Indo-Pacific**
8. Hawaii
27. Hawaii
9. Marshall, Gilbert, and Ellis Islands
28. Marshall Islands
29. Gilbert/Ellis Island
10. Central Polynesia
30. Line Islands
31. Phoenix/Tokelau/Northern Cook Islands
32. Samoa Islands
11. Southeast Polynesia
33. Tuamotus
34. Rapa-Pitcairn
35. Southern Cook/Austral Islands
36. Society Islands
12. Marquesas
37. Marquesas
13. Easter Island
38. Easter Island
49. Ogasawara Islands
50. Mariana Islands
51. East Caroline Islands
52. West Caroline Islands
19. Western Coral Triangle
53. Palawan/North Borneo
54. Eastern Philippines
55. Sulawesi Sea/Makassar Strait
56. Halmahera
57. Papua
58. Banda Sea
59. Lesser Sunda
60. Northeast Sulawesi
20. Eastern Coral Triangle
61. Bismarck Sea
62. Solomon Archipelago
63. Solomon Sea
64. Southeast Papua New Guinea
21. Sahul Shelf
65. Gulf of Papua
66. Arafura Sea
67. Arnhem Coast to Gulf of Carpentaria
68. Bonaparte Coast
22. Northeast Australian Shelf
69. Torres Strait Northern Great Barrier Reef
70. Central and Southern Great Barrier Reef
23. Northwest Australian Shelf
71. Exmouth to Broome
72. Ningaloo
24. Tropical Southwestern Pacific
73. Tonga Islands
74. Fiji Islands
75. Vanuatu
76. New Caledonia
77. Coral Sea
25. Lord Howe and Norfolk Islands
78. Lord Howe and Norfolk Islands




Fig. 1. Area covered by the Indo-Pacific Biogeographic Region

Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pacific#mediaviewer/File:Indo-Pacific_biogeographic_region_map-en.png – Author : Eric Gaba

The Indo-Pacific is considered the “largest ecological system on earth”.^[3] The region possesses a variety of tropical and sub-tropical marine habitats ranging from shallow coastal seas to deep oceans. It is home to the highest concentration of marine biodiversity and endemism in the world and also supports the greatest extent and diversity of coral reefs, and mangrove forests found in any region of the globe.



Fig. 2. Global Distribution of Coral and Mangrove Diversity

Source: http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/distribution-of-coral-mangrove-and-seagrass-diversity_30dc#

The Indo-West Pacific supports over 40% of the world’s mangrove forests or 6 million ha.^[4] This includes the Sundarbans that are the largest contiguous mangrove forests in the world. The vast floodplains of New

Guinea also have extensive mangrove swamps. The diversity of mangroves in the Indo-Pacific is much greater than in the Atlantic-Caribbean-East Pacific region, with species diversity as high as 40-46.^[5]

Table 2. Number of Floral and Vertebrate Species in Mangrove Regions of the world

| Region and Subregion Area (sq.km.) | Mangrove General Species | Flora Mangrove | Flora – | Vertebrates |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|---------|-------------|
| Indo-West Pacific | 83,000 | | | 47 |
| East-Africa | 8000 | 8 | 9 | 1 |
| Indo-Malaysia | 60,000 | 17 | 39 | 22 |
| Australasia | 15,000 | 16 | 35 | 26 |
| Atlantic–Caribbean – Eastern Pacific | 68,000 | | | 22 |
| Eastern-Pacific | 12,000 | 4 | 7 | 9 |
| West Atlantic-Caribbean | 32,000 | 3 | 6 | 15 |
| West Africa | 24,000 | 3 | 5 | 1 |

Source : Luther, D.A., and Greenberg, R. , Mangroves: A Global Perspective on the evolution and conservation of their Terrestrial Vertebrates, Bioscience 59(7), 602-612.

The mangrove canopies of the Indo-Pacific harbour many invertebrate, fish, reptile, bird and mammal species. At some places they even represent the last refuge for a number of rare and endangered animals such as Proboscis monkey (*Nasalis larvatus*) in Borneo, the royal Bengal tiger (*Panthera tigris*) and the spotted deer (*Axis axis*) in the Sunderban mangrove in the Bay of Bengal, Manatees (*Trichechsu* spp.), Dugongs (*Dugong dugong*) and the Indo Pacific crocodile (*Crocodylus porosus*). Mangrove forests in the region have contributed significantly to the socio-economic development of the coastal communities, traditionally providing two important resources – fish and timber. A large number of commercially important fishes such as snapper, mullet, wrasse, parrotfish, etc. utilize the mangroves during all or part of their lives. In fact it has been estimated that 30% of the fish caught in Southeast Asia are supported by the mangroves in some way, a figure approaching 100% for highly mangrove dependent species including certain prawns.^[6] Beyond the economic aspect, the mangroves in many parts of Indo-Pacific form an integral part of their cultural heritage, spiritual beliefs and identity. For example, according to the legend of the Asmat people from Irian Jaya (West Papua, Indonesia), the creator carved

human-like figurines out of a mangrove root, which came to life when he played a drum out of a mangrove tree. In Kenya, shrines built in the mangrove forests are worshipped by local people. Such close connections with the mangrove can be incredibly important for individuals and communities and are impossible to value.

The Indo-Pacific region also consists of about 85% the world's coral reefs including Australia's Great Barrier Reef – the largest coral formations in the world.^[7] It is one of the two distinctive regions of coral reef development in the world, the other being the tropical western Atlantic. The marine diversity found here is far greater than in the Atlantic as illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3. Regional Patterns of Species Diversity in Coral Reefs and related ecosystems: Maximum diversity seen in the Indo-Pacific region in all species group

| Taxonomic Group Pacific | Indo-West Pacific | Eastern Atlantic | Western Atlantic | Eastern |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|
| Scleractinian Corals | 719 | 34 | 62 | - |
| Alcyonarian Corals | 690+ | 0 | 6 | - |
| Sponges (Genera) | 244 | - | 117 | - |
| Gastropods: | | | | |
| Cypraeidae | 178 | 24 | 6 | 9 |
| <i>Conus</i> | 316 | 30 | 57 | 22 |
| Bivalves | 2000 | 564 | 378 | 427 |
| Gastropods: | | | | |
| Cypraeidae | 178 | 24 | 6 | 9 |
| <i>Conus</i> | 316 | 30 | 57 | 22 |
| Crustaceans: | | | | |
| Stomatopods | 249 | 50 | 77 | 30 |
| Caridean shrimps | 91 | 28 | 41 | - |
| Echinoderms | 1200 | 208 | 148 | - |
| Fishes | 4000 | 650 | 1400 | 450 |
| Butterflyfish and Angelfish | 175 | 8 | 15 | 7 |
| Seagrasses | 34 | 7 | 9 | 2 |
| Mangroves | 59 | 13 | 11 | 7 |

Source: Spalding, M., Ravilious, C., and Green, E.P., World Atlas of Coral Reefs, University of California Press, 2001, pg.21.

In the Indo-Pacific region is also the Coral Triangle, considered the global epicenter of marine biodiversity. It is often referred to as the 'Amazon of the Seas' as it nurtures one-third of the world's coral reefs, 75% of known coral species, nearly 3,000 species of fish, half of the world's marine molluscs, 6 of the world's 7 marine turtle species and more than 22 species of marine mammals.^[8] The rich biodiversity found here can be attributed to the combination of light, high water temperature and strong nutrient rich currents occurring due to the collision of the Pacific and Indian oceans. The abundant resources of the triangle directly support the livelihood of 120 million people as well as benefitting millions of other worldwide. The total economic value of the fisheries in the Coral Triangle is estimated to be USD 2.4 billion^[9] The Coral Triangle is a tuna spawning ground and provides nursery grounds and migratory passage for southern bluefin, bigeye, yellowfin, skipjack and albacore tunas from the Indian, Southern and Pacific oceans – the source of most of the world's tuna catch. The triangle also supports USD 12 billion tourism industry.^[10]

The Indo-Pacific as a whole also represents one of the most important regions globally for fisheries and aquaculture production, with India, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Philippines being among the world's top producers. Fisheries contribute substantially to these economies. In Indonesia, for instance, fishing and aquaculture employs some 5.97 million people. The total value of Indonesia's fisheries exports was USD 3.6 billion.^[11] The fishing industry accounted for 21 percent of Indonesia's agricultural economy and 3 percent of national GDP.^[12] Fisheries also play a very important role in the food and nutrition. In many countries of the Indian Ocean such as Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh – to name a few – the inhabitants meet more than half of the animal protein in their diet from fish.^[13]

Besides marine biodiversity, the region is rich in marine mineral resources as well. Major oil and gas offshore fields are proved in the waters off the Gulf of Cambay, Martaban Gulf, Strait of Malacca, Java Sea, Gulf of Thailand, Timor Sea and South China Sea off Brunei. The ocean floor in some parts of Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific are littered with millions of tonnes of polymetallic polysulphides and polymetallic nodules that have high mineral content. Marine aggregates comprising sand, gravel and shell deposits are found extensively along the coasts of many Indo-Pacific coastal states.

However, there are other goods and services afforded by the coastal and marine ecosystems of the region are harder to quantify and value.

For example, the Indo-Pacific is universally recognized as a region with profound influence on global climate system. It receives the strongest levels of solar irradiances on the planet, affecting atmosphere and ocean circulation systems. The Indo-Pacific warm pool, in particular, is a key component of the planet's climate. It is in fact the largest body of warm water in the global oceans and as a result, the largest source of heat and moisture to the global atmosphere. Other important services include shoreline protection, nutrient cycling, sediment stabilisation, purification of pollutants, etc. Some recent studies suggest these services can be very valuable indeed. For example, water purification services provided by mangrove species in the Muthurajawela marsh in Sri Lanka are valued at more than 1.8 million USD per year.^[14]

Indo-Pacific in Peril: Multiple Threats and Major Challenges

But myriad human pressures increasingly threaten to degrade essential ecosystem resources and functions. Across the Indo-Pacific, coastal development for urban infrastructure, roads, buildings and aquaculture is damaging mangroves, coral reefs, wetlands and other habitats. In the following section, we look at the important issues threatening the marine ecosystems of the region.

Pollution

Industrial effluents, agricultural run offs and domestic sewage are often dumped into the ocean untreated. These release toxic substances including synthetic pesticides and heavy metals that impact marine life and communities far from its original source. Some of these chemicals can also get into animal and human fat, causing cancers, hormone and immune system disruptions. For instance, in the Persian Gulf, the growing rate of anthropogenic waste input has led to the bioaccumulation of as much as 3.9 ppm (dry weight) of methyl mercury in fishes.^[15] This level is much higher than what is safe for human consumption. Similarly, studies in estuaries of Bay of Bengal have revealed harmful metal concentration in commercially and nutritionally important fish species.^[16]

Harmful algal blooms in coastal waters are often associated with increasing quantities of nitrogen and phosphorous from nutrient-rich waste water. These nutrients increase the productivity of the ecosystems and cause rapid growth of algae and phytoplankton. Algal blooms prevent light from penetrating the water surface and also oxygen from being absorbed by organisms beneath them. Hypoxia events usually

follow algal blooms. The algae, phytoplankton and other organisms when they die sink to the seafloor to be decomposed by microbes. The decomposition process uses up almost all the oxygen available in the ecosystem, creating 'dead zones' where most aquatic organisms cannot survive. Dead zones diminish biological productivity by millions of tonnes across thousands of kilometers drastically reducing fish stocks. Roughly 500 coastal dead zones have been recorded around the world. In the Indian Ocean region alone there are a dozen of them.^[17]

Solid waste, especially synthetics and plastics, frequently find their way into the world's oceans. Waste such as plastic bags and bottles, aluminum cans, foam cups, packaging material, etc. found in the oceans and on beaches, are called marine debris. This is recognized as one of the world's most pervasive pollution problem affecting the marine environment.^[18] In 1997, it was estimated that a staggering 6.4 million tons of garbage reach the marine ecosystems every year.^[19] While a large percentage of this is said to sink to the ocean bed, much of it remain floating indefinitely accumulating in vast patches in open oceans corralled by swirling, wind driven currents known as gyres. Countless marine animals and birds become entangled in marine debris or ingest them. This causes them serious harm and often results in their deaths. Many areas of the Indo-Pacific are polluted with marine debris. One of the worst affected is Indonesia, where seafloor debris of upto 690,000 per sq.km., has been recorded. In Ambon Bay (eastern Indonesia), floating debris as per studies is greater than 4000 items /sq.km.^[20] The recent search for the missing Malaysian Airline 370 reiterated the presence of large amount of litter in the Indian Ocean including a garbage patch spread over 5 million sq.km. The patch is centered roughly halfway between Australia and Africa. The contents of the garbage patch circulate constantly riding the current known as the Indian Ocean gyre.

Another serious form of pollution in the Indo-Pacific occurs due to the spillage of crude oil from ships that transport this vital energy source round the world. The Indian and the Pacific oceans are the world's main medium for transportation of energy – primarily oil and gas from the Middle East and parts of Africa to regions of high demand comprising mainly of China, India, Japan and South Korea. For instance, the Strait of Malacca - the narrow waterway that connects the two oceans - is recognised as one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world that records over 60,000 vessels annually. About 15 million barrels per day of oil flows through the region, making it highly vulnerable to oil spill incidents.^[21] About 490 shipping accidents were reported in the strait

between 1988 and 1992 alone, resulting in considerable amount of oil spillage.^[22] Studies reveal that there are tar balls all along the coast from Langkawi to Johor and this has severely impacted the fragile ecosystem of the region, especially the corals and mangroves. Accidental oil spills are frequently reported across the Indo-Pacific, the most recent one being the spill in Sundarbans, Bangladesh when two oil tankers collided. The Guimaras oil spill in the Panay Gulf, Philippines in the year 2006 was one of the worst ones. About 200,000 litres of oil poured into the gulf adversely affecting marine sanctuaries and mangrove reserves and also the rich fishing grounds that supply most of the demand for the entire Philippines.

Ship breaking is another activity that significantly impacts coastal and marine environments. End-of-life vessels contain toxic materials like polychlorinated biphenyl, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, organotins like tributyl tin used in paints, PVC, heavy metals and other substance like halogens, waste oil and asbestos. A lot these get released into the environment, contaminating seawater, sediments and the air during ship dismantling. In the Indo-Pacific, South Asia is especially impacted by this activity. Almost 70% of all end-of-life vessels head to shipbreaking yards of the region – Alang and Sosiya in India, Sitakund (north of Chittagong city) in Bangladesh and Gadani (Karachi) in Pakistan. Ship breaking has wreaked havoc in these places. In December 2010, the World Bank reported widespread contamination of Chittagong's beaches with lead, mercury and oil.^[23] Besides contamination, the broader environment in proximity of the shipbreaking yard has also been affected. For example, ship breaking in Alang-Sosiya Ship Breaking Yard (ASSBY) led to a decline in biomass measured in terms of both abundance and diversity. There is almost no vegetation in the intertidal zone. Very low levels of phytoplanktons and zooplanktons are found here. The mangrove forests have been completely lost. An additional assault to the local environment comes from non-native invasive species that arrive in the ballast water.

Coastal Development and Loss of Natural Habitats

The coastal areas of the world constitute only 15% of the world inhabited land space. But nearly half of the world's population now lives within 200 km of the coastline. The coasts of Indo-Pacific are also densely populated. The bulk of population in many of the Indo-Pacific rim countries is coastal or near coastal. Indonesia and Vietnam are two typical examples. Of Indonesia's population of 200 million, 130 million live on the main island of Java, on just 7% of the country's land area.

Similarly, Vietnam's population is almost all, coastal. Population densities along the country's coastline average between 500-2000 people per sq.km^[24].

Such high concentration of people in coasts has produced many economic benefits, including urban and industrial development, improved transportation, revenue from tourism and increased food production. But the combined effects of booming population growth and economic and technological development are polluting and threatening the very ecosystems such as mangroves and corals that provide many benefits.

Mangroves forests, for instance, are disappearing fast from the coasts of Indo-Pacific. By conservative estimates, the Indo-Pacific region is experiencing an annual mangrove deforestation rate of 1%,^[25] the greatest drivers for the loss being direct conversion to aquaculture, agriculture and urban industrial or recreational spaces. In the Southeast Asia region, the loss has been particularly wide spread with more than 70% of the verdant landscape having been denuded.^[26] Aquaculture development has decimated vast areas in the Gulf of Thailand, Vietnam, Java, Kalimantan and Philippines since the 70s. The benefits of aquaculture have often been short-lived due to poor planning, with ponds being abandoned when pollution or disease take hold, leaving unproductive saline ponds and depleted coastal fisheries. A study in Panay Island in Philippines showed lower number of crabs and a complete lack of commercially valuable mud crabs in places where mangroves were degraded.^[27] The existence of mangrove ecosystems in the Indo-Pacific is also being threatened by ever growing cities and metropolises as well as tourism infrastructure. In India, 60,000 hectares of mangroves were completely destroyed to expand the city of Mumbai. Goa and Kerala lost significant mangrove cover to lure tourists. In Kerala, of the original 700 sq.km., only 50 sq.km. survive today. Even where mangroves remain, they are being degraded through over extraction of timber, overfishing, pollution and solid waste disposal.

Like the mangroves, the coral reefs of the Indo-Pacific have also been threatened by human pressure, largely by coastal development. The region's coral cover declined at the rate of 1% between 1987-2007 (loss equivalent to 1,553 sq.km) and at a rate of 2% between 1997 and 2003.^[28] There has been rampant destruction particularly in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia due to a variety of reasons. These include sedimentation, eutrophication, and careless tourism. Coral reefs are blasted to make way for ports or navigation. Live corals are removed

from reefs for use as bricks, road-fill or cement for new buildings. Corals are also sold as souvenirs to tourists. Overfishing in reefs affects the ecological balance of coral reef communities. In many places in the Coral Triangle, fish are being caught and shipped alive to high-end restaurants in Hong Kong and Singapore. They are caught using highly damaging practices such as blast-fishing, cyanide fishing and deep water trawling (dragging a fishing net along the sea bottom) negatively impact the corals. In addition anchors dropped from fishing vessels onto reefs can break and destroy colonies. Another method used in Philippines, called *muro-ami*, employs divers (typically young boys) who pound the reef with rocks /weight bags to startle fishes out of crevices. This method destroys about 17 sq.m. of coral cover per hectare per operation and on an average about 30 muro ami boats repeat the operation about 10 times a day.^[29]




Fig. 3. Loss of Coral in the Indo-Pacific between 1978 – 2003

Source: Bruno JF, Selig ER (2007) Regional decline of coral cover in the Indo-Pacific: timing, extent, and subregional comparisons. *PLoS One* 8:e711

Tourism in coastal areas also has huge impact on the coastal and marine environment. Massive influxes of tourists, often in relatively small area, add to the pollution, waste and water and food needs of the local population. This often puts enormous pressure on local infrastructure and habitats. For example, 85% of the 1.8 million people who visit Australia's Great Barrier Reef are concentrated in two areas, Cairns and the Whitsunday Island, which together have a human population of just 1,30,000. Tourists also disturbs marine organisms and their habitats / nesting sites.^[30]

Unsustainable Fishing

Across the world, commercial fishing is the primary human impact on oceans. The United Nations estimates that 80% of world fish stocks are fully exploited or overfished. The problem of overfishing has become so intense that food webs have been altered, often eliminating species at the top of the chain. Fisheries represent one of Indo-Pacific's most important assets, nourishing and providing livelihood to hundreds of millions. But overfishing is increasingly affecting this vital resource. Fish catches in the region have grown tremendously in recent decades. In the Indian Ocean, for instance, from less than 900,000 tonnes in 1950, capture fisheries rose to 11.3 tonnes in 2010.^[31] Though detailed catch data is inadequate in many areas to evaluate the health of stocks, signs of overfishing are being observed across the region. Tuna, shark fins, turtle products and reef fishes are particularly being taken out of water at unsustainable rate. They are caught before they have a chance to reproduce and sustain the size of their population in the wild. Across the Indo-Pacific, 79% of spawning aggregations of reef fish have stopped forming or are in decline.^[32] Beside economic losses, this could also lead to loss of jobs and a source of affordable proteins.




Fig. 3. Fig. 4. Landing of Tuna (all species) by all methods in countries of Southeast Asia between 1950-2002.

Source: http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/coraltriangle/problems/

There is also the problem of fisheries bycatch – non-target species

incidentally killed during fishing. In some areas such as the Coral Triangle, the impact of bycatch has been devastating: population of nesting marine turtles have declined by as much as 90%. Overfishing of sharks in fisheries targeting tuna has endangered many species. Such wasteful practices can have potentially catastrophic implications on food security if left unaddressed.

Illegal and unreported fishing is adding to the woes. Such activities occur at the expense of local fishers. For example, Somalia's 3,330 kms coastline (the longest in continental Africa) is plundered by foreign vessels which fish, mostly without license. According to a U.N. report, an estimated \$300 million worth of seafood is stolen from the country's coastline each year,^[33] thus illegally removing more protein from Somali waters than what is being delivered to Somalia in food aid and famine relief.

Climate Change

As with the terrestrial ecosystems, the oceans too are already experiencing the impacts of climate change. The current increase in global temperature of 0.7 degrees Celsius is disrupting life in the oceans. Projected impacts from global warming include rising sea levels, stronger and larger storms, temperature rise and acidification of surface waters. For the Indo-pacific coastal ecosystems and communities, the repercussions of these changes could be considerable, threatening the livelihood, health and welfare of millions of people.

It is projected that global warming will cause sea levels to rise by as much as 5 mm per year over the next 100 years. Rising sea levels threaten entire nations on low-lying islands in the Indo-Pacific region. The Republic of Maldives is an example. It a nation of nearly 400,000 people in the Indian Ocean off the southwest Indian coast. Being the flattest country in the world (2.3 meters at its maximum elevation), it faces the very real possibility of majority of its land area getting underwater by the end of this century. The 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, although unrelated to climate change highlighted the vulnerability of the country's infrastructure including the Male Airport to inundation. The Ganga-Brahmaputra delta, one of the most populated regions in the world, is another climate hot spot. More than 1 million people are likely to be directly affected by 2050 from risk through land loss and coastal erosion. Climate change may also expose the Indo-Pacific countries to stronger and more frequent weather events such as storms and cyclones.

Changes in ocean temperature directly affect the metabolism, behaviour and reproduction of marine species. The sex ratio of marine turtles as well as some fish and copepods is determined by temperature. Climate change could therefore skew sex ratios and threaten population survival. Warmer water temperature can also result in coral bleaching and death. When water is too warm, corals will expel the algae living in their tissue and supplying them with food. This often leads to the death of the coral, especially if the stress persists. In 1997-1998, coral reefs around the world experienced extensive bleaching. The bleaching was most severe in the Indian Ocean region with places like Seychelles losing about 90% of its coral cover. The event was coupled to a strong El Nino Southern Oscillation, an indication of the potential impact climate change induced warming on corals. The bleaching event had severe socio-economic repercussions. For instance, in the east African coast, a 30% loss of corals reduced tourism in Mombasa (and Zanzibar) and resulted in financial losses of about US\$ 12-18 million.^[34] The Solomon Island that lies within the Western Pacific Warm Pool is a climate hotspot with rising ocean temperature recognised as the primary threat in this region. Since 1995, ocean surface temperatures around the Solomon Islands have warmed by 0.3 – 0.8 degrees Celsius, making the corals more susceptible to bleaching and death. This is reducing the country's food security as the country is heavily reliant on fishes.

The oceans absorb large amounts of carbon dioxide, generated primarily by human activities. This triggers increase in seawater acidity, which in turn may alter water chemistry and affect the life cycles of many marine organisms. Ocean acidification negatively affects many organisms that produce calcium carbonate shells or skeleton like corals and shellfish. The highly valuable aquaculture food enterprises in East and South Asia may be affected.

Degradation of the Indo-Pacific as a threat to Security and Human Lives

Security defined almost exclusively in military terms was something we inherited from the 20th century – a period dominated by two world wars and the cold war. But the situation in which we find ourselves in present times pushes us to redefine security to include other issues such as poverty, infective diseases, human trafficking, climate vulnerability, etc. that potentially threaten human well-being and survival. One such non-traditional threat of the 21st century is the degradation of the oceans.

Being the largest marine biogeographical region, the Indo-Pacific is of immense importance to Asia and the world at large. As discussed in the previous sections, the region's fisheries contribute directly to the eradication of hunger and are especially important in small island developing states and poor coastal areas, where upto 90% of protein can come from marine resources. Occupations associated with fishing, aquaculture and tourism also help eradicate poverty by creating employment opportunities. The near-shore habitats of the region - mangroves and coral reefs protect shores from storm surges, hurricanes and tsunamis. The marine ecosystem also helps regulate climate and provide an abundance of other ecologically important services. In spite of all this, the degradation of the marine environment does not generate a sense of alarm as all of it happens far away in the sea, out of our sight.

The fact remains however that deterioration of the Indo-Pacific's marine environment would present Asia and the world at large with a range of daunting challenges, the pertinent ones – Food and Energy Security (being meeting the food and energy needs of people living in the rim countries and beyond), Environmental Security (protecting communities from coastal disasters) and Economic Security (livelihoods involving scarce marine resources). These challenges in turn could interact with a host of other factors like population growth and poor governance leading to regional instability, terrorism and armed conflicts.

The region is already facing a number of conflicts over access to fishing grounds, especially in contested areas (dubbed as fishing wars). The India-Lanka fishing dispute, Indonesia–Malaysia conflicts and the Scarborough Shoal standoff are the well-known ones. These disputes are often, if not always be connected to one important factor – steady depletion of fish stocks. Another serious problem linked to decimation of fisheries and other natural resources is marine piracy. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of attacks on vessels in particular in the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and the Indian Ocean by pirates. Many of these pirates are believed to be poor, unemployed fishermen, who have been forced to find an alternate way of earning a living as their fishing grounds get overfished by large fishing firms (especially the ones that operate illegally). Similarly, sea level rise coupled with natural disasters is likely to fuel mass emigration of millions of people in the region. Such displaced and marginalised refugee population may become a breeding ground for recruitment for extremists and radicals.

Thus, disrupting the Indo-Pacific marine environment will have not only hamper socio-economic progress of the region, but also pose serious threats to human lives. It is time we pay heed to this warning. We need to adopt methods like of sustainable fishing, protection of marine habitats and stricter enforcement of rule towards waste management in order to preserve and protect this wealth in our own selfish interest. We need to save the oceans, to save ourselves! As John F. Kennedy had said- “*We are tied to the ocean.*”^[35]

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SLOCS Safety – Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific

Ajay Sood and Jai Kishan Chawla

Introduction

Indo-Pacific is a relatively new term which over the last few years is being used interchangeably with 'Asia-Pacific' amongst policy makers, strategic thinkers and think tanks. This highlights the unique geo-strategic relevance of Indian Ocean within the Asia-Pacific region. The phraseological fusion 'Indo-Pacific' signifies the metamorphosis of two vibrant regions into a singular 'geo-political' entity, with a strong maritime character blended by the Indian and Pacific Oceans.^[1] As a potential canvas for global power rivalries and home to present and perhaps future leaders of world economy, the region is set to dominate this century's geo-politics. The significant geo-political and strategic importance, regionally for Asia as well globally, is not a construct that should be left ambivalent and needs to be proactively addressed to evolve cohesive and productive results for all the actors involved.

The Indo-Pacific region has a wide geographical spread, spanning three major continents and cumulatively encompassing nearly half the humanity. Eastern Africa, Middle East, Indian sub-continent, South East Asia, East Asia and Oceania constitute the sub systems which form the larger geo-political Indo-Pacific construct. Over millennia, these constituent sub systems have interacted and transacted in numerous ways, influencing civilizations, political and economic attributes of one another. It is significant to mention that it is the maritime medium which has principally facilitated such interactions, primarily due to the connectivity in transportation and trade. The region is also home to three large economies of the world i.e. China, India and Japan and is net worked by some of the busiest sea lanes of the world. Maritime trade traversing through the sea lanes or passing through the choke points is the back bone of international commerce and vital for the economic sustenance of the world. The freedom of navigation and rightful use of the "Global Commons" for maritime economic activities are fundamental for the common good of the region. Upholding the principles of 'freedom of navigation' and 'unimpeded lawful commerce'

are integral to primary considerations for development, security and enhancing cooperation in the region. The intense maritime activity in the Indo-Pacific, while affording means for fulfilling aspirations of the region, puts forth an associated array of challenges, which need to be addressed collectively by all the contenders.

Major Slocs Of The Region And Choke Points

The growing dependence on natural resource flows and commerce linking producers and consumers’ pan-Indo Pacific ranging from Middle East and Eastern Africa to Far East Asia, the maritime distribution and supply chain matrix binds the region tightly. The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) are a term describing the primary maritime routes between ports, used for trade, logistics and naval forces. These are the key maritime routes that facilitate heavy shipping traffic volume including transportation of key maritime trades such as crude oil. The major SLOC network of the Indo-Pacific region, primarily in terms of crude oil transportation may be considered as shows:




Fig.1 SLOC network in Indo Pacific region [2]

The two routes from Indian Ocean to Far East primarily are characterized by the depth of water available and category of vessels passing through. The very large crude carriers (VLCC) (180-300 thousand tonnes) pass through the Malacca straits, but the deeper draft ultra large crude carriers (ULCC) take the route via Lombok strait, then transit through the waters of Indonesia. The SLOCs in the region feature multiple narrow passages or ‘choke-points’ necessitating additional safety and security concerns. Any incident in these choke points can result in disruption to shipping traffic impacting economic interest of littoral states and international trade. More than 80% of the world’s seaborne trade in oil passes through the following Indian Ocean chokepoints:

- (a) The Strait of Hormuz, located between Iran and Oman accounts for 90% of oil exported from the Persian Gulf by tankers, primarily destined for Asia, Western Europe and United States.
- (b) Malacca strait located between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore,

accounts for about 35% of global seaborne trade and is the shortest sea borne route between China and Japan and the Persian Gulf oil suppliers.

If the straits were blocked, almost half of world's fleet would need to reroute through the Sunda or Lombok Strait.[3]

- (c) Bad-EL-Mandab, a choke pint between Djibouti, Eretria and Yemen links the Mediterranean sea and Indian Ocean via the Red sea and Suez canal and accounts for approximately 8% of global seaborne oil trade.[4]

Maritime Security and SLOC Safety

Maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region is a subject involving limits of maritime jurisdiction, unresolved and disputed maritime boundaries, disputes over islands, SLOCs and archipelagic sea lanes, non-traditional maritime security challenges and issues related to long term sea bed management. The major considerations may include traditional security and military conflicts, economic, energy, resource and environmental security including climate change and nuclear energy management considerations of the nations of the region. The Chinese territorial claims over South China Sea, disputes over Paracel and Spratly Islands, Naval arms build-up in the region, China-Taiwan disputes, presence of extra regional powers etc. are the challenges the nations of the region need to contend and achieve solutions for the benefit of one and all. The maritime security challenges of Indo-Pacific region are a vast area of study and safety concerns in consonance with the topic further considerations are towards asymmetric challenges and concerns of SLOC safety.

Piracy And Armed Robbery

The menace of piracy has existed ever since the history of maritime trade and is not a new challenge to the mariners of the Indo-Pacific region. It is the modus operandi, the reach and the capabilities of the modern day pirates, necessitating demarking of large high risk areas and hot spots in the Indo-Pacific region. Over a decade ago, the epicentre of piracy was in south-east Asia but more recently it shifted to off Somalia and further extending over a large area along the East African Coast and Arabian sea.

Early in the decade, a flotilla of about 50 warships and auxiliary vessels drawn from 28 states were deployed in the region on anti-piracy

operations, primarily along the internationally recognized transit corridor and off the east Somali coast. In the interim Somali piracy incidents were reported off Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands, far from the Somali High Risk Area and well within Indian waters. The robust action by Indian maritime forces in sinking pirate mother ships has been effective and new piracy cases have not been reported in these waters. A sustained international cooperative effort by deploying Naval warships off the Somali coast has been able to only contain and not eliminate piracy off the Somali Coast. Like the allegorical mutant hydra, piracy tends to emerge in new forms and manifests itself in vulnerable by lucrative sea areas, like the reporting of new incidents off the west coast of Africa. The inability of a large Naval presence in high risk areas to secure safety from incidents of piracy, has necessitated the merchant vessels to implement own anti-piracy measures which include risk avoidance through circumventing risk areas and anti-boarding measures like water cannons etc.

Armed Private Security

The inability of the Naval forces and such other measures devised in eliminating the incidents of piracy, the ship owners and charterers have started hiring armed private security teams. The use of private armed security guards to protect vessels transiting through high risk areas in Indo Pacific region is driven by the inability of naval forces to provide sufficient protections as also the insurance companies refuse war risk covers without armed security teams embarked. However though a very proactive risk mitigation stance, the practice raises concerns for the safety of the crew on-board, given the availability of weapons and presence of armed men on-board. Further, once the presence of armed security is acknowledged in the risk matrix of the pirates, the likelihood of escalation of fire power by the pirates is an eventuality. Deterrence is not risk free and policy makers need to give due consideration to presence of private armed guards on-board when considering legal and jurisdictional aspects.

Regional Co-operation agreement on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP)

A nautical manifestation of robbery, piracy has now transmuted into a web of criminal operations funded through high ransoms including terror. It is also highly probable that the high ransom earnings from piracy, fuel other criminal activities including terror. India is a signatory to the Regional Co-operation agreement on combating piracy and Armed

Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which is the first multinational Government to government agreement to enhance the security in the regional waters. The ReCAAP agreement came into force on 04 Sep 2006 and India is one of initial 10 contracting parties who have ratified the agreement. The Director General, Indian Coast Guard is the ex-officio Indian Governor and was also the first Vice Chairperson of the ReCAAP Governing Council.

Maritime Terrorism

The Indo-Pacific region, more specifically the Middle East Asia, has witnessed a changing nature and texture of maritime terror. The weakening of Al Qaeda has reduced their operational maritime capability, but not its aspirations and it may be assumed that they would rely on their affiliates to conduct operations. The restricted operational space ashore due to heightened activity by the security agencies has led the terror operatives to shift focus on the maritime domain as an alternate venue for high profile attacks. The Abdullah Azzam Brigade (AAB) attack on the Japanese VLCC in Jul 2010 demonstrated their capability in the Persian Gulf and indicates recognition of the criticality of maritime sector and the vulnerability of the maritime infrastructure. Al Qaeda is known to have strong links with pirates and alliance with an affiliate, Al Shabab in Yemen on the other side of Gulf. Islamists have used pirates to bring in weapons and in return have trained and armed the pirates. Al Shabab is known to have provided funds to train a 480 strong force to create a maritime wing. Their ability to attack vessels cannot be discounted particularly those ships calling at Yemini ports or transiting close to the coastline. A declared intent to implement maritime operations in Gulf of Aden and greater operational congruence among Al Qaeda and Al Shabab may include maritime attack dimension in the Bab Al Mandeb, Gulf of Aden or Horn of Africa.[5] The increased likelihood of these attacks depends on lessening of pressure on land, focused maritime capability and determination of Al Shabab's operatives. Thus the threat of maritime terrorism in this region can be addressed through sustained pressure on these terror groups on land through international cooperation and initiatives.

Illicit Trafficking by sea

Apart from piracy, the Indo-Pacific region is also prove to other asymmetric challenges such as drug trafficking, illegal arms trade and human trafficking all having significant ramifications on regional

security. The sustained trafficking of illicit narcotics, weapons and people within and through the region arises from abundant availability of the commodities, insecure entry/exit points, unpatrolled/ monitored coast lines and the demographic environment of many a nations of the region.

Narcotics Trafficking

The two main opium production areas of the world viz. the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent are located in the region and though a major volume is trafficked over land routes, the movement by the maritime routes is also significant. The major illicit narcotics trafficked in the region include heroine / opiates, amphetamine stimulates and cannabis. Other than the productions in the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent, countries like Indonesia, Australia and India are also key source countries for illicit narcotics. The ports of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India and Iran are the potential points of maritime departure and transshipment of the contraband.

Small Arms & Light Weapons Trafficking

The political and democratic instability in many nations of the region, insurgency and separatist movements, disputed boundaries etc. are the potential cause for high trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the region. The Islamist separatists / terror groups in the Middle East, the instability in Somalia, Naxalism in the Indian sub continent, Junta regime in Myanmar and similar factions of insurgents, separatist factions and terrorism envelop almost the entire Indo-Pacific region. The flow of the illicit weapons and ammunitions in the region follows the logic of supply and demand, moving from surplus sources to areas of conflict to fuel insurgency and terror activities.

Human Trafficking

There are numerous source and destination countries for illicitly trafficked people in the Indo - Pacific region - be it the Somalis in Yemen or the Bangladesh migrants across the border into India. The recent reported instances of North Sri Lankan Tamils taking maritime route to seek refuge in Australia and Oceania reinforce the growing trends of these movements. In addition to the significant ramification to the area demography, the danger of loss of life at sea and abuse of the trafficked people by organized criminal mafia.

Ajay Sood and Jai Kishan Chawla

| | Narcotics | | | Small arms & light weapons | Human |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|
| | Opiates | ATS | Cannabis | | |
| Key Source countries | Afghanistan, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam | Australia, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Africa, Thailand | Afghanistan, India, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka | Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen, Thailand | Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Yemen |
| Points of Departure (Ports, Harbours Coastlines) | Pakistan (Karachi, Gwadar, Port MBQ); Iran (Bandar Abbas Charbahar, Jask) | Bangladesh (Chittagong); India(Mumbai, Chennai); Indonesia (Jakarta); Iran(Bandar Abbas, Charbahar, Jask); South Africa(Durban) | Pakistan (Karachi, Gwadar, Port MBQ); Iran (Bandar Abbas Charbahar, Jask) | Iran (Bandar Abbas Charbahar, Jask); Yemen (Hodeidah, Aden) | Djibouti, Somalia (Basasso, Berbera); Eritrea (Massawa, Aseb, and Sudan (Port Sudan) |
| Transshipment Modes | India (Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Kochi), Kenya (Mombassa) Mozambique (Nacala Porto, Pemba, Maputo); Oman (Salalah, Muscat); South Africa (Durban), Tanzania (Dares Salaam); UAE (Jebel Ali) | India(Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Kochi), Kenya (Mombassa) Mozambique (Nacala Porto,Pemba, Maputo); Oman (Salalah, Muscat); South Africa (Durban), Tanzania (Dares Salaam); UAE (Jebel Ali) | India (Mumbai, Chennai); Kenya(Mombassa) Mozambique (Maputo); Somalia (Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bøaso); South Africa (Durban), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam); AE(Jebel Ali); Eritrea (Seb (Massawa,); and Sudan (Port Sudan) | India (Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Kochi), Kenya (Mombassa) Oman (Salalah, Muscat); South Africa (Durban), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam); UAE, Yemen (Hodeidah, Mocha, red sea coast, Hanish, Island group) | |
| Means of Transportation (Vessel Type) | Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go-fast boats | Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go-fast boats | Container vessels (TEUs),Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go fast boats | Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go fast boats | Container vessels (TEUs), Dhows, Fishing vessels, General cargo vessels, Go fast boats |
| Sea Transportation routes | Malacca Babel Mandeb, Suez Malacca Durban, Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Sir Lanka/ Malacca Persian Gulf Suez | Malacca Babel Mandeb, Suez Malacca Durban, Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Sir Lanka/Malacca Persian Gulf Suez Singapore SE China/ Tiwan/Japan Western Australia Sunda Strait | Malacca Babel Mandeb, Suez Malacca Durban, Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Sir Lanka/ Malacca Persian Gulf Suez Singapore SE China/Tiwan/Japan Western Australia Sunda Strait | Malacca Babel Mandeb, Suez Malacca Durban, Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Sir Lanka/Malacca Persian Gulf Suez Singapore SE China/Tiwan/Japan Western Australia Sunda Strait | Malacca Babel Mandeb, Suez Malacca Durban, Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Cape Agulhas Persian Gulf Sir Lanka/Malacca Persian Gulf Suez Singapore SE China/Tiwan/Japan Western Australia Sunda Strait |
| Destination Ports | Major European Ports | | Major European Ports | Somalia (Kismayo, Mogadishu, Haradhere, Bøaso); Yemen (Hodeidah, Aden); Eritrea (Massawa, Aseb); Sudan (Port Sudan); Gaza/Lebanon and Syria (via Suez) | Bahmin, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen |

Fig 2. Maritime Trafficking in the Indian Ocean Region. [6]

Response to Illicit Trafficking

When assessing illicit trafficking within and via a maritime space, six key features are required as shown in the table below:

Interdiction and seizure of narcotics and weapons including other contraband commodities being trafficked by sea depends on timely specific intelligence, capacity of interception at sea and effective screening at exit /entry and transshipment points. The reliability of effective cargo screening at point of export, transshipment and entry points is not high depending on reliability of screeners, ill-equipped ports, remote locations etc. Thus, meaningful intelligence, deterrence and at sea interdiction is the most viable option for the maritime law enforcement agencies. It is pertinent to mention that nations or the capacity of their maritime forces in the region for interception at sea remains a critical salient feature towards combating these threats. In regards to human trafficking, the largest concern is trafficking by organized criminal groups from Africa across Gulf of Aden and Red Sea for the Arabian Peninsula. Similar situations, though to a somewhat lesser extent, extends across the Indi-Pacific region. The points of departure, routings and drop destinations for trafficking persons have been studied and known to the enforcement agencies. However given the limited capacities / deployment of available assets for counter piracy operations and maritime anti-terrorism operations, the nations of the region have little or no spare capacity for human trafficking interdiction. This security concern is best tackled at the ports of departure than at sea, though the challenge is substantial considering the smaller trafficking craft leave from small remote ports and unpatrolled coastlines.

The other transnational/asymmetric domains that need a mention include the illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) and the growing offshore exploration industry. Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) is a growing threat, both to the species of fish as well as economics of states and impact of illegal, unregulated and unreported IUU on the coastal populations of these nations, dependent on fishing and maritime activities, for their livelihood is an area of concern seeking early attention. The offshore exploration and production for oil and gas is rapidly increasing along the Africa's East Coast, Indian sub- continent, Oceania and south China seas. As this industry expands, infrastructure, port facilities and shipping vessels will be vulnerable targets for armed robbery, piracy, kidnappings and sabotage for a range of actors including pirates, organized criminal gangs, terrorists and insurgent groups.

Natural and Manmade Disasters

Indo-Pacific region is the locus of natural disaster, with the Indian Ocean Region alone accounting for about 70% of them. The area is prove to natural disasters including cyclones / typhoons, Tsunamis Floods, Earthquakes etc. The large shipping density in the regions also makes prove to conventional accidents arising out of navigational errors viz. collisions, grounding etc. as well to issues pertaining to sea worthiness of vessels operating in these seas. The effects of natural and manmade calamities are further aggravated by the fragile socio- economic conditions in most of the littoral nations. Cyclone Phailin and Hud Hud, which severely impacted the East Coast of India and Typhoon Haiyan, which caused extensive damages in Philippines, tested the nation's capacities to the core. The maritime pollution and oil related environmental effects due to the Natural and manmade disasters are also a big threat. The maritime pollution and oil related environmental disasters can create havoc with the marine ecology, impacting the free flow of shipping and trade. Ports and regions affected by such disasters.

Regional Initiatives : Indian Coast Guard

Every state has an obligation to contribute to maritime security and safety of the SLOCS, wherever common interests are concerned. However given the vast expanse of the oceans and the multitude challenges, individual states or actors cannot ensure security and safety of the global commons, concurrently, the diversity in the capabilities of individual nations to address challenges also makes a strong case for co-operative and collective solutions to such common concerns.

The Indian Coast Guard in Nov 1999 created a history of its kind wherein it apprehended a pirated ship along with pirates at high seas for the first time in the last century. MV Alondra Rainbow, a Japanese owned bulk carrier was then restored to its owners. This paved way for new vistas of co-operations among Coast Guards in the Indi Pacific regions. Since then we have entered into Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with Japan Coast Guard, Korea Coast Guard now marine police and a working understanding with Coast Guards of Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Mauritius. We have also entered into a MoU with Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and have a hot line between the two Director Generals who speak to each other on as required basis otherwise on every Wednesday. There have also been exchange visits between the two heads of service. The Indo-US Coast Guard cooperation

is historical as Indian Coast Guard is patterned on the US model. A large number of Indian Coast Guard personnel undergo training at United States Coast Guard Training Establishments. United States Coast Guard Marine Training Team regularly visits India for conducting training capsules. United States Coast Guard Cutters have also visited India on few occasions exercises and for interactions. There have also been exchanges of high level delegations between the two nations.

Indian Coast Guard have conducted two International Search and Rescue Conferences in past decade besides hosting bi-annual Search and Rescue Exercises to enhance co-operation among the littoral countries and are in continuous endeavour to harmonize the Indian SAR organisations capability with other resource agencies to handle high-sea SAR incidents in the Region. As recent as Mar 2014 Indian Coast Guard organised a Search and Rescue Workshop and Exercises (SAREX-14) at Mumbai. A total of 21 international observers from 10 maritime nations witnessed the exercise.

These initiatives became inevitable, as the seas in the region are now the setting for some of world's most perplexing problems of maritime management and jurisdiction. These regions have complex maritime geography with many islands and archipelagos, narrow straits and shipping channels with numerous overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction, and few agreed maritime boundaries. Uses of the sea are particularly intense with high levels of shipping traffic and resource exploitation. Southeast Asia in particular has become notorious for piracy and other problems of law and order at sea, including drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and human/arms smuggling. Wilful acts of marine pollution and the destruction of marine habitats are common. It is therefore logically felt that the Maritime cooperation is the only essential component that contributes towards effective management of region seas, especially marine environmental protection, marine safety, resource management, and preventing illegal activity at sea. Therefore, the Coast Guard to Coast Guard cooperation which precludes the possible arms race is an alternative, which the policy makers and the think tank may consider for a cost effective maritime management system in Indo- Pacific Region.

Conclusion

The focus must therefore remain on promoting mutual understanding and cooperation to overcome common security challenges. Bilateral and multilateral interactions between nations of Indo- Pacific must be

aligned to establish international arrangements aimed at peace, co-existence and development, underpinned by respect for sovereignty, mutual trust and dialogues. The nations and all constituent actors in the region need to synergise assets and capacities to ensure safety of the SLOCs.

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Maritime Dispute in the East China Sea and its Impact on Regional Security

Joshy M. Paul

Introduction

East Asian security is significantly dependent on the resolution of maritime disputes in the East China Sea. The territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between Japan and China encompasses many manifestations, including issues of economic development, maritime security, energy lifelines, sovereignty and ambition for regional hegemony. Historical animosities and regional power politics do complicate the matter further. The East China Sea region is endowed with abundant natural resources, especially oil and gas, so much so that no disputing party is willing to give up its claims over this repository of hydrocarbons. More than two-thirds of the oil and gas in this region has not been exploited because of the ownership dispute between Japan and China over these islands as the total distance between the landmass of the two countries is not wider than 400 nm across at any point. China and Japan have not shown much interest in arriving at a compromise. Instead, at times, they have showed belligerence over this issue, especially China. Importantly, China has resolved 17 of its 23 territorial disputes in a conciliatory manner since 1949, except its dispute with India over Himalayan border and Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China, along with East China Sea. In this regard, the East China Sea dispute is not just a regional security issue but has wider ramifications concerning larger Asian security.

Although the countries in the region are economically integrated by virtue of trade and investment, the tensions among them today over a handful of islets in the East China Sea show no signs of abating. In fact, so tense is the situation over ownership of the territories between Japan and China that some analysts fear an outbreak of war. Although such a view may still be in the minority, friction between two of Asia's biggest powers is undoubtedly posing a threat to the Asia-Pacific region at

large. Moreover, U.S. commitment to its security alliance with Japan has increased concerns that mounting friction between China and Japan could have global implications. Ownership of the five uninhabited islands located west of Japan's Okinawa islands and east of China, came into the public limelight following the discovery of petroleum reserves in 1968. Still, sovereignty of the territories did not capture public attention on both sides until a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels in September 2010. Prior to that Chinese Government vessels frequently intruded into the Japanese controlled disputed territory enhancing Beijing claim over the entire area. Amid the trawler crisis, China lodged solemn representations to Japan that the islands have been part of Chinese territory since ancient times and should stop "so-called law enforcement activities in the adjacent borders" of China^[1]. Since then, neither side has been able to agree on the ownership of the islands, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. Chinese protests heated up further when the Japanese government purchased three of the five islands for \$26.2 million from its private owners in September 2012^[2].

Indeed, the conflict between China and Japan is not just rights over fishing and natural resources, because around four decades ago the oil and gas discoveries were made, while tensions were precipitate at that time. It is more as a corollary of China's rapid economic expansion which has led to a surge in patriotism as well as militarization in recent years. In the case of Japan, there is ever-growing fear of losing its position as an Asian power, and worries about its foothold in the international community slipping away. In both cases, claims to the disputed islands have become a point of rallying patriotism and reinforcing national identity. At the same time, if the claim over ownership spirals into a military showdown, then naturally US will be involved in the dispute as Tokyo is a security partner and Washington is rebalancing its military capabilities toward the Asia-Pacific. President Barack Obama told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at a meeting in February 2013 that "the U.S.-Japan alliance is the central foundation for our regional security and so much of what we do in the Pacific region."^[3] Since Japan remains the single most important, reliable U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region, US can not shy away from making its commitment to Japan. Similarly, Taiwan too is a player in the territorial dispute, as it claims the islands were one of its provinces for centuries until 1895, following the end of the Sino-Japanese war. Interestingly, Beijing supports Taipei's claim, and has argued that since Taiwan is part of China, the islands too are part of China.

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are a group of eight uninhabited islets and rocks in the East China Sea, about 125 miles northeast of Taiwan and 185 miles southwest of Okinawa, Japan. According to estimates based on a geological survey, they are believed to contain 80-100 billion barrels (bbl) of oil reserves, but no test wells have actually been drilled in the disputed area. As a result, there is no actual evidence about the commercially exploitable hydrocarbon reserves^[4]. Both Japan and China claim sovereignty over these islands, as they are situated within the area of continental shelves and 200 nautical miles (nm) exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of both countries. Physical possession of the islets could mean sovereignty over 11,700 sq. nm of the continental shelf^[5]. As per international law and conventions, each country can claim sovereign rights over the surrounding seabed area up to a defined limit. According to Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982:

“... a coastal state can claim an EEZ to a distance of 200 nm from baselines or to the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, up to 350 nm.”^[6]

China’s claim to the islands consists of the following four main arguments: (i) Geographically, the Diaoyu Islands are situated on the edge of the East China Sea continental shelf, which is contiguous to the Chinese mainland and Taiwan; (ii) China claims “prior discovery” use, and ‘ownership’ of the islands as it had not only discovered but also administered the islands since the 14th century, which is mentioned in the documents of the Ming Dynasty^[7]; (iii) China points to Japan’s earlier acknowledgment of the former’s claim to the islands; and (iv) China asserts that Japan annexed the islands through the Shimonoseki Agreement of 1895 and, therefore, should be ceded the islands back to China after WWII, as stipulated by the Cairo Declaration.

When the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into existence in 1982, it superseded previously existing customary international law relating to freedom of navigation. With the existence of UNCLOS, countries are locked horns over various articles prescribed to deal with freedom of navigation and economic right. Indeed “freedom of the seas” has been replaced by “freedom of the high seas,” which has been classified in six kinds in the Article 87 of UNCLOS. Relating to navigation at sea, the basic principle now is “freedom of navigation” but not “freedom of the seas,” as per UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS, China

holds that it provides freedom only for the high seas, not for freedom of the seas in general. China further maintains that the Diaoyu islands are small, uninhabited, and cannot sustain economic life of their own. Therefore, UNCLOS is not entitled to generate a continental shelf or a 200 nm EEZ^[8].

Japan claims that the median line should be where the two 200 nm claims intersect; however, China claims a full 350 nm from its coastline. Tokyo argues that they are legal islands and, therefore, are entitled to have continental shelves and EEZs. Besides, it uses them as base points for its continental shelf and EEZ claims in the East China Sea. The parties to the dispute have put forward different principles of international law to support their claims. China uses the principle of “natural prolongation” of the land territory to argue that the East China Sea continental shelf is the natural extension of its continental territory, thereby providing its “inviolable sovereignty over this continental shelf”^[9]. Taiwan argues that the Okinawa Trough delineates the edge of the continental margin and that the axis of the Trough, thus, serves as the boundary between the continental shelves of both China and Japan. But Japan says the Trough is just an incidental depression in a continuous continental margin between the two countries and, thus, the continental shelf boundary should be equidistant between the undisputed territories of the two countries.

Japan rejects China’s “natural prolongation” thesis and has drawn a hypothetical median line separating the two countries but overlapping the 200 nm EEZ. Japan holds that there is no dispute over the sovereignty of the islands and argues that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are an integral part of Japanese territory.^[10] Japan took control of these islets under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. Until then, the islands were part of the Ryukyu Kingdom, which Japan annexed in 1879.^[11] The treaty sealed Japan’s victory over China, granting Japan money and land, including Taiwan. Prior to the Shimonoseki Treaty, there was no sign of Chinese suzerainty over the islands, which were incorporated to Japan as *terra nullius* a few months before China formally ceded Taiwan to Japan under the treaty^[12]. Japan considers that it acquired the islands through a Cabinet decision for performing a survey and erecting a marker on the islands in January 1895. And, China did not raise any objection over the subsequent peaceful and continuous exercise of jurisdiction over the islands by Japan till WWII. As per the Treaty, “the islands of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the island of Formosa” fall under Japanese control.^[13] The Diaoyu are not specifically mentioned anywhere in the treaty. However, China maintains that these islands

were part of the group belonging to Taiwan, a position that Japan disputes. Japanese suzerainty over the islands continued till the end of World War II (WWII). However, under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Taiwan was formally returned to China and under the Treaty of Taipei of 1952 between China and Japan, it was declared that all pre-1941 Sino-Japanese treaties, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, were null and void, while the Diaoyu Islands came under US control after WWII in pursuance of the UN trusteeship established under the San Francisco Treaty. During the US administration period (1951-1972), neither the Republic of China (RoC) (Taiwan) nor the PRC had protested the inclusion of the islands under the jurisdiction of the US administration. The issue of sovereignty emerged when the trusteeship ended in 1972 and the US declared its intention to return the area to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.^[14]

As per the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, the US returned “administrative rights” over the islands to Japan along with Okinawa in 1972, but refused to take a position on the sovereignty dispute.^[15] The US decision was, apparently made, to avoid offending either China or Japan and on the recognition that both sides had some basis for their claims. More importantly, it was during this period that the US administration initiated a rapprochement policy towards China and any decision in favour of Japan over the disputed island would have forestalled a healthy US-China relationship. However, China argues that the reversion of the islands to Japanese rule violated the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The Cairo Declaration stipulates that Japan must return all the Chinese territories it had annexed, while the Postdam Proclamation, which Japan accepted upon its surrender, called for the execution of the terms of the Cairo Declaration. Thus, China claims that the Diaoyu Islands should have reverted to Chinese rule. Conversely, Japan argues that the islands were not specifically mentioned in any of the treaties except the 1972 Okinawa Reversion Treaty.

The current conflict began when the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reportedly found natural gas reserves under the seabed around the islands in 1968. Japan was the first country to claim mining rights as these islands were under US trusteeship during that time. Japan held the view that the feature belonged to Okinawa owing to which it was not mandatory to communicate its claims to its neighbours. On 12 July 1970, however, Taiwan and the Gulf Oil Company signed a contract for the exploration and exploitation of oil resources in a specified area of the sea northeast of Taiwan, which

included the entire Senkaku area.^[16] Japan contested this on the basis that the island belonged to the Ryukyus and, therefore, implicitly belonged to Japan. The Japanese claim activated the PRC to announce its claim over the islands and all the adjacent seabed oil deposits on 4 December 1970.^[17] Thus, the dispute spiralled into a bilateral issue between Japan and PRC as the latter claims Taiwan to be its province, over which it has full sovereignty, and this naturally extends to natural resources embedded in the feature.

When Japan and People's Republic of China (PRC) established formal relationship in 1972, following U.S. President Richard Nixon's visit to PRC in 1971, they could not settle the matter. When the negotiation was undergoing to establish diplomatic relationship the Islands dispute was set aside for future deliberations. The Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping publically expressed in 1978 that the next generations would be wise enough to find good solutions satisfactory to all.^[18] China has insisted that there was a tacit agreement between Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Premier Zhou Enlai during the normalization talks to shelve the island issue^[19]. Beijing believes Tokyo has reversed its silence on the matter and publicly denied that such tacit agreement with PRC over the islands ever existed. In turn, Beijing views Japan's denial as a "complete breach of trust."

Japan declared its EEZ in 1996 and China in 1998, in accordance with the UNCLOS, though prior to that year, China had begun drilling oil and gas on its side of the "median line". On 13 February 2001, Japan and China agreed on a mutual prior notification system.^[20] However, they failed to mark a specific line in the sea beyond which advance notification is required. This agreement simply says that China is to give Japan at least two months notice when its research ships plan to enter waters "near Japan and in which Japan takes interest".^[21] Similarly, Japan is to inform China before its vessels enter waters 'near' China. The notice also has to specify the name of the organization conducting the research, the name and type of vessels involved, the concerned individuals, the details of the research such as its purpose and equipment to be used, the planned length of the survey, and the areas to be surveyed.

The Japanese drawn median line veers into the Chinese side of what is termed an 'equitable' line, which connects the middle points of the two shores. If the Chinese gain sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands, it would arguably enable them to claim the rights over the continental shelf plus the EEZ to the north and east of the islands. This would give China

exclusive economic rights to the whole southern portion of the East China Sea (that is south of the 30th parallel), which would include the Xihu Trough in its entirety (See Fig. 1).



Fig. 1: Senkaku/Diayu Islands and EEZ line claimed by Both China and Japan

Source: Deconstructing Japan's Claim of Sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol 10, Issue 53, No. 1, December 31, 2012. <http://japanfocus.org/site/view/3877#>

Based on known geological facts, Chinese petroleum officials believe that the most promising reserves lie on the eastern side of the continental shelf, that is, on the Japanese side. Chinese estimates of potential East China Sea gas reserves on the entire shelf range from 175 to 210 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in volume (Saudi Arabia has “proven and probable” gas reserves of 21.8 tcf and the United States (US) has 117.4 tcf).^[22] According to non-Chinese estimates, the potential oil reserves on the shelf are as high as 100 bbl (Saudi Arabia has “proven and probable” oil reserves of 261.7 bbl and the US has 22 bbl).

Regional security dynamics

Although both Japan and China are well connected through trade and investment, as China is the largest trading partner of Japan, politically they are wide apart. On the one hand, China is aspiring to become a global super power, and considers Japan its immediate challenger in its own backyard. On the other hand, Japan is an integral part of US led security system of East Asia, and the alliance system's primary purpose is to serve US pre-eminence in the region. China harbours

historical notion of “century of humiliation” by foreign powers, the most notable being Japan, for its Second World War atrocities. China uses its dispute with Japan to instigate nationalist sentiment – government allows only anti-Japan demonstrations to take place but not demonstrations for other reasons, not only to get support for the ruling Communist Party, but to garner wider endorsement for its foreign policy goal.

By the end of the previous century China has begun to assert in various issues concerning its security along with its ‘peaceful’ rise. China said that its rise would not affect the status-quo prevailing in the region, but its provocative action in various territorial disputes showed that its words and action do not match which make its intentions appear doubtful. Chinese naval ships have frequently passed through the disputed water as a sign of intimidation against Japan. The two countries have often come close to naval skirmishes in a bid to uphold their respective claims. For instance, Chinese marine scientific research and navy ships have been frequenting the area since 1998, causing great concern and consternation for Japan. Japan’s accusation is that the scientific research conducted by China in the Japanese EEZ area included collection of data for military purposes, which is against the spirit of UNCLOS. Japan found Chinese research vessels intruding into its claimed EEZ in the East China Sea on 16 occasions in 1998, 30 in 1999, and 24 in 2000.^[23] In May 2004, the conflict escalated when China started serious exploratory operations in the Chun Xiao gas field, only four kilometres from the “median line”. Subsequently, in November 2004, a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine intruded into Japanese waters near Okinawa for more than two hours, ostensibly by accident.^[24] In September 2005, the dispute turned dangerous when five Chinese naval vessels, including a guided missile destroyer, were observed near the Chun Xiao gas field and the destroyer aimed its guns at a Japanese Marine Self Defence Force (JMSDF) P3-C surveillance plane, which raised apprehensions about the Chinese intentions.^[25] Since the spring of 2005, the number of flights by Chinese military surveillance aircraft crossing into disputed airspace has risen to record levels. Japan suspects that the increasing activities of Chinese naval and research ships on the Japanese side of the “median line” would be a *fait accompli* that China can use to its advantage in defining the boundary of its own EEZ and its continental shelf. Japan is also concerned about the maritime security aspect because an East China Sea under Chinese control could interrupt the sea lane of communication (SLOC), as a majority of its oil tankers coming from the Middle East pass through this region.

Japan had also begun strengthened its efforts to reclaim its position on the islets. Japanese government authorised its companies to explore natural gas in the contested areas and Japan conveyed the same to China. In a similar fashion, Japan requested China to stop its exploration activities and also provide Japan with the exploration data. Subsequently, a working-level meeting was held between diplomats of both countries in which China again proposed joint development, while Japan insisted that prior to the joint effort, China must share the relevant data^[26]. Japan also argued that if China failed to provide the data, Japan would proceed independently to grant exploration rights. Eventually, Japanese Parliament members and business officials put pressure on the government to allow Japan companies to explore the natural resources in the disputed area and *Teikoku Sekiyu* became the first company to be awarded drilling rights in the disputed area in the East China Sea in 2005.^[27]

The bilateral relationship finally took a major turn towards a new stage of development, marked by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's ice-breaking visit to China in October 2006 and the subsequent Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's ice-melting journey to Japan. The two sides reached important common understandings, including accelerating consultation on the joint development of disputed territories in the East China Sea^[28]. However, the benign relationship did not last long. By 2007 Beijing had undertaken a variety of greater actions to reinforce and assert its claims, including increases in the numbers of vessels and frequency of patrols and training exercises near the disputed water, both in East China Sea and South China Seas. The situation aggravated in September 2010 when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol boats in waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands^[29]. The incident occurred about 12 kilometers northwest of the islands, and JSG ordered it to stop for inspection, but the Chinese trawler refused, and collided first with the *Yonakuni*, and then with the *Mizuki*, after a 40-minute chase^[30]. Subsequently, the JCG boarded the vessel, and detained the captain, Zhan Qixiong, and his crew and confiscated the trawler. The Japanese government declared that Chinese captain will be prosecuted under the Japanese domestic law for the crime of obstructing the JCG in performance of its duty. The Japanese arrest of the captain and his extended detention prompted a strong reaction in China. Some Chinese nationals vandalized shops of leading Japanese companies in China and a reported embargo of Chinese shipments of rare earth metals destined for Japanese ports only exacerbated the tensions. After two weeks of hectic diplomatic activity the captain was released, but China was not ready to budge in

the situation, rather it demanded Japan's apology, and for compensation to China for the damages incurred, which Japan rejected.^[31] China also released three of the four employees of Fujita Corporation detained in the Chinese officials, who were conducted a protest demonstration near a Chinese military base following the trawler incident. During the crisis, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the Senkaku Islands fell under the protection of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. So, even a small crisis emanating in the area is a major security challenge not only for the regional countries but for Washington as well.



The dispute exacerbated further when Japanese government, in July 2012, decided to purchase disputed islands from the private owner Kunioki Kurihara. Beijing immediately sent two maritime law enforcement ships to the islands, which belonged to the China Marine Surveillance commonly deployed in the South China Sea, in order to assert its claim over the disputed island. Escalating the tension one step ahead China, on 23 November announced establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East-China Sea.^[32] The ADIZ required that all aircraft flying through it provide information to the Chinese authorities, regardless of whether they are China-bound or not. The Chinese ADIZ not only covers Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone but also the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the zone is 130km from Japanese territory at its closest point. Although ADIZ declaration is over space, generally the establishment of it is above the territory one nation controls. Japan condemned China's declaration of ADIZ and declared that it was "totally unacceptable

for Japan”.^[33] Prime Minister Abe urged China to “retract the decision” otherwise it could lead to an unexpected event^[34]. Japan had its own ADIZ region, declared in 1969, covering its territorial airspace including Senkaku islands. Japan viewed that Chinese ADIZ was considered an encroachment in Japan’s sovereignty over the disputed territory. United States sent two unarmed B-52 fighter jets which flew through the ADIZ without informing China, a sign of defiance of the ADIZ declaration, and an assurance to its allies in East Asia that China’s intimidation will not be acceptable for the US.

Since China has extensively depended on maritime trade and maritime issues are closely related to the country’s development, China has introduced a new maritime strategy in March 2011 for its Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). The Five-Year Plan included a new chapter called “Promote the Development of Marine Economy,” which clearly set out a policy guideline for “develop and implement a marine development strategy based on unified sea and land planning, and improve marine development and control capabilities.”^[35] In March 2013, China established a new supervisory organization called State Oceanic Administration (SOA), which will combine the operations of the marine surveillance fleet, the Public Security Ministry’s coastguard patrols, the Agriculture Ministry’s fisheries patrols and the General Administration of Customs’ anti-smuggling efforts.^[36] Under the new set up, the SOA will carry out its maritime law enforcement duties through a new agency called the “China Maritime Police Bureau (MPB)” which will be responsible for defending maritime rights, which implies territorial protection.^[37]

Besides, in July 2013, Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Politburo held a study session on how to turn China into a major maritime power. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that as a land power, and also a maritime power, China possesses extensive strategic interests in the oceans^[38]. Ever since Xi Jinping took over the Presidency in China he has exerted a major influence on China’s handling of both the South China Sea and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands incidents. Since at least mid-2012, he apparently has served as the major senior member of two bodies, one formed to deal with maritime security issues in general and the other the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands crisis in particular. According to some analysts, Xi personally approved a step-by-step plan to intensify pressure on Japan, thereby rejecting a more moderate approach advocated by some in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs^[39]. His espousal of the “China Dream”^[40] concept that envisions a strong nation with a strong military, and his high-profile visits to military facilities to

support the notion that the new leadership will employ a far more muscular, military-oriented foreign policy, especially toward maritime and other sovereignty disputes, could further complicate regional security dynamics .

The East China maritime dispute is still lingering the peace process in East Asia. Although major East Asian countries such as South Korea, China and Japan, as well as the US are members of the various regional security groupings such as East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Six-Party Talks, and participate in multilateral naval exercise Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), the world's largest international

maritime warfare, but could not resolve the territorial dispute conclusively. Beijing's great power ambition and its non negotiable attitude of territorial dispute which was created by foreigners when China was politically weak, complicates the matter. At the same time Japan, under current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's is emerging as a 'normal' military power and Abe wants to jettison the pacifist nature of its security policy. In this regard, the maritime dispute in East China will continue as a major source of instability in the East Asia region.

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Fishing in Troubled Waters? The Case of Somali Piracy in the Indian Ocean

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Abstract

The recent spate of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has not only drawn attention to the dire situation in Somalia but also threatened the maritime security of the Indian Ocean region. The attacks are a product of the lack of central government in Somalia over two decades now since the end of Cold War and the overthrow of Siad Barre government in 1991. Ships and other sea vessels operating from various countries including India that were engaged in fishing and trade activities in the “troubled waters” were attacked by pirates largely based in Somalia’s puntland region thereby eliciting responses from several regional and multilateral quarters including that of the United Nations to the extent of authorizing use of force. Despite Somali piracy being contained to a large extent now the prospects of it combining with terrorism looms large and hence needs to be addressed. This article analyzes the inter-connection between failed states and piracy and the consequent threat it posed to maritime security in the Indian Ocean region using relevant literatures and archival and internet sources. The article is divided into four broad sections – the introduction provides the conceptual framework, the background section brings out a short glimpse of Somalia and its internal conflict situation, the third section analyzes the reasons for piracy and its repercussions and finally the fourth section provides the concluding remarks.

Key words

Piracy; Maritime security; Maritime Terrorism; Indian Ocean Region

1. Introduction

Failed states are a particular worry to the security of many other neighboring and distant states in the 21st century. Talking about the

problem, Francis Fukuyama (2004: 17) argues that “weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world’s most serious problems” and these range from poverty and various diseases to drug trafficking and terrorism, whose occurrence in one part of the world have a direct or indirect consequences on the rest of the world. The strength or weakness of a state therefore becomes a matter of international significance. Of course, not all states have equal strength. It varies from state to state. However, it matters a lot whether a state has the capacity to command loyalty, maintain essential elements of sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and the ability to garner enough resources that are necessary to rule (Holsti, 1996: 82-83). Hence, various interconnected components go to determine the strength or weakness of a state and they are the idea of the state itself, the physical basis, and the government machinery. Where these elements are well connected, their prospect to sustain and support each other will be strong. And if not, then we may term it as “failed states” – political entities that have collapsed or are on the verge of collapse. This is a state of affairs where there is no public order, ineffective command of authority and loyalty and groups of all sorts and factions attempt to resist those who might try to integrate the community to establish effective order.

As discussed below Somalia can be better characterized along the above lines as a failed state “largely under anarchy” in which groups composing of its society have lacked the will and leadership to reach an agreement on the terms on which they could accept a centralized authority. Without a central government, Somalia has been subjected to control of its constituent parts – under warlords or groups. This in effect means that for the past two decades the Somalian society has existed without government controls in terms of legislation (law and order), regulations, taxations, customs and general government controls on the citizenry – a situation which Somalians have got used to it now^[1]. What is interesting for us is that such a situation has led groups to turn to piracy thereby affecting maritime security of the Indian Ocean region.

In fact, piracy in general is not a new phenomenon at all. It has been in vogue for a long period of time. But what is new in this case is the repercussions on maritime commerce and security in the Indian Ocean region given the fast economic development that have characterized the Indian Ocean littoral states. In fact, the region has been one of the well-known regions not only for human interaction that has been evidenced since ancient times but also for maritime commerce as well. It has been an important “component of global maritime trade in terms

of volume, transport of key manufactured goods and resources and in terms of the steadily expanding significance of the national economies that dominate its trade” (Amit Pandya, 2011: p.1). The littoral states of the Indian Ocean, the East Asian economies and many other states from Europe and the Americas depend on Indian Ocean region as much of their trade interaction passes through the region connecting Southeast Asia, the Arab world and East Africa. In fact, history tells us that long distance trade has been prominent since 3 century B.C long before the Europeans discovered the region^[2]. Of late, this region has witnessed the most rapid change in maritime commerce more so with the emergence of new maritime commercial powers such as Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Amit Pandya, 2011, p.1). Obviously, as global trade increases in size and volume and the kind of investments being made in shipping industry it is natural that the stakes are quite high thereby extending into the security dimension as well. The significance of the region is profound too also because of the large population that lives in the region and with about 40 % of the world coastline (Amit Pandya, 2011, p.1). Hence maritime security including protection of sea lines of communication has become all the more predominant as compared to the previous years. Important to note is the expansion of infrastructural projects in the Indian Ocean region in which new ports, rail systems and sea-based pipelines traverse across the Ocean to connect parts of West Asia for economic and trade purposes. Hence, the region has attained greater commercial traffic as well as greater strategic competition.

It is here that the issue of piracy has attained acute interest. For example, according to Christopher Alessi and Stephanie Hanson^[3] there were 439 worldwide pirate attacks more than half of which were attributed to Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of Oman. And in 2011 alone Somali piracy impact on global economy alone cost \$ 7 Billion^[4]. Piracy, according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS) article 101, is defined as follows:

- a. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private aircraft, and directed,
 - i. On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
 - ii. Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;

- b. Any act of Voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft,
- c. Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b)".

There is however a distinction between piracy and "Armed robbery against ships". Armed robbery against ship is defined in the code of Practice for the investigation of crimes of piracy and Armed Robbery Against ship (UN resolution A. 922 (22) paragraph 2.2) as follows:

Armed robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation or threat thereof, other than an act of "Piracy", directed against a ship or against person or property on board such ship, within a states jurisdiction over such offences^[5]

Another useful definition on piracy is by Martin N. Murphy who in his book "Small Boats, Weak States and Dirty Money" (2009), defines "piracy, very simply, is unlawful depredation at sea involving the use or threat of violence possibly, but not necessarily, involving robbery...Piracy, while not a political crime, has invariably been linked to politics and the expression of state power, or more commonly weakness..." In the same vein, the International Maritime Bureau annual report 2009 defines piracy and armed robbery as:

An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act^[6]

Piracy in general is categorized into three main types that concurrently occur (Peter Chalk, 2008: p.5). The first category, according to Peter, occurs at the low end level called anchorage attacks mounted against ships at harbor. The international maritime bureau calls such types as low level armed robbery in which the attackers armed with knives mount their attack close to land by small high speed crafts for economic advantage. At a much more serious level is the second category of ransacking and robbery of vessels in the high seas or in territorial waters involving serious injury or murder usually operating from the mother ship and with modern weapons and at the third level is the outright theft of ships and their subsequent conversion for illegal trading. Such ships, according to Peter, are "renamed and reregistered under flags of convenience and issued with false documentation to enable them to

take on fresh payloads” (Peter Chalk, 2008: p.6). As we will see below the Somalian piracy started off as armed robbery and later turned into full-fledged one.

A Short Background to Somali Piracy

Somalia’s piracy has much to do with the very nature of the state as it exists today. It is vital, hence, to provide a short background of the state of Somalia, which today comprises of the breakaway region called the Republic of Somaliland situated in the North, the semi-autonomous region Puntland in the Northeast and the other regions in the south and center. It is located in the east coast of Africa, North of the Equator between the Gulf of Aden on the North and Indian Ocean in the east bordering Djibouti on the Northwest, Ethiopia on the West, and Kenya on Southwest. It occupies a strategically key position in the Horn of Africa between the Arab Peninsula and the African continent. The Republic of Somaliland broke away from the mainland in 1991 but has not been able to gain international recognition except by few neighboring states like Ethiopia. The semi-autonomous region Puntland became a self-governing entity in 1998 but still considers itself part of Somalia and the remaining regions in the South and the Center is currently engulfed in factional and sectarian violence since 1991. Somalia’s population in 2012 was estimated at 10,195,000 and the country has an area of 637,657, square kilometers, its GDP in the same year was put at USD 1306.00^[7]. Hailing from the Red Sea coast, the Somalis had developed intense contact with the Persian and Arab immigrants at early stages which shaped their lifestyle, language and culture immensely (Afyare Abdi Elmi, 2010)

The modern history of Somalia has its root in the 20th century colonial partition of Africa. The country was first under the British and later under Italian colonial rule for a significant period and attained independence on 1st July 1960 when the United Nations trust territory in the South, largely controlled and administered by the defeated Italian power called Italian Somaliland and the British Somaliland protectorate in the North merged to form the modern day Somalia^[8]. Italy had its influence since 1889, which later came under the UN Trusteeship in 1950 after the end of II World War and the British Somaliland protectorate in the northern region was established in 1886 after the infamous “Scramble for Africa” at Berlin in 1883(Lewis, 2003).

The Somali identity is defined by a common language (Af-Somali), a pastoral economy, adherence to Islam (Sunni), and a patriarchal clan-

based political system. And they are united by common descent (Afyare Abdi Elmi, 2010). Yet, the Somali 'nation' did not constitute a unitary state before or after colonialism. This was so because identity was mainly based on kingship. The people belong to one of the six kin-based 'clan families', namely the Dir, Isaaq, Darood, Hawiyee, Digil and Rahanwein which are again divided patrilineally into smaller sub-clans (Kinfe Abraham, 2002, p6).

The democratic political system that was put in place after independence was short lived. Primarily due to financial and administrative incapacity, successive civilian governments was not able to pull along and in October 1969 Somalia witnessed a bloodless coup which brought Major General Siad Barre to power turning the country into a socialist state in which all able bodied citizens were compelled to undergo military training. He ruled the country as a despot until his overthrow in 1991. Obviously, Barre's totalitarian rule provided the necessary incentive for his own downfall. His centralized administration manifested by militarizing the state without any opposition; the abrogation of the national constitution; dissolution of the elected National Assembly and appointment of people to important positions of power based on their affiliation and loyalty than merit; and bringing Somalia under a socialist ideology in tune with the then Soviet Union – all of them and many more put a full stop to his rule (Lewis 2003). With the mismanagement of Somalia's political terrain by Siad Barre's regime, warlords emerged along clan lines carving out enclaves and becoming very influential by smuggling just anything. Overtime, extremist Islamists such as Al-Shabaab emerged in 2006 with claims to Somalia's political power and very egregiously inflamed the conflict. In the process Somalia has turned into war zone leading to increased poverty, unemployment and migration to neighboring countries and also turning to piracy.

The Somali Piracy and its repercussions

The piracy in Somalia revolves around the Somali territorial waters, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It has the longest coastline of about 3,330 km in continental Africa. However the Puntland region of Somalia constitutes the critical axis of the Somali piracy as over 90 per cent of the Somalis involved in piracy are from Puntland. Land bases of the pirates are also found in the Puntland communities from where they launch out to sea. Besides Puntland, the other region from where piracy network was operating was the Mudug region in the Southern part of Somalia^[9].

Tracing the origins, Murphy (2009) indicates that much of Somali piracy appears to have its roots in fishing disputes. The absence of any effective authority operating along Africa's long national coastline has meant that fishing vessels from Europe and East Asia can exploit the area's rich marine resources at the expense of locals causing dangerous tensions. In other words, the Somali fishermen became increasingly challenged by well organized and sophisticated international fishing vessels from Europe and elsewhere. The Somali fishermen could not simply stand this competition from international fishing firms and hence they simply turned into pirates. This argument falls within the mainstream of most stories tracing the origins of Somali piracy but though not exhaustive as many other strands have since emerged. Some commentators argue that the main sources of piracy in the region is armed groups, formed by local fishermen in response to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) by foreign fishing vessels, which subsequently become pirate gangs.^[10] For example, a July 2005 report from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) estimated that Somalis lost \$100 million to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country's exclusive economic zone in 2003-2004.^[11]

As far as their method of operation is concerned, the piracy itself appears to be haphazardly executed while on shore their tactic of hijacking vessels and holding them, along with crew and cargo, to ransom is relatively sophisticated (Murphy, 2009: p.38). The lawless conditions in Somalia and one may add with the cooperation of fragile government authorities especially in Puntland, where it is possible to move a ship beyond the reach of rescue or retaliation, make it an ideal place for ransom based piracy to thrive. The ransom income of Somali pirates has probably been substantial. For example, the most successful group in the Southern Mudug region called the Xarardheere based 'Somali Marines', apparently demanded \$1m and eventually settled for #8000,000 for the return of the Dongwon-ho, a South Korean tuna fishing vessel that was captured in April 2006.

With the increasing success of such attacks and hijacking of sea vessels and the huge financial returns in the form of ransoms, the fortunes of these ex-fishermen changed and this resulted not only in a kind of organization or network for these earliest pirates but their success attracted many more Somalis, including, teachers, businessmen, militants working for several warlords, accountants and many more Somalis in other fields of human endeavor including Somali Diaspora (Keene, Sheema, 2012).

Table 1: Piracy by select African countries (2005-2012)

| Countries/ Locations | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Angola | | 4 | 1 | 2 | | | 1 | |
| Benin | | | | | 1 | | 20 | 2 |
| Cameroon | 2 | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 5 | | 1 |
| Congo | | | | 1 | | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| D.R. Congo | | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| Egypt | | | 2 | | | 2 | 3 | 7 |
| Equatorial Guinea | | | | 1 | | | | |
| Eritrea | | | 1 | | | | | |
| Ghana | 3 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 3 | | 2 | 2 |
| Guinea | 1 | 4 | 2 | | 5 | | | |
| Guinea Bissau | | | | | 1 | | | |
| Gulf of Aden* Aden* | 10 | 10 | 13 | 92 | 116 | 53 | 37 | 13 |
| Ivory Coast | 3 | 1 | | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Kenya | | | 4 | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| Liberia | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Madagascar | 1 | | 1 | | | | | |
| Mauritania | 1 | 1 | | | | | | |
| Morocco | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| Mozambique | | | 3 | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Nigeria | 16 | 12 | 42 | 40 | 28 | 19 | 10 | 27 |
| Red Sea** | | | | | 15 | 25 | 39 | 13 |
| Sierra Leone | | 2 | 2 | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Somalia | 35 | 10 | 31 | 19 | 80 | 139 | 160 | 49 |
| Tanzania | 7 | 9 | 11 | 14 | 5 | 1 | | 2 |
| Togo | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 6 | 15 |

Source: Compiled from ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, Report for the period January 2005 – December 2012, London 2013.

* Gulf of Aden

** Red Sea Coast

According to IMB report both of the above attacks are attributed to the Somali pirates.

Pirate attacks were previously concentrated in the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and the northern coast of Somalia and along the country’s eastern coastline. Subsequently, attacks on merchant ships took place over an area of more than 1 million sq. miles in the Gulf and the West of Indian Ocean and it posed a significant threat to commercial shipping

besides threatening relief shipments bound for East Africa and the countries of the Horn (Lauren Ploch, 2010, pp.5-6). In fact as per the statistical figures provided by IMB annual reports, if one compares the piracy attacks all over the world during the above period it is clear that Africa stands the largest number of such attacks among which Somalian piracy takes the lion share (see table above). Some estimate that Somalian piracy constituted some 50 per cent of the world wide piracy. The IMB report further goes on to say that in 2012 alone Somali pirates attacked about 11 ships while they were steaming, 1 ship was attacked while anchored and 37 ships were attempted for attacking while they were steaming^[12]. Besides, the numerous Somali youth who were recruited for the job and killed during the operation several other nationalities have also been either taken hostage or killed in the process of the attacks. For example, the IMB annual report 2012 points out that in the Somali coast alone 212 people were taken hostage while 1 was injured and 2 killed. In the attacks over the Gulf of Aden about 38 persons were taken hostage by the Somali pirates. Interesting to note in this entire episode is the kind of weapons used by the pirates. As compared to the attacks in the rest of the world the Somali pirates have predominantly used guns which go to show the extent of availability of such weapons in the country. This again tells us the interconnection between the anarchic nature of the country and piracy.

Besides the human cost of the Somali piracy, the economic cost is staggering^[13]. According to the Ocean's Beyond Piracy report the total cost of ransoms paid as a result of Somali piracy in 2012 accounted to \$ 63.5 million (Jonathan, 2013: p.10). The report goes on to categorize nine areas associated with economic cost of piracy which include: ransoms and recovery, military operations, security equipments and guards, re-routing, increased speed, labor, prosecutions and imprisonment, insurance and counter piracy organizations. Among these re-routing via Arabian Peninsula rather than the short route through Red-sea cost the shipping companies something like \$290.5 million (Jonathan, 2013: p. 3). The extra weeks of travel and fuel consumption would add considerably to the cost of transporting goods.^[14]

In this context it is important to note the interconnection between piracy and maritime terrorism and consequently to maritime security as well. Although studies (Peter Chalk, 2009; Martin Murphy, 2008; Eric Shea Nelson, 2012) point out that the nexus between the two differ – economic motivation in the case of former and political/religious ideology in the case of latter – yet, they opine that the danger of both overlapping in due course of time cannot be ruled out. In other words,

the chances of widening or extending the scope of piracy to maritime terrorism are always there. Peter Chalk, (2008: p. xiv) for example points out that “extremist groups will seek to overcome existing operational constraints in sea-based capabilities by working in conjunction with or subcontracting out missions to maritime crime gangs and syndicates”. However, so far, there is no credible evidence of such convergence says Peter (Ibid).

The other implication is with regard to India whose location along the Indian Ocean littoral gives it an added impetus to play a great power role next to China^[15]. India’s gradual emergence and increased reliance on international commerce and deepening engagement in the Indian Ocean region gives the region greater prominence in India’s foreign policy considerations^[16]. It is to be noted that India conducts nearly 40 % of its trade with littoral nations along the Indian Ocean rim depending on shipping lanes for a significant portion of its energy needs and hence securing the Ocean is of vital importance for India^[17]. Along this line, modernization of Indian Navy has commenced sending clear signals of its priorities over free access to the sea. It is to be noted that the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 was effected through the Mumbai sea coast in the Indian Ocean. Indeed the stakes are high for India and any removal of the containment or constabulary role of the international community will only lead to a resurgence of the same the last thing that India wants to see.

Conclusions

As noted above, the phenomenon of piracy off the Somali coast is a due to interconnected factors. Noteworthy is the lack of central government for over two decades that culminated in a situation where Somalis were caught in a cycle of poverty and were used to lawlessness. The prolonged internal crisis situation provided opportunities for international fishing vessels to exploit the Somali waters which went unchecked and thereby disrupting the coastal economy. This consequently led to the rise of attacks on foreign vessels in an attempt to prevent further exploitation. However, considering the lucrative financial gain the attacks over time increased and turned into actual piracy itself. Hypothetically then, had Somalia been a stable country piracy might not have happened in the first place. Sadly though, this did not happen and we have witnessed not only the piracy but also its dire consequences on maritime security of the whole region as such. Although the spate of piracy has been largely contained, yet, any diversion or relaxation of the containment will not only lead to resurgence of piracy but also pose serious threats

to the Indian Ocean littoral states including India gravely. It is vital hence that we find logical solutions to the phenomenon by not just situating the task force along the Coast but also finding amicable and long lasting solutions to the stateless nature of Somalia.

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
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
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M. Venkatraman



Map of The Horn of Africa



Source: Congressional Cartography Program, Library of Congress

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Maritime Security of Japan: Energy and Trade Route in Indian Ocean

Prakash Panneerselvam

Abstract

Piracy, or, hijacking the ship for ransom off the coast of Somalia has caught global attention. Resource starved countries like Japan especially which by and large depend upon their maritime domain for their economic growth, view the maritime violence as a grave security threat to Japan's energy and maritime security, thus compelling Japan's Self-Defence Forces (JSDF), previously not considered of vital interest, to operate in the Indian Ocean. So, the study will focus on, how energy and trade imperatives drives Japanese maritime security policy towards Indian Ocean Region.

“Peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a great role in preserving the common good in both regions.”

- Shinzo Abe
Prime Minister of Japan

The presence of multi-national naval force and stringent ship-security system drastically reduced piracy activity around the Gulf of Aden (GOA). According to IMB report, only 15 such incidents attributed to Somalia pirates in 2013, down from 75 in 2012 and 237 in 2011.^[1] These figures indicate the piracy activity off the Somalia coast is at lowest level since 2006. Despite the decline in piracy activity, the multinational naval force have decided to continue counter-piracy activity, as the situation still remains unpredictable in Somalia and the area around the GOA. For Japan, maritime piracy is a serious threat to its national security. As the result, since 2009, Japan has deployed Japan Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) vessels in the counter-piracy activity off the Somalia coast to protect its maritime interest and also to fulfill its international responsibility. So far, Japan has successfully conducted counter-piracy operations and is also supporting multi-

national naval force in counter-piracy operations. Despite the decline in piracy activity in the region, Japan among the major nation decided to continue the counter piracy operation in GOA because of Tokyo's increasing dependence on Indian Ocean waterway. This signifies that maritime security of the Indian Ocean is of paramount interest to Japan in order protect its SLOC in the region.

As far as transporting energy and trade is concerned, merchant ships ferrying goods for Japan are considered to be the 'Second Arm of Defence'. In the recent times, the 'Second Arm of Defence' was threatened by piracy and armed robbery against ships, maritime terrorism, human trafficking, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and small arms proliferation and other non-military issues like marine environmental degradation. These threats pose real-time security challenges to Japanese maritime security which encompasses both energy and economic aspects. This paper seeks to explain how the piracy, or hijacking the ships for ransom in the IOR transformed Japanese maritime security policy. Further, the article will also examine how the energy and trade imperatives persuade the government of Japan to formulate a proactive policy by deploying JMSDF units on counter-piracy role in the Western Indian Ocean.

Japanese Energy and Trade Destination: Indian Ocean Waterway

The Indian Ocean is a region of growing significance. In terms of energy production and trading, the region extends lucrative options for industrial countries. Both energy production and consumption is high in the region due to the presence of the world's great economies, viz., China, Japan and India. On the other hand, the region remains significantly crucial because West Asia is the world largest producer and loading area of crude oil.^[2] Nearly, 1.8 billion tonnes, equivalent to 45 per cent of the world crude oil production, is loaded on tankers and carried through fixed maritime routes in Indian Ocean Region. The British Petroleum Annual Report (2013) estimated that nearly million tons of oil is transported through two tanker routes in the Indian Ocean.^[3]

The shipments of oil from the Persian Gulf have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, which are considered to be two of the world's largest chokepoints, to reach Japan. The 21 miles wide Hormuz Strait handles 35 per cent of all seaborne trade and 20 per cent of oil worldwide which travel through the straits. Furthermore, Qatar and Kuwait export Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) through the

Hormuz Strait which accounted for about 100 billion cubic feet per year in 2010.^[4] Malacca Strait, another critical chokepoint in Asia, is the shortest sea route between the Persian Gulf and Japan and an estimated 15.2 billion barrels per day was transported through the straits of Malacca in 2011.^[5] Every year, 60,000 ships pass through the Strait of Malacca and Lombok Straits making it one of the busiest maritime highways in the globe. Japan, a major importer of oil and gas from West Asia, extensively depends upon the Lombok and Malacca Straits for safe and fast transportation. Most of the VLCC from West Asian use maneuverable Malacca straits to reach Japan, fewer vessels like ULCC with deeper draft use Lombok Straits to reach Japan. In case Malacca Straits is closed, re-routing oil tanker via Lombok Strait would cost more than US\$ 340 million per year to the Japanese petroleum industry.^[6] The energy and trade movement in the Indo-Pacific region is thus a major external security issue for Japan. At the same time, growing domestic demand and constrains makes energy security an even more serious affair in Japan.

Historically, Japanese industrial and economic development has been fuelled by oil. In 1973, oil supplied 77 per cent of the nation's energy requirement. Eruption of the Arab-Israel conflict in 1973 leading to the "oil crisis" made Japan realise that it "remains extraordinarily susceptible to serious disruption in supply or increase in the price of raw material".^[7] Consequently, Japan reduced its dependence on oil as a primary source of energy by introducing nuclear energy and LNG. By 1986, Japan's dependence on oil as primary energy reduced to 56.6 per cent; in 2009, Japan's total dependence on oil (including LPG) was approximately 47 per cent.^[8] However, Japan's dependence on LNG (16 per cent) and coal (12 per cent) is higher than that of its dependence on fossil fuel as a whole, with Tokyo maintaining a very high level of dependence at 84 per cent.^[9]

Today, Japan is the second highest net importer of oil and it consumes 4.8 million barrels of oil per day and has oil reserves of 0.0444 million barrels. Moreover, the Great Eastern Earthquake and the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Station significantly reduced public trust on nuclear power.^[10] This had drastically increased Japan's overdependence on LNG from 70 million tonnes in the fiscal year 2010 to 83 million tonnes in the fiscal year 2011. In 2013, LNG import increased 0.2 per cent to 87.49 million tonnes in 2013.^[11] In the same year, thermal coal import also rose 1.3 per cent to a record 109.03 million tone.^[12] The nuclear disaster mounted the pressure on Japanese authority to import more oil and gas from overseas. Yanagisawa Akira said "substantial increase in energy import quantity, increase in global

energy and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 has attributed to the rise in the import deflator.^[13] He also noticed “energy accounts for 58 percent energy of the total trading losses.”^[14] The increase in the overseas dependence for oil and gas also alerted government agency and military planners about vulnerability associated with the SLOC in the IOR. Many security experts opined that any possible disruption of flow of oil and gas to Japan would seriously hamper Japanese security. Even Akira Ishii, special advisor to Japan Oil, Gas and Metal National Corporation warned Tokyo of dire consequences as the “blockage of the Hormuz could cause an electricity crisis.”^[15]

Moreover, Japanese trade passes through crucial straits in IOR and this is also another major area of concern. Japan generated 80 per cent of the growth of the deep-sea cargo trade.^[16] As of February 2012, Japan exports goods worth of 5,441 billion yen; the Asian region accounts for 40 per cent of exports which is about one-fourth of the operating profit of Japan. Almost 99.7 per cent of the trade with foreign countries is sea-bound, carried out by sea-going vessels. At a critical time in global politics, Japan, increasingly reliant on overseas oil resources, placed Tokyo in a more delicate situation. Subsequently, Indian Ocean gained major importance in Japanese politics as the energy and trade route was under peril with increasing piracy activity off the Somalia Coast. Japan’s fear that any disruption in SLOC will hamper its development in the long run is based on Japan’s interest in oil and other natural resources in the Indian Ocean.

Piracy Activity in Indian Ocean: An Overview

According to the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB-PRC), issues like piracy, hijacking of ships for ransom and attempted theft is a constant threat to ships passing through the Indian Ocean. One Earth Future Foundation and Ocean Beyond Piracy reports estimated that the total cost of piracy in 2011 was as high as US\$ 7 billion; in 2012 the figure was dropped to US \$ 5.7 and US \$ 6.1 billion.^[17] It was also estimated that piracy off the coast of Somalia is the most important reason behind the rise in cost of piracy figures across the globe.

According to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) report 1999-2011 indicates that piracy and armed robbery remains a serious security problem for global maritime trade. Peter Chalk says the actual problem of piracy is far greater than these figures, since the numbers of attacks, even as much as 50 per cent, are not reported.^[18] Moreover, piracy seems to be a never-ending phenomenon in the Indian Ocean.

In the beginning of the 21st century, Southeast Asian waterways witnessed the highest number of crime related piracy and hijacking incidents in SLOCs. From 1999 to 2002, 241 piracy incidents were reported in the Strait of Malacca alone. In 2004, pirates in Southeast Asia kidnapped 43 crew members, out of which 36 of these kidnappings took place in the Strait of Malacca.^[19]

The unprecedented rise in piracy attacks around the Indonesian archipelago and Strait of Malacca raised an insurance cost for the shipping company and complicated the maritime transportation system in the Southeast Asian waterways. In response, Southeast Asian navies launched joint patrolling, information sharing and other proactive measures to contain maritime piracy and armed robbery in Asian waterway. Extra-regional powers very much concerned about the growing situation in Asia, offered support to littoral states in the form of training and intelligence and by supplying fast craft boats to enhance law enforcement in the region. As the result, by 2005, piracy and armed robbery around the Southeast Asian waterways had been reduced considerably.

At the other end, there was an outbreak of the Somalia Civil War in 2006 between Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Somalia Islamist Umbrella Group and the Islamic Court Union (ICU) for the control of land which aggravated tension in the sea close to the international SLOC. Meantime, piracy off the Somalia coast rose to global prominence with an increase in attacks during 2008 (111 attacked and 47 hijacked).^[20] In spite of the deployment of naval ships from 30 countries, piracy and hijacking of ships by Somali pirates rose significantly in the following years. Since 2008, more than 3,000 seafarers have been kidnapped and held for ransom, enduring months of captivity in appalling conditions.^[21] By converting the hijacked ships into a “mother ship”, Somali pirates increased the range of attack deep into the Indian Ocean. This indicator shows that piracy, kidnapping and hijacking of ships in the Indian Ocean for ransom seriously jeopardise global maritime transportation.

Moreover, the Islamic terrorist organisation *Al-shabaab* linked to *Al-Qaeda* and the organisation’s link to piracy in Somalia seriously raises the question of a nexus between the two. The Rand Corporation study suggests, “There is little evidence to support concern from some governments and international organisations that pirates and terrorists are beginning to collude with one another.”^[22] Piracy in Somalia raised the serious question about the future of piracy activity, where terrorist organisations made the best use of hijacking ships for ransom and

kidnapping sailors as a means to raise funds for terrorist organisations. Therefore, there is a strong possibility of piracy becoming a more serious issue in future as it is linked with terrorism and insurgency.

Piracy Attack on Japanese Ships: Tokyo's Reaction

Piracy and hijacking of ships in the Indian Ocean pose a real time security threat to Japanese shipping companies. The number of cases involving Japanese related ships increased from eight in 1995 to 39 cases in 1999 and 31 in the year 2000. Moreover, in the year 2000, the number of piracy related incidents in Southeast Asia alone stood at around 305 cases, which is about 65 per cent of the total.^[23]

The attack on Japanese owned/manned ships caused huge economic losses to Japanese shipping or trading companies. In 2007, ten Japanese ships were attacked in the Indian Ocean bordering the Somalia coast. Infamous incidents such as hijacking of the chemical tanker *Golden Nori* for ransom and failed plot to hijack the *Nippon Yusen* tanker in the Indian Ocean by Somali pirates in 2008 were some incidents which prompted the Japanese government to take serious note of the situation.

Table (2.8) Number of ships attacked by Somali pirates (numbers in brackets indicate concerned Japanese ships)

| Area | 2009 | | 2010 | | 2011 | |
|---------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | Attacked | Hijacked | Attacked | Hijacked | Attacked | Hijacked |
| Gulf of Aden | 131(0) | 20 (0) | 75 (3) | 16 (0) | 76 (3) | 4 (0) |
| Somalia Coast | 86 (2) | 27 (0) | 144 (5) | 32 (1) | 161 (4) | 24 (0) |
| Total | 217 (2) | 47 (0) | 219 (8) | 48 (1) | 237 (7) | 28 (0) |

Source: No reported attack on Japanese ships in 2012-13, Japan Ship Owners Association (JSA)

As a result of the surge in pirate attacks, the number of JSA member companies' ships transiting the Gulf of Aden dropped from 2,128 in 2007 to 1,684 in 2011. By avoiding the Suez Canal, Japanese bound ships from Europe via the Cape of Good Hope have to travel an extra 3,500 nautical miles which is roughly six to ten days longer than the Suez transit route to reach Japan. Moreover, the re-routing cost amounted to a major operational loss for the shipping companies. Japan Ship Owners' Association urged the government to take resolute military action against Somali pirates to secure a safe-passage for undisrupted oil and goods flow to Japan.

In a statement release, *Keindanren* (Japan Business Federation) sought

Japanese government intervention in the crisis to provide a safe cover for shipping companies and seafarers onboard. Since most of the seafarers are from the Philippines, Japan holds a global responsibility. In a “Proposal to Take Strong Measures to Combat Piracy”, *Keindanren* specifically argued for a strong military presence in the region by stepping up escorting operations. Moreover, JSA and *Keindanren* argue for more strong measures from the government to protect the overstretched SLOC. The JSA and *Keindanren* actively pursued the Japanese government in bringing security to merchant fleet playing for Japan. The JSA and *Keindanren* also helped Japan to concretise and formulate policy which adhering to the principle of pacifist constitution.

Japanese Counter Piracy Activities: In perspective

Maritime Piracy and hijacking ships for ransom have prompted Japan to take a serious stand on the maritime issues and freedom of navigation. In response to this, the Government of Japan has taken several measures to prevent such unlawful activities in Southeast Asian waters, by aiding the infrastructure of other countries in combating piracy. In 2001, the MOFA document shows key measures undertaken to combat piracy in Southeast Asian waterways.

Basic principles of anti-piracy measures promoted multilateral institution building in IOR and the following measures were taken by Japan to tackle piracy in the region:

- 1) Japan financed International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to study maritime piracy incidents.
- 2) Japan Coast Guards sponsored the Indian Ocean (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) Maritime Safety Practitioners' Conference in Tokyo in November 2001.
- 3) Japan led the “Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting in Tokyo in June 2004.
- 4) In 2005, Japan organised the second ASEAN-Japan Seminar on Maritime Security and Combating Piracy in Tokyo.
- 5) JCG also invited maritime law enforcement agency personnel from ASEAN countries for training courses in maritime law.
- 6) Japan initiated Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) which formally came into force in 2006.

Moreover, Japan assisted littorals along the Malacca and Singapore

straits with infrastructure development such as upgrading of the wireless communication network, the development of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), joint hydrological survey and the development of electronic hydrological maps of the straits.^[24] Ambassador Akio Suda, in charge of International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, points out that the Japanese private sector made huge contributions amounting to 15 billion yen since 1968^[25] for the installation of navigation aid, oil fence for environment protection and provided training vessels to Malaysia's law enforcement agencies.

Further, to enhance and strengthen security measures, including measures to combat terrorism and piracy, Japan provided seven billion yen under "Grant Aid for Cooperation on Counter Terrorism and Security Enhancement from the fiscal year 2006. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) claims that since 1956, Japan has provided 12.7 trillion yen (accumulated value until the fiscal year 2005) for development of the region. Japan had also provided monetary assistance worth 1,921 million yen to Indonesia to construct three-patrol vessels for the "Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons."^[26] Japan, through ReCAAP-ISC, Regional Coast Guard Conference with South Asian navies, capacity building, and technical assistance to littoral navies helped littorals in developing a robust anti-piracy drive in the region. These pro-active combined measures taken by Japan, along with measures taken by other stakeholders, helped address the problem in the region and find a solution to it.

Meanwhile, the September 11 attack on the US further intensified Japan's role in the Indian Ocean. In an immediate response, Japan pledged to offer tangible support to the US to fight against Islamic terrorism through the military campaign, "War on Terror". Japan a principal ally, wasted no time and responded immediately by setting up an emergency task force in the Prime Minister's office within forty-five minutes of the attack.^[27] Prime Minister Koizumi acted positively to the crisis and enacted the Anti-terrorism Special Measure Law (ATSML) in October 2001, authorising MSDF to provide logistic support to US and the international coalition force engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-IMO) in the Indian Ocean as a result of which many leaders of *Al-Qaeda* were killed or arrested. The MSDF refuelling operation covering three important sea-passages of western Indian Ocean-Southern Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Omen helped JMSDF to gain knowledge about the Indian Ocean. Before the JMSDF refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean had come to an end, piracy and hijacking of ships for ransom by Somali pirates had started to hurt the Japanese sea-lane.

Piracy off Somalia Coast: Japan's Anti-Piracy Operation

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a major security threat to global maritime trade. In response, the multinational naval task force CTF-150 has been established in support of “War on Terrorism” called upon for anti-piracy operations in Gulf of Aden. Later on, a dedicated anti-piracy naval task force-CTF-151 was formed to deal with piracy off the Somalia coast. In addition to this, prominent maritime nations deployed naval assets to protect their SLOC in the Indian Ocean. Japan, being among the chief users of the Indian Ocean also deployed its JMSDF vessels in the Indian Ocean, which had previously not been considered of vital interest. On March 2009, Japan issued executive orders to dispatch JMSDF vessels based on Article 82 of the Self-defence Force Law to participate in the new international anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia. The official name of the anti-piracy measure law, which came into force on June 2009, is the “Law on the Penalisation of Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy”.

The new law allows MSDF vessels engaged in anti-piracy missions to “punish acts of piracy by the domestic law, the SDF are allowed to use arms to stop vessels that are approaching commercial vessels for the acts of piracy.” The two JMSDF vessels and two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, along with five hundred SDF personnel and eight Japan Coast Guard officials, are currently enforcing anti-piracy measures in the 100 nautical mile Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).^[28] By deploying SDF assets in this area, Japan proved its strength and ability to perform “out of area” operations for the first time since World War II. This operation was crucial for Japan in order to defend the SLOC as well as to assert Tokyo's interest in maintaining “good order at sea”.

Notably, this was the first time that the integrated team composed of JMSDF and GSDF units had been dispatched overseas. Japan's counter-piracy measure composed of two stages, 1) P-3C patrolling GOA, 2) JMSDF Vessels patrolling established IRTC to protect convey. Captain Kuno Keiichi, Director of Research Department/JMSDF Staff College says that in the anti-piracy operation, “seventy five per cent of surface targets in the Gulf of Aden are watched by P-3C, the destroyer and ship-based helicopter which scouts the area for the potential threat to SLOC”.^[29] Moreover, this was the first time newly formed special force, called the “Special Boarding Unit”, specialised in anti-hijacking and counter terrorism operations was deployed to protect the JMSDF unit from pirate and terrorist attacks.^[30]

Japan also collaborating with Chinese, Indian and South Korean navy to synchronize patrols and to optimum the resource allocated for the escort duty by the each country. Furthermore, the naval base in Djibouti located in the Horn of Africa played a major role in stepping up Japanese strategic influences in the region. This new base allows JMSDF to respond quickly and effectively to address security issues in the region. In the past, JMSDF had been using a part of the US military facility position in Djibouti. “The new base will ensure Japan a sense of security and allow the MSDF to operate efficiently”, says Chief of Masahiko Sugimoto.^[31] Further, the upgrading the foreign minister’s office in Djibouti into an embassy in 2012 reflects Japanese growing interest in the Horn of Africa.

Japan had often been criticised by US, European countries and strategic experts for not volunteering for missions concerned with international security. Now with the changing scenario, Japan’s participation in the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and anti-piracy operations earned Japan high praise from the international community. Apart from counter piracy operations, Japan has also involved in various other capacity building in the region to strengthen state mechanism to deal with security threats.

Diplomatic Initiatives

Japan has history of using monetary assistance and aid to achieve its foreign policy objective. In 2000, the Asian waterway witnessed step increase in piracy and hijacking the ships. In response, Japan due to its historical legacy subdued its naval presence in Southeast Asian water and chooses to collaborate with littorals of Southeast Asian nation to curb piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asian. The monetary assistance and capacity-building programme for the regional navies created synergy among the Southeast Asian navies in fight against piracy in the Asian waterway. The naval patrol and coordination among the regional navies drastically reduced the piracy activity in Malacca and Singapore Straits.

In the case of piracy off GOA, lawlessness in Somalia posed more serious problem to maritime nations. The states bordering Somalia also lack mechanism to enforce law and order at sea. As the result, multi-nations maritime task force undertook patrolling in GOA to provide secure passage for merchant vessels transiting GOA. The patrolling and the stringent ship-security system drastically reduced piracy and hijacking the ships, however the problem in Somalia remains large where poverty and other grassroots problem remains a major issue for the TFG. In

order to support the local governance and to eradicate poverty in Somalia, international community through International Organisations has come forward to help Somalia. Japan among the developed countries provided support to the development, stability and prosperous of Somalia.

Since 2007, Japan has provided assistance amounting to approximately US \$ 338.7 million to strengthen human security and infrastructure in Somalia.^[32] Even though Japan does not recognize the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) as a legitimate government, Tokyo provided bilateral assistance to overcome the fundamental issues in the region to find solution to terrorism and piracy.^[33] Japan generously funded to support the rehabilitation of Bossaso and Mogadishu ports to revitalize regional economy in the piracy infested area. Moreover, it also implemented through United Nation Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) Tokyo a support policy training programme in Djibouti and also supported various other initiatives through working with UN agency.

Japan also contributed US\$ 14.6 million to the IMO Djibouti Code Trust Fund for capacity building in coastal countries of Somalia and US\$ 3.5 million to the trust fund to support counter piracy off the coast of Somalia for the prosecution of suspect pirates.^[34] Japan and 50 African countries agreed to beef up anti-piracy measures in the fourth and fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). In 2013 TICAD Japan, vowed to double monetary assistance to 3.2 trillion yen in total aid over the next five years.^[35] During the TICAD V, visiting President of Federal Republic of Somalia, H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud thanked Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for “unwavering support to the people of Somalia”. Besides, both the leaders had also discussed bi-lateral relations between the two countries and most importantly the development in the region. On the other hand, Africa is gaining significance in Japanese politics when the region is emerging as an important player in international affair through rapid economic growth.^[36] In 2014, visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to African continent was more of a business trip; however Japan expressed a deep concern over the growing security discontent in the region.

Islamic militants and maritime piracy in Africa pose significant challenge to international community. Japan supportive of international organization initiatives to resolve the basic grassroot problems would pave way for the community to build sustainable livelihood in conflict ridden society. Japan also made lots effort in the past ten years to build relationship with littorals states in Indian Ocean to fight non-

traditional security threats in Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Abe also realized the cooperation in maritime field would be an effective way to deal the existing security threats in the region.

Maritime Diplomacy

The piracy in Indian Ocean has sharpened Japanese response to security threats. Meantime, Japan also strengthened bilateral maritime cooperation with littoral of Indian Ocean. Japan-India maritime cooperation is one of its kinds has strong roots in protecting the SLOC from non-traditional security threats. *MV Alondra Rainbow* incident brought synergy into Japan-India bilateral relationship which was earlier primarily focusing on the economic aspects. Since then, the joint maritime exercise between two coast guards regularly involved in conducting annual maritime exercise. Following the improvement in the bilateral security relationship, the two navies commenced bilateral maritime exercise in 2012 primarily focusing the counter-piracy, search and rescue and HA/DR activity. Further, in 2013 Japan signed maritime cooperation agreement with Sri Lanka to deepen the bilateral relation to focus on the key security issues in Indian Ocean. In the same year, Prime Minister Abe visited to Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar to deepen security cooperation with energy exporting countries to safeguard its transit route in the region. Japan has also sent coast guard officials as defence attaché to Oman, and Yemen to keep the tab on security situation in the region.

Domestic Scenario

Japan a pacifist state, largely refrained from using armed force in international missions. But the attitude changed in the post-Cold War era, as Japan enacted a new law to allow SDF to participate in Peacekeeping Operations. The change in the new policy allowed JSDF physically contribute to international peace and development. But, the major changes in Japanese foreign and security policy came after the September 11 attack in the US. The JMSDF mission in support of the US lead operation in Afghanistan and JMSDF anti-piracy activity off GOA received positive response from Japanese people.

A public opinion survey conducted by the cabinet office in January 2009 shows that 63.2 per cent of the people responded that Japan should be engaged in anti-piracy activities, while 29.1 percent responded that it was not necessary.^[37] On April 2012, a public opinion survey conducted by the cabinet office gauged that nearly 90 per cent

appreciated the SDF overseas operation. In the post-World War period, for the first time, the public had a high expectation of SDF's role and activities. The domestic mood change allowing SDF to operate far-from-home is a welcome change.^[38] The positive response from the Japanese public allows government to pursue the

Considering the option, the Japanese government, planned to allow armed private guards to board Japanese flag vessels specifically, to counter piracy off Somalia Coast. According to Japanese newspaper reports, Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism is likely to submit a the bill before The Diet by which Japanese ships would hire armed private guards to safeguard Japanese vessels and its crew from the threat of piracy.^[39] At the same time, the Japanese government assured that it would deploy naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) till piracy finds an end. Captain Kuno says, "Even if the government allows Japanese shipping companies to hire armed guards to protect their ships from Somali pirates, JMSDF activity will continue in the GOA, in order to fulfill Japan's commitment to international security." Moreover, Shinzo Abe led Liberal Democratic Party government in the Japanese Diet (2012-2013) is also planning to expand the scope of Japanese Self-Defence to protect its sea-lane.

The government led panel, headed by the former Ambassador to US, Shunji Yanai has been studying how to interpret Article 9 of the Constitution, which currently prohibits Japan from its "right to collective Self-Defence."^[40] The government panel constituted under the Shinzo Abe administration has recommended that the government of Japan should provide "full support" to foreign forces when the security of Japan is at stake. However, the newspaper did not clarify the extent of the "full support" Japan could offer to foreign troops. If the government accepts the suggestions made by the government panel, it would drastically change the SDF posture. A revised interpretation of the constitution will further allow SDF forces to participate in joint patrolling with foreign ships and launch counterattacks if the ships of foreign nations come under attack. If Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is determined to revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, he will take a serious look at the suggestions made by the government panel.

Further to boost Japan Sea-lane defence, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's cabinet approved a modified version and bring an end to nation's arms export policy. The ease in the arms export would allow Japan to export patrol vessels to countries along sea lanes to ensure safe flow of natural resources.^[41] Despite the strict ban on export of arms, in the past Japan had donated three patrol boats to Indonesia, a training vessels to

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency to help fight piracy and terrorism in Straits of Malacca. The new arms export policy would further boost Japanese response in implementing the plan swiftly without any delay. The energy and trade route attained a major focus in Japan and the recent domestic mood change is because of the growing uncertainty in maritime domain.

At the same time, emerging security threats around Japan pose new challenges to Japanese maritime security. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes fear that emerging uncertain security situation around Japan will hold it back from actively participating in the Indian Ocean's security. According to Yoshihara and Holmes, Japan is finding it difficult to set priorities and allocate resources.^[42] Though the Indian Ocean is at the core of Japan's strategy, "Tokyo will execute the Indian Ocean operations on a not-to-interfere basis along with higher-priority missions like defence of the Japanese archipelago."^[43] The Chinese increasing assertiveness in East China Sea is likely to curtail JMSDF presence in Indian Ocean. In other words, the redeployment of JMSDF asserts that conflict with China could pose serious challenge to the Self-defence force. Parallel to that, as a peacetime task, Japan has pledged to maintain strict vigilant to protect SLOC in the Indo-Pacific region. The two daunting tasks need to be addressed promptly by Japanese policy makers in order to protect Japanese interest in the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

From the above analysis, it emerges that Japan has foremost interest in the Indian Ocean. For a very long time, Japan, a major user of the Indian Ocean waterway for energy and trade, had maintained a low profile in the region. The energy and trade imperative proved to play key role in shaping up Japanese maritime security policy. In order to overcome the difficulties in protecting the overstretching SLOC in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan promulgated a five-pronged strategy: 1) to enhance maritime capability of JMSDF and JCG; 2) encourage self-defence to participate in bilateral and multilateral exercises to increase interaction with world navies; 3) enhance capability of littorals in their fight against non-traditional security threats; 4) Build maritime cooperation with friendly country in Indian Ocean Region; 5) Strengthen regional and international institutions to maintain good order at sea. At the same time, Japan can not negate the military threat attached to deepening territorial issues with China over Senkaku Island in East China Sea. Therefore, Japan needs to consolidate its military might in order to protect its territory from external threat and to protect the SLOC in the Indo-Pacific region.

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The Imperatives of India - Australia Cooperation: A Maritime Security Perspective

R. Suresh

Introduction

The Oceans neither begin nor end at any particular point. They connect and interact with each other creating numerous possibilities and opening new horizons, especially in an intensely globalised world. The Oceans also pose multifarious challenges to international relations, as they become crucial to any nation's security and engagement with the outside world. The growing significance of maritime resources and sea-lane protection, as well as the concentration of economic boom zones along the coasts, has made maritime security more critical than ever before. The maritime security challenges include non-traditional threats such as climate change, transnational terrorism, illicit fishing, human trafficking, and environmental degradation. The overexploitation of marine resources has underlined the need for conservation and cautious management of the biological diversity of the seabed. The creation of a global ocean governance mechanism is *sine quo non* for the peaceful exploitation of ocean resources. The assertive pursuit of national interest for relative gain in an increasingly interdependent world is neither a formula for harmonious maritime relations or for peaceful utilisation of ocean resources to the benefit of mankind. In this context the need for cooperation among nations in the maritime domain cannot be overemphasised. In the emerging global order maritime security assumes great significance. Again maritime security cooperation among nations assumes importance especially in the context of non-traditional threat to security.

In the cold war period India's Indian Ocean policy was based on elimination of great power presence in the context of great power rivalry and competition. On the contrary, Australia an ally of the western bloc supported the US presence in the Indian Ocean. However a marked change in India's Indian Ocean Policy is discernible in the post cold war period. The change in the external milieu as a result of end of

ideology-based bipolar system and the accelerated pace of globalization, in fact, unlocked many opportunities for cooperation between these two democratic countries. India and Australia have several commonalities, which serve as a foundation for closer cooperation and multi-faceted interaction. Both are strong, vibrant, secular and multicultural democracies and both have a free press and an independent judicial system and the English language is an important link. This article is an attempt to explore into the opportunities opened up before these two democratic, multicultural countries in the post cold war period, especially in the domain of maritime security cooperation.

I. Indian Ocean and India's Security Concerns

Indian Ocean is very important to India's military, economic, energy, environment, and human security. India has a coastline of 7516 kms and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 2 million sqkms. The significance of this Ocean has long been recognized. The famous words of Alfred Thayer Mahan testifies this "whosoever control Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is important in the seven seas, in the twenty first century the destiny of the world will be determined in its waters".^[1] India occupies a central position in the Indian Ocean region, a fact that exercises an increasingly profound influence on India's security environment. Writing in the 1940s, K. M. Panikkar, noted the importance of the Indian Ocean to India that "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected."^[2]

In tune with the above observations the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, observed "History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India's sea borne trade at her mercy and, in the second, India's very independence itself."^[3] The significance of the Indian Ocean to India has also been emphasized in the Annual Report (2004-2005) of India's Defense Ministry, which noted that "India is strategically located vis-a-vis both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean Region."^[4] Again the Indian Maritime Doctrine asserts: "All major powers of this century will seek a toehold in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, Japan, the EU, and China, and a reinvigorated Russia can be expected to show presence in these waters either independently or through politico-security arrangements."

There is, moreover, “an increasing tendency of extra regional powers of military intervention in [IO] littoral countries to contain what they see as a conflict situation.”^[5] Thus the Indian Ocean and its littoral and hinterland area have a direct bearing in safeguarding India’s security interests.

II. India’s Indian Ocean Policy

In the post cold war period, nations are very astute in their interaction with others. The international politics of the post cold war is not the same as the one in the cold war period. There are no ideological confrontations. Nations are more concerned about resolving their basic problem. International cooperation is required for the protection and promotion of national interests, concerning peace, security and development. No nation however powerful can protect its national interest by pursuing an isolationist policy. This understanding among nations forced them to unite and work together to resolve domestic as well as external problems through international cooperation. Such cooperative efforts are also visible among the countries in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).

India’s maritime policy also underwent a sea change in the post cold war period. The policy of exclusive engagement and elimination of outside powers has given place to overt engagement with extra regional powers. This has been well reflected in India’s joint military exercises along with the US, Japan, France, and Australia. India no longer considers the external power presence as a threat to its security. Rather it considers a joint effort is required to wipe out the major threat to India and international community posed by terrorism. It is not possible for any single nation to address the menace of international terrorism singlehandedly. India began to realize the importance of a pragmatic approach in framing its foreign policy objectives and pursuing it through increased naval power and active collaboration with extra regional as well as intra-regional powers. This policy shift in India’s stand is visible in the maritime doctrine as well as in the Navy’s vision document published by the Indian Navy.

It essentially encompasses:

- (i) Shaping a favourable maritime environment in the IOR for operations in peace as well as during conflict.
- (ii) Preventing incursions by powers inimical to India’s national interests by actively engaging countries in the IOR littoral, and

rendering speedy and quality assistance in fields of interest to them.

- (iii) Engaging extra-regional powers and regional navies in mutually beneficial activities to ensure the security of India's maritime interests.
- (iv) Projecting the Indian Navy as a professional, credible force and the primary tool for maritime cooperation.^[6]

India has also earmarked the area which falls within its immediate concern. "India's growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca...." While enumerating the basic features of India's post cold war Indian Ocean policy the former Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh has stated: "India has exploited the fluidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military firmness."^[7]

It appears that India has adopted a three-pronged strategy to protect and promote its national interests. Firstly, through diplomatic means, India has pursued a policy of cooperation with all major players in the Indian Ocean, including extra regional powers. This policy would help India to increase its international stature. The Indo - US civilian nuclear agreement can also be viewed as an attempt to do away with nuclear isolation. The process of globalisation has also accelerated better and cordial interaction with outside powers as the movement of people as well as commodities would further cement relation between nations.

India has developed a friendly and cordial relation not only by bilateral exchange with nations but also strengthened the bilateral cooperation through interactions in regional organizations, such as ASEAN, EAS, SCO, BRIC, ASEM, IBSA, APTA, and IOR ARC. India is vigorously pursuing the objective to become a developed nation by 2020. This requires the Indian economy to maintain an annual average growth rate of 8 per cent per annum. India has framed the "Look East" policy in pursuance of this objective. Now the look east policy is a vital part of India's foreign policy. More than an external economic policy or a political slogan, the look east policy was a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and its place in the evolving global economy. It was also a manifestation of India's belief that developments in East Asia are of direct consequence to its security and development. Therefore, India actively engaged in creating a bond of friendship and cooperation with East Asia that has a strong economic foundation and a cooperative paradigm of positive inter-connectedness of security interests. India

became a member of the ARF in 1996 and considers it as an experiment in fashioning a pluralistic, cooperative security order reflective of the diversity of the Asia Pacific region. India has also successfully clinched a free trade agreement with the ASEAN which had come into force on 1 January 2010. This had further enhanced the Indo - ASEAN trade. India is also a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) which includes the ASEAN members and India, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. It focuses on energy, environment, climate change, and sustainable development. The look east policy of India has included not only vigorous interaction with ASEAN but also improved relation with China. The ultimate objective was to evolve an Asian Economic Community on the lines of EU.

India has also pursued a policy of strengthening its economic and military power. It appears that in order to increase the national power India not only declared itself as a nuclear weapon power but also augmented its non-nuclear defense capabilities manifold. The maritime doctrine of India focuses mainly on building blue water navy.^[8] India's role in ensuring the security of Indian Ocean region has been recognized by major players in the region mainly because of the major shift in its external policy through a pragmatic approach. As a result, India was not hesitant to cooperate with any regional and extra regional powers. India has undertaken several innovative steps towards economic resurgence of the country. India's initiative to interact with nations at the bilateral and multilateral levels through various regional groupings appears to be based on this policy.

III. Indian Ocean and Australia's Security Concerns

Australia has a coastline of about 34000 kms and extensive offshore territories and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 10 million sqkms with extended continental shelf of 2.5 million sqkms. Australia has three broad maritime economic interests. They are (i) the use of the sea for seaborne trade (ii) submarine telecommunication cables, and tourism/recreational use and (iii) harvesting/extracting natural resources from the ocean and sea bed.^[9]

Australia is a significant maritime nation. Australia's national interests have far-reaching maritime congruence and its national security and maritime security are extensively concordant.^[10] One third of the exclusive economic zone of Australia lies in the Indian Ocean, and a significant portion of the country's coal, iron ore, liquefied natural gas and other resources is transported through the Indian Ocean. As a result,

Australia is very much concerned with ensuring maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

In the cold war period Australia as an ally of the Western bloc had vigorously supported the US presence in the Indian Ocean region. The US presence in the Indian Ocean ensured its security during the cold war period. It appears that there is no major change in Australia's Indian Ocean policy in the post-cold war period except that of better economic interaction with most of the Indian Ocean countries necessitated by the accelerated pace of globalisation process. Australia's Indian Ocean policy is well reflected in the White Paper issued by the Australian Defence Ministry in 2013.^[11] The White Paper noted that the Indian Ocean is now surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as the world's busiest trade corridor. It also stated that rapid economic growth in South, Northeast and Southeast Asia is driving stronger economic links with the resource-rich Middle East and Africa. And one-third of the world's bulk cargo and around two-thirds of global oil shipments pass through the Indian Ocean.

Australia has direct interests in stable trade routes through the Indian Ocean. Some of Australia's major trading partners – China, Japan, Singapore, India and the Republic of Korea – are heavily reliant on these routes for energy and raw material resources. Over eighty per cent of China's oil imports transit the area. States proximate to the major trade routes, such as Indonesia, are increasingly important to the region's strategic stability. As Australia further develops the North-West Shelf as a global source of liquefied natural gas and other petroleum resource exports, freedom and security of the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean will become even more important.^[12]

These shared economic interests will lead in turn to greater strategic interdependence, as those with a stake in this trade also share an interest in ensuring it flows freely. Australia consider that the United States is likely to remain the strongest maritime power and security guarantor in the Indian Ocean, but over the next two decades it also expect an increased presence from the maritime forces of China and India.^[13]

Australia's Indian Ocean policy also envisages that the efforts to better secure economic interests in the Indo-Pacific will occur as the capabilities of regional states grow. Australia consider that it is important for countries with an interest in Indian Ocean trade and energy flows to strengthen security collectively rather than individually, including by supporting the development of Indian Ocean regional architecture such

as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation. Australia also considers that India will become a very important partner in building security not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the broader Indo-Pacific region.^[14] Thus the Australian Indian Ocean policy incorporated the role of regional countries, especially India's part in ensuring maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

IV. India - Australia Maritime Security Cooperation

The change in the external milieu as a result of end of ideology based bipolar system and the accelerated pace of globalization, in fact unlocked many opportunities for cooperation between India and Australia, the two major democratic countries in the IOR. Concomitantly, the post cold war changes in India's Indian Ocean policy also provide an impetus to better cooperation. Further, India and Australia have several commonalities, which serve as a foundation for closer cooperation and multi-faceted interaction. Both are strong, vibrant, secular and multicultural democracies and both have a free press and an independent judicial system and the English language is also an important link.

Map I India and Australia – The shortest Maritime link (Chennai – Perth)



Source: Google Maps

The relationship between India and Australia has grown in strength and importance since India's economic reforms in the nineties and has made rapid strides in all areas - trade, energy and mining, science &

technology, information technology, education and defence. Again a joint statement issued at the conclusion of recent (June 2013) Indian Defence Minister's visit to Australia, stressed that both countries have agreed to continue Naval exchanges to build confidence and familiarity between the two Navies and work towards a bilateral maritime exercise in 2015.^[15] They also have agreed to continue consultations and cooperation on issues concerning the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions bilaterally as well as multilaterally, including through the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Indian Ocean Rim—Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC).

a. Elements of Security Cooperation

India and Australia Security cooperation has included the following elements:

- i. Information exchange and policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia region and on long-term strategic and global issues;
- ii. Bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia, in particular the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum;
- iii. Defence dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation signed in March 2006;
- iv. Efforts to combat terrorism;
- v. Cooperation to combat transnational organized crime;
- vi. Disaster management;
- vii. Maritime and aviation security;
- viii. Police and law enforcement cooperation.^[16]

b. Mechanisms of Cooperation

The following mechanism has been adopted to carry forward the above mentioned security cooperation between India and Australia:-

- i. Exchange of visits at high levels, including by foreign ministers;
- ii. Defence cooperation, which includes: Defence policy talks (Senior Officials level); Staff talks and service-to-service exchanges, including participation in exercises as agreed.
- iii. Consultations between the National Security Advisors of Australia and India.

- iv. Bilateral consultation to promote counter-terrorism cooperation through such means as the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism.
- v. Sharing knowledge and experience in disaster prevention and preparedness and relevant capacity building.^[17]

Australia and India have also agreed to work towards developing an action plan with specific measures to advance security cooperation. Both sides acknowledged that maritime security and freedom of navigation in accordance with principles of international law were critical for the growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. The growing Maritime Security cooperation between the two Navies is well reflected in the participation of Indian naval ships' in the International Fleet Review (IFR) held at Sydney in 2013 October. The Indian Navy had got an opportunity to showcase its growing military capability at the IFR. In the Defence Ministers meet 2013 they took note of the progress made in defence cooperation in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation concluded in 2006, the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation issued during the former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's visit to India in 2009 and the Joint Statement issued during the visit of Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2012.^[18]

The Defence Ministers have agreed that interactions held between the defence establishments of both sides in a variety of fields and at various levels have been mutually beneficial. Both sides were pleased with the bilateral architecture established for pursuing defence cooperation and agreed that consultations had helped deepen mutual trust and understanding between the defence establishments.^[19] Both countries were already cooperating through the IONS — which Australia chair since 2014 and the IOR-ARC, Australia is the current chair 2013 – 2015.

In order to further enhance bilateral defence cooperation between Australia and India, both have agreed:-

- i. to continue to have regular bilateral Defence Ministers' Meetings;
- ii. to promote exchanges between the defence establishments and the Armed Forces of both sides, including through the regular conduct of the Defence Policy Dialogue, Armed Forces Staff Talks and professional military exchanges;
- iii. to continue ongoing bilateral Naval exchanges to build confidence and familiarity between our Navies and work towards a bilateral maritime exercise in 2015;

- iv. to continue to cooperate in the Asia-Pacific region bilaterally and through various multilateral forum including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus);
- v. to enhance Indian Ocean cooperation, including through the framework and priorities of the IOR-ARC and the IONS; and
- vi. to promote the sharing and exchange of professional knowledge and experiences through participation in training courses in each other's military training institutions.^[20]

Recently, strategic and defence co-operation between India and Australia has been deepened. This has been facilitated by two important agreements: the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Co-operation, concluded in 2006, and the Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation, issued by the Prime Ministers of Australia and India in 2009. Further very recently the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi and the Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, had reaffirmed that the Strategic Partnership between India and Australia is based on converging political, economic and strategic interests; a shared desire to promote regional and global peace, security and prosperity and a commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.^[21]

V. Conclusion

During the cold war period India and Australia followed divergent approach towards ensuring maritime security. India as a nonaligned country stood for the elimination of external power presence and strategic autonomy. However in the post-cold war period mainly due to the changes in the international system and the changed security threat perception, India is not reluctant to engage with external powers in the maritime domain. Again the emergence of non-traditional threat to security also necessitated changes in the security threat perception. India's Indian Ocean policy of elimination of external power presence is replaced by active engagement with external powers.

Australia considers that strengthening maritime security cooperation with India is very important. Australia also believe that as a naval power among the Indian Ocean Rim countries, India has the most powerful navy and maritime guards, with special positioning advantages at key choke points of the Indian Ocean and therefore have a greater role in protecting maritime navigation. In addition, Australia also believes that it is necessary to step up cooperation with India in the areas of counter-

terrorism, nonproliferation, disaster management, and combating illegal migration. India values Australia's growing naval power and its role as a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation. India is also interested to join hands with Australia in maintaining maritime security in the Indian Ocean and enhancing the role of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation as a regional framework for maritime security. In addition to these bilateral compulsions, the external factor such as the US policy of rebalancing in the Asia Pacific region also envisages greater role for India and Australia in ensuring maritime security in the Indo Pacific region.

As the two major naval powers in the Indian Ocean region, having certain common interests and stakes in the Indian Ocean, it is imperative to strengthen India - Australia maritime security cooperation. It is also important to strengthen the existing regional structure to address the emerging maritime security challenges in the Indian Ocean. As Dennis Rumley has rightly pointed out that there is a compelling need to develop maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean region as the current structures are both fragmentary and incomplete.²² The maritime security cooperation structure need to be focused on 'functional cooperation' towards better economic interaction among the littoral and hinterland countries in the Indian Ocean region than on military security and power rivalry. At the same time freedom of navigation as per accepted international law, for the smooth conduct of seaborne trade, need to be protected.

India and Australia have several commonalities, which serve as a foundation for closer cooperation and multi-faceted interaction. Further, the change in the external milieu as a result of end of ideology based bipolar system, the accelerated pace of globalization, and the emerging non-traditional threats to security, in fact, unlocked many opportunities for cooperation in the maritime domain, between India and Australia, Concomitantly, the post cold war changes in India's Indian Ocean policy also provide an impetus to better strategic and security cooperation between these two leading democratic nations in the Indian Ocean region with a stable economic and political system.

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Role of Indonesia, South Korea and Japan in Strengthening Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

Mathew George

The Indo-Pacific is a region that has been gaining prominence in strategic and security discourse for some time. Here though, its security is often discussed as hinged and influenced on the participation by great powers such as the USA, China and India. This paper, however, would look in to the role of the regional powers that exist in the region and who are often referred to as the primary stakeholders of the region. In this regard, the paper would look at Indonesia, Japan and South Korea.

The Indo-Pacific is a region that has been gaining prominence in strategic and security discourse for some time.^[1] Here though, its security is often discussed as hinged and influenced on the participation by great powers such as the USA, China and India.^[2]

But, some times what is over looked is the prerequisite role that the powers that exist within the region need to play, and without them, all the formulations of the great powers would be nothing but exercises in diplomacy creating shells with no explosive power. One should not forget the vested interests of the other stakeholders in the region, nor their apprehensions.

This paper would seek to understand this role to be played by three countries that have a lot at stake in the maritime peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific. However, before any discussion on the roles of these countries, we must understand some of the maritime security issues that one faces in the Indo-Pacific.

One of the most important issues with regard to this region or any region is the importance of the idea of the freedom of the seas, and the protection of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). These ocean highways account for over 80 percent of global merchandize trade by volume with Asia and the developing countries adding a major to this share of global trade by sea.^[3] It is imperative then that these lifelines be protected. The protection of these SLOCs involves not only protection

from piracy and the related fight against illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, but also against the imposition of sovereignty on the waters to prevent the movement of vessels through a certain region. Climate change and its resultant effects on the population can also lead to risks in the maritime security. Further, environmental hazards and disasters caused by shipping and from shipping can also lead to disruption of trade, along with environmental phenomena that could also cause major destruction and damage to life and property.^[4]

What is evident though, is that a comprehensive security approach is required when it comes to ensuring the protection of the SLOCs and ensuring that trade is uninterrupted. This uninterrupted trade is or should be the major vested interest that is shared by all parties in the Indo-Pacific.^[5]

So effectively, what is the role that these countries play in Indo-Pacific Maritime security?

Indonesia enjoys geographical advantage, being sort of the gateway between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This makes its role crucial and substantial in any plan that involves the security of the SLOCs that pass through from one ocean in to the other feeding most of the energy needs of the economies of Asia (Manning 2000: 80), and Japan being almost solely dependent on supplies from the Middle East.^[6] In this regard, Indonesia one could say is the gate keeper, to the flourishing of the Asia century, with it having to ensure that the SLOCs in its region are protected to ensure that global trade carries on uninterrupted. To ensure this though, Indonesia does not have the capacity to on its own, and is part of programs that strengthen its capacity to patrol and protect this crucial region. One such program is the patrolling it carries out in the Straits of Malacca in the cooperative mechanism MALSINDO (where Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia together patrol and respond to incidents in the Straits of Malacca) and the use of reporting techniques like ReCAAP being effectively used by the participants of these seas.

Japan's interest in maritime security is more of an existential issue that it has understood well. Being an island nation, it depends on the seas for its economic progress and sustenance. However, it is more than aware of the limitations that it faces in sending ships to protect its interests in the sea, especially along the straits where issues of sovereignty are proclaimed loudly and fiercely. In addition, for the longest time, Japan limited itself in what it could do in the maritime sphere through the use of its Maritime Self Defence forces (SDF) with the limitations of Article 9 of its constitution. However, these have

changed over time. Japan did send its ships to the Arabian Sea and now has a base in Djibouti to protect its interests in the ocean. (Medcalf 2013: 63)

Korea, unlike the other two countries mentioned here is a peninsula. However, the importance of the seas is not one that is past it.

The security of the maritime environment is a critical issue for South Korea because it is effectively an island nation: its only land border is with North Korea, which is openly hostile to its very existence. Moreover, its near seas are the thoroughfare by which security threats have approached it in the past and are likely to approach it in the future. (Lea & McDevitt 2013: 1)

Yet, this does not mean that South Korea has established itself as a regional maritime power. South Korea seems to have accepted a capability gap with North Korea (militarily) although with a remarkable economic development.^[7]

In addition to this, it also seems that South Korea seems to be engrossed in the happenings of its neighbour, while not adequately ensuring that its maritime interests are protected.

“South Korea seriously lacks public awareness of maritime sovereignty, does not have sufficient education, institutions, and more importantly laws to back our territorial claims, should it be engaged in any international maritime disputes.” (Sang-Ho 2012)^[8]

Yet, this does not mean that South Korea does not see the possibility of any progress to be made with regards to a role in ensuring maritime security. Or that it prioritises its concerns of Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) over everything else. Japan’s sending of an envoy to soothe ties (Chutter 2013) was welcomed by South Korea and Japan’s involvement for the protection of South Korea (with United States of America bases in Japan) is something that South Korea understands. (Lea & McDevitt 2013: 5)

In this regard, what could be the role of South Korea?

Well, South Korea needs to first resolve its need for laws to ensure its maritime interests are taken in to account. In addition, it then needs to work with Japan in assisting other countries in the Indo-Pacific with modernisation and other assistance that it could provide (being in an economic and technological advantage than other countries in the region). In addition, the disbanding of the South Korean Coast Guard is an interesting development and the efficacy of the body to continue the work of the Coast Guard would be something that needs to be

taken into account. Whether the South Korean National Police Agency would be able to work closely to create better systems of management and standards of procedure to ensure maritime and coastal security and larger cooperation between neighbours into monitoring the sea would have to be hoped. However, since this looks to be a largely a reworking of organizational names and organizational set up, it can also be gauged that the functioning of the body wouldn't be hurt as much as maybe a moral episode for the organization to deal with loss of stature in the public's eye, yet, that's something that can be handled by the organization from within with a little support from the political brass.

Nonetheless, this does provide for a situation where the country can start on a clean slate to work on strengthening its naval capabilities and working towards a regional the bilateral mechanisms to ensure security for SLOCs. It would be historical, though, for these countries to work towards reconciliation, nonetheless their shared existence and economies depend on the need for cooperation against disruption in trade.

While all this is quite encouraging, should these countries decide to act purely on these interests, it is hard for them to come together and formulate mechanisms out of the blue just because it is in their best national interest. The local opinion of each other is often negative, with history playing a huge role in how each other are perceived. In addition, their immediate strategic concerns are not always the same. While the increasing influence of China is a cause for concern for all three countries, it is not particularly a rallying point for the countries to come together. In fact, the chance of these countries forming a strategic military alliance is not something that needs to be factored in for the immediate future. Yet, there are some things that are common. For instance, all three countries have good relations with the United States of America (USA) and India. Japan and South Korea are, in fact, allies of the USA. Although a tri-lateral working relationship is still something quite out of reach of the countries.

So what is the need for such a relationship should be developed or discussed? The answer to that is in what these countries offer to the security of the Indo-Pacific region as whole. As was discussed earlier in the paper, the Indo-Pacific region has its share of problems and security threats, and these countries possess certain qualities that can enable them to play pivotal roles in the region. Japan's and South Korea's technological and economical prowess combined with natural resources that Indonesia is endowed with, along with the crucial geostrategic

locations of all three in terms of Indo-Pacific trade and maritime security form an imperative need that these countries play an active role in the security of the Indo-Pacific.

Such instances of cooperation may be seen in the case of natural energy resources (Urabe 2014). Yet, this is more of a private initiative with private interests bringing parties together than any state mechanism to broker cooperation to enhance the security of the region. This push to there being cooperation on those lines would have to come from the countries being pushed by such business interests to ensure their investments and products so gathered from each other are protected through mechanisms and cooperation in the maritime sphere (through which such commodities are transported).

It would be an interesting development should Indonesia use its energy exporter tag to ensure that Japan and South Korea could offer to develop and enhance its capabilities to protect the precious maritime trade that occurs in its waters, and through this development, create a synergy between the three countries.

In summation, while each country would have to play a major role in their own close surroundings to ensure that maritime security is upheld. Japan and South Korea could move beyond their immediate waters to help and develop countries along their SLOCs to make sure that trade is not disrupted. This may be done through investing and sharing military technologies and also helping in the development of the economies of those countries. As was mentioned earlier, a strong local economy and law enforcement and legal framework in a country would deter its inhabitants from turning to piracy or environmentally destructive practices. Furthermore, Japan and South Korea can also help countries in the region in times of natural calamities and in technologies to mitigate and adapt against the adverse effects of climate change. However, it must be noted that these steps are not steps to increase the risk of exercises in the region. It is best to develop mechanisms of communication and trust among the countries to deal with issues of sovereignty and rights of passage.^[9] A relationship that is forged and maintained through interests in security be it of energy, environment, food and in the traditional sense.

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India's Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

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Abstract: India is one of the emerging major powers in the Indo-Pacific region and it is in India's interest that it has to form viable mechanism to safeguard its maritime interests. There are few countries in the region that could serve India's interests on a mutually beneficial cooperative set up. This paper probes into that aspect and looks into India's cooperation with Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia as these states are at vantage points in the Indo-Pacific region. The nature of engagements and the future prospects of this relationship have been analysed taking note of China's position in the same region. Indian navy's feasibility to safeguard its maritime interests has also been discussed in the context of its role in the IOR region. This paper tries to make sense of the cooperative mechanisms between India and few important countries to the east of India and the prospects that come along with such a network.

Keywords: Indo-Pacific, maritime security, maritime cooperation, regional strategic network, India, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia.

Introduction

As a major power in the Indian Ocean Region, India has already created a viable security environment and a sphere of influence among different states to safeguard its maritime security interests in the IOR. Consequent with its enlarged trade and maritime scope in the Indo-Pacific region, it is time for India to engage with states in the all encompassing strategically important Indo-Pacific region. In this background, it becomes imperative for India to forge ties with important stakeholders east of Indian Ocean. That will provide an effective platform for engaging important states to evolve joint strategies to deal with maritime challenges against their national interests.

Some analysts look towards the "Indo-Pacific" geostrategic cooperation as solely a US- led policy framework that is to balance and even contain China's increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian

Ocean, with the help of some countries in that region. Though the term 'Indo-Pacific' is still in its infancy; it is becoming more acceptable among strategic community and scholars. Multifaceted globalisation has ensured that developments from the Suez Canal to the Sea to Japan or from African shores of the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific were strongly interrelated and mutually dependent. Therefore, the new spatial concept 'Indo-Pacific' could be a useful tool to understand the geopolitics of the 21st century (Bhatia 2013).

The focus on the Indo-Pacific region has many contexts like that of maritime dimension of inter-state relations; interests in trade and commerce and security perspectives; an avenue to examine political priorities, etc. In this context, the shift of global interests from west to east underlined by the US' pivot towards Asia cannot be overemphasised. Further, it also helps to move away from older cartographic view of Indian and Pacific Oceans as separate entities and areas of operation. Indo-Pacific as a concept now bridges the two oceans to encourage the idea of 'confluence of the seas'. There has also been a transformation among the strategic community to look at the maritime domain from a traditional frontier and barrier to be protected to an enabling medium, facilitating dynamic economic and security interactions among interested parties on a mutually beneficial terms.

Indo-Pacific as a strategic regional network

Looking beyond the fixed geographic locations and relationships among neighbours, Muranushi, looks 'Regions as Networks', asserting that 'regions' should not be seen only as geographical divisions but also as changing networks of nations. He delves into the networks between different countries and how they help to attain their national interests and fulfil their priorities by using the advantages of having different countries in its network. In this framework, he analyses and compares the degree of relatedness among the states in a region to gauge the success of this model. On this premise, we can observe that how China has done well in the recent decades in different areas like trade, investment, tourism, migration, delegation, communication, disputes, etc. by identifying and creating a network with the states that played a central role in its bilateral/multilateral relations. This now holds true in case of India too, where it has been showing immense interests to forge a working network in the Indo-Pacific region from Madagascar to Australia, thus emphasising the concept of network as more important than their mere geography. This also gives more opportunities for other states to cooperate and coordinate their actions to fulfil their national

goals too. For its Indo-Pacific regional policy, India has some policy choices on the basis of some principles and ideas like that of balance of power, maintaining strategic autonomy and concept of democracies (Prabhakar 2013). Nevertheless, India's gradual increase in its capabilities, and the frequency and complexity of the naval exercises with some of the Indo-Pacific countries has raised India's benchmark as a regional power.

Even though US is very keen to cooperate and have some exclusive defence relationship with India, such a situation is not preferred by the Indian strategic community and the policy makers as it would bring a face off situation possibly with China and likely to disturb the regional maritime equilibrium. To avoid such kinds of confrontational posturing, it is preferable to have a coalition of middle powers – an informal arrangement where the powers in the middle would make it a priority to strengthen and help one another, working in self-selecting groups, or “mini-lateral” arrangements that do not include Beijing or Washington (Singh Nov. 2014). This kind of system will avoid India aligning closely with US alone and shall also achieve many strategic goals and national interests. In this context, Indo-Pacific region gives immense opportunity for India's interests.

India and China are the important maritime power operators in the region with their vast military set up and thus it is imperative to look into the nature of cooperation these two countries forge with other states. As such, China is having ambitious plans and projects to enhance the development of its periphery, that includes older the Silk Road economic belt, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Some Chinese scholars believe creating these kinds of new avenues of cooperation and developmental activities shall only boost and transform the Indo-Pacific region into the “Indo-Pacific Era” that could create thriving national economies in the region (Zongyi Nov 2014: 1). However, India is wary of Chinese involvement in its periphery and therefore has leaned forward to forge ties with other powers in the Indo-Pacific region to safeguard its interests and also to enhance the security needs of those countries. The new Indian government's “Act East” policy holds significance in terms of relationship with the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. Though at present this “action” would be mainly focussed on trade, business and investments, at some point of time this will eventually result in security “actions” to safeguard the business and trade interests that would be evolving in time. Thus gradually expanding from economic and cultural areas to strategic and security spheres.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi shows keen interest in creating a cordial neighbourhood policy among the South Asian countries and his swearing-in ceremony created a framework of engagement in this direction. Meanwhile he also wanted to extend a stronger relationship with some extra regional powers to have a viable mechanism for cooperation and development in trade and economy. His visits to Japan and Australia during August and September 2014 respectively can be viewed in that context.

India-Australia Cooperation

The two most important factors driving India-Australia maritime security cooperation are the growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” regional architecture. During PM Modi's visit to Australia in November 2014, India and Australia made an agreement for security and military co-operation based on shared values and aimed at defending a rules-based international order. India and Australia have also decided to establish the Framework for Security Cooperation to reflect the deepening and expanding security and defence engagement between two, and to intensify co-operation and consultation between Australia and India in areas of mutual interest (MEA 18 Nov. 2014). The mutual areas of interest have been identified as defence, counter-terrorism, cyber policy, disarmament and non-proliferation and maritime security. The agreement also paves way for regular meetings at the level of the Defence Minister, conduct regular maritime exercises and convene regular navy to navy, air force to air force and army to army staff talks (Garnault 2014).

Earlier, the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper assessed that the Indian Ocean will assume strategic significance in the forthcoming years, and would be as important as the Pacific. In continuation, its 2013 Defence White Paper clearly stated that cooperation with India in regional maritime security matters is critical and in fact advised to pursue on a priority basis along with Indonesia. Interestingly, Australia released a Country Strategy Document on India, only a few months after the release of the White Paper, and identified the Indian Navy as possessing the most potential capabilities for a close maritime partnership (Singh Nov. 2014). These are interesting developments at a time when the Indo-Pacific is gaining momentum and acceptance among the strategic community. India and Australia have already participated in several multilateral maritime exercises together, namely Malabar (2007) and Milan (2012). Both the countries have also agreed to hold a joint naval exercise in 2015 to enhance defence cooperation. These two have

already been working together in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and during the international fleet review in Australia in October 2013, *INS Sahyadri* had taken part and both the countries are members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association – that works on the principles of open regionalism for strengthening economic cooperation particularly on trade facilitation and Investment, promotion as well as social development of the region and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium - that seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues.

Evolving challenges in the Indo-Pacific region

One of the main challenges in the Indo-Pacific region is to avoid conflicts between the aspiring powers in the region in the realm of maritime dominance. India has proved its dominance in the Indian Ocean and has plans to add more teeth to its navy by building its capabilities that could push its interests in the Pacific region too. Meanwhile, China too is modernising its naval capabilities and after positioning itself as a formidable force in its vicinity and the Pacific region, it wants to push its interests in the Indian Ocean. The increasing number of port calls it has made in some African and Asian countries and its immense interest to create a new maritime silk route makes the picture clear in this aspect. These developments create a scenario of possible clash of influence and dominance between the region's powerful countries, India and China, worsening strategic competition and mistrust between them that has ramifications for regional stability. Another major changing scenario in the Asia Pacific region particularly to the east of Indian Ocean is that of disputes among different states on territorial claims and energy resources. China has been a party to many of these disputes with its neighbours. There have been some claims and counter claims by the different stake holders like china, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and others.

India-Vietnam Cooperation

On the above mentioned contesting background, India's efforts to strengthen its ties with some of the Southeast Asian countries have been witnessing some vibrant actions. India and Vietnam had decided to increase their defence and security ties accordingly. Trade and economic linkages grew under India's 'Look East' policy particularly in the last decade with considerable substance and momentum. Now combined with India's new "Act East" policy will only bring rich

dividends for both the countries in many aspects. Accordingly India has signed agreement with Vietnam that will see the supply of four naval patrol vessels to and increased training of its military personnel (The Times of India Oct. 2014). This came closer just after a month India extending \$100 million Line of Credit (LoC) for defence procurement. The agreement between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Dung, to boost defence and security ties is likely to irk China. India said that the defence cooperation between India and Vietnam is among the most important ones for India and pledged it's commitment towards the modernisation of Vietnam's defence and security forces. On these lines, India is planning to train Vietnam pilots, in addition to the ongoing trainings provided to the Vietnam Navy personnel. Vietnam is also in the process of strengthening its military bases in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea that could strengthen its defence substantially. India and Vietnam have a long-standing defence relationship but till recently, it has been restricted to military exchanges, training, spares and maintenance of military hardware.

Joint military exercises between both the countries have not been a regular feature in the past ((Jha 2008: 23). But lately, there has been an increased activity in this aspect particularly with regard to naval exercises. In recent times both the countries have come together to gather and share intelligence and border-monitoring data. India brings its superior experience and surveillance and satellite monitoring capabilities to help Vietnam monitor the movement of pirates and drug traffickers along its coastline. With Vietnam's plan of action for upgrading its military capabilities, it only stands to gain from Indian expertise on information technology and e-technology applications. This is gaining in importance in the wake of the more proactive role of the major powers in the region. Indian companies are also investing in Vietnam in oil and gas exploration, mineral exploration and processing, sugar manufacturing, agro-chemicals, IT, and agricultural processing. Vietnam too has three investment projects in India with total investment of US\$ 23.6 million (MEA December 2013). Indian investments in the Vietnamese energy sector has rubbed China on the wrong side and it has expressed concerns with India not to fish in the troubled waters as the bocks allocated by Vietnam for India fall under the area that is part of disputed territories that both Vietnam and China claim.

Consolidation and strengthening the relations between the two sides are mainly the result of the continuous high level visits including the Prime Ministers, Defence Ministers and other officials and policy makers

from both sides. The Strategic Partnership between the two countries, established in 2007, set out very clearly the five pillars of cooperation. They are the political, defence and security cooperation, economic cooperation and commercial engagement, closer trade and investment, science and technology, cultural and technical cooperation, and cooperation at multilateral and regional forums (Panda 2013). Apart from providing technical training and vessel construction, military hardware procurement and transfers form one of the important components of recent military exchanges and cooperation between the two countries. During President Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Vietnam in September 2014, both the countries had reiterated their desire and determination to work together to maintain peace, stability, growth and prosperity in Asia. Both countries were of the opinion that freedom of navigation in the East Sea/South China Sea should not be impeded and also called the parties concerned to exercise restraint, avoid threat or use of force and resolve disputes through peaceful means in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the UNCLOS-1982 (Srivastava 2014). These developments are a precursor to suppose that India is prepared to assume the role of 'regional balancer' and extend its influence beyond the immediate South Asian neighbourhood.

India-Indonesia cooperation

Indonesia is also under a new leadership and the new president, Joko Widodo, has given top priority for maritime policies, which offers an avenue for cooperation for many countries. His priorities are on the revival of Indonesia's maritime culture; improved management of Indonesia's oceans and fisheries; boosting Indonesia's maritime economy; maritime diplomacy that encourages Indonesia's partners to work together to eliminate conflict arising over illegal fishing, breaches of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy, and environmental concerns like marine pollution; and bolstering Indonesia's maritime defences, to support the country's maritime sovereignty, wealth and maritime security.

One of the main concerns for Indonesia is to ensure its maritime security is to get the code of conduct in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN completed, that shall result in reducing the tensions in the disputed sea. During the East Asia Summit held in Napyidaw in 2014, President Joko recognized Indonesia's position as a "fulcrum between two oceans" to bolster its maritime defences both to protect its own sovereignty and for regional safety of navigation and maritime security.

In this aspect Indonesia's defence budget especially of its navy, will benefit from a targeted funding as part of a planned increase in overall defence spending to around 1.5 percent of gross domestic product within five years from 0.9 percent at present (Neary 2014). It is also planning to establish a coast guard of its own to take care of the different aspects of port and maritime security. Indonesia's new maritime policy presents interesting opportunities for collaboration in trading and security aspects.

The Indian and the Indonesian navies are regularly conducting coordinated maritime patrols from the year 2000 along the International Maritime Boundary Line. Indonesian Navy is a part of the annual Milan series of naval exercises. The Indian Navy also provided timely aid in 2004 during the tsunami that hit Aceh province of Indonesia. India and Indonesia had signed a MoU on counterterrorism in 2004 and Indonesia's experience in successfully fighting against terrorism will prove exemplary for India to face maritime terrorist threats. In spite of this, cooperation in the security sphere has not reached its potential. The Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2001 between the two countries was a milestone, but it took seven years to ratify and this kind of lacuna shall not be afforded in the present context of increased maritime threat perceptions. Reinvigorating bilateral defence cooperation between the two would require Indonesia to seek a convergence of its maritime interests with India by improving the awareness of its Indian Ocean neighbourhood in the same way it regards the Pacific. Sea lanes security is supreme for Indonesia's Indian Ocean maritime trade as its natural resources and mineral exports to India are set to grow in time. In this context, India-Indonesia relations on various maritime security interests are set to converge and get stronger.

Feasibility of the Indian Navy

India's cooperative mechanism in the Indo-Pacific region gains strength from the success it has gained from the Indian Ocean region. Indian Navy's capabilities form an important factor in shaping a feasible cooperative mechanism on maritime interests of other countries with that of India. The Indian Navy is currently the largest and the most balanced navy in the IOR region and the ongoing cooperative process only promises to make it more potent. The naval component of a nation's military strength possesses distinct advantages, not available to the other services. Besides war fighting, the other two roles, viz., policing and diplomacy, form the triad supporting the *raison d'être* of a nation's navy. This makes clear the rationale behind the increased maritime

cooperation between India and Maldives. Unlike the army, the Indian government avoided involving its navy in UN peacekeeping or multinational coalitions. This all changed drastically with the Indian Navy's supportive role in thwarting the attempted *coup d'état* on Maldivian government on 3rd November 1988; and involving in peacekeeping operations in Somalia in 1992 (the first ever naval involvement in a UN mission) (Karthikheyan 2011: 23). These developments augmented the Indian Navy's growing credibility in the region. India has become a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond (United States of America 2010).

The Indian Navy's role in safeguarding the economic interests of the nations in the IOR region has also met with commendable success and appreciation lately. This is evident from China's positive statement issued after the Indian Navy rescued 10 Chinese sailors kept as hostages onboard a Chinese commercial ship from the Somali pirates in April 2011. This clearly shows that China currently needs to engage with India to secure its sea lines of communications in the Indian Ocean. This also highlights the fact that China currently possesses limited power projection capability and lacks credible blue-water Navy.

Indian and navies of some South East Asian countries have for long conducted the Milan series of naval exercises. The Indian Navy also conducts coordinated patrols with Thailand and holds joint exercises with Singapore and Japan. Apart from the Malabar naval exercise, India and Japan had for the first time had joint naval exercises in June 2012. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in May 2013, it was agreed to renew the exercises and increase their frequencies (Panda 2013).

Conclusion

Maritime cooperation of the nature that India is nurturing with Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia is mainly driven by the need for India's presence in the Indo-Pacific due to strategic and economic reasons. The growing nature of India's international stature necessitates a wide ranging cooperation that will eventually secure its long-term interests both military and non-military. The Indo-Pacific regional conceptualisation is an appropriate medium for India to broaden and deepen its political and economic engagements throughout the region.

Nurturing India's relationship with Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia would be a significant step towards building the region, as these states are in strategic vantage points in the Indo-Pacific region and have immense potential for mutual developmental prospects. This gains

importance on India's own geopolitical engagements and is also critical in maintaining strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. This also comes from the realisation that no single state could have the full capacity and responsibility in the vast region where multitude of regional geopolitical interests and confrontations on various aspects are perceived to emerge and converge. China's reactions towards this changing matrix in the region should also be factored in to have a prudent cooperative mechanism without much of a visible confrontation that facilitates wider acceptability, reach and effectiveness.

Any new framework that is put in place takes time to evolve and mature and it is very true in international relations involving many sovereign stakeholders. Such a cooperative framework has to be given some time to attain momentum and to move towards optimisation of benefits. Moreover, there is a plethora of opportunities for all the states along with others in the Indo-Pacific region and there should be more people-to-people contact, naval exercises, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief, search and rescue operations, joint maritime patrolling and joint investments in the region to realise its potential. Now the onus is not on any single leadership of the Asia-Pacific region, rather it is a shared responsibility on mutually beneficial cooperative mechanism that will bring benefits to the stake holders in the widest possible terms and India stands to gain immensely from such an outcome.

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Securing India's Maritime Gateways Seaport Security Market Opportunities for the Private Sector in India

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Abstract

This article briefly studies the seaport security market opportunities for the private sector that manufacture specialised security related components, such as surveillance equipment, detectors and communications systems for the security forces dedicated to port security – typically a combination of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the local police force. The article looks into the Indian market size and assesses the market dynamics and competitive environment and offers suggestions and recommendations on how the private sector catering to India's seaport can view this growing market segment.

Keywords: Seaports, Maritime Trade & Commerce, Ministry of Shipping, Major Ports, Minor Ports, Tsunami, Terror Attacks

Introduction

India's rich maritime history

India has a rich recorded history of maritime activities. There exists irreproachable proof of trade links through the sea with other world civilisations such as Rome, Mesopotamia, Egypt and China. These exchanges have been in practice since the days of the Harappan civilisation. In fact India's maritime activities predate even that of many western civilisations. It is believed that the world's first tidal dock was located in Lothal, on the Gujarat coast, around 2400 BC during the height of the Indus Valley civilisation.

The ancient Hindu scriptures, the Vedas, and the Rig Veda in particular that dates back to 2000 BC, offers obeisance to Lord Varuna – the Lord of the seas. Today the Sanskrit line “Shanno Varunaha” is the motto of the Indian Navy. Many Indian kings from coastal kingdoms have been promoters of maritime trade and commerce. The expansion of religions

of Indian origin and culture in neighbouring littoral states support this statement.

Indian ports today

The Indian subcontinent has a vast coastline spanning over 7500 kilometers. This huge coastline is dotted and serviced by 13 major ports and over 186 notified minor and intermediate ports that handled 911.5 million metric tonnes of cargo in 2012, which is expected to reach 1,758 million metric tonnes by 2017.^[1] As recent as April–May 2014, major ports in the country are recorded to have handled 95.87 million metric tonnes as per statistics released by the Indian Ports Association (IPA). This brief statistics reveals the important role that ports play as the gateway for international maritime trade and commerce.^[2]

Here is a list of the 13 major ports of India.

1. **Mumbai Port:** The Port of Mumbai is the largest and busiest port of India. Established in 1873, the port today handles over 12% of the total sea-borne export-import of India. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Mumbai port was the most pre-eminent commercial port in this part of Asia. As such, it has played a key role in the development of Mumbai as the commercial capital of India.
2. **Kandla Port:** This port, located on the Gulf Kutch, is a tidal port and plays an important role in the development of the state of Gujarat. The Kandla port (built during the 1950s) is a result of the 1947 separation of India and Pakistan, when the Karachi port went to Pakistan.
3. **Marmagoa Port:** The Marmagoa Port, one of the oldest in the country, also doubles up as a naval base on the western coast. The port was commissioned in 1888 and declared a major port in 1964.
4. **Visakhapatnam Port:** Situated on the eastern coast of India, the Port of Visakhapatnam is the deepest protected (land-locked) port in the country. The port also serves as the headquarters of the Eastern Command of the Indian Navy.
5. **Chennai Port:** One of the oldest ports in the country, the Chennai Port is an artificial port providing services to the nation's economy for over 130 years.
6. **Kolkata Port:** The Kolkata Port, which consists of two docks - Kolkata dock and Haldia dock, is the only riverine major port of the country. The docks are facilitated with wide-ranging facilities

to handle a variety of cargo. This port also has the largest dry dock of all the major ports of India.

7. **Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNPT)**: Located in the commercial hotspot of Navi Mumbai, this port is today the fastest growing port in India. The importance of the port can be understood from the fact that it handles 65% of India's container traffic.
8. **New Mangalore Port**: This is the only port in the state of Karnataka. Inaugurated in 1975, it singularly handles the export of Kudremukh iron ore and imports crude and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) products, LPG, wood pulp, timber logs, fertilisers, liquid ammonia, phosphoric acid, other liquid chemicals, containerised cargo, and other chemicals.
9. **Tuticorin Port**: A minor port till recently, the Tuticorin Port was declared a major port after it merged with a recently constructed major port in the same town. The port was a minor port until Tuticorin minor port and the newly constructed Tuticorin major port were merged and the Tuticorin Port Trust was constituted. It today handles many types of cargo and connects with neighboring countries such as Sri Lanka, Singapore, Maldives, Indonesia, and so on.
10. **Cochin Port**: This port is situated in the south-eastern coast of India in the state of Kerala. It is situated on Willingdon Island - an artificial island created in the iconic and beautiful backwaters of the state.
11. **Paradip Port**: Declared as the 8th major port of India, this facility situated in the eastern coast on the state of Odisha serves industries situated in the eastern and central regions of the country.
12. **Ennore Port**: This port is unique due to the fact that it is a 'Public company' whereas all other major ports are run by the central government. Originally planned to be a satellite port to ease the cargo and shipping traffic off the Port of Chennai, this port is designed as a dedicated energy port. However, it also handles a variety of cargoes.
13. **Port Blair**: The latest addition to the major ports of the country, the Port of Port Blair was declared as one in 2010. Located on the Andaman Islands, this port serves as the primary port of the island group and serves as the hub of regional shipping.




Fig. 1: Map of sea ports in India^[3]

Administrative Structure and Organisation

The Ministry of Shipping

The Ministry of Shipping is a department of the Government of India. It is the primary institution that is responsible for the complete running of the shipping commerce and related services and infrastructure, such as the shipping fleet and seaports, of the country. Today, this ministry, under the BJP government, is headed Minister Nitin Gadkari.

The origins of the shipping ministry can be traced to pre-independence days in 1942 during when the Department of Communications was segmented into two critical sub-departments: Department of Posts and Department of War Transport. The latter department encompassed all vital logistics of the country such as major ports, railways, roads and water transport. Due to the heady days of the Second World War, it also looked into petrol rationing and producer gas. Subsequently, shipping and port management were also added under the department's purview. Over the decades since independence, road transport and shipping were divided into separate ministries. But in 2004, both the ministries were brought together and renamed as Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways. This ministry has two departments - Department of Shipping and Department of Road transport and Highways.

The nation's economic background

It is important to understand the economic status of the country to assess its maritime commerce and more importantly, to understand the role of seaports. The Indian economy is the eight largest in the world by nominal GDP and the third-largest by purchasing power parity (PPP)^[4]. According to Moody's, the Economic Growth Rate of India would be 5.5% in 2014-15.^[5] However, the country's services-led boom has not yet had a significant effect in raising living standards of the poor, with more than a third of India's over one billion population still living on less than a dollar a day. It is unclear how much of a priority extensive maritime security spending will be relative to social spending to alleviate poverty.

A vast supply of relatively cheap, skilled labour has turned India's service industry into one of the world's largest. More than half of the population is under the age of 25. Booming exports of IT-enabled services, from call centres to software developers, continue to be a valuable source of foreign exchange. This supply of labour is expected to affect the level of manpower employed in security (in relation to technologies and systems) and the country's technological sophistication (which is expected to increase soon).

India has a skilled workforce, but its business environment is crippled by excessive government interference. Foreign investment remains restricted in many sectors with greater liberalisation opposed by the left of the Indian political spectrum.

Indian economy showed high growth rate averaging 9% from 2003 to 2007. The global financial crises starting in 2008 also affected India. Over ten years ago, Goldman Sachs prophesied that India's GDP (in current prices) would overtake France and Italy by 2020, Germany, UK and Russia by 2025 and Japan by 2035, making it the third largest economy of the world, behind the US and China. Economists view India as a rising economic global power and will play a decisive role in global economy.^{[6],[7]}

In 2012, Indian economy began a phase of anaemic growth slowing down to just 4.4%. This brought to the fore other economic problems that were besetting the country: a plunging Indian rupee, a persistent high current account deficit and slow industrial growth. The Indian economy was affected by the US Federal Reserve's decision to decrease quantitative easing. Consequently, foreign investors began rapidly pulling out money from the country. This brief trend is now reversing and the current account deficit is narrowing substantially.

Government policies: What's in store for India's seaports

According to the Constitution of India, the structure of the government is that of a federation. Duties fall under three lists: Central, state and concurrent. Maritime transport comes under the concurrent list and thus is controlled by both the state and central governments – major ports are governed by the centre and minor ports are administered the state government in which the particular port is situated. Most of the minor and intermediate ports, which are over 180, have been identified for phased development involving public-private partnership. The development of ports depend on multiple factors such as the rate of development of industries in the hinterland, increase in export-import in the state in which the port is situated, overall trade policies of the government, the situation of the port and neighbouring trading countries and so on.

Ports play a vital role in promoting growth of the country's trade and commerce. The Ministry of External Affairs' website states "Around 95 per cent of India's trade by volume and 70 per cent by value takes place through maritime transport, according to the Ministry of Shipping."^[8] This statement drives clearly explains the intrinsic value of ports.

The ministry under the Prime Ministerial leadership of Mr Narendra Modi has sanctioned 100% Foreign Direct Investment under the projects related to the construction and maintenance of ports and harbours in

India and its maritime territories. In this regard, it has also sanctioned a 10-year tax exemption to participating enterprises that are developing, maintaining and operating ports, inland waterways and inland ports.

Over the past one-and-a-half decades (2000-2014) FDI to the ports sector was valued at US\$1,635.40 million as per records of the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. During the financial year 2013-14 the ports sector in India initiated over 30 projects that cumulatively drew investments of US\$ 3.26 billion - is a three-fold increase over the past financial year.

The state and central governments also offer sops such as tax holidays to enterprises involved in port development, maintenance and operation including inland waterways and inland ports. The 2010-2020 National Maritime Agenda of the Ministry of Shipping outlining the framework for port development suggests policy-related plans to enhance operation effectiveness in the country.

The 12th Five-Year Plan of the Planning Commission of India has earmarked US\$ 29.49 billion and has set a target capacity of over 3,130 MT by 2020 – largely driven by the private sector. Minor ports have a major role to play as they will be handling 50% of the total capacity.

Security Analysis

India is a rapidly growing economy with increasingly high interest levels in regional and other foreign markets. The growing industrial base makes its seaports an ever-open hub of import-export activity. Over 75% of the total cargo traffic is handled by major ports, minor ports account for 25% of maritime trade traffic. As space, labour and the effective management of limited resources to meet increasing demands are always in high demand, ports have become vulnerable zones for commercially illegitimate practices. To add to this, India, since the past twenty-five years is witness to increasing incidents of terrorist incidents.

The threat from the seas is real and often goes undetected. Despite the ever vigilant work of the Indian Coast Guard and the presence of over 42 Coast Guard Stations, 5 Coast Guard Air Stations and 10 Coast Guard Air Enclaves^[9], the Coast Guard is still inadequate to secure the coasts, let alone promote India's interests. While, India's vast coastline continues to be very porous, its ports remain half-open gateway for terrorists, smugglers and contraband runners. While establishments such as the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and the Central Reserve Police

Force (CRPF) along with their state counterparts, the Customs Department and the Indian Coast Guard look into the security of these vital institutions, nefarious activities continue to plague port security.

While it is one thing to check smuggling of contraband, gun running and drug exchange in ports and harbours, which will increase over the decades as terrorist groups, criminal gangs and international mafia become stronger and expand areas of operation, the protection of seaports themselves will be an increasingly complex task.

While the security from man-made incidents is constantly under the scanner of security forces, natural disasters are also considered a security hazard. The December 2004 tsunami is still strong in the minds of the people of south-east Asia and India despite the fact that it occurred over a decade ago. The earthquake registered 9.0 in magnitude and was the biggest in four decades. Despite having been triggered near the Indonesian island of Sumatra this Indian Ocean earthquake hit the southern peninsular coast of India. The ports of Vishakhapatnam, Chennai, Tuticorin, Port Blair and even Cochin suffered large to medium damages due to the tsunami. It is interesting to note the tide gauge levels at Vishakhapatnam, Chennai, Tuticorin and Cochin during the tsunami.




Fig. 2: Gauge level in Vishakhapatnam Port^[10]

Securing India's Maritime Gateways




Fig. 3: Gauge level in Chennai Port^[11]




Fig. 4: Gauge level in Tuticorin Port^[12]




Fig. 5: Gauge level in Cochin Port^[13]

Outlook of the Indian Market

General Market Drivers

Increased threat perceptions: India's recent surge in criminal and terrorist activity on India's territorial waters, coupled with the exorbitant number of fatalities/ casualties within the country's borders (such as in the aftermath of 26 November 2008 Mumbai attack), has led to an increase in threat perceptions. This is expected to lead to significant levels of spending on maritime security arrangements and on critical infrastructure such as seaports. This has consequently resulted in the Indian government looking to expand its capabilities and become versatile in order to combat smuggling and potential attacks penetrating the maritime gateways.

Privatisation of the Indian defence industry: Since 2001, the Indian government has been trying to enable greater private sector participation in the building, maintenance running of Indian seaports. This has created greater investment opportunities as there has been an increasing investment from private sector security product and service providers and the scope for joint ventures in the Indian seaport security market is greater due to the offset policy of the Indian Government. As stated

earlier, the Ministry of Shipping has opened 100% Foreign Direct Investment under projects related to the construction and maintenance of ports and harbours in India and its maritime territories.

Growth of the Indian economy: The Indian economy has been growing at an average rate of 8 per cent during the 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012)^[14] and this growth rate is expected to continue over the forecast period. This has created opportunity for the Indian government to increase investment for security-related investments, including seaport security. India's drive to create an increasingly sophisticated critical infrastructure security force is expected to create greater investment opportunities in this security category.

Another important factor is the number of 'pro-trade' policies that the government is rolling out with India's neighbours and distant countries. These policies form the life-breath of international maritime commerce. Increased foreign trade directly impacts the scale of operations in Indian seaports.

General Market Restraints

Absence of continuous investment opportunities: One of the most important obstacles to investment in the Indian security market, in general, is the absence of continuity in investment opportunities. Certain threat domains, such as airport, transportation and seaport security, present greater opportunities for investment. However, with growing maritime interests and greater knowledge about the boons of India's maritime zone, stakeholders in national and international maritime security are showing increased interest over the recent past.

More manpower, less technology: Indian paramilitary forces provide security to still handle a majority of the security operations with regard to critical infrastructure protection in India. The reliance on manpower is still quite heavy because of the prohibitive costs involved in procuring more sophisticated security measures. However, seaports require influx of robust and foolproof security technology to enable 'human resources' to better handle the security requirements of India's maritime gateways. Advanced surveillance technologies are imperative to secure national interests in the country's seaports.

Diverse threat domains, mixed opportunities: With threat perceptions varying across domains, the levels of security-related spending across the threat domains are expected to vary considerably as well. For instance, investment opportunities are bright in airport security and

mass transit security compared to other domains. Seaports are increasingly closer to the centre of the Indian shipping ministry's radar due to the increasing need of these maritime hubs to fuel the growth of the economy.

Indian Seaport Security Market

Recent developments


Research reports today present a dismal picture of India's major and minor ports. The ports are congested, ineffectively managed and lack basic facilities for dredging, automation and effective long-term storage facilities that are of international standard. All these make Indian ports not only inadequate to meet the country's rapidly growing cargo handling requirement, but also make them prone to terrorism attacks and illegal maritime commercial activities. While smaller neighbours such as Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia and larger and direct regional competitors such as China have systematically invested in superior seaport infrastructure and service, Indian ports are yet to reach benchmarked standards – despite the nation being a leading state in the global maritime forum.

However, the Ministry of Shipping seems to be intent in enhancing port performance going forward. This is reflected in its 2010-2020 National Maritime Agenda that outlines the framework for port development. This agenda suggests policy-related plans to enhance operation effectiveness in the country that aims to translate investments into actual capability of quadrupling current cargo throughput by 2020. But as Indian ports are already functioning at over optimum levels and are literally bursting at their seams, the coming years present opportunity for port development and allied industries (including seaport security) great opportunity towards development and management at massive levels. This also implies that current (existing) facilities have to be spruced up to meet international standards so as to bring all Indian seaports under a uniform quality umbrella.

Indian container shipping will witness largest sectarian development by 2016 - approximately 24% of the total maritime cargo growth volume. As far back as 2008-2009 approximately 25 projects were initiated to increase channel and berths at a cost of US\$13.95 billion. Such projects were initiated in anticipation of the growing volumes of containers (numbers) and the resultant sizes of container ships that will visit Indian ports in the coming years. This estimates to around 94 million containers handled by Indian ports by the year 2016-2017.

The US\$29.49 billion earmarked by the 12th Five-Year Plan to enable handling capability of over 3,130 MT by 2020 by ports includes approximately 4.5% on port security measures.

Market Drivers & Restraints



Development of existing seaports

Increase in cargo traffic, especially containers

Broadening transportation bandwidth

Keeping abreast with security initiatives

Container throughput is not spread across ports

India's seaport security is still manpower intensive

Container throughput is limited

Size, experience and proximity matters

Analysis of market drivers

Development of existing seaports: Indian seaports need drastic upgrades to not only keep in pace with economic development, but to also contribute as a key stake holder in the nation's developmental agenda. Over 85% of Indian ports' capabilities have cumulatively exceeded their capabilities. Approximately US\$520 million is expected to be spent for comprehensive security solution procurement by 2020. However, depending on the security scenario in and around the country, security assessments may drive further spending on technology solutions. Port security is currently manpower intensive (CISF). To reduce long-term costs on human resources, port administration must invest on robust technology solutions such as CCTVs, scanners and remote sensors.

Increase in cargo traffic, especially containers: By the year 2020, India is expected to handle approximately 3,130 metric tonnes of cargo annually cumulatively across all ports. The Indian government's Maritime Agenda 2020 states, "By 2020, according to some estimates, global container throughput will reach 1 billion TEU, double last year's total of roughly 500m TEU. Much of this growth will occur in the emerging economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America where port and terminal infrastructure investment is still needed to accommodate predicted trade flows."^[15] It needs no great calculation to understand that India will see a substantial raise in container traffic that

consequently requires a proportional increase in scanning and detecting equipment for the ports to remain compliant with specific security initiatives.

Broadening transportation bandwidth: Speed is of the essence. Major industries such as the automobile industry, machineries, food and so on depend on quick, hassle-free logistics. Many multi-national corporations prefer locating their manufacturing bases in India to facilitate cost-effective manufacturing vis-a-vis locations in Europe and the United States.^[16] However, to maintain India's industrial attractiveness, the relevant authorities will have to rapidly increase the ports' capacity to accommodate the increase in industrial activity and international trade. To enhance logistics, the government is mulling over 'coastal shipping' to ease burden on railways and to decongest highways. This, in the future, will call for creation of local 'mini' ports to handle coastal shipping traffic - again a widening horizon for private security technology solution providers.

Keeping abreast with security initiatives: While it may be easier said than done - and definitely not a fluid developmental exercise - in the interest keeping abreast with the latest security initiatives of the government and international standards, it becomes imperative for port authorities to heighten their security standards and thus, increase adoption of effective security technologies and systems.

Analysis of market restraints

Container throughput is not spread across ports: Despite rapid increase of cargo of all types across all seaports, especially containers, most container cargo are handled by Mumbai and JNPT followed by Kandla and then Chennai.^[17] Mumbai and JNPT together accounted for 70% of all containers handled at seaports throughout the country. While container handling is expected to be spread among the smaller shipping industry participants, the current concentration of container handling within two ports is expected to represent a significant hurdle given that multiple security market participants are going to operate in such a narrow marketplace.

Container throughput is limited: Despite the growing aspiration of the Indian people and the resultant blooming economy, Indian ports' throughput is relatively small when compared to other major economies - especially its Asian rival, China. For example, KPMG in its report, 'All aboard! Insights into India's maritime community' states, "At USD 8.3 trillion, China's GDP is approximately 4.5 times that of India's (by value).

In comparison, China's container traffic is estimated at 140 million TEUs while that of India is estimated at 10 million TEUs, reflecting a 14 times rise in container volumes.¹⁸ While this is a restraint for market opportunities, it will definitely expand during before 2020.

India's seaport security is still manpower intensive: Despite the government's need to tighten security by leveraging technology, this domain is still driven predominantly by human resources. The Central Industrial Security Force, which largely secures the country's entire critical infrastructure such as sea and air ports, research installations and power sources, is driven by manpower. It does not rely heavily on technology as a force multiplier unlike the Indian armed forces.

Size, experience and proximity matters: The clients of the Indian defence market in general are prone to hear large market players who exude experience and thought leadership. With respect to seaport security opportunities, significant expertise in related security technologies and solutions along with a implementation track record encompassing the entire gamut of critical infrastructure security solutions stand a higher chance of making it through tender selection processes. This may, thus, prove to be a challenge for small and medium enterprises. However, OEM agreements with established and Indian participants will enable a good foothold.

Critical success factors

The Indian defence and allied industries were dominated by large public sector undertakings (PSUs). The Indian economy was a closed one up to the early 1990s and even after the liberalisation of other sectors in 1991, this sector did not liberalise until a decade later. The government allowed foreign direct investment and greater participation from the private sector, and the leading private sector companies began to emerge in the Indian defence / security industry - but to a limited extent.

The Indian Seaport Security segment of the Critical Infrastructure / Maritime Security market falls under the purview of the Ministry of Shipping, which sets the procurement-related regulations and fixes budgets for seaports and related infrastructure under its control. The foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations that apply to infrastructure development and maintenance also apply to the seaport security market.

The commoditised security products (such as surveillance and scanning systems) are provided by a large number of indigenous companies that offer an extensive range of configurations. Till a few years ago, more

sophisticated and costly technologies (such as radar systems) are generally provided by foreign companies in partnership with Indian companies. However, this is now changing with increasing number of SMEs specialising in niche technologies.^[19]

The prospects for systems integrators are quite high, given the number of platforms that port administrations are looking to purchase. Integration with current security systems and infrastructure will be critical as individual (port-based) security arrangements are a combination of both technology-based and manpower-based systems - with a heavy leaning towards the latter. Thus, a successful solution will have to consider how new systems will integrate with the predominantly manpower-intensive Indian security measures installed.

Purchase and annual maintenance costs will be a major parameter in deals. Given the large number of market participants, most of the competition will be based around the cost effectiveness of whichever systems and/or technologies being implemented.

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Southeast Asia's Cooperative Efforts in Maritime Security: Is Maritime Regionalism an answer?

Anushree Chakraborty

Introduction

Southeast Asia is essentially a maritime region. The maritime space and strategic sea-lanes striding the region supports the continued existence of these nations. In recent times, the maritime space of this region, which is section of the Indo-Pacific stretch, became the epicenter of geo-strategic matrices. It is increasingly believed that “the history of the 21st century will be written in Asia”.^[1] And ASEAN has become the most conducive stage where great power rivalries and competition for influence are being played out. In this context, the sea at large provides the appropriate theater in balancing act for various flags considering its expediency to project power. The Southeast Asian maritime domain is one such volatile theater confronting challenges both from the traditional means as well as from transnational sources. Notwithstanding the otherwise improving relations among ASEAN members and their deepening cooperation in various fields, there are impending maritime disputes between them which augments possibility of upsetting the future stability of the region. Moreover, with the economic prosperity and surplus wealth, the Southeast Asian countries and other major Asian players have strengthened their navies in the last decades, thereby seen actively visible in ASEAN waters. The presence of strong impervious extra-regional navies adds to the precariousness at sea.

In the last sixty years, Southeast Asian countries tried the most successful experiment of regionalization in the Third World circle. ASEAN regionalism has eroded the past misgivings and bilateral irritants among the members thus encouraging cooperation and collaboration in all sectors including security. The association founded in 1967, is presently aiming at transforming the region of ten members into a community by 2015. In fact, the community building process is forging ASEAN security community wherein maritime security receives precedence in

the security architecture of ASEAN. Furthermore, the horizon for ASEAN is expanding bringing in the East Asian countries in the ASEAN contour. Therefore, it is important to examine the past efforts undertaken by ASEAN and its predominant 'plus three members' in order to address the future challenges at sea. Accordingly, the article will highlight the maritime security issues currently confronting the ASEAN waters. It will examine the increasing cooperation at sea among the Asia Pacific member navies. Finally, the paper will peruse the institutional architecture for supporting the maritime cooperative security, and consider the extra-regional players' complex involvement in the maritime domain of the Southeast Asian region.

Maritime Issues in Perspective

The ASEAN waters connecting the two important oceans - the Indian and the Pacific, have eternally been the medium of assimilation for trade, people interaction, and building new synergies for socio-cultural exchanges. The maritime history of this region was characterized by long stretches of collaboration leading to the peaceable exchange of commodities and culture, with only the occasional naval conflict directed towards the domination of sea borne trade.^[2] Even today, the maritime domain of this region continues to draw attention. And present scholarly interest is animated by the emerging perils in the Southeast Asian waters, which has implication far beyond the region.

The most perturbing factor is the ever increasing international shipping traffic through the straits in order to sustain the economies of the Southeast and East Asian countries, which is putting considerable pressure in the existing infrastructure. A better view will be backed by the fact that the amount of oil flows through the Singapore and Malacca Straits are three times greater than the Suez Canal and 15 times greater than oil flowing through the Panama Canal.^[3] In addition to the Malacca Straits, Lombok and Sunda Straits are other vital transportation routes for oil and raw materials. The free and safe passage of these sea lanes are therefore the major security challenges for the littorals as well as the user states.

In this respect, of the approximately 60 per cent maritime boundaries required in the region, less than twenty per cent have so far fully been resolved, and not much progress is being made with delimiting outstanding ones.^[4] This however remains in the purview of limited and localized disputes. ASEAN therefore is still in the state of maritime boundary making today. The major territorial and maritime disputes in the region are as follows: Vietnam-Cambodia border and maritime

disputes; Vietnam-China maritime dispute (South China Sea); Vietnam-Philippines maritime dispute (Spratly Islands); Thailand-Cambodia border and maritime disputes; Thailand-Myanmar border dispute; Thailand-Laos border dispute; Thailand-Malaysia border dispute; Indonesia-China border and maritime dispute (Spratly Islands); Philippines-Malaysia border and maritime disputes (Sabah); Philippines-China maritime dispute (Spratly Islands); Singapore-Malaysia sovereignty contention and maritime ownership of Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Putih.^[5] The most significant maritime discord in the traditional arena is the overlapping claims in the South China Sea over the Spratly and Parcel Islands. The Table 1 highlights the status of bilateral maritime boundaries agreement suggesting that unsettled boundary agreements will disturb resource development and hinder enforcement against illegal fishing.

In addition to the overlapping sovereignty claims among the ASEAN members and other Asian neighbours, there are substantial non-traditional maritime challenges besetting the region. The maritime threats are primarily driven by non-state actors involving trafficking of people, drugs, illegal arms and WMDs. These have serious security implications beyond the region. The issue of rapid depletion of fish stock is a major food security challenges. With the UNCLOS 1982 coming into effect, there are no high seas in Southeast Asia.^[6] Many traditional fishing grounds earlier free for all to fish have been changed into either archipelagic waters or EEZ where the littoral states have the sole jurisdiction over living resources. Terrorism is major threat speculated with plans on undersea gas pipelines and telecommunications cables that link the nations of the South China Sea and the Java Sea.

The environmental concerns and natural disasters such as tsunami arise from the sea, thereby creating havoc to the livelihood concerns of the coastal areas of the ASEAN region. Sea pollution from oil spills from ships grounding and vessel collisions are serious issues confronting the region. Marine pollution resulting from land-based activities has repercussions on living marine resources and enriching biodiversity in the region. Currently, increased reliance on interconnected computer navigation and communication systems has led to new vulnerabilities. Any breakdown in such systems as a result of hacking or software failure could cause accidents at sea.^[7]

In recent times, the Southeast Asian waters have turned into a geopolitical battlefield between the major powers particularly between the US and China. The US is concern about the increasing Chinese naval strength in and around the Taiwan straits. In addition, the Chinese

'creeping assertiveness' while dealing with the Southeast Asian countries on the South China Sea dispute have instigated the US to seek mediation among the disputant parties, much to the annoyance of Beijing. The rising diplomatic tension is a major maritime concern for the regional economies, which is subsequently building volatility in the turbulent waters.

Table 1: Maritime Boundaries in Southeast Asia

| Country Sea | Territorial Shelf | EEZ | Continental | Remarks |
|-----------------------|----------------------|-----|-------------|------------|
| Australia-Indonesia | NR | Yes | Yes | - |
| Australia-East Timor | NR | No | No | Joint Zone |
| Brunei-Malaysia | No | No | No | - |
| Indonesia-East Timor | No | No | No | - |
| Indonesia- Malaysia | Yes | No | Yes | - |
| Indonesia-Singapore | Yes | No | NR | - |
| Indonesia- Thailand | NR | No | Yes | - |
| Indonesia-Philippines | No | No | No | - |
| Indonesia-India | NR | No | Yes | - |
| Indonesia-Vietnam | NR | Yes | Yes | - |
| Indonesia-China | NR | No | No | - |
| Malaysia-Singapore | No | No | NR | - |
| Malaysia-Thailand | No | No | Yes | Joint Zone |
| Malaysia-Philippines | No | No | No | - |
| Malaysia-Vietnam | NR | No | No | Joint Zone |
| Myanmar-Bangladesh | No | No | No | - |
| Myanmar-India | No | No | No | - |
| Myanmar-Thailand | No | No | No | - |
| Cambodia-Thailand | No | No | No | - |
| Cambodia-Vietnam | No | No | No | Joint Zone |
| Thailand-India | NR | No | Yes | - |
| Thailand-Vietnam | NR | Yes | Yes | - |
| China-Vietnam | Yes | No | No | - |
| Philippines-China | NR | No | No | - |
| Philippines-Palau | NR | No | No | - |

Notes: NR = Boundaries are not required because either the countries are too far apart to have the relevant boundary (i.e., over 24nm in the case of a territorial sea boundary), or so close together that a territorial sea boundary only is required.

Source: Sam Bateman (2009) cited from *Limits in the Seas – National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction*, No 36, 7th Revision, 1995; Prescott and Schofield, *Maritime Boundaries of the World*, 2nd ed., 2005

ASEAN Response to Maritime Challenges: Cooperation through Institutions

Until 1990s, ASEAN countries dealt with maritime security challenges at the individual level. An example of individual effort is, the Indonesian action on counter-piracy measures involving rehabilitation of the fisher men in the coastal areas of the country who have traditionally been drawn to piracy as a livelihood option. Notably, these countries differed in their maritime boundaries, size of marine resources, capabilities and most important, their motivation to prioritize maritime security in their national security agenda. Since the principal actions were primarily taken at the individual capacity a propos to the respective country's domestic security threats, regional effort was absent. When South China Sea dispute became an issue to deliberate upon regionally, regional dialogue on maritime security started. For example, Indonesia took the initiative of a workshop on the South China Sea since early 1990s, thereby prompting the regional deliberation on maritime issues.

Maritime cooperation in the ASEAN region is visible at the bilateral and trilateral plane. The bilateral and trilateral cooperation focuses on a localized issue engaging the disputant parties alone; thereby establishing a limited level of multilateral set up to counter the maritime challenges. The two foremost examples are the Malacca Straits based initiatives and the Gulf of Thailand Joint Development. While combating the transnational crimes at Malacca Straits, Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) comprising Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP) and the 'Eye in the Sky' (EiS) air patrols were initiated. MSP conjures the maritime platforms of the three littorals namely, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, with the recent addition of Thailand. These patrols are complemented by shore based radar surveillance in some cases like the network of coastal radars to provide vessel traffic services (VTS) in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Similarly, in the Gulf of Thailand, the maritime delimitation overlapping claims between Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia embarks on Joint Development of the overlapping claimed area, thereafter making the Gulf a joint utilization regime. The bilateral level cooperation is exemplified by the Malaysia-Indonesia Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement (*MALINDO INCSEA*) initiated in January 2001. The new operationalized cooperation are becoming more frequent these days with examples of such pairings including, Indonesia-Malaysia, Malaysia-Cambodia, Brunei-Australia, and Malaysia-Philippines initiated bilateral naval exercise programs.

At the regional level, maritime cooperation among the member countries has been initiated but is yet to reach the significant level. The ASEAN grouping took initiative with the Regional Plan of Action in 2007 on the issue of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing which is causing serious depletion of fish stocks.^[8] ASEAN is realizing the importance of maritime security of the region in consequence to its increasing trade with East Asian dialogue partners like China and Japan. As a result, at **the 6th Meeting of the China-ASEAN Maritime Consultation Mechanisms held in Nanning in 2010, around** 40 representatives from China Maritime Security Authorities and the maritime authorities of each ASEAN country attended the meeting over talks on maritime cooperation in terms of shipping safety, crew's qualities, oil spill emergent treatment, environmental protection, etc and perfected the follow-ups relating the Memorandum of Understanding of the China-ASEAN Maritime Consultation Mechanisms.^[9] The formation of ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre is one good example of regional cooperation.^[10]

The South China Sea dispute is however one of the longstanding maritime dispute in the region. The ASEAN initiative on South China Sea in the beginning came in the form of workshop series held by Indonesia on *Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea* (since 1990) and the *Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security* (2003). Notably in 1992, ASEAN's first communiqué on security issue came on South China Sea dispute with the "Declaration on the South China Sea," emphasizing "the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means" and urged "all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes."^[11]

Subsequently, with the October 2000 suicide-boat attack on the guided-missile destroyer *USS Cole*, the December 2001 the ferry *Kalifornia* bombing, the February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry *Our Lady Mediatrix*, the ASEAN members took renewed interest in improving regional cooperation. This include the June 2003 "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security" and the "Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime," which was endorsed in January 2004 by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime. In addition, most regional shippers and nearly all major port facilities achieved compliance with the International Maritime Organization's December 2002 International Ship and Port

Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) before or shortly after its July 2004 deadline. Moreover in 2004, Singapore acceded to the Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (known as the SUA Convention).^[12] In ASEAN, at present five countries are parties to the SUA Convention, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Philippines and Vietnam in addition to Singapore.

The ASEAN members have adopted the IMO's Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) Demonstration Project in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Under the project, ships will receive information on real-time situation of navigation, which should reduce the risk of accident and environmental pollution at sea.^[13] This is an important step towards navigational safety. Another laudable step by ASEAN is that appropriate ASEAN bodies are looking into the Model National Law, which has been prepared by a Working Group led by the Comité Maritime International, International Chamber of Commerce, the International Maritime Bureau, International Maritime Organization and INTERPOL. Moreover, ASEAN countries are working towards narrowing their vision of threat perception and seeking new technologies, such as modern radar systems, satellites and integrated communications systems, employed keeping in mind actual needs identified by the littoral states themselves individually and collectively. Notwithstanding this, there are very active Federation of ASEAN Shipowners' Associations and the ASEAN Ports Association pursuing improvement in their working conditions as well as in the overall infrastructural needs of the maritime industry.^[14]

However, the most assertive step undertaken on the ASEAN platform was the *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea* signed in November 2002 at Phnom Penh. This was a momentous move considering the adherence of China into the multilateral initiative. Earlier, China was reluctant to address the South China Sea dispute multilaterally, since it considered such move would undermine its bargaining edge over the ASEAN members, as it would have been in case of bilateral negotiations. Since then, a status quo was maintained. However, in 2010, during the Summit meeting ASEAN made the South China Sea issue - a flash point in the regional security agenda. The situation of diplomatic stir arose when Vietnam, the ASEAN Chair for 2010 encouraged the US to intervene in the dispute. Subsequently, ASEAN members' failure to issue a joint communique after 45 years of existence in 2012 Summit under Cambodia's chairmanship have triggered the speculation of disunity among the members. Aileen S. P. Baviera notes, "the failure in Phnom Penh not only undermines

ASEAN's 'centrality'; it calls into question ASEAN's ability to negotiate with other countries as a collective actor."^[15]

The South China Sea turbulence highlights a dividing line between ASEAN members. After the Mischief Reef incident in 1995, the Philippines became less optimistic about ASEAN's mediatory role. This was primarily due to ASEAN's silent code during Philippines spat with China. ASEAN members such as Philippines and Vietnam call for US intervention while other members are less enthusiastic about it. Therefore, some ASEAN members started to renegotiate with China on the bilateral basis rather than relying on the multilateral set up. On the other hand, China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has augmented. China's inclusion of a map with the "nine-dashed line" in a note verbale to the UN in May 2009, its imposition of seasonal fishing bans in the northern portion of the South China Sea, an increase in the number of patrols by Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies in contested waters, an increase in the frequency and scope Chinese naval exercises in the South China Sea are some of the examples.^[16] In fact, in July 2011, a Chinese vessel hailed an Indian naval ship in international waters and demanded an explanation for its presence near Vietnam after the Indian ship makes a scheduled port call in Vietnam.^[17] Subsequently, China has stepped up its efforts. China established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea following the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ in November 2013. As a result, its behaviour over the past several years reflected an "incremental effort by China to assert control over the area contained in the so-called 'nine-dashed line.'"^[18]

Meanwhile, in Brunei 2013, ASEAN expressed willingness to advance another code of conduct for the disputant parties, by keeping the code with legally binding clause. On the other hand, in February 2014 the US for the first time explicitly rejected the U-shaped, nine-dash line that China uses to assert sovereignty over nearly the whole South China Sea, strengthening the position of rival claimants and setting the stage for a severe trial among the major powers in the region.^[19] Therefore, in the last few years, the active involvement of the US in addition to the stands taken by other major powers in the region, apart from the disputant and non-disputant ASEAN members, have made the South China Sea dispute a potential roadblock in ASEAN's future stability and integration.^[20]

ASEAN progress on maritime security cooperation can be particularly viewed from the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) initiatives. ARF is primarily an ASEAN offshoot with absolute focus on security issues. In

the past 21 years of its existence, the ARF has hosted meetings both at the Track I and II levels including, workshops, seminars and expert group meetings on various subjects including maritime security, nevertheless predominantly on CBM and Search, Rescue and Disaster Relief. The ARF meetings (1994-2014) highlight the proliferation on maritime security activities. ARF has, till 2014, conducted 19 meetings on Maritime Security.^[21] In 2014, three workshops were held including Maritime Environmental Protection Cooperation, ARF Seminar on the Regional Cooperation on Offshore Oil Spill and on the subject of UNCLOS. Currently, ARF is preparing for the next stage of evolution, which is drafted in 'A Vision for ARF by 2020.' The ARF Vision Statement does not however suggest anything fresh, except that a synergy between ARF and ASEAN Political-Security Community is voiced and a call for preventive diplomacy in priority areas is made which includes working towards mutually acceptable early warning mechanisms.

With the successive deepening cooperation in all sectors, the ASEAN is paving towards community building. The ASEAN community building process is beleaguered to be completed by 2015 aiming to synergies between ARF and ASEAN Political-Security Community. Since inception, defence was a notable exception in the broad range of ASEAN's Sectoral Ministerial Meetings - which include meetings of the foreign affairs, economic, finance, education, environment and cultural ministers. To meet this void, ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting (ADMM) was built in 2006. At the inaugural meeting, ASEAN constructed informal consultations amongst the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Force, giving opportunity to concerned people to enhance maritime cooperation through annual meetings of ASEAN Navy Chiefs and ASEAN Heads of Coast Guards. The lack of regional maritime cooperation initiatives was primarily due to the earlier absence of involvement of the Ministry of Defence of the ASEAN members in the overall dialogue process. This lacunae retarded the growth of trust building and naval cooperation among the ASEAN members in the regional waters.

One important step forward has been the establishment of ASEAN Maritime Forum. The Forum was formed to address the need for a permanent regional body aimed at resolving maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific waters. It is wrong to perceive maritime issues from the military perspective alone. Accordingly, the Forum is formed to exchange views on maritime issues affecting all three pillars of the ASEAN Community and the ways and means to enhance cooperation in maritime-related issues.^[22] Covering the EAS contour, Expanded AMF (EAMF) was convened back-to-back with the 3rd AMF on 5 October 2012. The EAMF focused on issues such as, relevance of the 1982

UNCLOS in today's context, maritime connectivity and capacity building, infrastructure and equipment upgrading, seafarer's training, protecting the marine environment, and promoting eco-tourism and fishery regime in East Asia.

Non ASEAN players sailing the ASEAN waters

In both time and space, the territories and people that constitute 'Southeast Asia' have found themselves positioned repeatedly between larger forces that projected both 'soft' and 'hard' power over land and sea.^[23] Given the limited military capabilities of the ASEAN members, their domestic security priorities in addition to their preoccupation with nation-building process, defence sector is not one of strength for ASEAN members. The maritime platforms and subsequent technological backing in most ASEAN members have been derisory, giving scope for extra-regional players to intervene in the regional maritime security framework. In this context, it is pertinent to recall the US initiative on Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2005 which was aimed to develop a partnership of willing regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws. This initiative was announced during the peak of piracy conflicting in the Malacca Straits, generating much hue and cry from the littorals states, particularly from the Malaysia and Indonesia, who interpreted the US initiative aimed at undermining their sovereignty in the Straits.

The Southeast Asian region has eternally been the playfield for external players. The Indian and Chinese influenced during the ancient period, subsequently with the American, Dutch, British, Spanish and Portuguese claiming their share of booty during the imperialist days. Thereafter, Japan turned occupying force in Southeast Asia during the World War II or more recently the Cold War period, when the region witnessed two wars and became a chessboard between the two superpowers. Considering the Southeast Asian waters are important international waterways connecting the two big Oceans, ASEAN waters remains witnessed to the presence of different flags sailing their waters. The US presence in the ASEAN waters are secured since US is considered the resident power in Southeast Asia. It plays the primary security guarantor for the ASEAN members and therefore, the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) ships have traditionally been hosted in the ASEAN waters. In 2009, USPACOM declared its strategy which is based on partnership, readiness, and presence in the region.^[24] More recently,

US has been conducting naval exercises with various countries in the region in order to build confidence and contribute to capacity building training.

China is no more a regional power alone rather it is a global power aiming to build a navy with significant strength and resilience. Southeast Asia is viewed by Beijing as China's sphere of influence. China seeks to bolster a stable and secure region in order to gain access to regional energy resources and raw materials, protect maritime trade routes across the region, and develop wide-ranging relations for economic and political purposes (including isolating Taiwan and countering U.S. influence).^[25] China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is preparing to fight the USN at the Taiwan Straits. However, the long term objective might be to make its presence felt in its backyard. Therefore, the recent spat with the US over South China Sea and its creeping assertiveness visible in dealing with ASEAN members is one aspect of China's relations with the Southeast Asian countries.

China's has declared the Spratlys and Paracel islands as their 'core interest' area in tune with Taiwan and Tibet. Moreover, it asserts the entire South China Sea as its internal waters, thereby attempting to restrict the sea as an internal thoroughfare, inaccessible to others. This is undoubtedly creating instability in the Asia Pacific region as the South China Sea is an important trading and energy sea-lane for ASEAN members as well as extra-regional players such as the US, Japan, India, Australia and other trading partners of the region. On the other hand, China is deepening its ties with the ASEAN countries on the maritime sector through cooperation on port development, maritime safety and through other training and funding mechanism. The above mentioned China-ASEAN Expo in 2010 is one such example. In fact, Beijing and ASEAN have declared 2015 "the ASEAN-China Year of Maritime Cooperation". This means China will focus on providing funding for maritime infrastructure, scientific research, and search and rescue capabilities, therefore establishing the efficacy of their relationship beyond maritime disputes. In 2014, at the ASEAN-China Summit meeting, China called for extending communication between maritime law enforcement agencies as well as setting up a hotline between foreign ministers for use in case of maritime emergencies. The ASEAN+China dialogue forum is utilized by the latter to bring maritime cooperation at the forefront of cooperation. In this view, the Transport Ministers' Meeting held in Jakarta on September 2002 reached understanding to strengthen all-round cooperation in issues relating to transport by land, water and air. Therefore, maritime transportation is increasingly in focus. Moreover, China is gradually collaborating in defence by

transferring defence equipments to ASEAN members. Myanmar and Cambodia already under substantial Chinese influence, were the initial arms buyers. Presently, Thailand and Indonesia are buying specific platforms from their giant northern neighbor. At present, Chinese leadership are pitching for a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, in order to boost trade links across Asia.

Japan, India and Australia are the other extra-regional players who have huge stake in the stability of the ASEAN waters. They fall under the user states obligation in the international law wherein they contribute to the maritime security of the region through partnership with the regional navies and other capacity building programs. Japan is particularly at risk in any imperil scenario in ASEAN waters since its entire economy is dependent on the supplies from these waters. Japan is therefore a significant maritime force that provides considerable support to the regional maritime architecture. Australia has been tied to the region's security through the archaic Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA) particularly engaged to Malaysia and Singapore. India is a significant maritime power in the ASEAN waters. India occupies its place in terms of geographical proximity to the region and the fact that it is a funnel state to Malacca Straits and secondly, India has a formidable navy which could be an important partner in addressing the unconventional maritime challenges for the future.

However, the presence of the extra-regional navies in the ASEAN waters has escalated tension and there are signs of ASEAN waters turning into a potential battle field to check out on each other. For the ASEAN members, the impact is substantial, as there are visible signs of ASEAN members silently building their naval platforms for future eventuality.

Is Multilateralism - an appropriate response?

The above discussion highlighted some of ASEAN's achievements in enhancing maritime cooperation in their multilateral set up. It is significant that there are encouraging signs of maritime domain increasingly occupying dominant place in the security dialogue. The ADMM plus with the eight dialogue partners which was held in October 2010 with much hype, talked extensively about forging maritime cooperation. Similarly, ASEAN Maritime Forum and ARF encourage dialogue thereby providing appropriate podium for better understanding and trust building. The maritime security challenges touches different fields whether humanitarian assistance and disaster relief such as tsunami, man-made disasters like environmental degradation from oil spillages; energy security as most of energy sources are based on off-

shore, or on matters related sovereignty through territorial disputes. The multilateral approach to maritime security is in reality an indispensable answer to maritime challenges. The problems touch every shore irrespective of the individual country's maritime capability. Therefore, multilateral approach could be an effective platform to deal with the non-state actors who are otherwise taking absence of state's weakness into their advantage.

The Way Ahead

ASEAN is currently moving towards ASEAN Political-Security Community which will require a regional approach to deal with the security issues. The ASEAN members' individual weakness could be supported with the backing of strong extra-regional powers, those who have sincere interest in keeping the ASEAN waters safe. Regional maritime cooperation is indispensable in the present world given the salience of non-state actors. In addition, China's growing naval power would require balancing naval strength in order to restrict any one country to turn the international waterways into internal waters. Since ASEAN has successfully embraced regionalism in economic and socio-cultural sector, it is time to extend the regionalisation to maritime security as it will solve several issues pertinent in the Indo-Pacific waters.

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Book Review

Dr. Krishan Gopal, **Kadloor Savitri Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: UN Engagement in Cambodia**, New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2014, 245 p Rs.. 995/-

A systematic theory has been woven around the methods of conflict resolution within the discipline of international relations. In the last decade-and-a-half, conflict resolution/conflict studies has emerged as a distinct discipline in India. Many crises have been evaluated and analyzed within the framework of conflict studies. However, this concept has not remained confined to situations of armed hostility alone but has come to represent an attempt to reconcile the contending and conflicting interests in such areas as environment, disarmament, economic development and social rights. With the advent of nuclear are, conflict assumed dangerous proportions. Reconciliation and harmonization in international relations therefore became a necessity. Over the years, there have been continuous and conscious efforts by the international community to build certain institutional arrangements to prevent international conflicts from escalating into war and, if they did, to maintain them at the manageable levels and resolve them at the earliest. International organization, therefore, represents an organized, regularized, regulating mechanism to resolve conflict. In today's world, international organizations – both global and regional – have come to play a crucial role in managing, containing, and resolving conflict, in peacemaking, peacekeeping and post conflict peace building. International organizations have increasingly come to be recognized with the concept and function of conflict resolution in their attempt

to prevent escalation of tensions or, to establish a semblance of peace and order in post-conflict societies, or yet again to help rebuild lives of communities torn by conflict. There is no denying the fact that peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding efforts have been subjected to severe critical scrutiny and political and social audit for flawed design and faulty implementation. Yet, if there is an incidence of brewing conflict or one threatening to get out of hand, the international community most likely looks up to international organizations to step in and help alleviate the situation or retrieve it before it reaches a point of no return. The precipitous proliferation of peacekeeping operations around the globe since the 1990s is a testimony to the critical necessity

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of engaging international organizations in resolving conflicts and rebuilding societies. It is even more critical, in this context, to understand, underscore and evaluate the framework, intent and role of United Nations as a near universal international organization in the resolution of international conflict.

The author identified three broad reasons that initially motivated research on this topic. One, in the chaotic, transitional years in the aftermath of the fall of Berlin Wall, a broad consensus seemed to emerge on the importance of the United Nations as an instrument of conflict resolution and as a partner in operational steps to prevent the intensification of international conflicts. Two, the contribution of the United Nations in bringing about conceptual and operational changes to peacekeeping operations and its increasing involvement in conflict situations that were not strictly international in nature, offered newer possibilities of reassessing the role of United Nations and situating its relevance in conflict resolution process in a significantly different political and ideological setting. And three, the need to review and analyze the new challenges faced and the operational responses offered by the United Nations in Cambodia and what it meant for the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization itself. This leads to the choice of the case study; there were several peacekeeping operations mounted in the first half of the 1990s and each of them offered a tantalizingly unique rationale and inherent logic. Nevertheless, the present study consciously trains its spotlight on Cambodia for several reasons.

The sheer magnitude of the Cambodian crisis – and the scale of UN operations – has been striking. It represents a good example of severe challenges faced by the United Nations in the field as well as in the relentless scrutiny of its larger role in conflict resolution.

The Cambodian conflict situation has had its roots in the armed hostility that regulated Indo-China Peninsula involving major powers (such as, France, China, the Soviet Union and the United States) right from the inception of the United Nations.

The book explore answers to following important questions such as what has been the UN conception of its role in conflict resolution in international relations and how the Charter provides a basis for its? Historically, what has been the interest of the regional and super powers in the Cambodian crisis? How their attitudes towards this crisis have shifted in the UN? Why and how do these powers account for their attitudes and their subsequent change in the UN? What prevented the UN forum from taking up this question prior to 1979? Why and how

far did the regional and super powers succeed in keeping the UN out of this conflict till late 1980s? Why did UNTAC encounter the problems it did in Cambodia? Were they due to the shortcomings in the mandate or the institutional inadequacies, or, rooted in social-cultural differences? What was the impact of UNTAC operation? What lessons can be drawn from the UN experience in Cambodia for its future action? Do they constitute a noteworthy precedent for future UN action? And, finally, how can we situate the Cambodian conflict situation and the efforts by the international community to resolve it within the broader framework of conflict resolution and the relevance of UN in achieving it?

The first chapter in this book ;outlines the contours of conflict, conflict resolution and its myriad avatars (like fights, games, disputes, skirmishes, war) to open up the discussion and provide a basis for analyzing the Cambodia conflict situation in the subsequent chapters. Recent institutional innovations and additions to achieving a logical closure to a conflict in the form of transitional justice mechanisms, as also increasing emphasis on non-institutional interface between conflicting communities attempted through such concepts as reintegration and reconciliation at social and emotional level set the conceptual background in the opening chapter.

To continue the elucidation of conceptual and procedural framework, the second chapter presents a historical, synoptic view of the procedures and practices followed by the United Nations. It attempts to understand how the UN procedures and mechanisms have evolved over the years as a response to emerging and continuing conflict situations. It attempts to provide a broad overview of the provisions, procedures and means of pacific settlement of disputes, as enshrined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and their application world over. In doing so, select examples have been cited to buttress the analysis. Furthermore, non-coercive, extra Charter developments leading to the innovation of concepts such as peacekeeping, peace-making, peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy have been firefly discussed. However, the emphasis is on those methods which are short of enforcement measures (under Chapter VII of the Charter). The various diplomatic procedures like negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement which have been endorsed in Article 33 of the UN Charter have been discussed in detail as also other procedures like good offices and fact-finding. The conceptual contours of the first and second chapters sustain and resonate in the discussion and e valuation of the resolution of Cambodian conflict situation in chapters four, five, six and seven.

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The third chapter traces political history and developments in Cambodia from its independence to the end of Pol Pot regime in 1978. It tries to anchor the unfolding events in 1970s in their historical perspective to gain insight into the efforts made by Sihanouk to lay the foundations of a neutral Khmer democracy in the post-independence period. Sihanouk activated grass root politics in the early years of an upcoming democracy and followed the foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment to insulate Cambodia from the great power rivalry in the region. However, a series of decisions made by Sihanouk coupled with external influence in Cambodian affairs, flawed domestic economic policy, internal ideological shifts in Cambodia, led to the involvement of Cambodia in the Vietnam War and the coup of 1970. The period from 1971 to 1978, i.e., from the establishment of the Republic of Cambodia by Lon Nol's Government to the Vietnamese entry into Cambodia, was marked by war and destruction of untold magnitude, but it continues to be singularly identified with radical ideology and genocide during the Pol Pot regime (1975 to 1978). This phase in Cambodian history also marked increasing super power interest and involvement in Cambodian affairs. China and the former Soviet Union assumed an unprecedented influence and clout as the external supporters of two rival Cambodian factions. This period shows how the domestic situation in Cambodia became an international and regional problem. The central focus in this chapter is on the various facets of ideology and politics of Democratic Kampuchea and its impact on society, economy and polity within Cambodia, eventually bringing the Cambodian crisis to a point of no return.

The fourth chapter delineates the contending interests of the parties and the continuing stalemate in the crisis. This chapter analyses the efforts made both by the international community and the regional powers while bringing into focus the initial stalemate in the situation until mid 1980s and thawing of the relations from 1987 onwards. Beginning with the Jakarta Informal Meetings, the Chapter culminates with a discussion on the first Paris Peace Conference in 1989 and the factors that led to its failure. It also highlights how several possible methods of pacific settlement of disputes were employed and the problems and progress experienced in the process of negotiation and mediation. It must be noted here that the United Nations deliberately allowed super powers, major powers and the regional organizations to take the initiative in reaching a settlement though it stepped into assume the role of a guarantor of the Agreements later.

In the fifth chapter, the intermediary period between the two Paris

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Conferences on Cambodia, the background to the second conference and an analysis of the Comprehensive Agreements are discussed. It shows how the focus of attention once again shifted to the internal factions in Cambodia. A detailed analysis of the Paris Agreements its conceptual innovations, unique features and the unprecedented mandate given to the United Nations forms the last part of this Chapter.

The sixth chapter looks at all the facets of implementing the mandate in Cambodia by the United Nations. It broadly surveys the preparations done in conducting the peacekeeping operation, the working of various components of UNTAC, the conduct of elections, the problems, successes and shortcomings of those components during 1991 to 1995. Finally a balance-sheet of UNTAC's role in Cambodia in the context of the operational impact of each component based on the mandate provided for in the Paris Agreements is drawn. Since the Cambodian peacekeeping operation was an ambitious one, the discussion on addressing the repatriation and reintegration of refugees who had lived outside of their country for more than a decade required greater attention and a detailed treatment. The seventh chapter is therefore solely devoted to the working of just one component of the mandate – the process of repatriation of refugees and how it impacted the process of reintegration in Cambodia.

The last section on conclusion dealt with a general over view and assessment of the UN role in resolving the Cambodian crisis and the institutional and other developments that have taken place within Cambodia after the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping forces. In fact, certain remarkable institutional developments have taken place in the last few years to address the issues of reconciliation and efforts to mend the fractured emotional fabric of a nation. Elucidating on these developments and the general overview will help in revisiting the discussion on desirability of reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms in achieving genuine resolution to conflicts presented in the first chapter.

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- A print as well as an electronic (through email) copy of article/ review may be submitted to Dr. Sudhir Singh, Editor, Politico , *New Delhi.*
- Word limit for articles: 3000-5000 words (max.) and key words should be included along with the article.
- British spelling should be used throughout.
- Institutional affiliation and designation with complete contact address, including email address must be provided along with the soft copies of the submission.
- References should be cited within the text in parenthesis by giving the author's last name, the year of publication and page number. Eg. (Easton 1999: 37)
- Notes should be numbered serially and presented at the end of the article, but before bibliography.
- Use double inverted commas for quotations and single inverted commas for quotations within quotations. Indent quotations of more than four lines, without quotation marks. Abbreviations, acronyms, etc . may please be expanded at first use.

Works cited may have the following details:

- a) Books:** Surname, initials/first name (year of publication), *title of the book*, place of publication, publisher, page number/s. Eg. Mahbubani, Kishore (2013), *The Great Convergence: Asia, the West and the Logic of One World*, New York, Public Affairs, p.123.
- b) Essay in a collection:** Surname, initials/first name (year of publication), "title of the article," editor's name, *title of the book*, place of publication, publisher, page number/s. Eg. Haider, Ejaz (2014,) "Counterinsurgency: The Myth of Sisyphus", Yusuf, Moeed (Ed.), *Pakistan's Counterterrorism Challenge*, Foundation Books, Washington, p.63.

- c) **Journals:** Surname, initials/first name (year of publication) “title of the article”, *name of the journal*, year, volume. number: page number/s. Eg. Choudhury, Soumyabrata (2012), “Caste and Debt: The Case of Ancient Greek Liturgies,” *Journal of Polity and Society*, IV. 2: p.7.
- d) **Article in a periodical/newspaper:** Surname, initials/first name (day month year), “title of the article,” *title of the source*,: page number/s. Eg. Lakshman, Narayan (19 July 2014), “Parsing America’s Modi Baggage,” *The Hindu*, p. 8.
- e) **Websites:** Surname, initials/first name (date of posting/revision), “title of the article,” name of the website, , name of institution/organization affiliated with site, date of access <electronic address>. Eg. Cook, William A. (18 July 2014), “The Dementedness Destroying Israel,” *countercurrents.org*, 19 July 2014, <http://www.countercurrents.org/cook180714.htm>

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