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Preface

It is often argued that 21st century will be a century of Asian countries, right from the Industrial Revolution to the end of the Second World War was a European century. However, the rest of the 20th century was of Americans and the present world order continues to be a unipolar era with United States as the sole super power. The first decade of 21st century stands over and it has yet to realize. In the contemporary world, the biggest challenge before the major powers of Asia is to arrive at a consensus on key issues otherwise American hegemony will continue to prevail.

The 21st century Asia is to witness the emergence of three major powers i.e. China, India and Japan. Since the devastating economic recession of 1929 contemporary world is confronting another international economic recession but both China and India have maintained better than global growth rate. Japan has not been able to maintain the pace of economic growth at par with India and China, however, its economy is growing and one should not forget that Japan has been an imperial power since long. Japan defeated Russia in 1905 and also defeated China in 1893-1895. During both the World Wars despite being an Asian power Japan played an important role at the global level. India and Japan has intensified their relationship after post cold war era in general and post 9/11 in particular. India's relations with Japan have undergone a significant transformation in recent years. India and Japan have also concluded an Annual Strategic Dialogue between Foreign Ministers since 2007. The election of PM Shingo Abe in December 2012 and his PDP's majority in July 2013 Senate elections has further cemented Indo-Japan relationship. The most crucial factor behind this bonhomie is convergences of interests ranging from bilateral issues to larger canvass of Asia-Pacific geo-politics. Geo-economics is also attached with growing Indo-Japan relations because of the nature of both economics. China is alarmed with this emerging relation. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh stated in Tokyo that the increase in India's bilateral relation with China in the last year alone was 'more than the whole of total trade with Japan'. The message was clearly meant for Beijing. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh further emphatically said that economic relations and security cooperation with Japan 'would not be at the cost of any third country, least of all China'.¹

What would have disturbed the Chinese is Prime Minister Singh's foreign

policy statement at the joint press conference with Prime Minister Abe at New Delhi that “Japan is at the heart of India’s Look East Policy”.²

The great Indian strategic thinker, Kautilya stressed millennia ago that there is no permanent friend or foe in international relations, the only permanent thing is the commonality of interests.

The Chinese have changed their attitude in the immediate aftermath of the cold war and inked a deal with Russia. Russia has longest boundary of 4,300 kilometers with China and had a history of bilateral contacts for about 400 years. For much of these 400 years, both countries have had a hostile relationship but changed after the end of the cold war. Chinese leaders were following Deng Xiaoping’s advice of ‘*tao-guang yang-hui*’ to observe the situation calmly, maintain a low profile, avoid assuming international leadership, and bid their time to develop China. Deng also instructed his successors to set aside ideological differences in handling China’s future foreign relations. One of the most important research questions of this issue is how far China is going to adhere with this mantra proposed by Deng to deal with India? Needless to say that it will be extremely important to reshape the strategic ambience of the Asia-pacific region which shall determine as to whether the 21st century will be an Asian century or it shall continue to be dominated by the United States.

Right from Keshore Madhubani to many important pundits of the international relations have stressed that 21st century will be an Asian century. As stated above, the first decade of 21st century has already passed, second is in its half and the hegemony of the United States continues to prevail into the international system. China and India fought war in 1962 and still this baggage of history prevails in their decision making process. First Prime-Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru accepted Tibet as an integral part of China. It is pertinent to mention here that China did have suzerainty over Tibet but never had sovereignty. However, Nehru accorded sovereignty of China over Tibet. It was the Himalayan blunder in the history of Indian foreign policy. In June 2003, Indian Prime-Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. It was a path breaking visit because both parties expressed their desire to expedite the process to resolve the boundary disputes and appointed senior officers to lead the negotiations. The following line in the Vajpayee-Wen (Chinese Prime Minister) joint declaration of June 2003 received wide coverage in the Chinese media, *The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side*

*expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China bringing out 'independence of Tibet'*³ In reciprocation, first time China had called Sikkim a State of India in a Memorandum exchanged between two governments on Expanding Border Trade. A dramatic exchange between Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee at Bali (Indonesia) conference in October 2003 became headlines news in India. The Chinese Premier was reported to draw Vajpayee's attention to a change in the official Chinese website that Chinese no longer designates Sikkim as an independent country.

But China even today didn't believe in Indian assurance over Tibet. In June 2010, Indian President, Pratibha Singh Patil visited China and again China raised the issue of Tibet. It simply means that Chinese are still apprehensive about the future position of India about Tibet. Tibet is still bleeding even after six decades of its forcible incorporation into China despite its all tall claims of rapid progress. Tibet is not a simple place, it constitutes almost 1/6th of entire Chinese territory and the roof of the world, additionally provides water to almost entire Asia and ecologically extremely important not only for India and China but for the entire Asia minus west Asia. The Chinese have done maximum damage to the ecological balance of Tibet to ensure mainland development. During the year of 2013 Tibet again remain in the lime light for two exclusive reasons. First growing number of incidents of self immolation has crossed 100 after 2008 Beijing Olympic and border intrusion by China adjoining to Tibet border into India. In March 2013 after ten years the Chinese leadership has changed and a new twin of Li and Xi has taken over as Prime Minister and the President and they will hold the power for next ten years. New Chinese PM visited New Delhi in May 2013 and that is reciprocated by Indian PM Beijing's visit in October 2013. During both deliberations, Tibet remains one of the focal agenda of dialogue.

Tibet still remains a bone of contention between India and China. Since long, China has adopted the policy of encircling India within South Asia. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri-Lanka and Myanmar have emerged as new pawns of China into this balance of power game within South Asia vis-a-vis India. The whole world knows that Chinese have extended all possible support to Pakistan to develop their nuclear capacity in spite of knowing their proliferation record. In July 2010, the Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited Beijing. It was his 5th visit since he has taken over in August 2008. Despite the global apprehension of proliferation of nuclear weapons, China granted two

nuclear reactors to Pakistan. In February in the backdrop of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014, Pakistan's President Mamnoon Hussain visited Beijing and inked many new projects. He was also given warm reception by his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. It was maiden abroad visit of President Hussain since his election in September 2013. His predecessor Asif Ali Zardari also visited Beijing first time after his election in September 2008. It shows special relations between China and Pakistan.

However during Kargil crisis (1999), China softened its traditional anti-India policies and advised Pakistan to settle bi-lateral issues with India through negotiations. Kashmir is the core zone of conflict between India and Pakistan. Pakistan was initially uneasy with Chinese advice to settle the discourse on bi-lateral level. The Chinese have persuaded Pakistan that the international community has little interest in getting involved into the conflict over Kashmir. At the same time, China continues to maintain strong relations with Pakistan and tries to get India to accept the fact that improvement in Sino-Indian relations should not come at the expense of Sino-Pakistani relations. The Chinese have adopted the policy to engage Pakistan continuously and promoting their interests in Pakistan. Although growing Indo-US relationship has provoked the Chinese to deter India from all corners therefore in foreseeable future, the sustainability of Pakistan as an irritant factor will continue. It is vindicated with December 2010 visit of the Chinese premier to Islamabad just after New Delhi with variety of lucrative gifts to Pakistan. It was repeated by new Chinese PM in May 2013 again when he visited Islamabad after New Delhi. India has also adopted the same pattern. During his October 2013 Beijing visit Indian PM chosen Moscow first in the backdrop of growing clash of interest between Russia and China over Asian balance of power.

However there are many irritants between India and the United States like Pakistan's influence over Afghanistan, sustainable US military aid to Pakistan, restructuring of international institutions including the United Nations despite that convergence of interests have compelled both countries to cooperate like natural allies. The rising tentacles of terror into the western Chinese Muslim dominated province of Xinjiang has remained a factor of concern for the Chinese and the Chinese have reminded the Pakistani authorities to contain the export of terror from its soil to this troubled Muslim dominated province. This factor has constrained a bit to China to extend all round support to Pakistan because of the fact that despite Pakistan's association in war against terror, there are ample indications that terror has been used as an instrument of foreign policy by Pakistan and this is going to sustain in

foreseeable future. In the backdrop of 2014 NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, the situation may sour in Xinxiang. In first three months of 2014, more than five dozen people have been killed in this province despite hard security system of China.

India's Look East Policy has left an imprint on China's strategic thinking. China perceives India's growing closeness with ASEAN as the counter of China's "Encirclement of India within South Asia" policy however India has taken a stand that it is normal relationship. This can be discerned from the comments expressed by leading Chinese scholars working on India. For example, when Prime minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited Japan in October 2010, before his arrival in Hanoi to participate in the East Asian Summit meeting, where he later met and interacted with his Chinese counterpart, the Global Times, known for its strong opinion, commented that 'containing China' was the motivation behind Dr. Singh's East Asia tour. Contrasted with this rather pessimistic assessment, Prof. Rong Ying, Vice- President of China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) said, 'At the government level, and at the level of scholars here who study India, we are very aware of India's good interaction with the regional countries and the 'Look East' policy, which has been announced for a long time'. Referring to Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit and sounding a note of optimism, he further said, 'This meeting is very significant, as it has become increasingly important for both sides to better communicate their interests.' He added, 'Both governments agree that the relationship is of importance beyond bilateral issues, and has strategic and global significance. In areas like G-20 cooperation, global economic governance and climate change, the two countries can really show to the public and the world at large that they can work together. By doing so, we can also help build strategic trust, which is particularly important in a fast changing regional environment'.⁴

Deepening India-ASEAN relations are also an important factor for China in the backdrop of growing tensions over South China Sea between disputants of ASEAN and China. The Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei are important disputants against China over South China Sea. India has extended all round cooperation with ASEAN countries therefore in 2012-2013 India-ASEAN bilateral trade has reached to \$ 80 billion which is more than 20% projected target.⁵ India has extended cooperation with Vietnam in exploration of oil and Gas in South China Sea in the legitimate shores of Vietnam. China has warned India many times to get away from this water because it is disputed but India has taken a policy line that its exploration work is

within the permissible extent according to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). India has also stressed for freedom of over flight and civil aviation safety according to international law in South China Sea and East China Sea context.

The bitterness among disputant ASEAN countries and China over South China Sea has gone up. It is vindicated by the recent statement of Philippines President.

Philippines President Benigno S. Aquino III called for nations around the world to do more to support the Philippines in resisting China's assertive claims to the seas near his country, drawing a comparison to the West's failure to support Czechoslovakia against Hitler's demands for Czech land in 1938.

Like Czechoslovakia, the Philippines faces demands to surrender territory piecemeal to a much stronger foreign power and needs more robust foreign support for the rule of international law if it is to resist.

"If we say yes to something we believe is wrong now, what guarantee is there that the wrong will not be further exacerbated down the line?" he said. "At what point do you say, 'Enough is enough'? Well, the world has to say it—remember that the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II."⁶ India has to support international law based resolution of South China Sea dispute. But the Chinese has adopted the policy not to accept international law mechanism because they perceive it anti Chinese. Vietnam is a small country but its shores are over 3000 KM, an important strategic place situated between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It has provided special status to India strategically. India has reciprocated accordingly. Since last two decades Vietnam has emerged as the fulcrum of India's Look East Policy. Vietnam has more strategically importance for us than China is in Pakistan against us in South Asia. Growing Indo-Vietnamese bonhomie has put China under the situation of the theory of Prisoner's Dilemma.

Russia is both Asian and European power due to its huge landmass. Although China and Russia has inked a border deal long back in 2005 but due to aggressive Chinese designs, Russian are apprehensive for the protection of their Far East. It is on Chinese border, has huge landmass, less population but an important place of natural assets. This has put China-Russia relationship under trust deficit mode. Sergei Karaganov has expressed fears that Russia's eastern regions and even the entire country could "turn into an appendage of China—first as a warehouse of resources and then economically and politically. This

will happen without any aggression or unfriendly efforts on China's part, but will happen by default." Moreover he says Russia's "semi Dependency" on China could add "a great deal of international weight" to the PRC," which should concern other countries of the Asia-Pacific community."⁷ Keeping this possibility in mind, Russia has expanded its engagement process with major powers of Asia-Pacific. In 2011 , Russia and China bilateral trade volume was of \$ 83 billion which is expected to touch \$ 200 in 2020⁸ like Japan-China case too it has not been transformed in other areas between Russia and Japan.

In recent years tensions have gone up between China and Japan over East China Sea. In the meanwhile bonhomie has started between Japan and Russia despite the fact that they have long time dispute over Kurile Islands. Since his re-election as PM in December 2012, Shinzo Abe has visited Russia five times within a year. Abe is proactively engaged in strengthening ties with Russia and in resolve the territorial issue. He decided to represent Japan in the Olympic ceremony (February 2014) even as Japan's western allies including the US boycotted the event citing Russia's human rights records. The Japanese analysts believe that Abe chose not to follow the US line as he wanted to seize the opportunity to deepen relationship with Russia.⁹ One important aspect of Japanese growing engagement with Russian is to resolve thorny Island issue but more important to solicit Russia support to contain China. Russia by all counts an important power in Asia and without Russian engagement a stable Asian order will not be possible.

It is an open secret that till all important Asian powers will not cooperate to ensure Asian century, it is not possible. India –China cooperation will be the key of this realization. Both countries have millennia old historical linkage, but they never accepted each other as their friends. After many decades of the spread of Buddhism in China, Han Yu, an anti-Buddhist intellectual in the 9th century (who later became the harbingers of Confucianism) put the issue starkly in his 'Memorial on Buddhism' written in 819.

"The Buddha was of a barbarian origin. His language differed from Chinese speech; his cloth of a different cut; his mouth did not pronounce the prescribed words of the Former Kings; his body was not clad in the garments prescribed by the former kings. He did not recognize the relationship between prince and the subject, nor the sentiment of father and son."¹⁰ At the same vein both countries learnt a lot from each other in ancient time. Noted Chinese philosopher, Fahian visited India in 401 BC, took considerable interests in contemporary health system in India. According to him

“All the poor and destitute in the country and all who are diseased, go to these houses, and are provided with every kind of help, and doctors examine disease. They get the food and medicine which their cases require, and are made to feel at ease, and when they are better, they go away of themselves.”¹¹

In ancient India, consume habits were rapidly influenced by innovations made in China. Kautilya's Sanskrit treatise on economy and politics, *Arthashastra*, first written in 4th century BC gives a special place to 'silk and silk cloth from China among precious articles and objects of value. There are even references in *Mahabharata*, written thousands years before *Arthashastra* regarding this and even there are similar references in the ancient Laws of Manu.¹²

India and China are bound to gain in absolute terms in case of cooperation and bound to lose in case of conflict. They became weak and indirectly invited colonial powers to invade them because they were not united in first and second millennia. Like climate change, justice based international economic order and like minded issues they must enhance the arenas of convergences to maximize their national interests.

The international politics of 21st century has given the prominence to Asia. We have to mark our strong presence in the security architecture of Asia-Pacific. We need not to allow any single power to monopolize the situation. We need to be proactive and sustain the process of engagement to these countries. Our growing aura is all set to increase in foreseeable future in Asia-Pacific. China must understand that if it will negate justice based order in Asia-Pacific then United States dominance will be unsustainable and Asia will subordinate the power. Since 2003 till date 17 high voltage rounds of meeting have not been able to resolve the thorny border dispute between China and India.

We must persuade China to cooperate but in case of negative response we need to adhere with the norms of international laws to resolve outstanding issues amicably. Majority of Asia-Pacific countries will follow our path.

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12. In his well researched study Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade, Tansen Sen shows that the size and continuity of Sino-Indian trade relations are often underestimated. For example, in contrast with the common presumption that the trade between the 11th and 14th centuries. Also, Sen provides evidence to conclude that Buddhism, too, continued to flourish simultaneously in Song dynasty China and in Eastern India in the early part of the second millennium.

Sudhir Singh

Sri Lanka and Maldives: New Pivots of Chinese Geopolitics in South Asia

Alok Kumar Gupta

India has been accusing China of encircling India through a systematic policy of weaning away its adversaries in neighborhood. Similarly, China also accuses India of encircling China in the same manner. India faces a tough challenge on this count. According to the infamous 'string of pearls' theory China added Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan, and now has entered into Maldives and Sri Lanka in a big way. Thus, these two countries are new pivots of China's South Asia Policy to strengthen its 'string of pearl'. This paper examines the same in details to reiterate the arguments that China envisages 'encirclement of India'.

Keywords: string of pearls, encirclement, economic cooperation, Sino-Sri Lanka relations, Sino-Maldives relations,

The two countries of Sri Lanka and Maldives are sitting astride in the Indian Ocean with tremendous strategic importance not only for India but for the entire globe. Accordingly, in the recent past both these countries have gained increased importance to China's regional strategic calculations thereby becoming the new pivots of China's South Asia Policy. This development has been reasonably underscored by the media and the foreign policy observers within India. Indian policy analysts has been referring this as China's soft power rise in South Asia and expressed the same as "creeping expansionism" of China around South Asia. This expansionism of China is in almost all the areas such as economic, military, political, and strategic. Such encroachment into India's traditional sphere of influence and immediate neighborhood is of great importance and is a sort of coup that is being engineered by China which shall have far reaching implications for India within South Asian region. The most serious of which would be disturbance of balance in the Indian Ocean with growing power projection by China in the region. The growth of bilateral trade of China with both these countries is on the rise. China has been extending all kinds of support to Sri Lanka and Maldives including in the fields such as culture, education and sports. The numerous points of contacts are also developing at an alarming rate with both these countries. Thus, China seems to have leapfrogged India in its backyard.

Alok Kumar Gupta

Each country of the region that China develops relations with, is often referred to as China adding yet another pearl to its “String of Pearls”. Under such circumstances India’s strategic interests in the region shall be doomed and it shall be at a great loss if fails to maximize its national interests. It shall have to face serious constraints towards promoting its economic and security interests. Recent development within Sri Lanka has posed a different kind of problem where Indian foreign policy makers are finding it difficult to call their shots because of domestic political compulsions. Foreign policy of India is being held hostage to domestic political conditions. On the other hand, foreign policy miscalculations in Maldives have exposed the paucity and laxity on part of diplomatic community within India. Hence, it makes it imperative to take a stock of developments that have taken place in the recent past in terms of Sino-Sri Lankan and Sino-Maldives relations to better comprehend the enlarging ‘string of pearls’.

China is being projected as another emerging super power in the world. Being in the immediate proximity of India and a power to be reckon with within the vicinity of Southern Asia also makes it essential to arrest the fast changing dynamics of China’s foreign policy in Maldives and Sri Lanka. Accordingly, the paper explores the points of contacts which have developed during the last few years between China *vis a vis* Sri Lanka and Maldives. It is an endeavour to find the implications of such developments on India’s foreign policy and the kind of challenges that the same shall pose in future.

China’s Economic Relations with Sri Lanka and Maldives

The rubber-rice barter trade agreement that the two countries of China and Sri Lanka signed in December 1952 to establish diplomatic relations has come a long way by the year 2014. In 1952 premier Zhou visited Sri Lanka for the first time and since then, top level leaders from the two sides have visited each other many times, the latest being Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s sixth visit to Beijing in May 2013.¹ Rajapaksha described China as an important partner, noting that the friendship between the two countries goes back centuries. Responding in equal terms Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said the two sides have developed a healthy and stable relationship and suggested strengthening infrastructure cooperation, implementing major projects on ports, railways and highways, expanding pragmatic cooperation and research on aerospace and marine science, and broadening cooperation in culture, education and tourism.²

China played a remarkable role towards bringing the Sri Lankan economy back on track in the aftermath of civil war between separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government in 2009. China provided US \$ 1.2 billion assistance in the form of grants, loans and credit, representing 54 percent of the total US\$2.2 billion committed by foreign countries and multilateral agencies. In the year 2010 the assistance was to the tune of US \$821 million and in 2011 US \$784.7 million.³ Needless to say that China remained involved in almost all the large-scale projects in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka is also looking forward for a Free Trade Agreement with China which shall make China, Sri Lanka's biggest trading partner, surpassing India. Bilateral trade between the two countries has also been growing considerably, and it was US \$659.94 million in 2005 reached \$ 3.14 billion in 2011. On the other hand, Sri Lanka's exports to China have increased from a mere US \$ 28 million in 2005 to US\$ 108 million in 2012.⁴

The milestone of the bilateral ties that was set with the completion of the Bandarnaike Memorial International Conference Hall in 1973; was once again celebrated when China refurbished the Hall at its own cost for the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). It also facilitated the meeting of a high-powered Chinese business delegation with its Sri Lankan counterparts, in which deals amounting to over US\$1.5 billion were signed.⁵ India decided not to participate in the CHOGM meeting though advanced a different reason than the fact of domestic political bargaining by the government of Tamilnadu.

The diplomatic relations between China and Maldives which were established on October 14, 1972 has also come a long way. Sino-Maldivian economic cooperation and trade volume were for long insignificant, as it was to the tune of US\$ 3 million only in 2002.⁶ However, in the recent past it has grown considerably with large inflows of Chinese tourists since 2010. Capital inflows have also increased rapidly since 2008. China's main exports to Maldives are rice and consumer goods.⁷ During Nasheed's regime the relations have really moved ahead even though prior to his election as President of Maldives he was quite critical of Communist Party of China owing to their views regarding modern democracy. In 2010, bilateral trade between both countries reached US\$ 64 million, which is an increase of nearly 56 per cent from 2009. China has provided concessional loans to build 1000 Housing Units Project. In 2010 alone some 117 Maldivian expatriates were reportedly studying in China, and over 120,000 Chinese tourists visited the Maldives, making China the largest source of tourists for

the Maldives.⁸ China as with Sri Lanka also signed a number of cooperation agreements with Maldives as well, including culture, education and sports. Needless to mention that Maldives' exports to China amounts not more than one per cent of its total exports at present.

Therefore, Presidents Gayoom and then Nasheed both recognised the importance of cultivating ties with China and so did President Waheed Hassan who by visiting China in 2012 announced a grant of US\$ 500 million (MVR7.7 billion) in loans from China, which equalled nearly one quarter of the Maldives' GDP.⁹Therefore, it becomes quite obvious that the volume of trade, commerce and economic cooperation is rising leaps and bounds between China and Sri Lanka as also between China and Maldives.

China's "Going Out Policy"

China has a "going out policy" which encourages overseas investment. Under this policy Sri Lanka and Maldives both have been a favoured investment destination for China. Sri Lanka had the largest foreign direct investment i.e. nearly 24 percent of the inflows from China in 2013.¹⁰ China signed 16 agreements in one go with Sri Lanka in later part of 2012, ranging from visa exemption, marine development to economic and technology cooperation, and promised to expand investment and increase imports from the South Asian country.¹¹ Other agreements include favourable loans offered by Chinese banks to some major infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka and cooperation on telecommunication and railway system renovation, scientific research, climate change, disaster prevention and relief, animal husbandry, agriculture product processing, bio-energy, and tourism.¹²

The broad spectrum of Sino-Sri Lankan ties is trying to serve the Sri Lankan dream project of transforming Sri Lanka into "Asia's miracle". China remains involved in almost all the large scale projects under construction in Sri Lanka. Some of the biggest projects financed by China include a \$ 1.3 billion coal power plant on the north-western shore and a host of other investments in the south including a \$1.2 billion port and a \$209 million airport, with a pledged \$760 million to improve country's road network and highway construction.¹³ Hambantota project, which is a showpiece of country's significant and growing cooperation with China, is almost complete.¹⁴

China is pursuing the policy with Maldives at the same scale. Some of the projects that Indian companies bagged earlier were terminated by the political dispensation within Maldives and were reallocated to

Chinese companies. The cancellation of the Airport project by Maldives is the most recent example in this endeavor of China. Maldives too requires developing its infrastructure in all the sectors of its economy and China has well understood this need of Maldives. Accordingly, China has entered into Maldives in a big way by cornering a number of airport, ports, roadways projects.

Strategic Cooperative Partnership

China and Sri Lanka have signed an agreement to upgrade their relations to a “strategic cooperative partnership” during Rajapaksha’s visit in May 2013. The agreement envisaged greater cooperation in law enforcement, security and defence, with Sri Lanka planning to launch a telecommunication satellite at a cost of US\$ 320 million in partnership with China’s State-owned great Wall Industry Cooperation. Both the countries have signed three other agreements in the fields of education, mass media and culture. They have also signed agreements for cooperating between film industries and in agriculture mechanization.¹⁵

Sri Lanka has recently opened a Consulate in Chengdu, where Pakistan too has an already active Consulate. Reportedly, Chengdu military region coordinates China’s military strategy in South Asia.¹⁶ Several reports have revealed that China is using its soft power expansion to further its military interests and consolidating its dominating presence which shall make China a pre-eminent power in the region. Soft power is thus a means for China to build and consolidate its hard power thereby maximizing its security interests.

Maldives too has suddenly acquired increasing importance to China’s regional strategic calculations. Relations between the two countries have gradually developed under the Chinese policy of “creeping expansionism” within Southern Asia. China is harbouring ambitions to set up a submarine base facility in the Maldives in Marao.¹⁷ China is using Pakistan to play the Islamic card with Maldives, thus, Pakistan is pressurising Male to facilitate Chinese plans for a naval base there.¹⁸ China has built the Country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs building and also national museum. Recently, China formed a Maldives-China Parliamentary Friendship Group and China’s Parliament has also set up a focus group, intent on further developing relations.

Trade in minerals and energy, worth many billions of dollars annually, passes near the Maldives, which is strategically located astride the major sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean. It is hardly surprising therefore that it shall impinge greatly upon Indian’s strategic concerns

in the Indian Ocean. Historically, Maldives has been India's sphere of influence and has sought to underwrite the security of Maldives, which was demonstrated when India dispatched its expeditionary force to rapidly intercept and neutralize a coup staged by heavily-armed ethnic Tamil militants in November 1988.¹⁹ More recently India played a considerable role in the political turmoil that Maldives underwent after the coup against Nasheed by Waheed; who later tried to captivate Nasheed and debar him from Presidential elections as he was being viewed as a strong contender. India provided asylum and prevailed on the political dispensation of the day to conduct a free and fair elections and restore the democracy in letter and spirit.

India as Stakeholder

There is hardly any doubt that China is all set and working hard to assume a leading role in emerging Asia. Probably, those countries which will have strong economic and political partnerships with China would be benefited by the changing economic fortunes of the second largest economy of the world. China and Chinese goods have also entered heavily into Indian market and economy. Similarly, given the economic benefits of its association with China, regardless of current strategic imperatives vis-à-vis the rivalry between China, India and the US, the Maldives will continue to be reliant on China's investment, trade and economic assistance to Maldives. Therefore, the implications of China's growing soft power influence are likely to be critical considerations for India and a real foreign policy challenge to hold on to its traditional allies, else China will wean them away from India.

Aid and trade have been important instruments of fostering better relations with Third World countries, especially South Asia. From 1956 to 1973, nearly 20 per cent of China's aid was targeted to South Asia, with Pakistan receiving 13.1 per cent, Sri Lanka 3.5 per cent and Nepal 2.9 per cent.²⁰ During recent years, China has expanded its economic assistance to Sri Lanka as well as Maldives many times more as explained factually above.

Bilateral relations between Republic of India and that of Maldives have been quite friendly and close in strategic, economic and military cooperation. India has made tremendous contributions towards maintaining security on the island nation and has forged an alliance with respect to its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean as also mentioned above. Both the countries amicably resolved their maritime boundary in 1976 although a minor diplomatic hitch occurred when

the brother of the then President of Maldives Maumoon Abdul Gayoom declared that the neighbouring Minicoy Island that belonged to India were a part of Maldives; Maldives quickly and officially denied that it was laying claim to the island.²¹ India and Maldives signed a comprehensive trade agreement in 1981.²² India and Maldivian leaders have maintained high level of contacts and consultations on regional issues. However, the way China is making inroads inside Maldives; has posed real challenge before the Indian diplomatic community. Maldives seems to have been slipping away from the hands of India because of either its foreign policy miscalculations or failing in its attitude of underscoring Maldives in its strategic interests.

It is quite obvious that India had cordial and deep rooted relations spreading across all areas from culture, trade, commerce, education, to strategic with both Sri Lanka and Maldives. However, of late it seems India has not only miscalculated its relations with both these countries but has also left the turf wide open because of policy bankruptcy thereby creating a vacuum which has provided enough space for China to intervene and consolidate. It has happened in spite of the fact that ties between Maldives and India is older than that between China and Maldives as India established diplomatic relations with Maldives on November 01, 1965.

India cannot afford the presence of any non-traditional friend within the vicinity of Indian Ocean and Southern Asia. India is clearly pre-eminent in the security matrix of Maldives and Sri Lanka, yet China has continued to expand its soft power influence in both these countries. The fact remains that China is not part of South Asia, but through systematic efforts, China has made its presence felt in a big way in India's neighbourhood.

The way China has cultivated India's long-time rival Pakistan, is suggestive enough that China is working hard to checkmate India's influence in its neighbourhood, and hence it must be a matter of great concern for India and its foreign policy makers. V Suryanarayanan has correctly mentioned that Chinese diplomacy is aimed at counterbalancing India's pre-eminent influence in its immediate neighbourhood. India's maritime ambitions, thus are being challenged and contested. Almost 55 per cent of India's trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, some countries continue to oppose allowing it to play a prominent role. China has voiced displeasure at the growing Indian naval presence in the region. China also opposed Vietnam granting exploration rights to Indian company ONGC Videsh in offshore blocks located in disputed waters.²³ Despite that fact the India does not

share a contiguous maritime border with South China Sea its maritime interests in the region are well established. The broader interest is to ensure that China's increasingly assertive position over maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea is not repeated in the Indian Ocean. With Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Marao in Maldives, an expanded Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean could result in a role reversal of its position in the South China Sea; whereas China is the coastal state and India the external maritime power in the South China Sea, the tables are turned in the Indian Ocean. This could entail Chinese interventions in disputes over the demarcation of maritime boundaries that India has with its neighbours namely Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and intelligence gathering and exploitation of maritime resources close to India's coastline. Biomass poaching and piracy on sea is recent breed of criminal activities that India requires to address with a heavy hand and strong naval presence in the blue waters. The Asian maritime domain is most likely to emerge as an increasingly active theatre of inter-state rivalries, given concerns of a strategic void created by a more "hands-off" approach by India.

Policy Choice for India

India requires impressing upon the smaller neighbours such as Sri Lanka and Maldives that they should not allow themselves to become a pawn in the geopolitical game of bigger powers in the region. Smaller countries of the region must know that it is far easier to deal with India than with China. They must understand the dynamics of the on-going Sino-Indian competition in the region and thus their policy must be to avoid any considerable involvement in the geopolitics of the region, else they may have to suffer at the hands of both China as well as India.

"Maritime Asia" has emerged as a new geopolitical frame of reference in recent years as the nations of Asia evolve into major trading and resource-consuming powers with economic growth contingent on sea-borne trade. India is no exception, with 95 per cent of its total external trade by volume and 75 per cent by value now conducted by sea, and with more than 70 per cent of its oil imports transiting the maritime domain.²⁴ To protect these burgeoning maritime interests, the Indian government requires maintaining a multi-dimensional Navy with extended outreach and sustainability. The Naval modernization will have its own course but the diplomatic community of India must think beyond that and design the geopolitics of the region in a manner that it is able to hold on its traditional sphere of influence without being

interventionist. India must cultivate political trust by investing political and economic capital in the neighbourhood.

China on the one hand engaged in encircling India with its power projections and presence in the neighbourhood; on the other hand becoming assertive by frequent intrusions into Indian Territory. India rather than responding befittingly has ordered for raising another mountain division to put its house in order. Such policy responses are rectification measures; however, at the same time India too should enhance its engagement with its neighbour at all levels and in all field economic, political, cultural, cooperation, military exercises, sports, education, tourism and security.

India must also play a constructive maritime role by generating a 'maritime concert' as suggested by NSA Shiv Shankar Menon by taking the neighbouring states into confidence as the fact remains that China is a growing maritime power as well and is moving at a great speed to architecture a geo-politics for itself in a manner that it is able to safeguard its strategic and economic interests in a sustainable and assertive manner. India must learn the lesson and act before it is too late.

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Nepal, A Factor In India-China Relations: An Analysis

Amulya K Tripathy and Roshni Kujur

Indian foreign policy in the 21st century saw some drastic changes in terms of structure and dynamics. Old ideas like building a socialist society; emphasis on politics; leading the 3rd world; anti-western phobia and idealism gave way to building a modern capitalist country; emphasis on economics; the desire to be a great power on its own right; pro-western political impulse and pragmatism. The earlier pillars of Indian foreign policy like non- alignment & anti- colonialism are absorbed in this new thinking. One of the consequences of this shift is the readjustment of its relation with its neighbours. Himalayan neighbours like Tibet, Nepal, and Bhutan were important buffers between India and China. But after 1962 Tibet was annexed by China. Though Sikkim became a part of India and Bhutan became an Indian protectorate, Nepal became a problem for the policy makers in India.

Without an outlet to the sea, Nepal has been dependent on India for international trade and transit facilities. Nepal emerged as a unified state over 200 years ago at a time when Britain was expanding her colonial rule in India.¹ Even though Nepal has sought to maintain friendly relations with neighbours, its cultural, linguistic, religion and economic ties with India historically much closer than China. Nepal is dependent on India as the source of access to the sea through the major port of Calcutta.

The dynamics of Nepal's relationship with either India or China cannot be studied separately because Nepal is strategically placed between these two countries and they both take more than a normal interest in what is going on in Nepal. The relationship between India and China is complicated. India was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China on 1st April 1950. Subsequently, they exchanged high-level visits, and shared warm relations, but did not last. By the late 1950s, serious differences emerged, particularly over Tibet

From 1951 to 1996, Nepal, generally tried to maintain balanced relationship with both India and China. However Mao had different perceptions about Nepal.

Mao Zedong had been influenced by historical considerations. In 1930, he “openly declared that the correct boundaries of China would include Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Taiwan, Korea and Ryukyu Island. These remarks were contained in the original version of the Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party,² but were deleted from the later versions of the book with a view to avoid suspicions in the minds of the leaders of these countries”.³

To counterbalance these ties to India, Nepalese monarchs started playing the so called “China card.”⁴The dynamics of Nepal’s relationship with these two countries moved into a different environment after a Maoist insurgency began in Nepal in 1996. When this Insurgency began, it appeared to be anti-Indian, but in 2001 it was revealed that the Maoist were operating from bases in India.

There is difference of opinion among scholars about the Chinese intensions in Nepal. According to some scholars the Chinese follow the principle of their core foreign policy issues like respecting the sovereignty of all states including Nepal and following the principle of non-interference. They also believe that the warm relationship between China and Nepal is possible because of the Chinese belief on Going out Policy by which China aims high levels of economic growth within China through global engagement, especially in new developing country markets such as Nepal.

There are three Himalayan states that border India. They are Tibet, Bhutan & Nepal. Mao Zedong’s Five Finger Policy includes all these states. China always wants to influence all those states for its security. Hence it annexed Tibet in 1950 and tries to have a say in rest of the states. Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim became Indian states and Bhutan is India’s protectorate. This posturing alarmed China and therefore it tries to focus more on Nepal. Further, though Tibet has been annexed, its problems are not over. There are 20000 Tibetan refugees in Nepal who embarrass China worldwide. They constitute a transit route to Tibetan leadership based at Dharmasala. China wants that route to stop operation. Therefore, it constantly tries to pressurise the Nepalese leadership to act against them. It requires a stable regime, effective security apparatus to deal with Tibetan refugees and a compliant government that would co-operate in the control of Tibetan refugees. This is not acceptable to Indian leadership which is committed to help Tibetan cause.

Mao’s .Five Fingers Policy indicates another fact also. It states that Nepal is a buffer zone between India and China; a delicate yam between two

boulders. Given Nepal's size and land-locked- status, the fact that its powerful neighbours have a major interest in its affairs, is no surprise. But Chinese occupation of Tibet increased the importance of Nepal more for India. Thereafter, in 1950 itself, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed. But after 1962 even this situation was changed. The direct contact between China's Tibet and Nepal became an issue for Indian security. China presented itself as a benevolent neighbour before Nepal with its intention to stabilize the kingdom in contrast to the superior attitude of India towards its smaller neighbour. Though India has shed some of its earlier attitude of a perceived predominance to a kind of accommodation of the interests of its neighbours, it has never compromised its security, and therefore wants to show Nepal that accommodation is not weakness.

Chinese Policy Towards India in 21st Century

China's interest towards India has largely been reactionary due to the Indo-US relationship since 2000. This is a natural strategic decision for China. The first reason that China shifted its India stance was due to a more pro-active U.S. policy towards India that was initiated during the second Clinton administration. (1996-2000)

The second reason that China is seeking to forge a closer relationship with India is the rapid growth of Indian national powers. According to World Bank statistics in 2006 India emerged for the first time as the No.3 economic power in Asia-surpassing the Republic of Korea. Growing India-Japan relations has also made an impact on china.

Nepal's Pro- China Policy

Nepal's pro China policy began with King Mahendra and was continued in successive regimes. But the Maoist regime in Nepal openly invited China to balance India's excessive role in Nepal. The first country that Pushpa Kamal Dahel Prachanda visited after being sworn in as Prime Minister was China. He was 'invited' to attend the closing ceremony of the Olympic Games in 2008. Prachanda's visit lasted for five days.

There are people who argue that China is not only courting the Nepalese Maoists, but also rendering political as well material support to the Indian Maoist whose ultimate aim is to overthrow the parliamentary democracy through an armed struggle. It is very important to note that 38 official Chinese delegations visited Nepal during Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahel "Prachanda's term, while the numbers of delegations from India were about one-fourth the above numbers. It is

also well known that the Maoist government and China were preparing to extend the Tibet Railway to Nepal.⁵

Chinese relationship with Nepal follows a greater design. It has three principal motives. They are:

- [a] to compel Nepal to follow One China Policy
- [b] commercially oriented economic aid and
- [c] military assistance to help achieve both a & b.

China's Role in Nepal: India losing the Race?

Although Nepal and India have an open border and free mobility of populace across borders; it is China that is increasingly working to take over India's position of the largest trading partner of Nepal. In 2011-2012, India-Nepal trade was USD 3 billion and the total volume of trade between Nepal and China amounted to USD 1.2 billion. To enhance these ties, China has offered zero-tariff treatment to 60 per cent products of Nepal. Simultaneously, there is added emphasis on boosting cultural exchanges. There are now almost 19 China Study Centres (CSC) and Confucius Institutes in Nepal to promote Chinese language and culture. The aim now is to have a comprehensive cooperation that serves mutual development and prosperity with the promotion of trade and tourism, joint border management, development of hydropower projects, building infrastructure for greater connectivity, and bring in overall socio-economic growth of Nepal.

For Nepal, China serves as a potential supplier of goods and assistance that it badly needs in order to recover its economy. Almost half the population of Nepal is unemployed and more than half is illiterate. At the same time, more than 30 per cent of the people in Nepal live in abject poverty. To deal with its internal problems, Nepal surely has serious business to engage with China. However, China also has deeper motives than just business cooperation. The Tibetan community in Nepal is a serious concern for the Chinese authorities.

China's open diplomatic policy in Nepal remains to exploit the resources of Nepal and take advantage of Indian market. Hence, it has already completed 22-km road in central Nepal connecting its southern plains with Kyirong, county of Tibet, making the shortest motorable overland route between China and India. Besides, it has been active to engage itself in the Nepal-China-India trilateral meeting for enhancing trilateral cooperation, which was held recently. One of the major focuses of the

meeting was energy projects based on trans-country power trade agreement, which allows free trade of electricity among Nepal, China, and India and through a regional grid connected to all the countries⁶

While China's relations with Nepal grow, resentment against India is on the rise. Nepali sentiments that India has expansionist tendencies are gaining ground. In particular, the Chinese economic clout over Nepal is giving space for open antagonistic view against India. On January 9, 2013, at the inaugural session of the 6th General Assembly of the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) in Kathmandu, Chairman Mohan Baidya Kiran stated, "China respects Nepal's sovereignty unconditionally, while India has set an evil eye there exists several unequal treaties between the two countries." Such concerns were also for the first time openly expressed by the Indian side at the end of last year when Pranay Sahay, Director General of Armed Border Force Sashastra Seema Bal after an India-Nepal border meet told the press that the Chinese activities in the southern part of Nepal have increased.

India-China Power Game in Nepal in 21st Century and the Consequences

After the August 2010 visit to Nepal by Shyam Saran as special envoy of the Indian Prime Minister, a delegation of 21 senior Chinese leaders led by He Yong, vice-premier and secretary at the secretariat of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, arrived in Kathmandu on September 11, 2010 on a six-day visit.

This is the highest-level Chinese delegation to visit Nepal since the beginning of the peace process. The visit also coincided with news about a controversial audio tape purportedly containing a conversation between Krishna Bahadur Mahara, International Bureau Chief of the Unified CPN-Maoist, and an unknown Chinese, in which Mahara is heard asking for 500 million rupees to buy off 50 lawmakers required to form the government under Prachanda's leadership. This tape brought China into the internal political debate of Nepal for the first time. As of now, it is not known whether the tape is genuine or not. If it is genuine, then it indicates a serious shift in China's policy towards Nepal. It can be seen as the beginning of Chinese interference in Nepal's internal affairs.⁷

The Chinese have always adopted a pro-establishment policy towards Nepal. Nepal-China relations are based on the Five Principles, according to which China will not intervene in Nepal's domestic politics and Nepal will respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity with respect to Tibet and Taiwan.

But the controversial audio tape violates the principle that China will not intervene in Nepal's domestic politics. It also indicates that China seems to have adopted a proactive policy towards Nepal. China had always gained good faith in the Nepalese mind by pointing at Indian interference in Nepal's internal affairs. The current visit of the Chinese delegation, coming close on the heels of the audio tape controversy, also indicates that China may involve itself more actively in Nepalese affairs and serve as a check on interference in Nepal's internal matters by any other external powers.

These events are also taking place at a time when there is a souring of relations between China and India due to the denial of visa to the Indian Army's Chief of Northern Command Lt. Gen. B. S. Jaswal. There is also tension between India and China on the issue of stapled visas being issued to Kashmiris, the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the issue of Dalai Lama, and so on. Thus, one can argue that China is taking such actions in Nepal to confront and counter-balance India and will continue to act similarly in other countries in India's neighbourhood.⁸

China also found it expedient to cultivate the Maoists because of the growing tensions in Tibet, particularly after the March 2008 uprising. China wanted to curb the underground activities of some 20,000 Tibetan refugees settled in Nepal. As is well-known, Nepal is the most easily accessible entry point to Tibet and it has the second largest Tibetan refugee community in the world. China has traditionally alleged that international forces are conducting operations against it, through Tibetans based in Nepal. In this context, China was deeply concerned when six Nepalese Parliamentarians visited Dalai Lama in Dharamsala in February 2009. Only after this did China start establishing good relations with other political parties like the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Madhesi People's Rights Forum apart from the CPN-Maoist.⁹

It is well-known that even though Maoist leaders are posing themselves as anti-Indian, most are aware that at the end of the day they will have to deal with India, and that they cannot wish away the geographical, historical, cultural and socio-economic linkages between the two countries. It is almost certain that they will temper their policies towards India once they come to power.

The economic aid provided by China is designed in such a manner that it is a part of Going Out Policy in disguise. As per the treaty of 1950 India is the most significant external economic actor in Nepal contributing 38% of the total foreign investment, and in trade it is

60%. But by 2009, China's investment in Nepal rose from 11 to 20% and its trade from 19 to 28%. But the significant scenario is that Chinese investment pattern follows an investment graph called the Big Three- in infrastructure, in communication and in hydropower. Though the increase in economic aid is not conditional, India knows well that it is linked to the performance of the Nepalese government to fulfil the important objective of China and that is the control of Tibetan refugees. Therefore control of larger market and control of Tibetan refugees are the twin objectives of the Going Out Policy .This trend is a direct challenge to Indian interest in Nepal. Already there are symptoms that Indian goods are unable to compete with Chinese goods in a Nepali market. If the trend continues then the entire South Asian market would be covered with Chinese goods via Nepal.

Over the years many of Nepal's traditional institutions of governance have either collapsed or been superseded. But Nepal's army remains the most stable and reliable national institution in the country. Moreover, it is the most important institution where Indian influence is visible. But after 2005 when king Gyanendra seized political power, there developed coolness of relationship between Indian and Nepalese army. This opened space for .China to develop its economic assistance to Nepalese army. In 2011, General Chen Bingde, Chief of General staff of the People's Liberation Army announced a military assistance package of 17 million dollars. It is interesting to note that the assistance deal between China and Nepal was signed not by the government but by the respective military Chiefs. Though the amount of assistance was small, India is apprehensive about the direction of its use. It believes that the amount will be diverted to some elements of anti-Indian Maoists who were accommodated after the end of Jan Andolan phase two.

Strategic Issue

Strategically, both India and China share same stake at Nepal. Both know that Nepal is weak and internally vulnerable and so it's less able resist foreign interference. Hence both try to maximize their area of interest. It is here that there is a clash between the constant elements of the relationship like history, geography and culture and the strategic elements like social, political and economic factors. While India was a dominant factor in strategic elements, after 2005 China gradually entered into the arena of Nepalese strategic interest. This disturbs India. This apart, Nepal, after 2005, has been proposing two strategic concepts like "Greater Nepal" and "Nepal as a Zone of Peace". Both these concepts challenge two famous treaties between Nepal and India. The first, the

Treaty of Segowee was signed between Nepal and British India on 2 Dec, 1815 whereby Nepal ceded 1/3 of its territory to British India. Now this territory is an integral part of India. Nepal claims this territory through the concept of Greater Nepal. Second, when Nepal proposed it as a Zone of Peace, it challenges the Indo-Nepalese treaty of 1950, whereby the peace of the region rests with India. Both these concepts were pursued after 2005 when Chinese contact with all Nepalese political parties emerged stronger.

Concluding Remarks

As proposed in the dichotomy, Indian foreign policy peruses certain values which are not received well in Nepal. China is a big factor in this scenario. As India and Nepal has an age old emotional relations based on religion and culture basically, therefore it is for the Nepalese leadership to decide.

Asian balance of power struggle is also on while global unilateral power the United States is receding. In the process major Asian countries have developed trust deficit against each other. India and China is passing out through this situation. India after launching its *Look East Policy* in 1992 has increased its presence in Southeast and East Asia. In recent years these relations have gone up rapidly. Indian –Vietnam and India-Japan relations in particular have emerged as serious challenge for China. India has also remained active in oil exploration activities with Vietnam despite Chinese protest in South China Sea. This growing Indian activity has pushed the Chinese to work hard on its traditional *Encircling India within South Asia*. After Pakistan, Nepal has emerged as an important Chinese pawn in South Asia. However Nepal is passing through hard time since 1996. Moist violence has consumed more than 20,000 people since last 17 years. In November 2013 constitutional assembly elections the people of Nepal has given a positive mandate. One must hope that this assembly will not only formulate the constitution but provide governance also. Since almost last two decades no accountable government is at place therefore ambiguity rules the roost. Once accountable government will take the charge things may improve. But the fact remains the growing Indian might in the emerging security architecture of Asia has propelled the importance of all South Asian countries including Nepal for China in the context of its Encircling India policy. In this context India must reformulate its strategy to cope up with the situation.

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Myanmar as New Pivot of Clash of Interests between India and China

Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas

India's evolving cooperation with ASEAN should not be simply looked from the perspective of countering China. The simultaneous rise of China and now India is a fundamental factor for understanding the twenty-first century. In rising as Great Powers, a relative term, they are coming up against each other across Asia and its surrounding. Myanmar for over fifty years, was strategically befriended by the PRC, a friendship that translated into wide array of energy security partnerships and projected actualized and implemented over the years. Today there is a sea change with the reforms in Myanmar and people's participation in public affairs. This change was reflected in President Obama's first state visit in the beginning on his second term in November 2012. Myanmar has the world's tenth biggest gas reserves estimated at more than 90 trillion cubic feet. This will shift the future development of resource diplomacy between India-China-Myanmar in a cooperative or competitive framework.

Keywords: Cross national Oil and Gas Pipelines, Energy Security, ASEAN, Road and Rail Connectivity, Trade

I

The post Cold War geo-strategic and economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region is still evolving and a new equilibrium is taking shape. With the rise of China and India as significant powers and assertion of military profile by Japan, the centre of gravity of global economy and politics has gradually shifted from Europe to the Asia Pacific region in recent years.

Myanmar lying east of India and Bangladesh and in the Southwest of China, has common borders with Laos and Thailand as well. Having a long coastline along Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, the country has a number of rivers, i.e. Irrawaddy, Chindwin and Sittang, originating in China and going up to Indian Ocean. Situated between India and China, it was considered an important gateway to China and on the other hand, a gateway to ASEAN as well. Jawaharlal Nehru had an

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understanding of all this in his mind when he tried to forge intimate relations with Burma, and together with Prime Minister U Nu strove for wider Asian Cooperation including friendship and cooperation with China as a key factor.”¹

India’s and China’s stances on the Myanmar issue are based on their pragmatic strategic thinking in this country. Myanmar is the second largest country (after Indonesia) among the ten states of ASEAN to which it was admitted in July 1997. For both China and India, Myanmar’s geostrategic location at the tri-junction of East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia is of critical significance. In the case of China and Myanmar, the two countries share a common border of 2,200 km with easy access to each other’s territory. Myanmar is not only a potential supply route bypassing the Malacca Strait, but also a strategic staging point for controlling access to Malacca Strait’s western approaches. While “controlling Malacca Strait is a key strategic objective of China to the point of risking armed conflict with the regional states and the US.” Access to Myanmar’s ports and overland transportation routes through Myanmar is seen as a vital and strategic security asset for China.

China, as the rising global power with a strong regional and global agenda, has emerged as a major factor. Evidently, China is slowly but surely occupying the strategic space being vacated by the US and is taking advantage of the short-term regional opportunities whether strategic, political or economic. China would like to work towards blunting any scope for causing her discomfiture. Her evolving strategic ties with ASEAN, her now pre-eminent position in North and East Asia and her leadership and pro-active role in the Asia-Pacific institutions are all integral parts of the evolving Chinese strategy in the region. At the bilateral political level, China has developed special strategic relations with Myanmar.

Like other Asian powers, India too is re-defining its position and role both at regional and global levels. Two factors are contributing to India’s re-thinking about its role in the world in general and the Asia Pacific region in particular. These factors are: the political dividend India has garnered as the world’s largest democracy and its growing economic status, which, according to projections, will cause it to emerge, along with China, as a key economic driver of the future. India is also trying hard to contain Chinese strategic maneuverer in Myanmar and since NDA regime (1998-2004) sustained one policy to engage Myanmar. There are divergences between China and India on Myanmar front and on larger Asia-Pacific on the other hands.

II

China has emerged a powerful factor in the politics of Myanmar in the past few decades. When India was displaying indifference to forging closer relationship with the military rulers, the Chinese had astutely manoeuvred it in their favour by forging strategic and economic bonds. India woke up after 1998. The rebel groups of the Northeast had already strengthened their bases in Myanmar with the cooperation of China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The status of Indian origin people in Myanmar is the only divergences between India and Myanmar.

Myanmar being contiguous to India and China is a gateway for India to enter Southern China or ASEAN markets through roadways and railways. In fact, Myanmar occupies one of the most important land routes for China known as 'The Burma Road'. This has been historically important for business and trade in Southeast Asian region. A hostile power in control of Myanmar could threaten India's security through land, sea and the air. Both ASEAN and SAARC know the strategic importance of Myanmar and adopted the policy of "constructive engagement" to maintain constant interaction.

In the conduct of foreign policy Myanmar supported the policy of non-alignment in the first decade of its independence, but subsequently they cultivated People's Republic of China as the closest partner. It abstained to choose either of the two super powers but instead China, a neighbour with which it shared border and culture. A major change in Burma's foreign policy towards China had repercussions on Indo-Burmese relations. A Sino-Burmese border agreement and a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression was signed on 28 January 1960 when General Ne Win was leading a caretaker government in Burma. The changing attitude of China to Burma also figured prominently in the Indian Parliament. On 22 August 1961, Pandit H.N. Kunzru said that: "Since the conclusion of the Sino-Burmese Agreement, China has been making efforts to woo Burma", and "offers of help are being made to Burma in order that Indian influence there might be lessened".

However, the matter of great strategic significance is the construction of certain strategic outposts/facilities on two banks of the Irrawaddy River and the Indian Ocean. China has established a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) facility at Coco Islands, 30 nautical miles from the Andaman Islands. The project in is that the Chinese SIGINT facility can enable China to monitor Indian missile tests off the Orissa Coast. Besides Coco, the Chinese have also developed Hanggyi as an important port and facilitated communication through Bassein River.² The Chinese

collaboration in opium industry has also been well known. Myanmar is an important part of the golden triangle and drug syndicates in the area have evolved networks for production, sale and illegal trade of narcotics. In that endeavour, there has been collusion amongst opium growers, military elites and the smugglers. The Chinese collusion in opium business in Myanmar has been historically deep-rooted. India is concerned about it because there is growing abuse of drugs in the Northeast due to its proximity with Myanmar. India is worried with the nexus of Pakistan's ISI, supported by China in Myanmar, which fomented insurgency in northeast.

Although Southeast Asian countries are cooperating with China in a massive manner but they never felt comfortable with China given the Chinese past record of aggression towards ASEAN countries. The changes which have taken place in the international and regional politico-strategic situation in recent years have helped to improve markedly the environment for positive developments in India – ASEAN relations.³

III

As Myanmar situated between the two biggest powers in Asia, India and China, on the border of South and South-East Asia. If China is important strategically, India cannot be ignored. India is important enough to Myanmar for strategic and economic considerations. For most of the 1990s it has been Myanmar's largest export market, importing pulses, timber, rubber, leather and spices. It has also provided major assistance in building a 170-km road by the Border Roads Organization, from Tamu, opposite Moreh in Manipur, to Kalembo, which is connected to Mandalay. India-ASEAN cooperation now covers a wide field, including trade and investment, science and technology, tourism, human resource development, transportation and infrastructure, and health and pharmaceuticals. India signed "Long Term Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" with ASEAN, which is the corner-stone of India's Look East policy.⁴ The road is completed and it provides an important passage for India into ASEAN market and vice-versa. The opening of the road has facilitated tourism. The opening of the road made it easier for Burmese Indians to visit their relatives. Most of them have suffered from the general impoverishment of the country since the army took it over in 1962 (When the better-off Indians and Chinese left, after their assets were nationalized by General Ne Win). It may not be fanciful to even look ahead to the days when Tamu becomes one of the land entry points for tourists, along with similar crossing points from Thailand and China. Discussions have also been

held on Indian assistance in building a second road, connecting the border near Champhai, in Mizoram, with existing road networks further inland. India could also become a useful source of investments, although the largest Indian investment approved so far has been a proposal by Kolkata firm to invest \$4.5 million in rebuilding, maintaining and leasing Caterpillar tractors. India accounts for about two-thirds of Myanmar's pharmaceutical imports.⁵

Since early 1990s, with the adoption of Look East Policy, India-Myanmar engagement has been growing. Several empirical studies show the extent of economic integration between South and Southeast Asia, where Myanmar has been playing the lead catalytic role.⁶ It is therefore an important country for both India and ASEAN that helps integrate economies across the border. India's change in policy towards Myanmar has paid a rich dividend. For example, the bilateral trade between India and Myanmar has grown from US\$ 12 million in 1980 to about US\$ 1.5 billion in 2009, increased by an extraordinary 46 per cent per annum in the last two decades. It further increased to over \$ 2 billion in 2012 and expected to cross \$ 5 billion by 2015. This phenomenal rise in bilateral trade has been driven by Myanmar's increasing exports to India. Today, Myanmar exports goods worth about US\$ 1.09 billion to India, which contributes to 85 per cent of total bilateral trade and one-fifth of Myanmar's exports to the world. In contrast, Myanmar's export to China is half of what is exported to India. What follows is that India is Myanmar's the second largest export destination, next to Thailand.⁷

While India's increasing trade deficit with Myanmar is a matter of concern that increased from miniscule US\$ 2.5 million in 1980 or about US\$ 131 million in turning of the last decade to about US\$ 1 billion in 2009, India has been providing a consistently higher market access to Myanmar, which is perhaps the highest in volume that India provides to the LDCs in the world. If trade liberalization is one of the determinants that helped Myanmar to increase her export to India, trade facilitation by opening of border trade between the two countries in 1995 is equally responsible for higher bilateral trade between the two countries in later years, particularly since 1997 onward. Nevertheless, India exports a bare minimum share of its global export (even less than one per cent) of its own imports, and a small range of imports (edible vegetables and wood and articles) and relatively diversified exports (pharmaceuticals, iron and steel and electrical machinery).⁸

India's export to Myanmar has increased considerably in the last few years. India's top 10 exported commodities to Myanmar in 2009-10, whereas top 10 exported products at a disaggregated level for the years

2009-10 and 2010-11. Indian exports to Myanmar are relatively diversified where the top 10 commodity groups account for about 80 per cent of India's total exports to Myanmar in 2009-10. India's export basket to Myanmar is dominated by finished goods such as pharmaceutical products, iron and steel, electrical machinery and equipment, which contribute about 2/3rd of total Indian export to Myanmar. Other important products in the Indian export basket are residues and waste from the food industries, mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, rubber and products, plastic and products, machinery and mechanical appliances, cotton etc. During 2000-01 and 2009-10, Indian exports to Myanmar increased substantially and also witnessed a compositional change. In contrast, while India's imports from Myanmar are three times higher than its exports to Myanmar, imports are mainly primary products and relatively less diversified.⁹

Finally, India's trade with Myanmar witnessed a higher growth in the last decade, which indirectly suggests existence of a large trade potential between the two countries.¹⁰ This had positive impacts on the creation of positive environment for regional cooperation.

VI

India and China have been pitted against each other as strategic competitors in Myanmar. India, which got its Myanmar act together much later than China, is now seeking to address this imbalance. For India, the process of visits seems to have taken off in 1998 with two Secretary-level visits. In 1999, the two countries signed an agreement on science and technology and the Myanmar Deputy Home and Railway Ministers paid separate visits in July and December 1999. The Chinese, on the other hand, have remained engaged with Myanmar. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the two sides have kept up the exchange of high-level visits. The State Councillor and Secretary-General of the State Council, Mr. Luo Gan (in January 1991), the State Councillor and Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen (in February 1993), the Premier, Mr. Li Peng (in December 1994), the Chairman, Mr. Li Ruihan (in March 1997), and the Vice-Premier, Mr. Wu Bangguo (in October 1997), visited Myanmar one after another. During the visit of Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng, signed some agreements for providing soft loans for building infrastructure, which included construction of airbase at Mandalaya, highway to connect Mandalaya to Yunnan (China), a port at Hanggyi and a passage through Irrawaddy delta to Bay of Bengal. The Chinese were already supplying strategic weapons to Myanmar ever since they signed agreements for \$1 billion arms deal. In 1994, the two countries

signed another agreement worth \$400 million for naval frigates, jet aircraft, tanks, APCs, etc.

Since the early nineties, there has been steadily increasing cooperation on all fronts and India has begun to figure in the strategic thinking of Southeast Asia. When India became a nuclear power in 1998, major powers like United States, Japan and many other countries sat up and took note of this important development. ASEAN wanted closer ties with India to balance the influence of China. Singapore played a particularly important role in creating awareness of India's strategic importance. Hence India became important to balance the situation. India was given status of full dialogue partnership of ASEAN in 1995 and the membership of ARF in 1996. The ASEAN desired that India should promote the objective conditions for peace, stability, security and prosperity of the region. Pursuing the policy of Look East, India entered into dialogues with Myanmar to strengthen economic and strategic ties. India wanted to enlist the cooperation of Myanmar to address the threat of insurgency and terror in the northeast. Myanmar agreed to exchange information on insurgents and help India in tracing their hideouts. Myanmar also offered support for the India's bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council. It evinced interests in maintaining Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. General Malik visited Myanmar on goodwill missions (2000) and he was satisfied with the positive response. He was trying to get Myanmar's deeper level of cooperation to address the problem of cross border insurgency and drug trafficking. General Than Swe, COAS also expressed support for India and serious dialogues have started ever since to counter cross-border subversion and insurgency. There is a constant effort to promote understanding. India's Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, visited Myanmar and was happy with the outcome. *The Times of India* (22 January 2007) reported that:

In what may be a breakthrough of sorts in the drive to close in on secessionist outfits engaged in terror against India, Myanmar has agreed to India's proposal to institutionalize cooperation between their armies for operations against ULFA and other insurgent groups in the North-East. The understanding was reached at a meeting where India's foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee also agreed to Myanmar's pending request for supply of military equipment. While Myanmar has been cooperating with India's drive against insurgency in the north-east and has even taken action on the basis of information provided by New Delhi, it has not been enough to prevent insurgents from crossing over.

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After the visit of Mr. Mukherjee, Myanmar has tried to diversify its procurement of arms; in fact, China, Pakistan and Israel were supplying arms in the past. It is reported that India and Myanmar have decided to promote constructive engagement and establish cooperative mechanisms between the navies of two nations. Their agreement for joint exercises and exchange of intelligence would help the drive against sea piracy and smuggling of narcotics. India is pleased to transfer two BN-2 defender Islander maritime aircraft to Myanmar and there are positive signals for better understanding of India's security concerns.

China does not like a strong Indian presence and influence in Southeast Asia. China is aware of the various cultural and spiritual convergences that India shares with Southeast Asia. China knows that India is the only country that could possibly challenge its ascendancy and potential hegemony in Asia, and therefore it makes sense for China to try hard to keep India under pressure. Traditionally, China has been very dismissive of India, which it treats as a mere South Asian player. However, over the last two decades, the Chinese have been somewhat puzzled and intrigued by the steady rate of India's economic growth and its political stability. So they have no option but to take India more seriously.¹¹ India and Myanmar are evolving cooperative mechanism through ASEAN, ARF, BIMST-EC and Mekong-Ganga project to promote economic and strategic interaction. But there is another area, which needs to be addressed properly. Myanmar is richly endowed by nature in terms of oil and natural gas. It is a huge supplier of oil to China. Always hungry for oil and natural gas, the Chinese succeed in getting contracts in Myanmar. Pranab Mukherjee discussed the issue of energy supplies from Myanmar with General Maung Aye and Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung on 20 May 2007. The deliberations also focused on India's desire to tie-up energy supplies from Myanmar with Mukherjee, raising the issue of a pipeline to ensure uninterrupted supply of natural gas to India with General Aye, but it was clear that progress could be made only if India matched the price quoted by aggressive competitors and if A-3 block, in which India wants to take a stock, yielded enough gas to be economically feasible. A Belgian consultant engaged by the Government of India has estimated that a pipeline must carry a minimum of five lakh million cubic feet of gas to be feasible. The decision of Myanmar to sell China the gas from the fields where India has made an investment was a disappointment for India, which had been hoping that the gas would be sold to India. India had only been looking at Bangladesh with regard to a pipeline route but New Delhi should also have been looking at the possibility of routing the pipeline through the Northeast Region. This would have been more expensive but it would

have stimulated the development of the region. Pipelines are important not just for the economic and energy benefits they bring; they are also strategic projects. Any project involving an investment of thousands of crores of rupees has to be a strategic project. India and South Korea, which had invested in Rakhine offshore area to explore and to extract oil, were disappointed when Myanmar signed a MoU with China, committing all gas from Block A-1 and A-III to China. The gas is to be wheeled through a 2,380 km pipeline connecting Myanmar's Kyakphyu in the Bay of Bengal to Rili in China's Yunnan province. China agreed to pay an annual transit fee of \$150 million for 30 years to Myanmar.¹² Two Indian owned state companies – ONGC Videsh and GAIL alongwith South Korean Daewoo had made investments and they were expecting a better price and deal. India was planning to build a pipeline through Bangladesh to bring energy to India, but could not succeed. Due to non-cooperation of Bangladesh, and astute business sense of the Chinese, India faced setbacks. India's political establishment unfortunately tends to take an accountant's perspective when it comes to infrastructure, looking at the figures and not at the potential strategic benefits of projects.¹³

Myanmar borders a region of India that unfortunately does not have much political weight in New Delhi. The Northeast Region states have to fight to be heard, while for decades the West Bengal government has generally been at odds with the Centre. As a result the region tends to get sidelined. India should invest more money in Bangladesh and Myanmar. If India can give US\$ 2 billion to Afghanistan, which isn't even one of our immediate neighbours, Myanmar and Bangladesh, which are much larger countries, should each get at least the same amount. There is a need to cooperate with both countries on water, energy, transport, drug trafficking, illegal migration and infrastructure. Regional economic integration is also necessary. In fact, the Northeast Region, Bangladesh and Myanmar form an integrated whole. The growth of the region is therefore interconnected.

V

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has however spoken about a long-term vision of an integrated Asia from the Himalayas to the Pacific in which it would be possible to trade, travel and invest freely through the region. Southeast Asia is a growth area of the world. Most people are agreed that the fulcrum of global geopolitics is shifting to Asia. The 21st century is being widely called the 'Asian' century. It is evident that the 'Look East' policy must therefore be a significant element of India's foreign policy. The regional environment is however changing rapidly

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and East Asians are interested in Indian markets. East Asian Community is aimed at creating a cooperative environment. India, China, Myanmar and Japan have to play major role for community building in the region. Free trade, common currency, people-to-people contacts are on the agenda of the future. Myanmar has to act as an important hub of economic activities between SAARC and ASEAN and has to dilute its tendency of over dependence on China. That would be appreciated not only by China but by the international community in general. Over the last two decades the Chinese have built very close relations with Myanmar. Myanmar's role in providing China a shorter access route to Indian Ocean and ASEAN is going to be crucial in the strategic scene of South Asia. The Chinese have used the geophysical advantage they enjoy to gain access to Myanmar's mineral and natural gas resources. Following a policy of non-interference in internal affairs of the country, China has become the main supplier of arms to Myanmar.

India has embarked on a policy of building closer relations with Myanmar to counter the Chinese influence and facilitate the growth of trade and commerce with ASEAN as part of its look east policy. It is financing road and port development projects in Myanmar which would improve connectivity of India's north eastern states and help their development.

Concluding Observations

Myanmar has become a magnet of global and Asian powers in recent years. President Obama, Japanese PM, Shinzo Abe, British PM, Russian leaders and many other world leaders have visited recently. It is a reminder of the fact that isolation of Myanmar is going to end and the pace of democratic reforms is also on. Actually since last one decade the global power have felt that since gravity of the world politics is deviating towards Asia therefore they have given a new Phillip to their engagements with Myanmar and the intended motive is to reduce its dependency over China. PM , Manmohan Singh visited Myanmar in 2012 and the same year it was reciprocated by the Myanmar's President. In second week of March 2014, PM Manmohan Singh again visited Myanmar (BIMISTEC Summit) and had summit level talks with the Myanmar ruling elites. The ongoing security architecture of Asia and growing great power positive engagements with Myanmar has created a unique opportunity for India. India must push its decade long policy according to the strategic view of Kautilaya. India's Look East Policy (LEP) will be extremely successful if we will connect ASEAN through roads and rail.

Myanmar has facilitated the process therefore as PM Manmohan Singh has set the deadline by March 2016, we must put the connectivity in order. Only part of economic motives of LEP has been achieved yet. By 2012 India-ASEAN trade was \$ 80 billion, over 37% from the expected one. By 2015 it is estimated to \$ 100 billion and by 2022 \$ 200 billion but if connectivity will be established it could create wonders. Myanmar has always consistent in its approach of independent foreign policy therefore for balancing China it needs India. India must seize this opportunity to not only promote human security in its North East but make deep inroads in ASEAN and Asia-Pacific.

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The China Moment of the Indian Foreign Policy

Binod Singh

***Abstract:** India and China, the two Asian giants have recently realized the importance of economic cooperation at bilateral as well as international level. However, the last one decade under the rule of UPA, India-China relations witnessed nothing substantive achievement or political development. In fact the bilateral relations have further deteriorated from the level where the NDA government under Vajpayee has built till 2004. But again doubts have been raised on the peaceful rise of the two giants, and question has been raised if the two countries can rise simultaneously and coexist together. Can they trust each other, and sit down on a negotiating table for serious business between them? In this article the author has attempted to bring the main issues facing the two countries and have suggested some major policy making points for the upcoming new government in Delhi.*

Keywords: India, China, South Asia, Bilateral Trade, Military Relations, Foreign Policy.

Historical background

Recent debate has focused on China and India as the world's fastest growing economies, their expanding bilateral trade, and the vast potential for closer cooperation. There is, however, little attention devoted to what prevented cooperation in the past, how economic engagement factors into their respective "grand strategy, and how it influences the scope, pace and context of bilateral economic interaction. For most of the time since the late 1950s, relations between India and China have been fraught with tension and conflict. The major contention has been the issue of delineating the boundary line which goes for more than 4000 miles in a very difficult Himalayan terrain but of utmost geostrategic importance. One major factor for distrusting each other has been the issue of Tibet and Tibetan religious leader Dalai Lama living in India, whom China has branded a Political conspirator and fugitive.

The China Moment of the Indian Foreign Policy

Hundred years ago in 1914, there was held a “Shimla Conference” between China, Tibet and the then colonial government of India. That conference had sown the seeds of discontent between the two great ancient civilizations India and China, which we are still struggling hard to get rid-off. After the independence, we tried to resolve that issue amicably but then we had to fight a brief war with China in 1962, the memory of which still reminds us not to trust the dragon anymore. The diplomatic relations were revived in 1976 and things were normalized by 1990s. But the debate of Mc-Mohan line being legal in certain cases and illegal in most of the sectors of our boundary continues till today. The agreement then signed by the Tibetan government is not at all acceptable to Chinese government.¹ Hence the boundary issue persists till today. In the 21st century, these issues are still obstructing our path when India and China looking forward to forge a strategic partnership. Nevertheless, we have moved forward step-by-step in forging an incremental relationship with China, and today this country is our largest trading partner. It is also the first outbound destinations for Indians and soon emerging as an attractive destination for Indian students to study medicines and MBA degrees. This proves the maturity our leadership has shown to move ahead in all direction and gradually find a mutually acceptable solution for resolving the boundary issue. We will be soon celebrating the 60th anniversary of the signing of the “Panchsheel” between Zhou Enlai and Nehru in 1954. Hence this is an opportune time to do an introspection of current bilateral relations and figure out the major issues which will be at the foreign policy agenda of the new government in New Delhi. In the following sections this paper attempts to find out some of the major opportunities and challenges the two country faces, and then it suggests some policy making points for the next government in New Delhi.

The China Opportunity in the 21st Century

The world has already accepted the economic dominance of China, now it's time that China will assert its military supremacy. We no longer complain against the quality of Chinese goods and indeed the country has improved on and now delivers quality products. But are we ready to accept China as next military superpower. The opinion is yet divided globally as well as inside India. The opinion inside our country is divided on this issue of how to perceive the rise of China. Our military and strategic thinkers are viewing the rise of China as challenge but some section of our policy makers and diplomats have come to view China as

an opportunity. The corporate houses in India have always advocated an economic engagement with China based on reciprocity but our bureaucrats in the ministry of commerce have been apprehensive of Chinese goods flooding the Indian market.

In the coming years, China will be interested in South Asia more than any time in its history, not just for geostrategic concerns but also for it is the next region to witness high economic growth after East Asia. China has invested and fostered a long lasting all weather friendship (termed as higher than Himalayas deeper than Seas) with Pakistan and now it is time to harness that in economic terms. On the political side, Beijing's involvement in the south Asian region has materialized in the establishment of so-called "strategic partnerships" with several small states in the region. The intensifying Sino-Pakistani links seemingly support a neorealist perspective according to which Beijing uses trade, investment, development aid and diplomacy in an attempt to balance the regional and global dominance of India.² Hence it is obvious that China's South Asia policy or the extended "Look West" policy will be anchored on its long time tested ally Pakistan. Indians are more than happy if China invests in Pakistan and brings helps it to become a normal country. But, perhaps the close military ties along with sell of nuclear technology to Pakistan are the main reason for India viewing China as a threat. India would like to engage China in the region in a multilateral framework under the auspices of SAARC and other institutions. Therefore India welcomed the Chinese plan to set up a Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) which was on top of the agenda when Chinese Premier visited New Delhi in May 2013. But for most of the time these initiatives have been put into cold basket and nothing substantive has been achieved in attempt to link the India's North East region to that of China's South West. We have also noted that nothing substantive has been done to promote the border trade between India and China since the Nathu-La border in Sikkim was opened in 2006. The City of Kolkata and Kunming (K2 initiative) has initiated and held numbers of dialogues in order to facilitate the trade and development in the region. Before coming out with the "maritime silk road"³, Chinese leadership has already launched its program to revive the land based ancient silk road which starts from Xi An (the ancient capital of China) runs through the Central Asian states and ends in Roma.⁴ This has been one of the major policy initiative of new president Xi Jinping to revive the fate of China's Western region. In 2000 China has launched a policy of "Developing the Western Region (Xibu Kaifa)" which did not deliver the result as expected. The debate over the regional disparity inside China has intensified and it has given

rise to deep dissatisfaction among minorities towards Beijing development policy. On an even larger scale, the “new silk road⁵” and “maritime silk road” represent complementary efforts to build up infrastructure for trade and transportation between China and Central Asia.⁶ It is believed that the re-opening of traditional trade routes would help reconcile the diverse interests of the traditional Silk Road partners and help restore free trade and human mobility as well as cross-cultural and ideological fertilization.

The Major Roadblocks

Due to above different perception towards china, Chinese companies find it hard to penetrate the Indian market. Indian bureaucracy continues to be a major drag on doing business in India. The new government must facilitate the business for Chinese companies on priority basis and reduce the involvement of multiple in government agencies in approving their projects. Getting Visa has always been a nightmare for them.⁷ The tourism sector will be the major beneficiary of the liberalization of VISA regime. Millions of Chinese Buddhist pilgrims regard India as the birthplace of Shakyamuni Buddha, and once in their lifetime they would like to travel to this holy land. But due to inept infrastructure in the Buddhist sector we have been unable to attract them. This could be a priority sector for the next government to create millions of employment in the poorest region of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

Although India and China have increased bilateral trade over the last one decade (65 billion USD at the end of 2013), the amount is far less than the potential of trade possibility between them (the target for 2015 is predicted to reach 100 billion USD, which is doubtful). As of now speaking, the trade volume or even people to people relations between India and china are in its initial phase and it's far below the level of interdependence achieved between Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. Hence India needs to show patience and work out mutually beneficiary trade deals with China and let the dragon get economically involved in the region. The USD 300 billion offer of Chinese investment in Indian infrastructure buildup should be welcomed with red-carpet only if it has provisions of use of local available machineries and providing maximum employment to the Indian people. It should not go the Sri-Lankan or African way where most of the projects have been executed by the Chinese engineers and workers and local employment has been very minimal.

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Despite mutual distrust prevailing between them, Chinese and Indian companies are making significant cross-border investments. More than forty Chinese state owned companies have opened their representative offices in India and are planning to bid for major infrastructure projects. India is already the major destination of Chinese construction equipments and electrical appliances supply. According to sources from the Indian embassy in Beijing, till 2013, more than 70 billion worth of project being executed inside India which involves these Chinese companies. We have intentionally or unintentionally become dependent upon Chinese suppliers for majority of our project requirements. If you ask the Indian managers and corporate, they are candid enough to accept the fact that only Chinese manufacturers can supply the quantity at the price affordable to the Indian buyers that too in a limited time. With regard to their investments in India, many Chinese companies viewing the South Asian giant as a promising source of growth often sour their hopes as they face red tape and distrust fuelled by the rivalry between the two nations.⁸

Changing Perceptions

India and China are ideally suited to be married economically in a lasting bond, but due to burden of past acrimonies and unresolved boundary issues, the relationship is not working well. The two economic giants have great potential to trade with each other and bring mutual prosperity and quality of life for their middle classes, but due to some vested interest and economic miscalculations the trade barriers are not down yet. On the contrary, the bilateral trade has been going down and trade related disputes have been on the rise at an alarming rate.⁹ Time and again at various platforms (such as BRICS) China and India have repeatedly vowed to attract investment from each other but the realities of mutual investment and doing business in two countries tells a very negative story.

One of the major attractions for Indians will be that of growing techies demand by Chinese technology companies. As per industry estimates, China requires thousands of Indian engineers to work for their newly formed tech ventures. The story of India as an outsourcing hub in the knowledge intensive industry has been well recognized in China. The country is regarded as success model for the emulating it in China. Special policies have been taken by City governments of Shanghai, Hangzhou, Chengdu and Dalian to attract Indian IT firms and techies. China is ready to learn from Indian experience in this sector wants major collaboration with Bangaluru. The city of Chengdu singed a sister

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city agreement with Bangaluru in order enhance the cooperation in IT sector. India's Infosys has invested more than 100 million to build business development centers in southern China. At the same time, China's Huawei has built a research and development center in Bangalore. There are many other similar investments taking place. The Goal set by the Xi Jinping regime is to restructure the Chinese economy from a manufacturing oriented towards services industry. For this purpose China is investing a large sum of money in high-tech sector. The previous regime of Hu Jintao has already set the goal of becoming an innovative nation by 2020. It is also the right time for India to reap its population dividend. India has the largest pool of technical as well as management degree holders and if they are willing to adjust in the Chinese environment, it is great employment opportunity for them. The growth rate of China's population will continue to shrink and China's population to sink in the future. Its labor force is shrinking and China will lose its competitive edge in that field. The population will get older and greyer. China has realized this challenge and has already relaxed one child policy in selected cities of Beijing and Shanghai. Our young generation must grab the China opportunity and even learn a little of mandarin so that it will be easy to deal with Chinese companies and their working cultures. It is sad that we know very little about the Dragon's 5000 year old ancient culture and have to deal with them at all front.¹⁰

On the other side, in the last one decade, there have been a dramatic change of perceptions among Chinese about the potential of the Indian market and the prospect of India being the major consumer of the Chinese goods and machineries. During the Cold War, India was viewed in China as part of the anti-China encirclement built by American imperialists, or later by the Soviet Revisionists. As the latest public opinion poll conducted by one Chinese agency revealed, there are mixed feelings about India in China. But among China's influential elite, there is near unanimity on one point: India's rise is the next global phenomenon. Virtually every Chinese Indian scholar and news article regarding India begins with this statement of perceived fact. To our surprise, Chinese scholars have done enough homework on Indian domestic politics and they know well in advance that Mr. Narendra Modi is the leading candidate for the Next Prime Minister. Hence, they gave him a red-carpet welcome when Mr. Modi made a business trip to China back in 2012, and in future we can expect a better business ties between the two governments.

The China Challenge

China's rise in one generation as a global player under the communist party of China (CPC) rule has come to epitomize the reconfiguration of power structure in East Asia and the wider world. Not since Japan rose to world-power status during the reign of the Meiji emperor in the second half of the 19th century (after 1868) has another non-Western power emerged with such potential to alter the world order as China today. As the 2009 assessment by the U.S. intelligence community predicted, China stands to more profoundly affect global geopolitics than any other country. The Rise of China is reshaping the regional and global distribution of economic, political and military power. The perception today is that there might be fundamental changes in the post-Cold War international order that has been led by the United States. Since 2008, the Global Financial Crisis has prompted the relative decline of the United States while China has maintained its strong economic growth. In 2010, this structural change has coincided with discussions in regards to a more "assertive China," which can be seen in issues such as human rights, arms sales to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to Washington, and the appreciation of China's currency. There is now growing concern over the possibility of a conflict breaking out between the United States as the existing hegemonic power and China as the emerging competitor, in line with the arguments of power transition theory.

The implications of military rise of China and changing balance of power in Asia are significant for India. Since US has been the major balancing power in the region and its decline has caused concern among all the neighbors of China, including India. As China challenges the American pivot and military primacy in Asia, it would like to minimize its differences with neighboring countries including India and focus on it's so called a new type of great power relations. Therefore it will be interested in resolving the border issue with the formula of give and take. But as of now there is little evidence to suggest that the special representatives of two countries are even close to any formula for the compromise. Hence the only way forward for the two nations is to build the political momentum by increasing economic cooperation and people-to people contact which will become the base of future negotiations.

Since India and China are geographically proximate hence it is natural to have conflict of interest on various issues resources including that of water, energy and other ecological concerns. But conflict can be avoided

if there is a mechanism to resolve these issues of common concern in a mutually acceptable manner. But as of now we are far from reaching any consensus even on the issue of delineating our boundary line in three sectors. Lately, there has been new proposal from the Chinese side to devise a mechanism for managing the border areas when the soldiers cross across the line of control.¹¹ This may be intended to avoid the situation like the March-April 2013 standoff between PLA and Indian army in the Daulet-beg Oldi area of the Ladakh region. Now the Indian side is “studying” it, nobody is clear whether it is actually necessary or why a new code is needed less than a year after both sides signed a border defense cooperation agreement (BDCA) during the visit of Prime Minister Singh in 2013. While the military leadership has been proactive on both side of the border, the political leadership has tried to played-down the conflict factor in the bilateral relations. The outgoing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has managed to earn a good reputation for himself of a wise economist among the Chinese leadership and has been able to develop a good relationship with the previous premier of China, Mr. Wen Jiabao. The leaders in India and China, on the whole, walked the peaceful path in their bilateral relations and successfully avoided any major conflict at their borders. This indeed is also a small achievement of the outgoing government.

Rising Tensions at Sea

It is natural for India to be vigil of Chinese navy’s rising naval profile in the Indian Ocean and view with much suspicion Chinese construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan (Gwadar) and Sri Lanka (Hambantota). China began pursuing its so-called “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean in 2001 via the commercial route, constructing the Gwadar port. Subsequently, China won contracts to construct ports at Hambantota on the southern tip of Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Kyaukpyu on the east coast of Myanmar in the Indian Ocean. In the Indian Ocean China has been courting the Seychelles¹² of a base for Chinese ships deployed to the Gulf of Aden and the West Indian Ocean. Although it is intended to help combat piracy in the region, but its long term lease will ensure a permanent presence of PLAN in this region. While it’s not yet clear if the offer has been accepted, Chinese media reports suggest that Beijing is actively considering it as a “resupply” base.

China’s has been always concerned about its vulnerability in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) where there are certain choke points which can derail the normal passage of Chinese ships and hence the economic

activity. In the IOR China highly depends on the security regime provided by US and Indian navies. China has seen this region with great suspicion and always wanted to show its presence in the region. China does not accept the Indian Ocean Region as India's backwater and hence opposed to any Indian hegemony in this sea. In the short run, Chinese overtures in the IOR may not disturb the balance but it will indeed give a wakeup call for Indian Navy to consolidate its power and increase the presence in the surrounding region. As a repercussion of this, Indian Navy may extend its presence in South China Sea as well as the Pacific Ocean. But this will depend upon the policy change in the Indian Foreign policy making and the speed of Indian Navy fleet modernization. Given the track record of Indian defense ministry in the last one decade, one can hardly be optimistic about Indian Navy taking steps to balance the growing influence of PLAN.

Time and again Beijing has been opposing any Indian commercial military involvement in the South China Seas, warning in clear words that it could affect their bilateral relations and also add to the complications of the current border dispute.¹³ The assertion of Chinese maritime claims in this region has compelled the countries in the region to invite India to play a role and limit China's growing influence as a regional power.¹⁴ Currently in the South China Sea, China claims to more than 80 percent of the area surrounding so called nine-dash lines.¹⁵ From the Chinese perspective, it was smart move to invite India to join the maritime Silk Road project.¹⁶ But Delhi is likely to consider its tradeoff vis-à-vis its own geostrategic advantage and risk for collaborating with China in the IOR. The strategic goal of the PLAN is to speed across both the Pacific and Indian Ocean at the same pace. Therefore the urgent task for the new government will be to revamp the defense establishment and especially increase the scope and deployment of the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean. If we lose our advantage in the Indian Ocean our freedom will be at danger. It is because, since time immemorial, Indian economic and energy interests are deeply linked with the IOR.

Military Diplomacy or Buddhist Diplomacy

Despite its benign intention of emerging as a peaceful power, no one can credibly predict the future Chinese behavior in the region. In the last few years, the world community can see a clear pattern of assertiveness that causes us concern.¹⁷ Chinese leadership since Deng Xiaoping has time and again emphasized this particular aspect of the Chinese foreign policy that the country will not seek hegemony¹⁸ in the

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region and it will continue to pursue the path of peaceful rise of china by following the path of “Panchsheel” and “amicable relations with her neighbors (Mu Lin)”. But it will be a naïve to believe in the rhetoric and diplomatic jargons and not take into account the recent overtures in East and South China Sea. China occupied the headlines in 2013 for giving headaches to many of her neighbors by its assertive behavior to claim the territorial claims both at land and in sea. The latest was the declaration of ADIZ in the East China Sea. But at the same time, the territorial disputes on oil and gas fields in the South China Sea as well as East China Sea sends a clear signal for the PRC that its rise will not go unchallenged in the region.

For all the Asian countries, in the region the major question is what kind of world power will China be?” and if her behavior continues to be as assertive and aggressive as it is now then how to approach it theoretically and politically. The rise of China could be peaceful or may not be peaceful. This issue has been well debated among Western International Relations theorists.¹⁹ Realist Scholars such as John Mearsheimer has strongly put forward the point that no power has risen peacefully hence the rise of China will not be peaceful.²⁰ But Chinese scholars have strongly protested this kind of cold war mentality and argue that rise of China will not be a zero sum game and they are ready to coexist with US as the concept of G2 (first propounded by Zbigniew Brzezinski in the aftermath of the Global financial crisis and relative decline of the US power) surfaced few years back. Chinese scholars have been enthusiastic for a while on the idea of the World order becoming G-2, which is a power broking between the US and China. But the official foreign policy documents of the PRC, still emphasizes the need for creating a multipolar world order in the 21st century. But it is not clear as how the PRC will accept and accommodate the role of other emerging and existing powers such as Brazil, India, Japan, and Russia, The implications of how this choice is made will shape Asian political and security affairs for coming decades.²¹ Chinese defense white papers have failed to explain the continuous buildup of Chinese military and how they are going to use it in case of territorial disputes both at land and at the sea. There is concern about the transparency of Chinese military budget and its actual deployment across the various borders. In India, there is a lack of well-informed analyses of PLA buildup in the Tibet region. Hence there is need for exchange of information including maps and troops deployment across the border. The military-to-military dialogue is a right step if it really involves more than just exchange of Bollywood songs.

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At home, our own military planners are certainly among the most worried section of the Chinese military buildup although it is not aimed at India. As a response to the emerging Chinese challenge is it a correct strategy to ally with like minded²² countries in the region and including powers outside the region. But this may against our basic beliefs of a Non-aligned foreign policy which we have inherited from the idealist era of Nehru. Chinese leaders have expressed concern about India join anti-China coalition along with Japan and United States, to which the Government of India has issued statements to affirm that India will not be part of any such coalition which will be meant to contain China. In fact, the trilateral dialogue between India, Japan and USA has been put into the cold basket by now. The recent courting of India by Japan has also generated a plethora of articles in media which talks about two Asian powers being natural ally.²³ But no government in Delhi can afford to send this wrong signal to China at this juncture when a lot is at stake. Befriending China and engaging it at all political economic and cultural front may serve the best of our national interest. We must apply the civilization approach as advocated by some senior China observers and try to restore the bonhomie we enjoyed thousands years back when Buddhism was the main theme of the Chinese culture.²⁴ India must leverage her cultural soft power and restart Buddhist diplomacy with the dragon. Instead of entering into a hard power as well as soft power rivalry²⁵, India should better focus and leveraging soft power by reviving the ancient Buddhist links the two civilizations shared.

Need for a Pragmatic Approach

It has always been a challenge in India's long history of how to manage its relations with a country as complex or ambiguous as China. Economically, no country is so indispensable; politically, only a few might be more anathema; and strategically, no challenge looms larger than avoiding the upheaval that will accompany the growth of Chinese power. Under an uncertainty of China's next step and India's unpreparedness to meet the rising challenge, it is becoming much more confusing for Indian strategic experts to predict anything substantive for their future relations. In a complex setting such as this, it is little wonder that India is struggling to define a unified set of national interests in relation to China.

The understanding of the ground reality in China remains shallow in India and hence there is a strong undercurrent of suspicion in the Indian psyche towards the intention of China.²⁶ Today, China has shown every

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sign of being a revisionist power in Asia. Therefore we should live under no illusions, and our defense establishment should match every Chinese move to project power in Asia and especially in the IOR. But recent border incursions of China in the Ladakh region and the apparent submissiveness of our own establishments to Chinese pressure require a reconsideration of the current optimistic attitude (which I call the China Moment). For government officials and for most of the Indian strategic analysts, it is impolitic and perhaps imprudent to talk about the possibility of repeat of the 1962 conflict. Successful policy depends on calling a spade a spade (The China Challenge). But when the next government reviews the current state of India-China relations, it will be compelled to take a pragmatic view of the Chinese military strength and will not engage in political rhetoric or empty nationalism. For the upcoming new government in Delhi, the Indian foreign policy faces a clear scenario of either a “China Opportunity” or “China Challenge.”

The Chinese leadership is known for its pragmatic approach in foreign policy making and have refrained from making eye catching political and idealistic statements such as “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” or “Chindia” coined by Jairam Ramesh (2003). The same policy they are trying to pursue with India by offering deeper economic engagement and being assertive on the boundary issue. The latest courting of India to join the so called Maritime silk route is another example of China displaying its good intention of becoming a responsible stakeholder in the region.²⁷ However India has been using political rhetoric in dealing with China and very little substantive work has been done to improve the bilateral relations. In the last ten years there has been no substantive achievement and to the contrary the bilateral relations have deteriorated, bilateral trade is going down and mutual trust seems to be a distant dream. The outgoing UPA government had failed to address the increasing security threat from China and has brought down the morale of our soldiers by kowtowing to China.²⁸ Therefore, India must work assiduously on international diplomacy and internal military reforms in order to minimize the various risks posed by the China’s military buildup.

As in the past, China has successfully engaged Japan, US and various other countries and regions by sidelining the differences and focusing on mutual economic benefit. I think there is no reason why India and China should not engage each other, and trust each other despite there could be no real trust between them. The world is better-off when China and India cooperates on various issues such as energy resources, scientific research, epidemic controls, global warming and including security issues related to regional and international terrorism. The

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mutual distrust and hate against each other could be just thing of the past, when the two countries pursued diametrically opposite political ideologies in the cold war era. But nevertheless, developing a long-term economic partnership between India and China requires a conducive political atmosphere where the mutual investment could be guaranteed and current restrictions on mutual investments are removed.

We have arrived at a defining moment in the history of India-China relations. The year 2014 may be proven to be of great significance for the two Asian giants rising at the same time. The next Prime Minister (most probably Mr. Narendra Modi) must pursue effective foreign policies to ensure peaceful, sustainable development at home and cooperation on behalf of mutual benefit with China not aggressive policies cloaked in rhetoric. Economic cooperation and political competition can go hand in hand. A serious attempt should be made by the new central government in order to address the possible security threats which may emanate unless and until the boundary issue is resolved to mutual satisfaction.

The last but not the least is the role of media in influencing our bilateral relations. The degradation of mainstream Indian press coverage of international issues, especially that of China, a country still vital to India's national security, has been under way for many years since the market was liberalized. If the recent tsunami of shamefully unprofessional and politically inflammatory debates and articles in electronic media and in leading newspapers and magazines—particularly about the more than 500 times Chinese incursions and water dams in Tibet has already done enough damage to bilateral relations. The media needs to be regulated or at least given some training in international reporting so that they do not play the spoiling roles in our public diplomacy. Whatever we talk about public diplomacy, it is our media that is the major source of information about each other and build their perceptions based on it. Hence, our media ought to play if not constructive role at least a balance reporting of the issues involved.

Prospects for Future

In the coming years we expect that stability and peace in the India-China relationship will tend to be maintained as leaders in both Beijing and New Delhi will continue to focus on economic advancement as a primary goal. The two countries will avoid military entanglements as it is undesirable and not helpful in solving any of the issues including boundary problem and may hinder their domestic economic

consolidation. But at the same time, the author believes that not just Japan is remilitarizing but India and China are poised to increase their defense budget further and prepare for an arms race in the growing Asian rivalry.

We conclude that in the coming years the rapprochement in Sino-Indian relations is likely to continue. The most likely explanation for the relational change are first, their own domestic stability and sustained economic growth, and the second is the concerted effort in both countries to be seen as responsible players in Asia and at the global level. Thus, general economic prudence and changing international order will push India and China to work together at both bilateral and multilateral level. In the long run, these above conditions may be having a positive effect on the India-China relationship and then we can revive the bonhomie which existed among the peoples of two great civilizations for thousands of years.

References

1. In 1912–1913, the 13th Dalai Lama returned to Tibet from exile in India. His ragtag volunteer force expelled all Chinese officials and troops from Tibet, reestablished his rule, and began a thirty-nine-year period in which Tibet held total control over its own internal and external affairs. China never accepted this state of affairs, and the Republican and Kuomintang governments worked to restore Chinese control. They were unsuccessful, however, and when Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949, the Tibetan government alone still controlled Tibet. The new People's Republic of China continued the Kuomintang's Tibet policy and set as an immediate goal the reintegration of Tibet with the "motherland." In October 1950 it launched military offensives which quickly defeated the Tibetan forces, and in May 1951 the Tibetan government, under the authority of the sixteen-year-old 14th Dalai Lama, signed the now controversial Seventeen Point Agreement, in which Tibet for the first time in its long history formally accepted Chinese sovereignty, albeit with regional autonomy. When Britain left India in 1947, it abandoned its interest in Tibet, yielding all initiative to the newly independent Indian state. Thus, at the time of the 1948 trade mission, instead of trying to foster an independent identity for Tibet, Britain refused even to issue visas on Tibetan passports. And two years later, in December 1950, when Tibet appealed to the United Nations for help, it was the British delegate who spoke first, informing his colleagues on the world body that after a half-century of intimate relations with Tibet, His Majesty's Government felt that the status of Tibet was unclear and suggesting that Tibet's appeal be postponed. See Goldstein, Melvyn C. *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1992 1992. P.1, 12. Also see, Nirmal C Sinha, The Shimla Convention 1914: A Chinese Puzzle, available at the URL: <http://>

himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/bot/pdf/bot_1977_01_05.pdf

2. In recent years China has taken several steps to improve trade and investment relations with its South Asian Neighbors, including, among others, the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in 2006 with Pakistan. As a result of this, Trade between China and the South Asian countries have increased manifold. The newly proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is one of many examples of China trying to enhance its economic integration with countries to its west. In 2005, China received the status of an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Pakistan received this status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Islamabad is attempting to make Beijing's involvement in South Asian affairs more active. Chinese-Pakistani cooperation covers the chemical industry; engineering; railroad rolling stock supplies; and the construction of roads, ports, bridges, residential houses, and so on. One of the main objectives of Chinese investments is the port of Gwadar, in the construction of which China at the first stage invested \$2.6 million; this made it possible to construct nine berths.
3. China has rejuvenated its proposal for creating a "maritime silk route" that would link the Indian and Pacific Oceans, visualizing the region as an arena of cooperation and commerce, rather than strategic contest. First proposed by President Xi Jinping in October 2013 while he was visiting the ASEAN countries, China has set up a 3 billion Yuan (\$495 million) fund to support the idea. Yang brought up the idea during the Special Representatives dialogue, and Beijing has raised the subject this week with the Sri Lankan president who is visiting China.
4. The Silk Road studies reveal that India and China has been at the forefront of civilization contact between the East and the West. It was not just a trade route but an important link for cultural understandings among the people of Eurasia. The close contact and interaction between the Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Islam practiced in the regions has prevailed till today. At the outset of the twentieth century, the Buddhist literature and paintings found in the Tun-Huang cave has opened a great chapter in the civilization discourse between China, India, and the Arab World and European countries. Scholars in Mainland China who are mainly based at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the South Asian Studies of the Peking University as well as its Department of Archaeology has completed some of the excellent work on Silk Road art and culture and many similar are in progress. The famous Sanskrit Professor Duan Qing of the Peking University has launched a full fledged new center in order to study the khorosti script found in Tun-Huang, Turfan and the Xinjiang region. In the coming years we eagerly await for much more discoveries from her team. Liu Xinru *in his latest manuscript* argues for the close interrelationship between the spread of Buddhism and trade on the Silk Roads. The Chinese National Library in Beijing is gradually emerging as one of the main hub of the Silk Road manuscripts. For a detailed study of the Ancient Silk route,

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see Xinru Liu, *Ancient India and Ancient China: Trade and Religious Exchanges, AD 1-600* (Oxford Delhi PB, 1994).

5. There has been two blueprint of reviving the Silk Road (also called the New Silk road) one is US version and another Chinese one. The US version of the 'New Silk Road' project aims at linking South Asia to Central Asia via Afghanistan. The project envisages the creation of a transcontinental trading network linking Afghanistan, Central Asia and Europe. The US is keen that this project takes shape after the NATO forces leave Afghanistan in 2014. The Chinese version of the 'New Silk Road' is based on the creation of three main corridors across the Eurasian continent, called the Eurasian Land Bridge, which will serve as the 'main artery' from which offshoots consisting of railways, highways and pipelines will be built. The first one is the existing Trans-Siberian Railway running from Vladivostok in eastern Russia to Moscow and onwards to Western Europe and Rotterdam; the second runs from Lianyungang port in eastern China through Kazakhstan in Central Asia and on to Rotterdam; and the third runs from Pearl River Delta in southeast China through South Asia to Rotterdam.

There have been consultations among the governments of South East Asian countries as well as India and China to revive the various branches of ancient Silk Road and use it for the facilitation of economic development and tourism in the region. In this regard the Yunnan province of China has been emerging as the new hub of all the trade route links with the region. Historically Yunnan was at the natural crossroads of China, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Tibet, linked together by the southwest Silk Road (Bin Yang, 2010). Yunnan was at the centre of linking the ancient three overland trade routes: the Yunnan-Burma-India route, the Yunnan-Vietnam route, and the Yunnan-Tibet route. Until the Mongol conquest in the 1250s, China was only one of several culture areas linked to Yunnan, in spite of occasional attempts by Chinese states to govern that frontier zone.

6. With the help of Asian Development Bank, some feasibility studies has been carried out in order to develop the trans-Asian rail network and the Chinese government is seriously thinking of implementing these blue prints. India is expected to develop its linkage with the region but until now the progress has been slow. But the country has shown its commitment at various forums to take active part in the revival of the Silk Road. India is keenly interested in tapping the energy resources of the central Asia which can be transported to the country via Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is of course dependent on China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan remaining as good friends demonstrating willingness for peace. India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan, today have unprecedented incentives. Such cooperation would help transform the region into a more peaceful and progressive zone, promote human security, social sustainability, improve the quality of life to people in China, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan.
7. No issue has done much harm to Indian soft power in China than the Visa issue. The blame lies partially on our economic policy towards China and partially towards our bureaucracy which is notorious for its harassment of

public at home and also at Visa office in Beijing. My own experience of helping Chinese students and scholars getting a student visa or conference visa has been a nightmare and worth writing a book. But when I looked into the other side of the story, that is Chinese visa regime in Delhi, the story was equally discriminatory. There has been clear sign of reciprocity in their bilateral political and economic relations. Both are closed to each other and have restricted their market against other products. Indian Pharma and tech companies find it hard to penetrate into Chinese market or get Chinese government contracts. Some of them have completely withdrawn from the Chinese market for being deprived of any major business in the country (case of Suzlon energy is a clear example). It is hard to blame one country for visa issues and not the other. The visa problem cut both ways and there were cases when Indian companies could not get long-term visas for China. The Visa regime has to be liberalized between the countries and as the news report suggests, “The governments on both sides are now working to see how they can further facilitate the movement of people.”

8. Some observers say that corruption and India's bureaucracy are cited as major hurdles for Chinese businessmen, with the visa-application process high on their list of concerns. In his last visit to China in 2013, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told His Chinese counterpart Premier Li Keqiang that his country was committed to simplifying the process for Chinese to apply for visas to India, but no agreement was signed on the issue. But no document was signed or exchanged during his visit which will substantiate his claim. It is expected that by the end of this year India may extend visa on arrival facility for the citizens of more than 40 countries including Chinese. It is hard to blame one country for visa issues and not the other. The visa problem cut both ways and there were cases when Indian companies could not get long-term visas for China. The Visa regime has to be liberalized between the countries and as the news report suggests, “The governments on both sides are now working to see how they can further facilitate the movement of people.”
9. One can check the list of trade disputes between India and China at the Indian Embassy in Beijing Website. www.indianembassy.org.cn
10. Although we have announced the Chinese courses at CBSE schools but we are progressing typically at Indian speed. In China, there are already 12 Universities offering Hindi, Sanskrit, Bengali and Pali language courses and there are more than 30 monasteries in China offering lessons in Sanskrit.
11. This came on the agenda at the 17th round of talks on February 10-11, between National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon and China's State Councillor Yang Jiechi, the Special Representatives of India and China respectively on the boundary question.
12. The Seychelles is a small island country in the Indian Ocean comprising a group of 115 small islands covering an area about 450 kilometers square. The country has a population of just 87,000, but has a huge Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 1.4 million square kilometers. The country's strategic importance can be traced back to the Napoleonic era, when Britain

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gained control over the island. Much more recently, the U.S. originally intended to develop a base on the Seychelles' Aldabra Island, but intense pressure from conservationists prevailed, and the United States instead went with Diego Garcia.

13. Along with international norms, India has been a strong proponent of freedom of navigation at the sea. In fact the country always believed in the philosophy of Seas belonging to the whole humanity and should not be included in territorial claims. In the South China sea, India is just exploring what has been clearly assigned to Vietnam by the UN, and her claim for freedom of navigating in the South China sea has been well appreciated.
14. India's state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed a deal with Vietnam's Petro Vietnam to purchase BP's stakes in oil and gas development in waters off the Vietnamese coast (following a naval confrontation between India and China in the area). While China protests the deal as violating its sovereignty, ONGC and PetroVietnam claim the area in question is within Vietnamese territorial waters. And on 12 October 2011, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi, with both sides pledging to maintain peace and security in the South China Sea while expanding the contents of their strategic partnership.
15. See the details of nine-dashed line at the Wikipedia link. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nine-dotted_line, last accessed on 3rd March, 2014.
16. The invitation for India to join the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) was extended during the just concluded 17th round of border talks between the Special Representatives of the two countries in New Delhi. India's response has not been very clear yet.
17. Although it is yet premature to characterize China as a hegemonic power, but the recent behavior in the region compels us to think seriously if the emerging superpower will claim its hegemony in the region if not at the global level. The motivations of the Chinese leadership therefore are not completely hidden or incomprehensible. Although no one can define the Chinese Grand Strategy not even Chinese strategic thinkers, but the obvious goal of the Chinese leadership is to surpass the US economy by 2020 and then the National Comprehensive Power by 2050. In the disguised words they call this goal as to "create a modern Chinese nation " and hence realize the "Chinese Dream". But there are many Western Analysts who still do not subscribe to the theory of China replacing US as the world Superpower. In his latest article published at *The Week*, Think Progress's Zack Beauchamp argued that "China is not replacing the United States as the global hegemon. And it never will." Specifically, Beauchamp posits that "China faces too many internal problems and regional rivals to ever make a real play for global leadership. And even if Beijing could take the global leadership mantle soon, it wouldn't. China wants to play inside the existing global order's rules, not change them." Read the whole article at <http://theweek.com/article/index/256406/china-has-not-replaced-america-mdash-and-it-never-will>

18. Hegemony is a concept that permeates Chinese thought. As far back as the Warring States period, rulers were seeking hegemony over “all under heaven (Tian Xia) .” “All under heaven” is a phrase used in China’s ancient military classics to denote the kingdom of China. Those beyond the Middle Kingdom were considered barbarians and were not considered “under heaven.” Chinese characters, ba quan, taken separately mean right or authority (ba) and rule by might rather than right (quan). The Modern Chinese English Dictionary defines “ba quan” this way: in the realm of international relations, to use force or power to control or contain another country. It also is translated as supremacy.
19. In an eloquent study entitled *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, Martin Jacques argues that those that don’t see all that much change ahead are relying on several flawed assumptions: first, that China’s challenge will be primarily economic, and not political; second, that China is essentially becoming a westernized economy and society; and third, that China will become a compliant member of the current international political-economic system. Looking at the long history of China’s political governance and today’s realities of its policy framework, Jacques argues, all three assumptions may turn out to be incorrect. See Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, (Penguin Press, 2009), 12.
20. John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” *Current history* 105.690 (2006): 160-162.
21. See An Gang, Rejecting the ‘G2’ Beijing Review, September 30, 2013, available at http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-09/30/content_30174118.htm
22. Like minded here has been interpreted as mainly democratic powers of Australia, India. Japan and the USA. But Vietnam is also joining the bandwagon by being taking part in military exercises.
23. Based in New Delhi, Prof. Brahama Chellani of being one of the main proponents of India and Japan being natural allies.
24. The rising civilization paradigm has been emphasized by the Indian Chinese ProfssorTan Chung, in his various articles and books, and this has given a new hope for a stable and harmonious relations between the two Asian giants. This school takes the position that India and China have strengthened their bilateral relations very considerably since 1988 through regular, high-level meetings, confidence- building measures, accelerating economic activity, and revival in public memory of the rich cultural and intellectual exchanges that have taken place between their two glorious ancient civilizations. For a detailed study of Civilizational dialogue between India and China, one can refer to works of Prof. P C Bagchi, Prof. Ji Xianlin etc.
25. There has been much talk of economic and political rivalry between the two Asian giants, but there is hardly open recognition of soft power rivalry between the PRC and India. Starting from hosting the world Buddhist

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congress in 2006, China is projecting herself as the main inheritor of Buddha's legacy. Buddhism probably arrived in China around the 1st century CE from Central Asia (although there are some traditions about a monk visiting China during Asoka's reign), and through to the 8th century it became an extremely active center of Buddhism.

26. The scholars of China and India are preoccupied with the realist paradigm of international relations, and they have limited their study to the China India boundary dispute, struggle for power and influence, and strategic alliance with the superpower. Some of the young generation scholars have been influenced by the current economic growth trend in the two countries and have attempted to focus on the economic interaction between China and India. Although the professional discussion of China India economic cooperation has just taken off, but it is set to engage the new generation of scholars from the two countries to focus more on non-conventional issues between China and India.
27. See the comments of C Raja Mohan published in the Indian Express, in which he reminds us to be vigilant to Chinese offer of joining the so called Maritime Silk route. "The involvement of China and its state-owned companies in the maritime connectivity in the Indian Ocean indicates a long-term interest in the region. These have both civilian and military purposes. Hence the idea of "maritime silk route" needs to be cautiously weighed by New Delhi. In the background of China's efforts to shoo Indian oil companies in South China Sea, India needs to insist on reciprocity with China in the East and South China Seas and work with like-minded parties."
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Manan Dwivedi

The transforming Imperatives in Asia Pacific

India, China and United States form part and parcel of a triumvirate of a nexus in the international system in the Realist sense of the term. Indian scholars and observers along with the Chinese mandarins have been adherents to the Realist and the power centric school of thought in the contemporary sense of the term. The rise of Asia Pacific as the novae “Pivot” pendulum for the Global polity has been acknowledged by the international relations observers and more significantly the American strategic and diplomatic lobbies premised at the Pentagon, White House and the Foggy Bottom. This can be construed as the novae post US recession international system where-in the myriad cornucopia of nations have traversed a full growth and developemental odyssey. Thus, the realisation of a post-neo liberal world order which is will not be Euro centric or Americo-centric seems to have been festooned upon the rubric of the international system as a measure of “reflexive change” in the turbulence of the international system.

Thus, the stellar role playing by the nations of the order of Great Britain, France, Japan (the Yellow Colonialists) along with the nation with the Manifest Destiny, United States of America, seems to have receded to the background. The Global recession , the economic Euro Zone crisis along with the American economic meltdown juxtaposed against the economic rise of People Republic of China, the Indian rise and their good and healthy economic showing, are some of the significant factors leading up to a new narrative. The new narrative traverses beyond President Bush’s, : New World Order, President Clinton’s Multilateralism along with the austerity measures being heaped upon the European nations. The rise of Asia Pacific as the new battleground of sea faring lanes and the economic and financial foci have been the landmark signposts of the post September 11 international system.

The question that needs to be asked is that where does the Newly proscribed US Foreign policy leave the novae nations such as India and China? With China jostling with United States and the European Union to catch business, corporate and strategic space in regions as far flung as South America and Africa, the tricky rebalancing as advanced by the US State Department needs to be taken cognizance of.

Another question that Ruchir sharma in his work, “Break out Nations”¹ posits is that has the Asiatic century arrived or is the current state of Affairs a mere recurring theme of multilateralism and multipolarity of the non Euro international system. Ruchir Sharma working for the Morgan Stanley Corp posits the transformational herd instinct of a neo capitalist geo economic scenario where-in, the idiom of fast paced, unplanned and unregulated economic and industrial booms can be deleterious for the fate of nations such as India, China, Brazil, Mexico and other upstarts in the Global polity which is carving out a new and independent geo economic world order for itself.² Financial times writes, “It’s refreshing to read *Breakout Nations*, Ruchir Sharma’s book on the Bric countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China—and the rest of the developing world. The book offers a careful view that has little truck with forecasts of the relentless Bric-led rise of the emerging world.”³ Thus, this literature frames a narrative out of an already emerged order which is all set to establish new statistical trends and attain new benchmarks in the period beyond 2015,

The Idea of the American Pivot

The post September 11 and the post China rise international geo economics is a matter of contemporary study. The issues at stake concern the future of the Globe and its sustainable future. The stability and stolidity of the geo economic and the geo political scenario in the Trans Atlantic along with the unfortunate perditious lives of the African monolith leaves the Asiatic rise as the focal point of all ends and it is here where all the nation’s and corporate’s alleys converge to. Thus, the significance of the American pivot in the Eastern hemisphere. Akin to the what George Kennan had to pen down in the Foreign Affairs journal in the famed “X Article”,⁴ the threat perception seems to have returned to the American strategic thought. Earlier on it was the Soviet Un ion which had become a nuclear power , the second one after United States in the post World War-II scenario, which had invited the Manicheastic portrayal of Soviet Union by the American strategic and defense machinery in order to get the higher pedestal in the Cold war era. It is now that scourge of Islamic funadamentalism and the rising

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People's Republic of China have emerged as the new 21st century threats to the American order and interests which have been accorded the manicheistic⁵ stature in the popular narrative in the West and the United States and rightly so.

History too needs to be taken recourse to if the paramount signposts of changing trends and inclinations have to be comprehended. The place occupied partially by China of the contemporary times was gracefully occupied by the Russian bear in the popular American discourse. It was the timing of the Soviet rhetoric which made the start of the Cold war historic necessity. It can be observed that, "From Moscow, Kennan watched US-Soviet relations deteriorate as World War II drew to a close, and he became increasingly vexed by the Roosevelt administration's efforts to delay a showdown in hopes of salvaging the wartime alliance. Eager to weigh in on Soviet policy, Kennan seized the opportunity provided in February 1946, when Moscow's more militaristic rhetoric and refusal to participate in the World Bank and IMF prompted State Department officials to ask Kennan to assess the motives and assumptions underlying Soviet policymaking."⁶ Thus, finding new bugbears has to become the order of the day in the Global discourse as great powers need to strengthen their power, influence and their international overarch in order to sustain order and peaceful alacrity in the international system.

It is now that the Chinese can conveniently replace the idea of a threat for the United States quintessential narrative. The change of the American foreign policy stress has been well reflected in the official speak of the US Government. Lenin posited that, "The Unevenness of the capitalist development will lead to imminent collapse of the capitalist system when all the sources of production will be appropriated by the Socialist Block."⁷ Thus, the warning for the capitalist did not turn exactly true and now the PRC itself stands on the cusp of crypto capitalism thus lending the Kennan's warning about the Socialist threat and Lenin's forecast about the collapse of the Capitalist system as a malapropism. Thus, in the context of the twenty first century all the accepted and established definitions and formulations which began and ended with the White House seems to be changing and this factoid has been deciphered by the United States strategic and diplomatic community.

The idea of Asia Pacific has renewed the international discourse. Much similar to the theme of Archaic Globalization,⁸ the preponderance of the East has resurfaced and it is here to stay in the international geo political and geo economic background. David Northrup and others have written about the Eastern Dominance and the prosperity of the

West in the context of the global exchange and barter of goods and merchandise. He writes in one his works that, "About a thousand years ago, the forces drawing people closer together became more powerful than those fostering ever-increasing cultural diversity. From that beginning, this "great convergence" has proceeded unsteadily to the globalization of the present day. The spread and decline of languages, the virtues and faults of empires, the periodization of history, and the emergence of world history as a discipline are other factors which had a face changing influence on the older global ge economics."⁹ The new 21st century understanding is not vastly different from the archaic times when the Orient was a prosperous trading region though not as any monolith. Kenneth Liberthal writes in the Foreign Policy Journal, that, "Obama came into office as avowedly "the first Pacific president," convinced that George W. Bush's administration had paid too little attention to Asian regional issues and that the United States should restore and then enhance its traditional level of engagement there. Efforts accelerated as China's Asia policy became more hard edged during 2010 and as, during 2011, the United States' military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly declined."¹⁰ The question that arises is that does a retreating and internalising United States have the resources to match its words about the Asian Pivot with equal resources and does it go beyond the containment of PRC and moves on to a more comprehensive engagement with the Asian Pacific, far and the near East.

Justin Logan argues in the Policy analysis of the US based Cato Institute that, "The main factor driving Washington's interest in the region is the growing economic and military power of the People's Republic of China."¹¹ He further posits that, "Despite the United States' focus on the Middle East and the Islamic world for the past decade, the most important international political developments in the coming years are likely to happen in Asia. The Obama administration has promoted a "pivot to Asia," away from the Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific."¹² Thus, going by the strain of President Obama's Cairo speech in 2009 where he extended a benign and harmless handshake to the Arab world in the light of the general tenor of Anti-Americanism doing the rounds, the American pitch had begun to change after the avowed difficult situations which had emerged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, the economic DNA of the international system which witnessed such changes as People's Republic of China emerging as the first and foremost investor and exporter to Africa. The Chinese had more than registered their presence and a rebalancing of the great power response became a prime necessity of the day. The interconnect between India and china

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too forms a significant morsel of the flesh and bones of the Asiatic context in the light of the American rebalancing in the region to counter several winds of change.

The US, China and India Triumvirate: An Issue of Diffuse Polarity

The Sino-India relationship has been one of the international flashpoints of the region since the military engagement between the twin nations in October-November, 1962. The observers have often mentioned the themes of the great Chinese betrayal of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the strategic and military miscalculations and tangible unpreparedness of the Indian Defence establishment. Still, with the times the relationship improved in the seventies with both the warring nations establishing ties with each other. The Chinese support to the Pakistani nuclear programme and ambitions along with the financial and structural support being given to the Pakistani state has been a significant bone of contention and a major irritant in the Sino-India bilateral relationship.

Still, the chief point of divergence which has been the cause of one war and several border intrusions has been the one over cartographic obfuscations over demarcation of the international boundary separating both the nations.¹³ The issue stems from 1914 when the Chinese, Tibetans and the British signed the Simla agreement and the Macmohan line was agreed upon. It was later on part of the official Chinese position that they did not recognize the Macmohan line and thus regarded the British position and the Indian claims as cartographic invasions and misinterpretations of the situation.¹⁴

Also, the Chinese had fought a full blooded war with United States from 1945 till 1953 in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the Chinese had no themes on offer with a strategic or any kind of a convergence and an amalgam with Washington. Also, the "Unforgotten Korean War",¹⁵ led to another theme of the recognition of Formosa where the fleeing Government of Nationalist China was seated. Formosa for all practical concerns was in strategic and political turbulence with shifting sands of sovereignty being the order of the day with the Americans sending their Seventh fleet to prevent a Chinese take over of Formosa. Thus, the historical underpinnings of the antagonistic relationship between the People's Republic of China and Washington juxtaposed against a dull, plateaued tie between New Delhi and Washington could not make for a clear cut and unambiguous earmarking and fencing and side taking

between this threesome of PRC, India and the United States. This is as much as the historicity of this international is concerned about.

If one takes a synoptic view of the Sino Indian relationship then one can decipher a few flaggings. One was the visits of the Indian Prime Minister to Beijing to bridge better bilaterals between the twin neighbours. Then, on another note, the Indian Defence Minister too visited Beijing in order to cement military ties between both the nations which have already seen a spate of joint naval exercises in India since the last few years. Then, the Chinese incursion into Daulat Beg Oldie occurred which hurt the bilateral understanding between the twin nations and to cap it all a Chinese General hurled threats and abuses and threats at the Indian establishment further vitiating the public discourse between Beijing and New Delhi.¹⁶ Tanvi Madan of Brookings Institute further encapsulates the significance of the economic ties between both the nations. She argues that, “Those economic ties have already grown. China is one of India’s largest trading partners. Bilateral trade in goods has gone from less than \$3 billion in 2000 to \$66.57 billion in 2012. While investments haven’t kept the same pace, they have also grown.”¹⁷

Still efforts are being made to cement the ties make the linkage as transparent and mutually cohabitative as possible. In a Hindu Report the intent of a Chinese spokesperson is rather inviting and welcome. The Chinese official argues that, “With the length of our land boundary and our history, the Army was the initial focus but now we are moving beyond this,” an official said. “Today, our ships, trade and naval activity in Asia have increased. More than 50 per cent of our trade comes from the east of India, through the South China Sea, East China Sea, Malacca Straits and Indian Ocean. We are operating in a larger space, they are operating in a larger space, so it is natural that our ships will be in the approximately same space.”¹⁸ Thus, the geo economic convergence of the two nations as a result of growing interdependence and inter state trade in the Asia Pacific has made overtures towards an official camaraderie a must for regional stability. The notional understanding of a hard power based relationship can be a good earmarker for the internal stolidity of a country but when it comes to developing a regional and global outreach for a country then the convergences within divergences have to be pinpointed if the larger concerns of peace and normalcy have to be achieved.

The Americans have needed not tread on difficult waters in the context of the Sino India relations. In the post China rise millue, United States too espouses a relationship characterised by “competitive engagement”

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with the People's Republic of China. In such a scenario, the American subterranean intent of containing a surging China cannot be underestimated. But, a large slew of opinion contends otherwise that United States is not attempting to contain PRC. Philip C Saunders endorses the second view and standpoint which also happens to be the official standpoint of the US establishment. It can be stated that, "Many Chinese military officers and commentators misinterpret the Obama administration's rebalance to Asia as part of a U.S. effort to contain China. I tell them that if the United States were really trying to contain China, it would be seeking to isolate it internationally and cut off trade and investment ties, not working to expand China's role in international organizations and increase U.S. access to China's market. Official Chinese views are more sober, but the underlying suspicion is clear."¹⁹ How does it impact the Sino India Relationship?

The American intent to be neutral towards the developing Sino India relationship with its ups and downs interwoven with its corporate, territorial and diasporic intricacies can be considered to be the standard American thought on the relationship. Thus, the American standpoint can amount to a balancing out of its individual relationships with both the countries for which the witch hunting and the Macrythism which is part of the popular US discourse has to be moved out of the Sino American relationship in a non cold war like scenario. Thus, ideally China and United States happen to be trade partners and that too, one of the biggest trade partners of each other with the Chinese manufacturing finding a stolid toehold in the American markets with the "Made in China" brand being an ordinary and household name in the American homes as of now.

Still, there are many yeses to the notion of an American encirclement of the rising People's Republic of China. Phillip C Saunders writes, "Yes, U.S.-China relations have grown more competitive over the last few years, especially in Asia, where China's growing influence and expanding military capabilities are challenging U.S. dominance. And yes, Washington is concerned about China's increasingly muscular military, which is developing anti-access/area-denial capabilities that might challenge the U.S. military's ability to operate in Asia."²⁰ Thus, in more ways than one the Chinese might in the military context might be related to an subterranean threat perception being felt by Washington. Also, India might end up with the correct side of the Americans as the Americans intend to shore up their allies and coalition in the form of nations such as Japan and South Korea. In the South Sea context, the Chinese sabre rattling over Senakaku, Scarborough shoals with

Philippines and Japan seem to be another area of concern for the US as Washington exercises a military, security and a nuclear Umbrella over the South and East China region and the general oceanic and maritime pathways and lanes in the region which need to be kept free of Chinese intransigence in American interests. Also, New Delhi can go ahead and is already firming up ties with nations such as Japan as was posited by the November 2013 visit of the Japanese King and January Japanese PM visit to India. Thus, India in a way has a completely non adversarial relationship with Tokyo which in a way brings together the liberal democratic states of Japan, South Korea with all these political freeways converging on to the democratic hub of United States.

Professor Peter Rodriguez of University of Virginia runs a course on India, China and United States. In the founding elements of the course, themes such as the economic rise of china, US at the end of the Global World order, India's rise from isolationism, China's miracle and strategies for a new economic order, are the signposts of learning.²¹ What a sane academic can discern from this course outline is the framework and a grand outline of a new emerging world order which will not be premised upon confrontation between either China or India or maybe grandstanding between China and United States over Snowden exposes or cyber warfare or a human right tangle somewhere. Thus, the future lies with the geo-economic confluence between United States being at one side of confluence and the changing and grandstanding ties as they will exist and have been existing between a rising Indian Union and a Chinese juggernaut now not only 'at large' akin to a dragon in the Asian context but spreading its wings all across the global firmament.

The Council of foreign Relations too terms the relations between India, China and United as that of a great balance and affine balancing act in the region and the larger global context. Esther Pan writes in a backgrounder to the triumvirate of a relationship between the mighty United States, People's Republic of China and Indian in a very pithy and pragmatic manner. Esther argues, "Indian officials have "no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible relationship with China and to try to shape their policy to that end. Neither India nor the United States is interested in any kind of containment of China," Anupam Srivastava of University of Georgia agrees. Still, he says, Chinese officials still harbor suspicions about U.S.-Indian intentions."²² Still, the Sino India relations also remain in a confused set of diplomatic, strategic and military stasis and dialectic as

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there is an element of strategic dilemma which is reminiscent of an indecisive manoeuvre on the part of both the neighboring nations. Still, it might be too simplistic an analysis if one argues that PRC since the times of Sun Zu has been adhering to an expansive policy of territorial aggrandizement which was amply reflected in the wars with India and Vietnam. On the other hand, the iota of trade linkages which now flower between the twin nations makes confrontation a very strange and unwanted commodity.

One such voice was recently recorded in the People Republic of China's print Media when one Chinese national daily echoed a school of thought directing United States not to get wily about the trade relationship between India and china. It was reported in the Indian national daily, the Hindu and the coverage ran thus, " As Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made a "successful" visit to India despite recent border stand off, an influential state-run daily here took a dig at US saying Washington should not feel "jealous" over close Sino-Indian ties. The ruling Communist Party's mouthpiece 'People's Daily' also said India would not harm its ties with China to further US' strategic interests."²³ Thus, the idea of diffused power and polarity resonates in the India, People's Republic of china and United States trio and the brio generated by the tri relationship should not be submerged by a selfish undercurrent of a separately framed Sino India rapprochement as internationalism and interdependence have made their presence a stark reality where narrow dimensions of an Asiatic superiority might sour the geo economic pitch which the Occidental mission Civiltraice did since the last couple of centuries.

Concluding Remarks

In a way the voice of rapprochement defines the cooperative paradigm in the relationship between the twin neighbors. China follows an independent foreign Policy and India too adheres to an value neutral and idealistic framework which makes the twin nations adherents to the notion and the practice of multipolarity and multilateralism. The idea of BRICS led development which the currant inclusion of South Africa and the inclusion of the BRICS led Convergence account and the Councils on think tanks and corporate partnerships in the context of the African continent also sheds light on the novae avatar of the China and India frameworked and ordained global narrative which might be a narrative at present but with professional predictions of turning into a Global mega force and a delineating and defining instrumentality in the next 10-15 years from now on.

Also akin to earlier narrative about the Russians, Chinese and the Indian forming a counter productive block to the United States led structures, the idea of a Chinese Indian bilateral twist might be a bit too far fetched as the earlier troika of India, China and Russia did not live up to its potential as the European Union rode on its success with the inclusion of newer nations in its fold such as Latvia and the Russians frittering away their remaining strength and preponderance in the midst of curbing insurgencies in Chechnya and other regions bordering the fast intruding Eurozone. Similarly a China India détente cannot be as effective as the Chinese US détente as United States is a much bigger market and has more resources to its credit along with global coalitions to stabilise a China –US military and trade relationship. Still, with all the three being in the grand contention for the top slots in the realm of biggest and the most productive economies and nations, it can be a much better denouement for the global geo economics if the pathway of a mutually cohabitative exchange becomes the order of the day and takes some tangible form.

Still, the gloomier forecast is that India is a rising late giant which will end up crossing paths with PRC in the near future and its is here that the nations such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and more significantly, the ‘still-difficult-to-mess-around with’ United States of china can emerge as a savoir in more senses than one. Also, the Chinese perpetual tinkering with Nuclear programs and ports (Gwadar) in Pakistan always remain a threatening prospect to the Indian state and its immediate national, South Asian and maritime interests. It is here that the containing, constraining, ideological and civilizational convergences between the oldest and the largest democracy in the world can serve as the panacea and a bulwark for an all evident Chinese expansionism.

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the spirit and against such a tangible target, all the national energies and strivings have to be directed for the culmination of national strength and superiority.

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Work on India's Bid for United Nations Security Council and Role of China

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India was the earliest country to establish diplomatic relations with China among the non-socialist countries. In 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Nehru exchanged visits and jointly initiated the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China and India are two of the world's oldest civilizations and have co-existed in peace for millennia. Cultural and economic relations between China and India date back to ancient times. The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between India and China, but is also credited for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to East Asia.

Jawaharlal Nehru based his vision of resurgent Asia on friendship between the two largest states of Asia. Tibet, which had traditionally served as a geographical and political buffer zone, and where India believed it had inherited special privileges from the British Raj became bone of contention culminated into 1962 war.

However, the initial focus of the leaders of both the nations was not the foreign policy, but the internal development of their respective states. When they did concentrate on the foreign policies, their concern wasn't one another, but rather the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the alliance systems which were dominated by the two superpowers.

But the relations have been turbulent and very fragile as it is shown in the timeline below.

- 1962: Sino-Indian War; China seized Aksai Chin and overran Arunachal Pradesh.
- 1967: There were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim.
- 1986-87: Chinese and Indian forces clashed in Arunachal Pradesh
- 1988: Relations began to thaw. India and the People's Republic of China agreed to broaden bilateral ties in various areas, working to

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achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute.

- 1993: Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng signed the border agreement.
- 1998: Sino-Indian relations hit a low point following India's nuclear tests in May. George Fernandes declared that "China is India's number one threat", hinting that India developed nuclear weapons in defense against China's nuclear arsenal.
- 2004: The two countries proposed opening up the Nathula and Jelep Passes in Sikkim which would be mutually beneficial to both countries.
- 2006: China and India re-opened Nathula, an ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road.
- 2013: Latest intrusion by the People's Republic Army

Current structure of UNSC (United Nations Security Council)

The United Nations Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action through Security Council resolutions; it is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions to member states. The permanent security council has five members, also known as the Permanent Five, Big Five, or P5, include the following five governments: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These nations showcase the power and role they can play in world affairs. Just for thought these nations can even order military actions against any of the nation.

Some of the powers and functions enjoyed by these nations are as follows:

The actual permanent members of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) are held by five permanent members and ten elected members (Non-permanent). Prior to this there were six non-permanent members and the number of fixed members has not been changed since the creation. Elected members hold their place on the Council for a two-year term, and half of these places are contested each year. To ensure geographical continuity, a certain number of members are allocated for each of the five unofficial UN regional groupings.

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A chart of the members is below:

Permanent members

Country	Regional Group	Member Since
People's Republic of China	Asia-Pacific Group	Previously Republic of China
France	Western European and Others Group	1946
Russian Federation	Eastern European Group	Previously the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom	Western European and Others Group	1946
United States	Western European and Others Group	1946

As clearly seen nothing have changed since the inception hence the supreme power in this council enjoys a large scale of clout being on the permanent side of things. Hence it can be regarded as the founding member/ pillar of the United Nations Security council. This is in the status quo for substantial years now. The world has changed on its head since 1945. It has seen a completed change in the world order and hence the balance of power has shifted to a very great extent.

Thus it can be safe to say that the top five members do not represent the correct balance of power.

A look at the Non Permanent members:

Non Permanent members

Country	Regional Group	Term Began	Term Ends
Argentina	Latin American & Caribbean Group (GRULAC)	2013	2014
Australia	Western European and Others Group	2013	2014
Chad	African Group	2014	2015

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Chile	Latin American & Caribbean Group (GRULAC)	2014	2015
Jordan	Asia-Pacific Group	2014	2015
Lithuania	Eastern European Group	2014	2015
Luxembourg	Western European and Others Group	2013	2014
Nigeria	African Group	2014	2015
Republic of Korea	Asia-Pacific Group	2013	2014
Rwanda	African Group	2013	2014

The above chart clearly defines that the world system and checks, balances have not been correctly represented in the United Nations Security Council. Especially nations like India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany are kept out of scheme of things.

Today the world has evolved since the dark days of World war and hence it's a vast and much more equally distributed world , it was sixty nine years ago. United Nations being a democratic representation of the world does not justify the proper representation of the world order. Hence the reform of United Nations Security Council is eminent and need of the hour.

Reforms of United Nations Security Council and India

India has been the largest contributor of troops for United Nations peace keeping forces. India has been elected seven times to the UN Security Council. Only three countries have served longer than that (Japan, Brazil, and Argentina), except for the Permanent Five, and Colombia has served the same amount of time.

India has been seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council as a member of the G4, an organization composed of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India, all who are currently seeking permanent representation. According to their proposal the UN Security Council should be expanded beyond the current fifteen members to include twenty-five members. If this actually happens, it would be the first time permanent Security Council status is extended to a South Asian nation and supporters of the G4 plan suggest that this will lead to greater representation of developing nations rather than the current major powers. So far India has taken part in 43 Peacekeeping missions with a total contribution exceeding troops and a significant number of police personnel having been deployed. In 2014 India is the third largest

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troop contributor [TCC] with 7,860 personnel deployed with ten UN Peacekeeping Missions of which 995 are police personnel, including the first Female Formed Police Unit under the UN.”The process of bringing about UNSC reforms cannot be seen to be an exercise ad infinitum. A results-based timeline is imperative, and those who ask for not imposing artificial timelines may be advised to desist from inflicting artificial delays on this process,” India’s Ambassador to the UN Asoke Kumar Mukerji said on the Annual Report of the UN Security Council at the General Assembly. There has been a powerful group G4 who has been asking for the rightful reform of the council. The G-4 is an alliance among India, Brazil, Germany and Japan for the purpose of supporting each other’s bids for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.

India’s bid for permanent member of UNSC is backed by permanent members namely France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States, although the United States initially opposed India’s candidacy on grounds of nuclear proliferation. But American president have endorsed Indian candidature in UNSC in his address to Indian parliament during his last visit. Thus making India the only candidate that has received support from all permanent members and most other nations as well.

The African Union also supports India’s candidacy for permanent member of UNSC.

China’s role in India’s demand for permanent seat in UNSC

As a legacy rival to India and Japan, China would never like to have a share among the clouts over the status it enjoys. China has been evasive over the issues and has not given a clear stand. Thus many believe that the delays in these reforms are due to Chinese stand of being evasive over the issue. China continues to be evasive over its stand on supporting the G4 nations, including India, for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, advocating extensive consultations to reach a broad-based consensus. Then foreign ministry spokesperson Ma had warned that forcing “premature” reform plans will not only “undermine” the unity of UN member nations, but also harm the process. He said that UN member nations should seek a package of solutions for the reform, on the basis of broad and democratic consultations among member nations to accommodate interests and concerns of all parties.

The G-4 is an alliance among India, Brazil, Germany and Japan for the purpose of supporting each other’s bids for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.

China officially expressed its support for an increased Indian role at the United Nations, without explicitly endorsing India's Security Council ambitions. However, recently China has expressed its support for Indian candidacy as a permanent member of the Security Council if India revoked its support for Japanese candidacy. This is a diplomatic calculated move rather than supporting India's candidature. This is seen as divisive among many nations.

This makes a good and no doubt sincere case for India's claim to permanent membership of the UN Security Council. His analogy of Sisyphus, however, is not quite apt, because India's efforts have so far not taken us anywhere near the top of the mountain. India to be "cunning" if it is serious about its ambition. Indeed, he wants many countries, including the US, Israel, Palestine and others to be "cunning" if they want to achieve their respective goals. But, as far as India is concerned, his prescription of cunningness will meet with the same fate as the present approach of Group of 4 neither will succeed. India advocates a formula for UNSC reform seven permanent members, seven semi-permanent members and seven non-permanent members. This formula has the attraction of sounding simple, neat and reasonable. But it does not enjoy any advantage over other approaches. According to formula the seven permanent members will be the US, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Nigeria and one more. He does not mention who the seventh would be. He has not advocated that either the UK or France give up their privileged position. If all the P5 have to retain their membership, there is no room for India, since he makes an even stronger case for Brazil and Nigeria. If India has to be inducted as a permanent member the number goes up to eight. As for non-permanent seats, there are 10 seats at present. Why should the vast majority of the membership give up three seats? There is huge interest in non-permanent seats among smaller countries. One indication of this is the fact that in the Asian group, candidatures have been announced up to 2035. Africa wants three permanent seats, but might settle for two. The African nations are not able to agree on which two countries should have the seats; will they ever agree to one? Further, they will never agree to Nigeria alone. The criterion is not how many students a country has in Harvard; in that case, Japan would surely top the list. Even South Korea would fare better. And do not forget the Arab countries. Will they ever agree to this formula? The P5 are cunning. They coordinate among themselves which one of them should declare support for which candidate and which ones should oppose them. Not a single one of the P5 wants a single addition to their ranks, even without the right of veto. US President Barack Obama is being "cunning" when he

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says that he would support India's claim in a "reformed" security council; he does not declare support for reform, nor does he say that he or his country will actively work for reform. He got a good round of applause in Indian Parliament for his cunningness. The UK has supported India and has earned India's appreciation, perhaps even gratitude, but knows that the "reform" cannot and will not take place when each of the P5 has veto power. In comparison, China is more forthright. It openly opposes Japan and repeats the same mantra about India namely that it supports India's aspiration to play a more active role at the UN. Russia too is circumspect. Reform of the SC needs an amendment of the Charter, and the P5 are simply and totally opposed to it. Sixty-nine years after the end of World War II, the P5 are still not prepared to delete the article regarding enemy states.

Conclusion

There has been some past foreign policies mistakes by then leaders of India who gave away an opportunity of India become a permanent member of the UNSC. The leadership then failed to understand the importance of UNSC permanent seat and was courteous enough to offer the seat to China. Which was proven to be a huge blunder and the cost is still not been overcome by us till today. India's continuous fight for the same has continuous and seems indefinite.

The leadership then forgot that nation's interest is far more important than the rapport between two political leaders. That trust has been fatal for us in the Sino India war. The world is finally recognizing the need for India getting the rightful position and hence world over there has been great support. except China still not making its stand clear over India's claim as it does not want to have a balancing power , which turns out to be its great economic rival , military competition and one of the most developing nation.

India has more supporters than Brazil, if I remember it right, France has supported India's membership as well and Russia would have no objection to India's given the relationship that the two countries share. Several members, including the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Australia, Brazil and South Africa, have expressed support for India's claim for permanent membership in an expanded security council.

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China and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

Nirmal Jindal

The question of peace has always been on the top of the agenda of international politics and global community. The issues of war and peace are considered to be the two opposite sides of the international system and the issue of peace is as old as war. Even after the first world war the eminent scholars and researchers like Quincy Wright and Lewis Fry Richardson contributed in a large way to peace research. The discipline of international politics focussed on the study of wars primarily to explore the reasons of war and search for the solution to the problem in order to make the world a more peaceful place to live. It is noted that the issue of war became more critical with the emergence of nuclear weapons. The eminent US scientists like Einstein and Oppenheimer, (the father of the US bomb) were quite against the use of nuclear force for military purposes and expressed grave doubts about the future of the nuclear world. Infact, war never threatened human civilization with such grave consequences as the nuclear war. Therefore, a parallel argument in support of nuclear disarmament has been in existence since the development and use of the bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The issue of nuclear disarmament has always been emphasised by the major powers including the nuclear countries however, they could not set an example for nuclear disarmament to a large number of non nuclear countries because there had been a gap in their own appeal and action. Since 1945 various countries had been trying to acquire nuclear weapons as they perceived it as a weapon of deterrence and not of war. The supporters of nuclear disarmament are of the opinion that though nuclear weapons deterred war but the possibility of destruction by existence of nuclear weapons can not be ruled out in case deterrence fails. Moreover, the growing number and quality of nuclear weapons work against the logic of deterrence. The supporters of disarmament are also critical of the restricted and limited approach to nuclear weapons reduction followed by most of the nuclear countries. In the opinion of supporters of nuclear disarmament the only approach to world peace is disarmament and it should be complete, general and comprehensive. However, the nuclear weapons acquisition by major powers in the world had encouraged the

middle range power countries to acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, the USSR acquired nuclear weapons in response to the US. Various European countries had acquired nuclear weapons in response to the USSR. In Asia, China, where Mao had declared a bomb, a paper tiger had also acquired nuclear capability for self defence or for the purpose of deterrence. India's nuclear program is also perceived more as a reaction to the nuclear power of China and Pakistans nuclear programme is perceived to be a response to India's nuclear programme. It is interesting to note that though China has been instrumental in developing Pakistan's nuclear programme, it always criticised India's nuclear stand and tried to block India's entry in the nuclear club as well as in nuclear regimes to check clandestine nuclear proliferation and technology. It shows China's discriminatory policy towards India's vis a vis Pakistan. In this regard, the following paper discusses the reason for India's nuclear acquisition despite its belief in nuclear disarmament. In this connection, China's discriminatory policy towards India's nuclear policy is also taken into consideration.

Power begets Power:

Since the development and use of the first atom bomb in 1945, the US has been emphasising on the prevention of nuclear proliferation. The US leaders were of the opinion that in case USSR acquire nuclear weapons, it would resort to the use of nuclear weapons. The USSR was willing to accept the proposition of nuclear disarmament only on the condition that the US also denuclearized itself. However, the US refused to abandon its nuclear weapons as it argued that it had acquired the technology and its leaders being more rational and mature won't use nuclear weapons in future. The USSR having failed to induce positive response from the US had also acquired nuclear weapons. China on the other hand a very different approach to nuclear weapons. Mao not only called the bomb a 'paper tiger' but also declared that even if the US used the bomb against China, it's T! population would still survive the war and respond back. However, by 1964, China had also acquired nuclear capability. It shows that China declared the US bombed a paper tiger because they did not want to concede the power that a bomb gives to a country. In other words, they knew the tremendous destructive potential of the nuclear bomb that led to China's acquisition of the bomb. The subsequent US policy in Asia shows that the US never tried to over power China since it acquired the nuclear bomb. It also belied the US perception that communist countries would try to use it to maximise their power or as a tool of foreign policy. Both the USSR and China refrained from using nuclear bombs in any of the conflicting situations and proved that the leaders

learn the utility of the bomb as soon as they acquire it. It means the leaders of the communist countries were also as mature as any of the western nuclear countries. The behaviour of China and USSR was also not different from the western countries as they also aimed at preventing further nuclear proliferation and joined hands with western nuclear powers to form the nuclear club.

Indian approach to Nuclear Disarmament:

India has been one of the countries which has been championing the cause of nuclear disarmament. India has rejected the realist perception of international politics that considered war an endemic disease in international politics. India has always considered war a great curse of the international society. Various western scholars and historians have been intrigued by India's position on weapons and wars as Indian history has witnessed various wars. Mahabharata is known for its destructive nature which has wiped out the majority of population from the society. Ramayana also aims to destroy Ravana. However, both wars were fought for justice. Mahabharata was fought for justice as it aimed to destroy unjust elements that could be harmful to the society. In Ramayana also war was fought to get justice and respect for women. It is also a fact that India never tried to invade any of the countries beyond its borders and shores since history to the contemporary times. Being a land of Budha, Ashoka and Gandhi, India always emphasised on international brotherhood, peace and human security. India's foreign policy after independence aimed at unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence and India genuinely tried to develop friendly relations with all the countries of the world regardless of their ideological differences. India's non alignment policy acted as an antidote to the cold war politics. For several decades India championed the cause of nuclear disarmament. Despite having acquired the declaratory nuclear posture, India's stand and belief for nuclear disarmament has not changed. However, Indian perception of nuclear disarmament was considered idealist and unachievable by major powers which indulge in nuclear arms race.

The westerners considered nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence which rendered total war obsolete. Fulbright argued, "Nuclear weapons have rendered total war totally obsolete. These nuclear weapons have deprived the force of its utility as an instrument of national policy as the nuclear wars and international missiles have made the total war as an act of suicide"¹ The world has witnessed that there has been no world war since 1945, though on several occasions the war between two superpowers

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appeared to be quite imminent. History shows that Gen MacArthur had considered the use of bombs in Korean war (1950-53) but President Truman had dismissed him. In Cuban Missile Crisis also the world had reached the brink of disaster because the nuclear war seemed quite imminent between the two superpowers. In the Vietnam war, which became a burden (due to its protracted and extended nature) on the US, the use of nuclear weapons was not considered. This is indicative of a new situation as countries despite having overkill capability restrain from resorting to war. The supporters of the nuclear weapons even went to the extent of saying that deterrence replaced war and maintained peace in the world. Richard Ikle referred to the political advantages of deterrence and argued that "Deterrence has become so entrenched as an approach not because it has objective merit as the best means to avoid war, but because it alone reconciles nuclearism and the state system in an age of technophilia. It's hyper-rationality is in the last analysis, an indigenous rationalization for the international status quo."²

The advocates of nuclear disarmament argue that deterrence legitimises the existence and use of nuclear weapons systems which in turn leads to nuclear arms race and a threat of a n immoral genocide. The Catholic Church Bishop in the US had appealed that the world should make genuine efforts to "reduce dependence on nuclear weapons in the long run."³ During the cold war period though no major war among major powers took place, the world was not free from wars. Various limited wars took place in the regions of Asia, Africa and West Asia. In several wars both the US and USSR were involved indirectly and fought proxy wars in these regions. However, in none of the wars any of the superpowers considered the use of nuclear force because they feared the possibility of conversion of small wars into major wars. They refrained from direct involvement in small wars as they feared that conversion of small conventional war into a nuclear war could not be completely ruled out. It means they did not want to take any risk of war and acted very cautiously to avert any unwanted situation that could lead to nuclear war. However, Indian perception was very different. India believed in disarmament and did not equate abstention of nuclear war with non violence or peace. The fear created by the presence of nuclear weapons and the asymmetry of power created by the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the international system was equated with structural violence as it forced more and more countries to get indulged in arms race and diverting their financial resources from human security and development to military security. Gandhi ji called it structural violence.

World without war: Gandhian perception

Gandhi ji always emphasised the significance of non violence and global peace and harmony. He rejected the significance of weapons and wars to achieve any objectives. He always considered means as important as objective. He wanted that non violence is a very powerful tool to achieve any objective because he considered it as a tool of heart conversion. He argued that Hitlerism will never be countered or deterred by super Hitlerism rather it can only result in superior- Hitlerism. He also felt that though nuclear weapons deterred wars for the time being but the “world may return to violence with renewed zeal after the effect of disgust is worn out”⁴ India’s first PM Nehru also considered the choice between war and peace is like a choice between self extinction and survival. He emphasised that the world should use all its energy to “prevention of catastrophe”⁵ He proposed that instead of spending money on arms, the world should spent money to fight hunger and diseases. The cause for nuclear disarmament continued under Mrs Gandhi and Rajeev Gandhi’s administration though India had conducted nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974 which gave it tremendous power and prestige to India and India did not encounter any war from China or Pakistan since then.

Clandestine Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia:

Despite serious efforts for nuclear disarmament, India rejected the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (1968) as it found it discriminatory which sought to prevent only horizontal proliferation while allowing major nuclear powers the vertical proliferation of their weapons at mutually acceptable pace. Such policy was perceived as an arms maximisation rather than an arms control policy by Indian leaders. The behaviour of nuclear powers in regard to clandestine nuclear proliferation was also contradictory to the essence of nuclear non proliferation. On the one hand the nuclear powers were emphasising the significance of nuclear disarmament on the other hand they were indulging in clandestine nuclear proliferation. They were secretly supplying nuclear technology and nuclear fuel to some of the countries fitting into their geo- political interests. For instance China not only had acquired nuclear capability (as it always believed in achieving political objectives by fighting psychological warfare) itself but had also been indulging in supporting Pakistan’s nuclear programme. China’s aggressive and expansionist designs against India on the one hand and support to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme on the other hand had built strong pressure on India to develop its own nuclear programme. It is believed that India’s nuclear programme had developed

in response to China's nuclear weapons power position. The nuclear countries actions of creating crypto nuclear powers was also causing nuclear proliferation in the world through the nuclear club remained confined to five nuclear countries. It means through nuclear non proliferation treaties they wanted to cap the nuclear capabilities of only those countries which were not allied to them. Though the US appealed for a regional nuclear free zone which prevented nuclear proliferation in various countries of the world, it could not prevent proliferation completely. India rejected this discriminatory and limited approach to disarmament.

India's nuclear policy and China- Pak axis

India was the first country to oppose the existence of nuclear weapons and proposed the nuclear non proliferation treaty and rejected any limited approach to disarmament. India believed that Disarmament should be complete and comprehensive. The vertical nuclear proliferation was in fact perceived as legitimising the use of nuclear power for political and diplomatic purposes. In 1998 India resorted to the declaratory nuclear posture in order to deter its nuclear adversaries encircling India. Since beginning India's nuclear programme was perceived to be a reaction to the China- Pak axis. China is known as an all weather friend of Pakistan and does not want to lose it in order to maintain its hegemony in South Asia. India's rising power has always been a source of irritation to China and it always tries to indulge it in conflicting situations with Pakistan so that it never emerges as a powerful nation. Since China had a bad experience with the USSR - which refused to extend knowledge and technology for bomb development so China did not want to commit the same mistake in relation to Pakistan. China wanted to build strong relations with Pakistan and also wanted to develop Pakistan's deterrent capability. Pakistan's developed nuclear weapons to promote its state sponsored terrorism against India by deterring India's nuclear reaction by its own all out nuclear war strategy.

In order to control and prohibit the export of technology of nuclear materials to non nuclear countries indulged in clandestine nuclear programmes, multilateral control regimes like Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and MTCR (1987) the Wassenaar Agreement (1996) and Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) 1987 were introduced. Most of these regimes had been proved ineffective as countries like China refused to join these. It shows China's intent to exploit its technology and nuclear materials for political and commercial purposes. China has been supplying missiles to Pakistan in violation of these regimes which became a source

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of irritation between the US and China as well. China's support to Pakistan's nuclear programme causes serious concern to India as it is felt that Pakistan sponsored terrorism might increase under the guard of its nuclear shield. It is very clear that nuclear deterrence does not work in case of terrorism as it is hidden and not clearly visible. Deterrence works only against a clear and visible enemy against whom one can act preemptively.

India's nuclear programme a response to nuclear apartheid:

India's no first use declaration and not indulging in unending nuclear arms race is indicative of its belief in rejection of arms. China aims to curb the nuclear capability of India without reversing its own nuclear proliferation while also supporting Pakistan's nuclear proliferation in order to put India in disadvantageous position. It shows China's double standards and political game to pursue its own political agenda of hegemonizing the entire Asian region. Since India and China are the biggest and the fastest growing economies in Asia, China is not happy to perceive India at par with China. Moreover, India's strong strategic position would be advantageous in strengthening its alliances with the South East Asian nations who are apprehensive of China's expansionist designs. India's Look East policy and its engagement with various South East Asian countries will prevent China from executing its expansionist designs in Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Therefore, China perceives that India's entry in the nuclear club will enhance its image, power and will counter China's hegemonic designs. Therefore, China is not only opposing India's entry in the nuclear club but also opposing its membership in the Security Council and Nuclear Suppliers Group.

India's nuclear programme is primarily for deterrence and self defence; to counter any expansionist designs of extra regional powers in the region and the waterways which are essential for international trade. India justifies its nuclearisation on the grounds of protesting against the apartheid of the nuclear world. India's nuclearisation and support for other country's right to acquire nuclear weapons is based on its protest against unjust and discriminatory world order. India does not accept the nuclear club of five nuclear countries and acquisition of permanent seat in Security Council by nuclear countries projects the power and status nuclear weapons acquisition render to a country.

In the post cold war world, despite the emphasis of neo-liberal policies and economic integration of the world, nuclear proliferation is increasing.

China and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

The advocates of nuclear weapons consider denuclearisation dangerous as it can be destabilising for international peace and security.⁶ India is critical of nuclear proliferation but against discriminatory nuclear arms control or non proliferation measures. India is for general or comprehensive nuclear disarmament otherwise feels that so long nuclear weapons exist non nuclear countries should not be denied the right of acquiring nuclear systems. India has also justified the possession of nuclear weapons by non western countries on the ground that non western leaders can also act as maturely as the leaders of western countries. India encountered various conflicting situations from its neighbouring countries, China and Pakistan but has not indulged in war like situation which shows that one's country acquires nuclear weapons, it learns its utility also. India's protest against nuclear proliferation continues and its justification for its possession on the ground of protest against discrimination against non nuclear countries also continues.

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Challenges to UN Peace Building in Somalia and Strategic Interest of Asian Giant

Nisheet Kumar

Abstract: Somalia has witnessed one of the worst civil war in the history of mankind. World community including China and India in current time is developing interest towards oil and other natural resources of Somalia. this article is intended to highlight main challenges towards peace building efforts, how successfully two Asian giants particularly India is maneuvering her diplomatic policy to tap the benefits of natural resources of Somalia and what need to be done for improved bilateral relations.

Keywords: UNSOM, Somalia, India, China, Natural Oil, Diplomatic relations

Two decades after its withdrawal, United Nations summoned back its peacekeeping groups and closed down its philanthropic activities in the ravaged Somalia, the Horn of Africa, in the year 1994. This determined comeback was mainly due to the motive that in the year 2013(May 2), the UN Security Council sanctioned the formation of the UN Assistance Mission (UNSOM) in Somalia and assigned with certain responsibilities concerned to peace building and state-building process in the war-torn country. Moreover, on July 24, 2013, it expanded its time limit to November 25th, 2014.

Background of Peacekeeping in Somalia

The operation of UNSCOM on June 3, 2013, for a preliminary period of one year denotes the beginning of the third attempt of UN intercession for an enduring peace in Somalia. These were considered as the most daring analysis executed in the line of philosophy of “humanitarian militarism”, in the early years of the post-Cold war period.

UNSOM I was unsuccessful to develop a safe and sound ambiance for the charitable operations and unfortunately ended up within a short time period of eight months. Being supported by IAF helicopters, Indian

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troops were present in brigade strength and worked with various tribal races in Somalia to reconstruct an authentic government and set up social institutions. Also, Indian Naval Ships participated in the patrolling duties off the Somali coast and in the conveyance of men and material for the United Nations. The UNSC conceded Resolution 794 approving the UNITAF (Unified Task Force) to undertake the responsibilities from UNSOM I. This facilitated United Nations to function in Somalia between December 5, 1992 and May 4, 1993. However, when numerous Pakistani peace mongers were assassinated, the Security Council conceded another Resolution 837 allowing the UNITAF troops to employ “all necessary measures” to assure the delivery of the charitable aid pertaining with the Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows to implementation of force encompassing weapons in peacekeeping operations.

In the year 1993 (March 26), the establishment of UNISOM II escorted in as “second attempt” of UN intercession under the flagship of the Security Council Resolution 814 that also approved the implementation of force right from its establishment. But unfortunately, UNSOM II was completely ruined after the “Battle of Mogadishu” and the out coming events encircling the incidents of Black Hawk Down in which 18 American soldiers were mercilessly assassinated.

After realizing the significance of regional forces and organizations that are involved in setting up peace, UN in its distinct attempt with UNSC resolution 1809 started a joint AU-UN panel (the “Prodi Panel”) to think about the options and opportunities for assisting AU peacekeeping operations which was headed by the ex-Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. In the meantime, on 20th February, 2007, the Security Council conceded resolution 1744 that legally approved the establishment of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), encompassing more than 17,000 peacekeepers and intermediaries at its summit primarily from Kenya, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Djibouti and Uganda and funded from the determined UN contributions. The well-synchronized and coordinated military operation between the Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian armed forces combined with the alleged logistical support from U.S and French armed forces with a code named as “Operation Linda Nchi”, which means to protect and safeguard the country. It followed the Al Qaeda-associated Al Shabaab troops who were charged of abducting several foreign tourists. Moreover, the organization supported the Kenyan employees and aided the country from its diminishing economical and security crisis. AMISOM later conquered Al Shabaab in Mogadishu, the capital of Somali. Then the

associated Somali National Army (SNA) and KDF apprehended control over the harbor city of Kismayu, which was previously the refuge of Al Shabaab. This glorious victory has re-established a peace and tranquility in the country, eventually facilitating the election of the new government in Mogadishu 2012 (September). The new government was solely backed up by the UN and was headed by the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Moreover, the Kenyan operation has also prepared the way for the safe return of the UN and its organizations in Somalia.

The rolling third attempt of UN interventionism is a fine combination of the “soft power methodology which is governs the 21st century’s multi-polar world order and a strong mark out of militarism which precisely enunciates UN involvement in Africa from Cote d’Ivoire to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone to Sudan, Liberia to Mali, and recently in South Sudan. In Africa, the militarism has observed the overflowing of the UN troops by 52.35% , where the number of the troops which were around 47,778 in the year 2001 drastically elevated to 91,216 by last year of June. While the newly established US intervention in Somalia is on a raft ride of Security Council-sanctioned instruments encompassing the Panel of Experts on the prohibition of the weapons (2002) and international counter-piracy action (2003), its leading lights are now the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the notorious UN Monitoring troop in Eritrea and Somalia.

UNSOM

2102 is a universal resolution as conceded by the UN Security Council on 2nd May, 2013 to set up a new mission leading with politics as led ahead by the United Nation department for Political Affairs for UNSOM or the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. The newer mission took place with the United Nations Political Office for Somalia or UNPOS which provides a mandated conclusion for 2nd June, 2013. Moreover in the resolution 2093 for 2013 the UN Security Council focused on the requirement to function with cooperation with AMISOM. UNSOM functions to reinforcing the association between AMISOM and UN in the strategic approach. Both concerned organizations works with responsibility in supporting peace building technique of Somalia and are into function to limit the practical relationships on several grounds. The core objective of UNSOM rest on assistance of creation, being a facilitator, stimulating the strategic and the political ambience on which the process of peace building and stabilization can be performed with a leveraging the other different sections of the UN systems &

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international partners. The federal government of Somalia has the support of UNSOM with importance to state-building, peace and security has risen for the assistance to experience a fair and free election in 2016.

UNSOM MANDATE

Mandate of UNSOM encompasses the stipulation of policy guidance to the Somalian Federal Government and AMISOM on establishing peace and state-building in the areas under governance, Rule of Law (including the disengagement of combatants), Security Sector Reform (SSR), progression of the federal system which embodies the election preparations for 2016 and cooperation of the international donor support.

- a) *Good offices*: The reconciliation efforts are motivated, intercession aids and the facilitation of the Government assistance in order to promote major assignments with respect to politics which has process such as referendum to be ensued on the constitution, constitution auditing, arranging for the coming election for 2016 and progression of federal system, are considered as the main schedules of UNSOM.
- b) *Rule of Law & security sector*: UNSOM's assistance to the principle objectives of the Government for developing and transforming the security of Somalia and rendering technical advice resulting into justice organizations and making arrangements for transformation in security sector, rule of law (encompassing corrections, justice and police), disarmament, reincorporation and demilitarization, mine action and naval security, disarticulation of the contenders.
- c) *Human Rights*: Raising the theory of awareness & honoring the human rights emphasizing empowerment of women, protection of children and gender based conflicts & sexual violence, reinforcing the justice of Somalia.
- d) *Coordination of international assistance*: Standing according to the attempt of the government to match the support of the donor, basically assisting the security sector maintain balance with nautical security, recuperation and constancy, manage the public finance along with the ability to develop, functions related to multilateral and bilateral partners through the agenda in the New Deal.

Political Affairs and Constraints

Right from its inception in the year 2013(June 3), UNSOM has involved the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and also conventional leaders and civil society institutions, towards the staunch emphasis of national equalization and state-building which encompasses the good offices and intercession, building up national outstrip and reconciliation sophisticating the constitutional development.

Moreover, an added significant agenda for the UN peace building attempts is assisting and encouraging the FGS towards the setting up of the local administrations in other corner of the country. These locations comprises of Central Somalia, the Baidoa and Beletweyn processes, including the Central Regions Partnership Meeting. Here involvement lies with the Somaliland, the northwestern part of Somalia. It always upholds its sovereignty and persists to discard the federation. It also continues to rebuff UNSOM on the grounds that the mission's objective is to promote and improve federal system in Somalia that functions contradict to the goals and Constitutional framework of Somaliland. However, Puntland, (North eastern part of Somalia on Indian ocean) pledges to a federal system, but since 5th of August 2013, suspended coordinated relationships with FGS on several accusations that immensely gyrates around the allegations that the federal officials 'tampered' with the Provisional Federal Constitution signed in June 2012 in Nairobi, Kenya by the participants to the Roadmap on concluding Somalia's transition. At this juncture, UN need to persist to arbitrate between the two parties in an attempt to sort out gridlock and should avoid the mistake of UNSOM I or II when it left everything aside halfway.

The constitutional reform is considered major challenging factor in peace building and state-building objective. UNSOM began to function in close association with the UNDP, involving Somalia's Federal Parliament in the arena of governance and constitutional reform. Their consultation led towards the establishment last year on June 16th by the Federal Parliament's Constitutional Oversight Committee of a constitutional audit procedure. UNSOM and its associates, mutually with the Federal Parliament, have designed a Roadmap for Somalia Constitutional execution & Auditing Process. The Roadmap would pave way towards a nation-wide referendum and eventual national elections which has been prepared for 2016 and it could promote peace and stability in Somalia.

Human Rights and Related Challenges

UNSOM with strong mandate on human rights that includes monitoring, helped in reporting and investigating the Council & helped in prevention of violations or abuses of the human rights or the humanitarian laws on the international grounds that is committed in Somalia that includes deployment of the observers under human rights. The UNSC provided an emphasis on UNSOM that adheres to the Secretary-General's Human Rights & Policy on due diligence & the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy on Abuse and Sexual exploitation. The mission is mandated to build the human rights capacity of the government, child protection, women's empowerment, rule of law and fighting conflict-related sexual violence.

To address some of challenges related to Human Rights, the Government in August 2013 endorsed the Government Post Transition Human Rights Roadmap and declared 27 August as Somalia's National Human Rights Day.

Challenges of IDPs and Civil Societies

The eviction made people to displace in Mogadishu with UN's continued efforts to maintain them. October 2013 witnessed, Somali police to evict orphans, households headed by female and disabled people along with around 2000 members belonging to the host community of the settlement "Majo" of Mogadishu. Without prior planning the evictees got shifted to other settlements. These are some of the major challenges in the societies after the conflicts and required proper planning and implemented policies on grounds or these weak threads may somehow become violent to break the tender and fragile peace.

Somalia's civil society organizations continue to play a pivotal role in the country's democratic transition. However, their members continue to be victims of arbitrary arrests and detentions and killings in their efforts to improve the situation.

Establishing Rule of Law and Streamlining Security and Judicial Institutions

In an appreciable and much applauded effort of the UNSOM the Rule of Law & Security Institutions Group (ROLSIG) is created which is a new structure within UN Mission. Under this umbrella it brings together UN elements (Mission staff & UNDP) in order to deliver a 'One UN'

approach in support of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Somali people. The New Deal Compact signed in Brussels on 16 September 2013 offers “A new beginning for a sovereign, secure, democratic, united and federal Somalia at peace with itself, and for the benefit of its people”. UNSOM suppose to play a major part in supporting the delivery of the Compact’s goals on security and justice.

Accordingly UNSOM is working with the Federal Government and the wider international community to develop appropriate coordination mechanisms that allow delivery of the necessary support for Somalia’s security institutions. This involves providing assistance in areas such as training, logistic planning, infrastructure development, human resource programs.

There is, however, a need and challenge to streamline and integrate the country’s many security forces into its federal institutions. The Federal Government of Somalia defines the independent militia groups in Somalia as ‘regional security forces’ and is undertaking a political outreach process - particularly through Members of Parliament - to determine the appropriate roles of local, regional and federal authorities. UNSOM supports engagement by the Commander of the Somali National Army and the Police Commissioner of the Somali Police Force in persuading these regional security forces to align with and integrate into FGS security institutions.

Along with the above mentioned rule, UNSOM laid technical support to implement Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy (MRSS), which anticipates in revenue generation on a large scale for the country that can unlikely be achieved in different other areas pertaining to economic development for the next 5 years. The important maritime challenges include fishery protection & licensing, prevention in dumping of toxic waste & other enforcement laws required for (drug smuggling, arms smuggling & privacy, trafficking), border control. The advent of oil and gas exploration also demanded some significant security requirement at the sea.

Military reform is undertaken by UNSOM through an important coordination mechanism, the Defence Working Group (DWG). The DWG is lead by Somali officials, facilitated by UNSOM, and supported by AMISOM and key donors and partners.

Other big challenge is the lack of ability and accountability of the state and corrections. UNSOM mandates in strengthening the capacity of the Somali Custodial Corps to develop, manage and maintain a safe, secure, viable and system with humane prison being an integral part of

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efforts of nationally-owned sustainable and a building block important enough to prevent relapsing during conflict. UNSOM during the assistance of the Corps of Somali Custody in order to address the gap of prisons, needs of infrastructure, overcrowding, water, food, sanitation and health needs of the prisoners. Maintenance of good order in the prison with safe exercise and humane control on the prisoners are the most important areas to be addressed.

Gender Issues

The UN is engaged in developing a road map with the FGS to ensure a comprehensive consultative process for the finalization of the National Gender Policy. Emphasis is required to be placed in addressing the specific challenges and needs of different regions, capacity building within government, and engagement of civil society and women groups throughout the country. This will be an important instrument to ensure adequate gender programming, funding and achieve tangible results for gender equality. It will also be an important framework to seek donor support in the pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment in Somalia.

Strategic Significance of Somalian Peace and Oil for Two Asian Giants

Situated within "oil window", there are certain positive prospective of oil and gas that rest with Somalia. The western countries have the knowledge about Somalia's oil content but are unaware of the quantity. Their assumptions are backed with the study led by Texas-based Hunt Oil Corp and World Bank. According to the study of Word Bank on 1991, 'the geological parameters' around Puntland includes "conductive to the generation, expulsion and trapping of significant amounts of oil and gas". After the successful exploration taken place in South of Yemen, Hunt Oil reached the similar conclusion of "the estimated one billion barrels of Yemeni oil reserves were part of a great underground rift or valley that arced into and across northern Somalia". Accordingly following the footsteps of US, China, Britain, Canada, Australia and India too have the interest as a part of national security in getting hold of Somali Oil. Among the other things, as being the reason that the sub-regional areas of Gulf is about to go prolonged strategic importance & according to that Somali oil reserve can turn as a boon for their economy. Horn Petroleum Corporation being the subsidiary of Canada's Africa Oil began the oil exploration process in the last February in the north eastern side of Somalia, with drilling 2 wells of 3800m depth

being the first in the last 21 years. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Chinese Giant Corporation, has gained legal permission to drill oil in Somalia which proves Chinese desperate needs to get alternative source of energy compared to others in the Middle East. Similarly, the government of India runs an exploration for hydrocarbon a led by ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), Oil India (OIL) and ONGC's foreign arm to have a part of Somalia oil.

India

Though India does not maintain a direct diplomatic relationship with Somalia but a healthy a constant diplomatic relationship is maintained. As the civil was sustained for longer period in Somalia, there was fewer complacency in diplomatic and political dealings. Though for the first time, the Prime Minister of Somalia H.E. Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke who accompanied with Minister of Information visited in India in the year 1963. After the diplomatic visits as done by the Somalia government the Indian Government too reciprocated to their visits. In the recent past, Hon'ble Minister of State for External Affairs Shri E Ahamed get hold of the Indian delegation at the conference held in London on Somalia on 23rd February, 2012. He met the other delegates as that include President of Puntland H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud Farole, President of Galmudug H. E. Mohamed Ahmed Alin and TFG President H. E. Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. The Minister of Trade of the Federal Republic of Somalia Mohamud Ahmed Hassan visited India for the business summit at Gujarat during the period of January 2013. Recently, the Indian delegates were led to the Somalia conference held in London by the High Commissioner for the period 7th May, 2013. India has offered Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) scholarship for training and Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) for the scholarship to Somalia. The 2nd Africa-India Forum Summit held in Addis Ababa in May 2011, the slots including the ITEC training enhanced up to 35 in 2011-12 in Somalia. For 2012-13 fifteen ITEC slots for training were offered to Somalia. Furthermore, Somalia is also the partner of the e-Network project of pan Africa. Somalis travel for medical attentions and studied to India. However smaller number of Indians worked for the various Somalia regions.

For 2012-13 the trade between India and Somalia was around US\$ 195 million that showed around 30% increase compared to 2011-12 figure of US\$ 148 million. Somalia has qualified for India's unilateral concept of duty free tariff for the preferred market for exporting services and goods to India. The scheme as introduced in 2008 included a duty

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free access on LCDs with around 84% on the tariff line as preferred by India and other preferential access with another 9%. Following the announcement of Hon'ble Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the 2nd Africa India Forum Summit that held in Addis Ababa in May 2011, India gave around US \$ 2 million to African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM). An extensive contribution was announced by India in March 2012 of US\$ 1 million to AMISOM. For the purpose of anti-piracy, the Indian navy patrolled around Gulf of Aden from 2008. India is an active member of UN Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia.

China

The Chinese has a diplomatic relationship with Somalia much before 1991 which is the period of civil war that broke in Somalia. However, around January 1991, the Chinese government closed their operation in Mogadishu during the civil war. Though the Chinese officials departed, yet the two countries maintained a healthy trade relationship. The total volume of trade for the year 2002 was around US\$3.39 million, with Somalia's export being US \$1.56 million and import being \$1.83million. In between 2000 to 2011 around 7 development projects were launched by China in Somalia. The initiatives included economic assistance for \$6 million, anti-malaria drug donation, debt relief \$3million.

With the establishment of the Government in the Federal mode of Somalia during the mid-2012, the authorities of China reaffirmed their supporting nature for the government of Somalia and gave a call to the international community in order to strengthen the bond and commitment for peace progress in Somalia. The permanent representative of China for UN, Li Baodong provided an emphasis on his support by the administration for the stabilization plan of the federal government of Somali that includes the effort of the latter's at "implementing an interim Constitution, carrying out its six-point plan, strengthening institutional capacity, exercising government functions and extending effective authority over all its national territory." Last year August, a meeting with Wang Yang, Chinese Vice Premier and Fowziya Yusuf Haji Adan, Somalia's Foreign Minister had made an announcement that the authorities of Somalia were eager to have a cooperation with the Government of China in various sectors like agriculture, infrastructure, national security and energy sectors. During September 2013, the two governments made sure that the official agreement of cooperation made in Mogadishu as a part of national recovery plan with 5 years term in Somalia. The pact will have the

authorities of China to reconstruct many major landmarks of infrastructural importance that includes landmarks in the capital of Somalia. This includes Mogadishu stadium, National theatre and hospital and also a connecting road between Galkaya and Burao in North Somalia.

Conclusion

The involvement of Somalia by Chinese government even at a small level would be a sign of non intervention it maintains after the cold war is changing as it focuses on other parts of the world, especially in Africa. As the influence of China rises, it is leading to the growth in trade and investments in Beijing and this would mean that China would interfere to protect its natural resources, trade, investments and help. The evidence indicates that China is emerging as a strong nation and also possesses great ability to become one. This has great involvement in the world affairs and there is huge possibility that the desire of Beijing would help it to grow more, protect and enjoy the sovereignty while hoping for spreading the peace that it has done in the UN for these many years. This hope that the international fame of China would make the world to need it as China needs the world. More cooperation with various other missions like Somalia operations is the right stride taken by China based on its view.

On diplomatic level India and Somalia may appear close and constant diplomatic relations are visible but there is clear gap noticed, no strategic emergency and need are being felt by both countries more particularly by the India. The response of the giant of South Asia is so cool that it is fast developing as East African country that has the Common Ocean and has a good influence over the trade route of India ranging from the Europe to the Gulf of Eden. Even though OIL and OVL that belongs to India have begun to make approaches to get a share of oil from Somalia, it has not yet succeeded in obtaining legal rights for exploration of oil. Here India has to have the oil firms' support to grab the legal rights to explore thereby enhancing the tie-ups while also showing much interest in the stability and peace of Somalian region and its government would get good amount of benefit both on the trading sector and economically.

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Geopolitics and Conflict Resolution between India and its Neighbours– A Case Study of China

S. Manivasakan

“War is the decision to go for victory than resolution. Peacemaking is an attempt to resolve the sources of conflict and restore a situation of balance, thereby eliminating the need for victory and defeat.”

– Jim Wallis. **The Soul of Politics: A Practical and Prophetic Vision of Change**, London: Fount, 1994, p205.

The results of war are so appalling that they raise a question everyone ought to ask- *Are such levels of suffering, imposed by human beings on each other, really necessary? Aren't there better ways of managing and resolving the differences between people, and groups of people, which bring about war and violent?*¹

Conflict has its own unique characteristics, and it is possible to analyse its structure and behaviour. When conflict is understood, it's easier to find ways to predict, prevent, transform, and resolve. Conflict is thus the expression of disagreement over something important to both (or all) sides of a dispute. The first important thing to grasp is that it is entirely dependent on the people involved. It depends on each individual point of view, which may or may not have independent facts and evidence to support it, and on how they react when they encounter an opposing point of view. The evolution of cold war has paved way for different types of conflicts: interethnic conflict, environmental degradation, piracy, transnational organized crime and HIV/Aids. Conflict in the post-cold war period, has focused primarily on “Human Security”. Conflicts mainly take place in failed states, failing states or States of Disorder.

The Conflict Resolution is a process of resolving a dispute or a conflict by meeting at least some of each side's needs and addressing their interests. Knowing how to manage and resolve conflict is essential for having a productive work life, and it is important for community and

family life as well. Conflict Resolution also known as dispute resolution, is a relatively new field, emerging after World War II. Scholars from the Program on Negotiation were leaders in establishing the field.²

Methods of Conflict Resolution

There are many methods of conflict resolution based on power, principle, cooperation, right and values. Some specific types of conflict-handling mechanisms such as: Coercion, Avoidance, Arbitration, Adjudication, Facilitation, Mediation and Negotiations.

Conflict Theories

Micro Theories of Conflict

Among the most important assumptions of the Behaviourist school are the beliefs that the root causes of war are in the human nature and human behaviour; and that an important relationship exists between intrapersonal conflict and conflict that pervades the external social order. The behaviourist school believes in the centrality of the stimulus - response hypothesis. This school seeks to establish whether humans possess either biological or psychological characteristics that would predispose us towards aggression and conflict.

Another important theory was the evolution of the Frustration-Aggression theory. The basic assumption of the Frustration-Aggression theory is that all aggression, whether interpersonal or international, has its roots in the frustration of one or more actors' goal achievement. That is to say that conflict can be traced to the unfulfilment of personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand for basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an actor's failure to obtain what it needs. The Frustration-Aggression theory rests on the basic stimulus-response hypothesis. The questions that this theory raise are: *Does all frustration lead automatically to aggression, and can all aggression and conflict be traced to some frustration?*

Thus, Behavioural or Micro theories are based on observations of an individual within their environment. They analyse the subconscious mind in order to establish motivational variables. Behavioural theories evolved from animal studies using comparison with human behaviour, to more sophisticated theories which examine the relationship between the individual and their group identities. While Behaviourism still assumes the centrality of the simple stimulus-response hypothesis, it

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has managed to create complex models of human behaviour such as the social learning and social identity theories. Social Identity Theory introduces important concepts that bridge the gap between individual and group behaviour. It also sheds light on minority-majority group relations. Consequently, the socialisation process, group comparisons, perceptions and positive identities are important concepts for conflict resolution.⁴

The micro theories have added an important dimension to our understanding of conflict. They put complex situations into workable models that stand up to an empirical analysis. They are a useful asset in our attempt to impose some objectivity in specific situations. Rather than wait for the nature-nurture debate to be resolved, if indeed it can be, it is better to combine both approaches in the development of a sophisticated explanatory model. Socialisation is an important concept, so are group comparisons, positive self and group identities and the perceived illegitimacy by minority communities. Once these issues are understood, explanations of aggressive behaviour become possible.

Macro Theories of Conflict

Macro theory focuses on the interaction of groups, specifically on the conscious level. Macro theorists would agree that power comes in many forms: economic, political, military and even cultural. The common assumptions of macro or classical theories are that the roots of conflict stem from group competition and the pursuit of power and resources. These assumptions operate on conscious motivational factors in a material oriented environment. Classical theory capitalises on observations of group phenomenon for single events in order to study the problem in depth, and to determine the importance and relationships of many variables rather than using few variables for many cases.

Decision making and game theories have their origins in the 20th century model of the rational actor. The rational actor model was developed by economists to explain human economic behaviour. It presupposes that people make choices and decisions on a rational basis based on informed choices and weighing of opportunities.⁵ Game theory is based on the rational actor model in that it relies on the assumption of a rational decision making process that is fundamental to the engagement of human conflict.

Within the macro theory there is an important set of concepts that can be derived from the study of ethnic conflict. This is of importance to India and Srilanka because the same concepts are applicable to the root cause of conflict. Whether one defines the conflict in Srilanka as

Ethnic (between Tamils and the Sinhalese) or as Territorial, it makes little theoretical difference as the conceptions for Ethnic and Territorial conflict operate in the same manner. What is important is that these groups of people have categorised themselves as distinct groups and they view each other as the out-group or enemy.

While such things as religion and economic deprivation may be important contributing factors to ethnic conflict, it is the opposition of national identities which define such conflict.

Geopolitics of India



Source: <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/india-and-the-south-asian-neighbourhood/>

Indian Neighbours and Vulnerable threats

Indian Regions/ Zones	Possible/ Vulnerable risks/ Threats
NE India	Insurgency Affected Areas
NW, Bangladesh	Islamic Terrorism
China, Pakistan	Nuclear Threat
China, Pakistan	Missile Threat
Orissa, Hyderabad, Patna, Parts of Nepal	Maoist Threat
Srilanka	Ethnicity/ Territorial

Source: Compiled from <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/india-and-the-south-asian-neighbourhood/>

Geopolitics and Conflict Resolution between India and its Neighbours–
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When we discuss India and her neighbours, we should have a clearer idea of what, in India's eyes, constitutes her neighborhood. Should we look at India's neighborhood strategically or geographically? If the first, then a case can be made out that India's neighborhood encompasses the entire region from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca. This is India's security parameter. Developments in this region have a major impact on India. On the western side, about 6 million Indians are employed in the Gulf, remitting to their home country annually over \$ 70 billion. This region is the largest supplier of oil and gas to India. This area is the heart of Islam that influences the ideologies emanating from here impacting on India's immediate external environment and indeed, to an extent, the domestic scene. In any case, had India not been partitioned in 1947, its western frontier would have extended to the Persian Gulf. In the East, India's possession of the Andaman and Nicobar islands stretches her frontiers to the other choke-point, the Malacca Strait. The Bay of Bengal has Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand as littoral states. Bangladesh and Myanmar have been categorized as failing states which have failed the basic conditions of a state and have shown loss of control and the inability to interact with neighbours. The stretch of the sea is the link to South East Asia and beyond and for buttressing India's 'Look East' policy, this area is of vital importance. Apart from India forging bilateral ties with these countries, the security of the sea lanes of communication in an area where the only regional blue water navy is Indian, devolves some special responsibilities on India.

If geography alone were to determine India's neighbours, then Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives constitute the core of her neighborhood. Myanmar is a contiguous neighbour but as India has been conditioned over the years to view essentially the SAARC countries as her neighbours. Hence from the Indian view, Myanmar has lost sight, despite its critical geographical location adjacent to the north-eastern region of the country and gateway to ASEAN. At present, Afghanistan may not be a direct geographic neighbour. However, given the fact that Pakistan's occupation of the northern areas in Jammu and Kashmir is regarded by India as illegal, but it can be treated as one. In any case, with the inclusion of Afghanistan as a full member of SAARC, the political case for treating Afghanistan as an integral part of India's neighborhood stands reinforced. China's occupation of Tibet, the former has become India's direct neighbour. The unresolved border dispute between India and China constitutes a major Indian foreign policy problem, colouring her relationship with the world's foremost rising power⁶. Moreover, in India's perception, China has adversely influenced

India's relations with its South Asian neighbours. China, therefore, qualifies as India's most formidable neighbour, affecting India's role not only in the South Asian region, but in Asia as a whole and even at the global level.

Even as there is awareness about a truly democratic system in Pakistan that limits the power of both the armed forces and extremist groups would be beneficial to India-Pakistan ties, India has not sought to interfere in Pakistan's internal politics. On the contrary, India has willingly done serious business with Pakistan's military regimes, especially during the regime of General Musharraf. Similarly in Bangladesh, India has never rejected serious engagement with their military regimes. In the case of Myanmar, even at the cost of earning some diplomatic flak, India has sought to build close ties with it irrespective of the country's regime for reasons of overriding national interest. For India this is practical politics, shorn of the hypocrisy of those who promote democracy selectively and at lowest political and business cost to themselves. While on the negative hand, Pakistan is in no mood to resolve the Kashmir issue.⁷

India's foreign policies are affected seriously by Nepal. This is the only Hindu country of the world which is facing lot of challenges. About 17000 lives were lost in an armed revolt by the Maoist political party in 1996. The economy was badly hit after the fall of the monarch.

In such situation, what are the steps need to be taken by India? How can India help Nepal in resolving the problems faced due to Maoists? India has an uncertain path ahead till the time the problems of her neighbouring countries are not resolved. ⁸India should be vigilant and should take a close look at the situation and conduct an in depth analysis of the situation on a continuous basis.

The military expansion of China and its encroachment of both on Indian lands is troublesome. India should first try to gain control over these issues and then think of helping any other nation. The management of relations with neighbours is always a declared priority in any country's foreign policy. The assumption is that a stable neighbourhood strengthens a country's foreign policy posture, whereas an unstable and troubled neighbourhood saps its ability to act effectively on the international stage. The credibility of a country's regional and global posture, is believed and also undermined if it is seen as embroiled in disputes and conflicts with neighbours. The accepted view is that the time and energy spent in controlling events in the immediate neighbourhood is at the cost of pursuing wider interests at the regional

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and global level. Sections of Indian public opinion are acutely conscious of India's failure to stabilise her own neighbourhood. It is argued that India as the biggest country in the region has the primary responsibility for managing the regional environment.⁹ Often India is criticised for not being sufficiently generous to her neighbours, of hesitating to make unilateral concessions to them, which it is believed that she can well afford it. Such concessions are advocated especially on the economic side, the argument being that India as a huge economy can easily absorb the limited sacrifice that is expected of it and in the process which can attach the neighbouring economies to itself in a mutually beneficial manner. The stakes which develop because of this interdependence would theoretically make it difficult for other governments to pursue adversarial policies beyond a certain point. Poor border management, failure to create proper border posts and customs infrastructure is viewed as another example of insensitivity to the need to facilitate relations with neighbours.

China - A Case Study

Sino-Indian relations make for a compelling case study, as their strategic complexity and future importance defy any easy explanation. Over two thousand years ago, Kautilya, propounded that because of the clash of interests, a large and powerful state on the border becomes a **“natural enemy”**.¹⁰ The above statement explains the India- China relation in simple words. The India-China relationship dates back to two thousands year ago. The initial period of their relationship was based on friendship, trust and mutual respect for each other. The countries have shared and passed culture, language and religion. According to B.M. Jain, “The Flowered relations between India and China had faded and withered the mutual hostility following the 1962 war.” In the Asian Continent, India and China are demographically and geographically large in size. The relationship between India and China has been complicated by issues such as the McMahon line, the Tibetan issue and the 1962 war. The relationship straddles the entire breadth of geopolitical possibility, encompassing points of conflict and cooperation in the military and economic spheres, territorial and resource disputes, dissonant domestic political systems, and perhaps most importantly: the unprecedented opportunity for two of the greatest development success stories in human history to shape the world in the 21st century.

Some of the disputes in the past and in the present have strained the Sino-Indian relations, such as the unresolved border issues in the Himalayas (both in Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir) seem to have

complicated the relationship. The two sides fought a war over one of the disputed areas in 1962, which ended in a humiliating Indian defeat, and though there have been scattered diplomatic flare-ups and unauthorized excursions since then, no more shots have been exchanged. In 2006, a Chinese envoy incited widespread outrage throughout India when he declared that the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to China. The most recent rhetorical snipes occurred in 2013, when Chinese army entered into Daulat Beg Oldi of Laddakh sector.

A resolution is likely to remain elusive due to the strong historical case to be made on both sides, as well as the inherent strategic value of the territory in question. From a military point of view, the state in control of the disputed territory bordering Arunachal Pradesh possesses a valuable launching pad for military strikes, while the other side is left with the logistical headache of having to traverse the Himalayas in order to reach population centers on the other side of the border.¹¹ Moreover, and perhaps more salient to the realities of 21st-century warfare, the area can serve as a conduit for destabilizing the domestic politics of the opposing side, whether by supplying rebels in India's northeast or by inciting revolt in China's Tibet Autonomous Region.

The disputed area also has an important environmental dimension, one that could come to impact the strategic balance between India and China as water scarcity becomes more pronounced in the future. The Tibetan plateau feeds the Brahmaputra River, which flows through Assam before it meets the Ganges in Bangladesh and ends at the Bay of Bengal. China is building a dam at the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, and has recently approved the construction of three additional dams as part of their 12th Five-year Plan.¹² Though these dams are firmly in Chinese territory, the Chinese authorities have offered every assurance that they would not impact the downstream flow of the Brahmaputra. The Indian officials are still nervous, and Indian Prime Minister had brought up the matter explicitly during his last Beijing visit of October 2013.

Conflict Resolution for coordination between India and China has become operational in 2012. The major objective of its forum was to mitigate the risk of military development especially along the border. Border negotiations between the two sides may likely be remained fixed on a road to nowhere. India would risk confrontation by propelling its influence into China's strategic backyard especially when one examines China's Indian Ocean Policy, which could have been called 'Look West' if it wasn't already known as the 'String of Pearls.' Beijing has long

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sought to establish a series of naval outposts in the Indian Ocean, with the presumed aim of keeping the Indian Navy from consolidating its influence over its own strategic backyard. On the economic front, Sino-Indian relations are a success story. Although bilateral trade has witnessed impressive growth, some politicians in India have been voicing worries about their country's widening trade deficit with China.¹³ Efforts to alleviate this deficit, in the form of opening up IT and Pharmaceutical industries have not produced the desired results.

Both India and China are members of BRICS countries, which recently took a step towards relevance by announcing the establishment of a BRICS development. But China has not been very accommodative in India's quest to secure permanent membership in UN Security Council. Despite lingering differences, it appears that the forces of attraction will win out over conflict in Sino-Indian relations. Perhaps an old sign at one of the Himalayan border crossing puts it best: China and India, two old civilizations developing hand-in-hand.

As the two largest developing countries in the world, and a combination of two-fifths of the world's population, India and China's bilateral relationship stands to shape Asian politics and the fight against various transnational threats ranging from pandemics to terrorism to global warming. The growing Chinese market has provided opportunities which cannot be ignored by several governments and their corporations. A seed of shared leadership on some of these matters seems to coexist. India and China are the two nations that will have a powerful role to play in the upcoming era and be global players this has been indicated by the recent trajectories of the two states.¹² China aims at expanding its powers over the Asian region and obtains the position of an Asian Leader in the future and its one of the major foreign policies. The rise of China in the contemporary period has regional and international implications. The Indian value system has been the bases of eminence and continued survival. India will be hurt by any efforts to change or modify this value system. The essence of India is its culture and this fact should be borne in the minds of the western civilization while networking with India. India has gained a stage of honor in the world economics. The need of the hour for India is to politically stabilize the country to sustain its position in the world. But it is also a fact that India faces threats from almost all her neighbouring countries.

The Chinese move will affect India and its strategies to a great extent. The main motive of China is to expand its power all over the world. This expansion rampage can be well understood from its move into the Indian Ocean where it has built ports in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar

and Sri Lanka. China is a strong competitor of India for the energy resources present in Middle East nations.¹⁴ This is viewed as an alarm for not only India but also for the entire world. The strategies of China have been a major concern for the entire world. The policies and the ideologies of China are based on the country's history and legacy of communism. The Communist China is politically closed along with a working open economic system. In the years ahead, China will be the biggest strategic challenge to India. Although the relationship between India and China are constrained, there are several attempts made by the government officials from both the countries to smoothen the relationship.

India has been sensitive in handling the issue of democracy in her neighborhood. Even as the western democracies seek to impose democratic values on others and use instruments of moral reprobation and boycotts to coerce select non-democratic countries to reform their political systems, India has abjured such thinking.¹⁵ The basic approach of India is to do business with the ruling governments in power.

In actual fact, most countries have very problematic relations with their neighbours and yet many are not held back. Historically, Britain rose to global power status despite ceaseless conflicts with its neighbours. France became a world power inspite of being embroiled in wars with her neighbours. China has huge problems with her neighbours, without affecting its inexorable rise today as a global power. Turkey has problems with virtually all her neighbours but this does not materially affect its rise to regional power status.¹⁶ It is therefore, open to questions whether a stable neighbourhood is a pre-requisite for a country's rise to regional or global status. There are many other factors at play that allow countries to rise and flourish even if their neighbourhood is not peaceful.

Since the end of the cold war, the Sino-Indian relations have not only steadily improved but also have strengthened in diverse fields of mutual interest. The diplomatic meetings between New Delhi and Beijing trace back to 1988 during the period of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The relation has been shaped under the rule of eminent Rulers from both the countries. In the present scenario, India and China are now slowly but steadily stepping up military engagement, in the year of 2014 the countries will exchange visits by their defence ministers, to hold a "senior-level exchange" to discuss on practical measures for management of border issues and conduct joint army exercise.¹⁷

While in theory the need to have a peaceful, stable and friendly

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neighbourhood may appear self-evident. The Conflict Resolutions like negotiations and the extent to which we can make concession will play a great role in balancing India's relation with her neighbours. In Indian context, expecting for reciprocity from our neighbours will also play a crucial role in deciding the strategy and the methods of conflict resolution between India and her neighbours. The emerging trends indicate that both India and China would remain highly competitive in the global and regional trade and economic domain, and would continue to compete for status and influence in the Asian region in general, and in South Asia in particular.¹⁸ A comprehensive understanding can be developed between the two countries through foreign, economical, cultural diplomacy and strategic cooperation that benefit the countries interest, utilization of natural resources and act as a tool to promote regional peace and stability, keeping aside their differences.

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SLOCs and the Imminent Challenge for India

Utham Kumar Jamdagni

India as a principally sea trading economy, has a vital concern in the protection of the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). Although there is ample discussion on the approach towards the securing of SLOCs, especially on the protector and manner of protection, this article argues that States should be the primary actor in the protection of SLOCs. These SLOCs can be in their sovereign territory, as well those that are of a strategic interest to the State in an extra-territorial region, should the States in that region not ensure the safe passage of vessels through that region.

The security of SLOCs is of primary importance to a State, and it needs to address the gaps that are present in the protection of SLOCs. This would not only ensure that growth continues, but also to ensure that India's interests, both to present itself as a viable destination of investment, and to become a regional and possibly a global power, are guaranteed and not a distant dream.

The principal pitfall is the policy approach which propels "land centric" defence to the fore. The primary need then is to refocus our attention on the vulnerable seas. At the outset, it would seem that the best way to do this would be through the cooperation with other countries, especially those who are more capable of securing their maritime interests. This article would try to look at this by first trying to understand why SLOCs and its protection require a great deal of importance. It would then focus on the important aspects that India must look into and recommend solutions based on the varying ideas of the imperatives with the influences of knowledge gained.

Importance of SLOCs

The idea of an Asian Century however enticing to a rising power like India still holds some unfulfilled goals for this vast nation. Thus there is a requirement to locate the significance of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in this context.

As propellers of economic growth in most modern economies, SLOCs find a major role in the nation's over all development matrix.¹ For India, more than 90% of all trade is sea-bound. The primary need to ensure the security of the SLOCs can thus be realised.

To compound the importance of the SLOCs, it must be remembered that India imports 70%² of its oil requirement through the sea. This is a staggering amount. Any disruption in the flow of oil is a major concern to any of the emerging economies in Asia, as is very well the case of India.

This is one aspect of why SLOCs are important. The other aspect is that the protection of SLOCs requires a comprehensive approach towards maritime security, and hence improving the overall maritime security apparatus. Also, the improvement of the maritime security of a country requires an improvement in the internal security and stability of the country.

The internal security of a country needs to be strong to ensure that the instability and the lack of a strong security apparatus does not give the power to rouge groups to terrorize and hold to ransom the seas surrounding a country. Also, a weak security situation would mean decreased confidence in making economic investments that would directly affect growth of a country.

For all these purposes, securing the SLOCs can be seen to be of vital concern to States and hence was understood to be the best starting place to see how India should cope up with the challenges.

Indian Approach

India is not an island nation, and it has historically been bothered only about the invasions over land, primarily through the North-western region. Invasion through the sea however, took place only once, during the colonization of India. This kind of representation of a 'pan-Indian' history as largely land related may allow one to have a justification of the lack of influence of maritime affairs over strategic affairs of India. However, there is ample evidence to suggest a rich and vibrant maritime history for India. Post independent India has itself to depend on to take care of the security of its maritime interests whether these interest are either in our immediate waters, or in extra-territorial waters.

Nonetheless, India's understanding of the importance of the seas is quite ambivalent with the priority in defence expenditure going to the Army.³ Also, while India does feel that the Navy is important, it also

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feels that it isn't as important as the other forces. Even though one may cite the short history of the State in this regard, one cannot forget that the State's prosperity and capability to upgrade the other forces rests heavily in the security of the seas and the trade that takes place on it.

As far as India is concerned, the security of the maritime environment primarily rests with the Indian Navy. This task is carried out by personnel of around 55,000 equipped with 171 ships including 16 submarines and 241 aircraft. This large force is the primary body in charge of the security of the 2.3 million square kilometres EEZ. However, in relation to India's aspirations of a regional and global power, the capabilities of this number are less than required.

It's easy to say that India takes its Navy for granted. While, recognizing the importance of trade, and the volume of trade that is conducted through the sea, only 15% of the defence budget is spent on the Navy.⁴ It is just a drop in the ocean given the changing power architecture of Asia.

India also has plans for technological and equipment upgrades, however, these are not always followed up by time bound practices to induct the best and the latest. This lacklustre planning is also reflected in the number of ministries and departments that are put in charge of securing the maritime environment. While this may mean the maximum coverage of the largest range of subjects under maritime security, it also results in duplication of tasks and resources as there is no central coordinating agency.

India has never shied away from her aspirations of becoming a global leader, and has always expressed this desire at all platforms available. Nonetheless, the definition of a global power is still to be defined or clearly understood with its gamut of components including economic, strategic and cultural.

Military power and capability to secure this is extremely important. India should be capable of securing its economic interests. Military security is important because, as Barry Buzan puts it, "state and its society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure."⁵

So what should be India's future action? India would have to develop and improve its naval technology and capabilities to ensure a three dimensional security of the seas around India and follow this up with bases around the IOR region to ensure security of the IOR region on

the whole to ensure that the protection of SLOCs can be ensured through its own capability or through the closest available resources.

Also, India could follow up on its current interest in cooperating with other countries to ensure maritime security. In other words, countries should be enticed to be made willing to assist in securing the area.

All these steps would allow for India to behave like a regional power and in the future, act like a global power. And should India wish to be regarded as a strong, hard power, or a soft power with a strong hand in ensuring security of the region the capability to project power is a must for India to add these tags to her name.

Furthermore, cooperation allows for new avenues where the mission of securing India's maritime interests is covered in terms of agreements, ties, management of resources, enhanced trade etc. And at the same time, should cooperation fail, India retains the ability to take command of the situation in its favour; while ensuring that current deficiencies like the lack of the equipment to monitor our seas and deter any attempts at opportunism, the presence of some equipment but lack of will to assert ourselves and the lack of a security partner can all be mitigated.

This would mean that, India would need to strengthen its Navy not just in the field of modernizing equipment but also in the approach to problems and challenges. This in effect requires us to look at what India's strategic culture, and needs to influence and change this strategic culture which as of now is grossly sea-blind.

Increase in the spending in the maritime areas means that India spends more of the defence budget on the Navy, it would also allow for the setting up of structures to bridge the gaps in the defence structure. Also, it would assist in the induction of new equipment without delays while also creating the possibilities to make incentives for the merchant fleets to cooperate with defence structures and protocol to ensure safety of those on board and the State as such. The now often occurring accidents on board naval ships and submarines are warnings for revamping an ageing fleet and the dire need for refurbishment⁶.

Technology acquisition would incorporate not only the several weapon systems, but also technology for surveillance as well as the capability to develop technology that is as yet unavailable. This acquisition of new weapon systems, if handled right, would not send out wrong signals of an arms race. India's military acquisitions are as yet not threatening signals⁷.

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An assertive nature and approach to India's maritime security and its trading lines would allow for greater trust in the region on India's capabilities and an assurance to global trade of the safety of the IOR region both on the seas and the ports. This assertive nature can be augmented through the creation of the security initiatives like the CSI or Container Security Initiative⁸.

Also, assertiveness requires that India assist all cargo ships that request for assistance/help at any time, even if this may seem uneconomical currently. This assertive nature may be easily reflected when, coupled with tracking and surveillance technology, ships are stopped when they deviate from standard operating behaviour.

Concluding Remarks

Threats that affect India's maritime interests and its SLOCs are emerging. India or any other country cannot wait for threats to escalate to acquire mechanisms to counter them. Proactive measures with long term planning should be a core part of how resources are spent. India should also prepare for scenarios instead of creating solutions after they happen. Thus a complete overhaul of the approach to maritime security, earmarking additional resources to spruce up the maritime defence structure and adoption of an assertive and almost pre-emptive strategy to expect greater challenges and to appropriately prepare for them would ensure safety of the lifelines of India's growth and propel the country to greater prosperity.

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Deconstructing China's Afghan Strategy: Explicit Goals and Implicit Actions

Shazia Shaikh

Abstract: China is cautiously and yet prudently pursuing its interest in Afghanistan. Despite coming into limelight, China has maneuvered to maintain strategic ties with Afghanistan. Geopolitics also attracted China to Afghanistan to make an imprint in Central Asia. However, escalating separatism in Xinjiang and its connection with growing extremism and militancy in Af-Pak region has worried China. Nevertheless, Sino-Pakistan strategic liaison has benefited former to address its predicaments in Afghanistan and to maintain ties with major stakeholders in the country. As United States has decided to drawdown its forces, China is eagerly looking to stabilize Afghanistan through its protégé Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Keywords: Afghanistan, China, Strategy, Geopolitics, Xinjiang, Af-Pak, SCO

Introduction

Sino-Afghan ties have always remained cordial in the absence of any strategic tensions between these two countries. It is Xinjiang province of China which shares disproportionate boundary with Afghanistan and due to which they had never experienced border tensions at bilateral level. China has very explicit and limited objectives in Afghanistan and it has customarily relied upon its closed partner Pakistan to realize its specific maneuvers in Afghanistan. This illustrates rationale of China's less than proportionate presence in Afghanistan. Ever since American militarily intervention in Afghanistan, China has sought to confine its involvement there, but continues to pursue its strategic gain in Afghanistan. Given China's non-interventionist policy, China had never openly supported America's military involvement in Afghanistan. Secondly, an American military base in Afghanistan and in the Central Asia closed to China was perceived as major security threat by China. Thirdly, China did not have any confrontation with Taliban. But despite

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these intricate challenges, China had welcomed western alliance next to the country to counter the rise of Islamic militancy in Xinjiang and in the neighboring Central Asia. According to China, resolving Islamic menace in Afghanistan is vital to regional security in general and to overcome its own security dilemma.¹

America's withdrawal from Afghanistan has intensified China's apprehension and concomitantly, China had promised to increase its commitment towards Afghanistan which includes trade, economic cooperation, diplomacy and training Afghan National Security Forces. China's total reconstruction aid cost 900 million dollar. Though it is less significant than US and India but in doing so China obviate itself from inviting Taliban hostility. China has invested million dollar mining project at Aynak in south east Afghanistan to gain the confidence of Taliban. China has set implicit strategy of establishing rapport with the dominant section of Afghanistan given the increasing possibility of regime change.² Recently, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi had visited Afghanistan and openly urge for resolving security menace in Afghanistan, which could possibly produce spillover effects on China's Xinjiang region.³ In fact, Chinese President Xi Jinping had agreed to extend its support to Afghanistan to fight against terrorism. China perceives regional solution of Afghanistan and hence wants to capitalize the involvement of SCO.⁴

Energy interest

Stability of Afghanistan is very vital to China's growing energy cooperation with Central Asian States. For China, Central Asian energy resources are strategically significant for the fulfillment of its policy of diversification of oil and gas, in the present context of increasing domestic demands of energy imports. In order to dodge its predicament over excessive reliance on Malacca strait, China wants to divert its energy transport from Central Asia and Russia. China has already place oil and gas pipelines in Kazakhstan and further exploring oil and gas of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan etc. In addition to this, China has huge commercial investment in Central Asia. But changing geopolitical scenario in post 9/11 order had added security trouble to China's established interest in region. America's prolong stay in Afghanistan and its bases in Central Asian states have provided major setback to China's influence in the region.⁵

Central Asian States primarily shares boundary with China's Xinjiang region. Though this region is integral part of China but it is

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geographically secluded, due to which it remained underdeveloped. Therefore, China has the vision of connecting it with resources rich countries of Central Asia and consequently, makes Xinjiang as a transit route of importing energy from Central Asia to Asia-Europe routes. In nutshell, China has a long term strategy of forming convergence between Xinjiang and Modern Silk routes. Hence, China can also subdue rising extremism in this province due to its protracted backwardness.⁶ However, Islamic fundamentalism operating from Af-Pak region persistently checkmates China's entrenched energy interest. As a result of this, China is determined to rule out extremism emanating from Afghanistan and to restore stability there. China also perceives Afghanistan geopolitically important to reach out to Central Asia. To explore this, China has undertaken proposed project of building railway lines to connect it with Uzbekistan via Kabul and Aynak. China has committed \$4 billion investment in copper mining project at Aynak, which could possibly generate job opportunities for local Afghans.⁷

East Turkestan Movement in Xinjiang

China is wary of growing liaison between Islamic Movement of East Turkestan and Al-Qaeda along with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan based in Central Asia. America's war against Taliban-Al-Qaeda nexus had successfully ended in overthrowing them from Afghanistan. Consequently, China in return supported American cause to raise the attention of international community to its home grown Jihadi group i.e. East Turkestan Movement in Xinjiang and to contain the activities of these Movement, which has been raising the slogan of Self-determination for Uyghur Muslims. However, in course of time, Al-Qaeda-Taliban soon found sanctuary in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in northern Pakistan. From there, they have been giving operational training to these Jihadi groups' endeavors to form separate Islamic State in Xinjiang and Central Asia. These has augmented separatist tendency internally and externally, these has incited shadow of suspicion over China's energy interest in Central Asian region.⁸

The demand for East Turkestan dates back to 1962 when thousands of Uyghur Muslims escaped to Soviet Kazakh republic. However, China had subdued it as a domestic conflict and in doing so; China had cautiously dissuade this issue from global attention. This was the reason of China never officially recorded any outbreak of violence resulting from Uyghur Separatism in the country. It was only after 9/11, China has been persistently pointing at three evils of 'Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism' as a major threat to the domestic and regional security.

Due to this, America had also categorized ETIM as a terrorist group. However, this organization has made affiliation with Al-Qaeda, whom at present has emerged as a global leader of Jihadi group across the countries. Eventually this has raised China's trouble of growing waves of separatism in Xinjiang. In 2009, ethnic clashes between Uyghur Muslims and Chinese Han people received worldwide coverage.⁹ Recently, major terrorist attack hits Kuming Railway station in southwest China. Chinese officials considered Xinjiang terrorists to be behind this attack and in fact, Xinhua news agency, the official media, has termed it China's "9-11".¹⁰ This underscores China's falling prey to escalating terrorism in the region and concomitantly, it could be conceived as a peril sign for territorial integrity of China.

Sino-Pak Grand Strategy

China's limited presence in Afghanistan is due to the strategic Sino-Pak nexus, which has been formed ever since 1962 Sino-India war. Despite security challenges in Af-Pak region, China has hugely invested in both the countries. In doing so, China wants to contain the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and increasing bonhomie between Indo-US alliances. China is clandestinely boosting Pakistan's military capacities vis-à-vis India. Though China shares boundary with Afghanistan, but it is less than 100 kilometers and plus, geographical barriers. Therefore, China has been relying on geopolitical and geo strategic attributes of Pakistan to fulfill its objectives in Afghanistan. Foreign intervention in the Soviet era and United States has established legitimate influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Hence, China has been maintaining ties with Afghan authorities via Pakistan. In fact, China had also persuaded Taliban regime not to back Uyghur separatists on Afghan soil. Taliban had good terms with China during their brief phase of rule.¹¹

However, China has switched off its support to USA against Taliban-Al-Qaeda nexus in Afghanistan to wipe out growing extremism in Xinjiang. Despite this, China did not experience any hostility from Islamic fundamentalist groups as long as it has made mutual understanding with Pakistan. But China started facing major trouble when Pakistan army began losing its control over FATA to the Jihadist groups. Unfortunately, these Jihadi networks have been escalated in Sino-Pak border i.e. Karakoram Highway. There have been reported cases of Chinese engineers and workers being targeted in Afghanistan and Pakistan allegedly by Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. To reverse this trend, China had established rapport with some of the influential Islamist parties such as MQM and Jamaat e Islami etc. in Pakistan. China also

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invokes legitimate role of Taliban in post-2014 Afghanistan considering their resurgence in Af-Pak.¹²

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

As United States is withdrawing from Afghanistan, China is endeavoring to capitalize on the involvement of SCO in resolving Afghan situation, instead of taking bilateral initiatives. The main purpose of this organization is to remove bottlenecks in the way of growing cooperation between China and Central Asian States along with Russia. However, member countries of SCO had always incorporated Afghanistan issue to address their unanimous contention over spillover effects of international terrorism on their countries. Afghanistan has also acquired Observer status in SCO. In 2005, SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was officially formed. In March 2009, SCO has convened special conference on Afghanistan. Apart from original members, this conference was attended by delegates from US, UK etc. and representatives from U.N. and NATO etc. In this, SCO has emphasized over peaceful solution of Afghan conflicts, training its security forces and increasing investment there.¹³

SCO is extremely concern over current developments in Afghanistan as most of the members' shares direct boundary with it including China. Most importantly, they have adopted cautious approach towards Taliban and other Islamist groups in Afghanistan to establish rapprochement with them in post 2014 scenario. SCO does not want to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan due to this approach. However, it wants to enhance its investment in socio-economic fields such as infrastructure and economic development of Afghanistan to stabilize the country against this odd situation.¹⁴

Concluding Remarks

China has limited, but crucial stakes in Afghanistan and therefore, has adopted cautious Afghan strategy. China is highly worried over post 2014 developments in Afghanistan. But China mainly believes that successful Afghan transition can be possible only when there is a sync between the strategy of regional and global powers in Afghanistan. China Afghanistan policy is tilted towards Pakistan policy with an iota of divergences. Containing Indian influence in Afghanistan is common interest of both Pakistan and China.

In recent months violence has escalated in Xinjing resulted into many deaths and that has alarmed China. Growing Unrest in this restive

province connecting Pakistan and Central Asia will be a great set back for Chinese grand plans. It is in everyone's interest to secure the region free of toxic terrorist elements, which emanates from Af-Pak. Hence, China stresses upon regional solution of Afghanistan conflict, instead of assuming major commitment at bilateral level, to resolve its strategic dilemma.

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China-Pakistan Bonhomie: Implications for India

Sudhir Singh

Abstract: Pakistan-China relations are bound to sustain due to convergences of interests. India factor is cementing both countries. In the backdrop of post 2014, NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistani options are also shrinking. This relationship is going to sustainable because India is growing.

Keywords: Afghanistan, NATO, USA, China, India

China-Pakistan relations have been smooth minus first decade of its existence. In 1951, formal diplomatic relations were established between Pakistan and China. Pakistan was the first Muslim and third non-communist country to establish diplomatic relations with China.¹ The Bandung conference in 1955 provided the first proper opportunity to the leadership of the both countries to interact.² Both countries then went through a rough patch. According to a recent study, in 1959, General Ayub was shown a Chinese map which showed a large Pakistani area as Chinese territory.³ It further states that in September 1959, a few minor border skirmishes also took place between Pakistan and China in the Hunza border area. This was the reason behind Ayub Khan's offer of joint defense to Nehru as by that time, both China and India were out of the romanticism of *Punj Shela* and *Hind-Chiney bhai-bhai*. Nehru, however, shrugged off the joint Ayub's defense pact offer by stating: *against whom?*

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan voted for a resolution condemning Chinese excesses in Tibet.⁴ However, the relationship soon took a different turn, a development which resulted in the establishment of one of the most unique bilateral relationship in international history.

The deterioration of India-China relations which eventually resulted in a border war between the two and American over all support to India brought Pakistan and China together. But these positive Pakistani gestures for a structural relationship with India were lost due to Nehru's

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utter negligence and lack of knowledge about the geopolitical importance of Tibet.

After that, both countries have placed considerable importance on the maintenance of an extremely close and supportive relationship.⁵ Since then, the two countries have regularly exchanged high-level visits resulting in a variety of agreements. The PRC has provided economic, military and technical assistance to Pakistan and each considers the other a close strategic ally.⁵

During Ayub military rule (1958-1967) Z.A. Bhutto became Foreign Minister and after 1971 he became PM. His tenure as the foreign minister of Pakistan during the Ayub era, Pakistan-China relations came on solid footings. Bhutto was a student of Socialism and regularly donned a Mao cap which became his signature cap.

During this phase of the bilateral relationship, both countries were supportive of each other.⁶ Bilateral relations have evolved from an initial Chinese policy of neutrality to a partnership that links a smaller but militarily powerful Pakistan, partially dependent on China for its economic and military strength, with China attempting to balance competing interests in the region. China has become Pakistan's largest supplier of arms and its third-largest trading partner. Both nations have also extended their cooperation to improving Pakistan's civil nuclear power sector.

Post 9/11 September Scenario

In the aftermath of the tragic events of the 9/11, Pakistan took a U turn in its Afghanistan policy and sided with the American in the WoT. Despite becoming a frontline state in the still on-going global war against terror and a non-NATO ally, Pakistan's relations with China remained strong and expanded even further. The leadership of both countries exchanged a number of high powered visits since 2000-2001 and a number of important agreements were inked. USA, often ignoring its track record of abandoning Pakistan, most recently after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan was left alone to deal with its effects, questioned why its aid, support and help is not acknowledged by Pakistani people the way they acknowledge the Chinese help and support? One of the most important visits by President Musharraf to China took place in February 2006. During this visit, Pakistan and China signed an agreement, to "build co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear power."⁷

Chinese President Hu visited Pakistan in November 2006 and since then it has almost become a convention that after visiting New Delhi, Chinese leaders will visit Islamabad. It happened in May 2013 as well when new Chinese PM Li visited Islamabad after New Delhi. Since a long time it has also become a tradition that new Pakistani PM/President's maiden abroad destination is Beijing. All these high profile visits have further cemented bilateral relations based on hard calculations of realism.

Since 2001 'Operation Enduring Freedom' is on in Afghanistan by NATO forces which is all set to withdraw by the end of 2014. During this period the United States poured \$ 20 billion to Pakistan. In May 2011, Osama Bin Laden was killed at Abbotabad and this has revealed the secret that he was under military protection. These incidents have aroused anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Needless to say that it has lifted the curtains from the reality. According to Pew Research Centre in 2013, Pakistanis have the most favorable view of China after China itself. Maintaining close relations with China is a central part of Pakistan's foreign policy. China supported Pakistan's opposition to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan and is perceived by Pakistan as a regional counterweight to NATO and the United States. China and Pakistan also share close military relations, with China supplying a range of modern armaments to the Pakistani defense forces. China supports Pakistan's stance on Kashmir while Pakistan supports China on the core issues of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan. Military cooperation has deepened with joint projects producing armaments ranging from fighter jets to guided missile frigates.

Chinese cooperation with Pakistan has reached economic high points, with substantial Chinese investment in Pakistani infrastructural expansion including the Pakistani deep-water port at Gwadar. Both countries have an ongoing free trade agreement. Pakistan has served as China's main bridge between Muslim countries. Pakistan also played an important role in bridging the communication gap between China and the West by facilitating the secret visit of secretary Kissinger and followed by 1972 Nixon visit to China.⁸

Economic & Defense Cooperation

Pakistan and China are collaborating in a number of sectors especially defense, trade and developmental and energy sector. Since 1960s, China has been the most important supplier of military goods to Pakistan. The JF-17 Thunder is the hall mark of this defense cooperation. Other

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than that both countries have collaborated in establishing munitions factories, China has provided technical assistance in improving and modernizing existing facilities. Both countries have also cooperated in a nuclear energy sector and have organized joint military exercises and officers from both countries attend courses at military institutions. Despite global concern about the safety of the nuclear arsenals, China has sustained its support to Pakistan even ignoring international requirements.

Economic trade between Pakistan and China are increasing at a rapid pace and a free trade agreement has been signed. China has also pointed that it will increase its investments in Pakistan and is currently investing in various projects related to development of infrastructure.

Such as power plants, building of roads, gold and copper mines, electricity and power and nuclear plants. From 2007 to 2010, the Chinese investment was expected to increase from \$ 4 billion to \$ 15. During his first Chinese visit after May 2013 election, PM , Nawaz Sharif brought Baluchistan CM also and inked many deals about the development of Kashgar-Gwadar corridor. Expansion of Karakoram Highway was also included in these agreements.

Conflict Zone

However, there are a number of issues which require immediate attention to avoid any further complication for the relationship prime amongst them is the issue of ETIM and its terrorist activities in Xinjiang area. There is a view, held by a number of Pakistan and China watchers that China is concerned about Chinese Uighur separatists finding a safe heaven in Pakistan's tribal areas. On July 18, 2011, a series of bomb blasts and knife attacks happened in Hotan, Xinjiang. The Muslim militants accepted the responsibility for these attacks. Chinese officials pointed out that these militants were trained in the Pakistani tribal areas. Islamabad and Beijing are already working closely but China has apprehensions about Pakistan's motives. In recent years violence has escalated in Xinjiang resulted into over 100 deaths and that has alarmed China. Growing Unrest in this restive province connecting Pakistan and Central Asia will be a great set back for Chinese grand plans to be an important power to reckon with in Central Asia. Chinese are worried about post 2014 scenario only due to its concern about Xinjiang.

Concluding Remarks

The relations between Pakistan and China have been described by Pakistan's ambassador to China as higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey, and so on.

In Afghanistan also Chinese are playing their game with Pakistan. They know very well that Pakistan is part of the problem in Afghanistan and not the part of the solution even though they are participating on Pakistani script merely to contain growing Indian influence in Afghanistan.

During Kargil conflict (1999) Pakistan took a neutral stand and advised visiting Pakistani PM and COAS to resolve the issue bilateral. But since 2000 United States –India relations has gone up many rounds and that has make China upset. The growing U.S-India bonhomie has pushed China to use Pakistan as the fulcrum of its South Asia policy. Indian might also grow in the larger context of Asian security architecture. Pakistan has no option because in the backdrop of laden killing trust deficit is prevailing with USA. In sum growing Indian power has also increased the geo strategic importance of Pakistan in Chinese perspectives. But at the same time the Chinese are concerned that India should not tilt entirely towards the USA therefore some time they are taking neutral posture and some time hawkish. This mixed signal will be order of the day of the Chinese foreign policy towards South Asia in foreseeable future also. It is kind of prisoner's Dilemma situation for China. India must reformulate its strategy to cope with this situation. The importance of Pakistan therefore for the Chinese will be sustainable in foreseeable future too because India is growing in various directions.

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The Changing Dimensions of Security and the International Response towards the Tibetan Problem

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Abstract: In the classical formulation, security is about how nation states use force to manage threats to their territorial integrity, their autonomy, and their domestic political order. This classical national security formulation has been criticized on various grounds. A nation may be secure but does not mean that all people living in that nation are secure. The social, economic and political orders prevalent in that nation have an implication on the security of the people. The development in the field of ICT and the rise of global civil society organizations strengthened the informal interaction between people living in different nations. In this context it appears that the Tibetan peoples six decade old peaceful struggle for right to self-determination get the support of global civil society organizations. The increased involvement of global civil society organizations in support human security issues appears to provide a new impetus to the Tibetan struggle for right to self-determination.

Keywords: Security, Human Security, Self-determination, Post-cold war, Tibetan problem

Introduction

In the post cold war period the end of ideological confrontation has given place to the process of integration of domestic economy with global economy. The perception regarding security of nation states also underwent a marked change. During the cold war period the developed and developing nations focused mainly on arms built-up to ensure the security of nation from the threat posed by potential rival nation states. The general belief was that if the nations are secure from external military threat posed by other nation states the people living in that nation are also secure. Therefore during the cold war period national security was purely based on military security aspect. Concomitantly military alliances, armament and arms race were the natural corollaries of such a state of affair. (Karl Deutsch, 1989: 182) However in the post

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cold war situation the capacity of non-state actors to harm human and material resources manifested that no nation whatsoever militarily powerful can single handedly meet the threat posed by them to their security. (Suresh, 2010: 103) Similarly the global economic meltdown and global climate change demand concerted action by the developed and developing nations.

Again the development in field of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has united the people across the world. The international non-governmental agencies act as an agency to aggregate and articulate problems confronted by ordinary people in their daily life across the world. These problems include denial of basic human rights, and many other predicaments in the realm of protection and promotion social, economic and political rights. Most of these matters can be considered as human security issues. This paper is an attempt to examine the changing dimensions of security in the post cold war period and the international response towards the six decade old Tibetan people's peaceful struggle for right to self-determination.

Dimensions of Security

With the end of the cold war, the concept of security has increasingly come under scrutiny from scholars of international relations and other discipline. This classical national security formulation has been criticized on various grounds.

The debates on security is centered on the presuppositions about what security is, what is being secured, the causes of insecurity, and how best to address insecurity. (Kanti Bajpai, 2003: 195) International relations theorists and policy experts have varying perspectives on these questions, which have evolved and have had changing levels of acceptance over time. The realists and neo-realists emphasis the nation state as the central reference of security. (Hans J Morgenthau, 1983, 23; Kenneth Waltz, 1979: 31) Liberal theorists recognize a wider set of values embedded in the concept of the state and state security, in the methods and means to address insecurity, and the actors involved. ¹ The critical constructivist scholars understand that the interests and identities of nation states are themselves constructed by the distribution of ideas and interests within the state-based system and this shapes a state's security interests and how these are conceived, and in turn impacts upon the actions necessary to ensure security.² Thus there are divergent views with regard to concept of security, whose security, that is, whether the security of the nation or people, the causes of insecurity, and how to ensure security.

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The Westphalia state system had made nation states as the basic unit in the international system. Each nation decides the internal and external policies. The prime responsibility of a nation state is to promote its national interests.³ The national interests of nation states are mainly to ensure peace, security and prosperity. Some nations employ aggressive means and some peaceful methods.⁴ And foreign policy of a nation is the means to achieve their respective national interests including the security interests. Therefore, though the national interests are same nations frame divergent foreign policy, which in turn is conditioned by the interplay of internal and external factors.

The post cold war changes in the global politics especially in the context of accelerated pace of globalization and the developments in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) appears to have altered the traditional security perception which is purely based on military security. The emergence of nontraditional threat to security especially in the fields of economy, and environment, demands a multilateral approach. Along with this the global movement towards democracy, protection and promotion of human rights with the active involvement of civil society organizations at the national and international level further support the human security or people's security.

Human Security

Though the idea of human security in its rudimentary form may be traced in 1960s, it was the Independent Commission on International Development Issues in its North-South Report of 1980 highlighted the changing thinking on development and security. The chairman of the commission Willy Brandt observed "Our Report is based on what appears to be the simplest common interest that mankind wants to survive, and one might even add has the moral obligation to survive. This not only raises traditional questions of peace and war, but also how to overcome world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of the rich and poor."⁶

Another notable development in the idea of human security was the Common Security Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues chaired by Olaf Palm. The report noted "common security requires that people live in dignity and peace, that they have enough to eat and are able to find work and live in a world without poverty and destitution."⁷

With the end of superpower rivalry the call for new thinking in security

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matters gained momentum. In 1991 the Stockholm Institute on Global Security and Governance issued a call for “ Common Responsibility in the 1990s “,which maintained a” wider concept of security ,which deals with threats that stem from failures in development, environmental degradation, excessive population growth and movement, and lack of progress towards democracy.” Again in 1995, the Commission on Global Governance’s report, *Our Global Neighborhood*, stated that “The concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the security of the planet.”⁸

However, a human security perspective was developed by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) in the Human Development Report of 1994. This report contains a section on ‘Redefining Security: The Human Dimension’.⁹ It proposes an alternative to traditional security and a necessary supplement to human development. The report discusses in details the question of security for whom by reference to traditional notion of security. These were concerned with security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interest in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation state than to people. Human security, on the other hand, is people centered.

The Human Development Report maintains that human security means protecting vital freedom of the individuals. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Protection shields people from dangers. It requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making.¹¹

People centered security would help to solve the problems of the individuals in a better way than the state centered security. Nation states were the creation of people who desired to protect and promote their security. It was one of the means to achieve people’s security at a particular stage of human civilization when the threat to security of the people emanates mainly from external sources. With the change in the external threat perception of nation states there is a need for consequential change in the security policy of nations. In the changed context security, therefore, means people’s security. In the post cold war period the external military threat perception has been diminished or even eliminated and new threat to security of nation states as well as people are evolved. These nontraditional threats to security of nation states including terrorism, global economic slowdown and global

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climate change can be addressed only with multilateral effort. Thus the blurred boundary between human security and national security on the one hand and national security and international security on the other hand again emphasizes the significance of human security.

The peaceful struggle to establish the right to self-determination gains support from civil society organizations. Nation states often compromise on protection and promotion of human rights and human security when the economic interests are involved. Unlike nation states the civil society organizations are not much concerned about protecting their economic interests. The civil society organizations can not only influence the world public opinion but also influence their respective national governments.

Tibetan Problem

The dispute over Tibet's political status vis-à-vis China began in the eighteenth century, when the Manchu dynasty sent its armies to Tibet and imposed a "loose protectorate." The Manchu dynasty, however, had no interest in directly annexing and administering Tibet and were satisfied with posting a few imperial commissioners in Lhasa together with a small garrison. Tibet continued to be ruled day to day by its own government, laws, and officials.

Internationalization of the Tibet question began at the turn of the twentieth century when the British in India attempted to extend their influence into the region. The British invaded the country in 1903–04 and imposed a treaty that gave it the right to station officials in Tibet and conduct trade relations. Despite this, Britain did not try to convert Tibet into a protectorate and signed new agreements on Tibet with China and Russia reaffirming Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. However, British troops marching into Lhasa shocked the Manchu dynasty and led them for the first time to take active steps to integrate Tibet more closely with the rest of China. Due to instability at the Central Chinese Kingdom, Tibet expelled all remaining Chinese officials, and declared that it would rule the country without any interference from China. Thus from 1913 to 1951, Tibet functioned as a de facto independent polity.

However, the Chinese governments that succeeded the Manchu dynasty insisted that Tibet was a part of China and must be reunited with it. The Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States implicitly supported this by recognizing only Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, even though it was clear that China exercised no control over Tibet and that Britain and other countries routinely dealt with Tibet directly.

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When the communists defeated Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 and established the People's Republic of China (PRC), they set out to reunify all provinces and territories that had been part of China in the past, including Tibet. The Tibetan government rejected Chinese claims of sovereignty and refused to open negotiations with China over 'reunification'. They sought military and diplomatic support from the United States, Britain, and India. However, Tibet received no such diplomatic support. In October 1950, China invaded Tibet's easternmost province to force the Tibetan government to negotiate a reunification agreement. The Dalai Lama turned to the United States and the UN for help but again received no help. Finally, Tibet reluctantly sent representatives to Beijing and signed the Seventeen Point Agreement under whose terms Tibet accepted Chinese sovereignty in return for the maintenance of the Dalai Lama's government in Tibet for the immediate future. The Chinese agreed that reforms of the old feudal system under the agreement would not be implemented until the Tibetan leaders and people request them. However this agreement lasted only for eight years. In 1959, there was an abortive uprising in Tibet and the Dalai Lama fled to India along with 80000 Tibetans. In exile, the Dalai Lama renounced the validity of the Seventeen Point Agreement, declaring Tibet an independent country illegally occupied by China. The Chinese government also renounced the agreement and terminated the old Tibetan government. They also implemented 'socialist reforms' that ended the feudal and monastic systems. During the Chinese cultural revolution of the 1960s, Tibetan religion and culture were attacked and suppressed.

Though Tibet was never formally recognized by the League of Nations or the United Nations, Tibet in the period 1913–51 had an independent government, currency, army, judicial and postal systems, and administration. Furthermore, the Tibetan government enjoyed formal bilateral relations with the neighboring countries of Mongolia, Nepal, India, and Bhutan, and concluded treaties with China and Britain. The Tibetan claim that they have every right to self-determination as China had illegally occupied their territory in the name of 'peaceful liberation of Tibet'.¹²

China Response to Tibetan Problem

The views of the PRC on the Tibetan issue are well reflected in the white paper report issued by the Chinese government in 2009 and also in other official publications. The report stated that the Tibetan people enjoy the democratic right to be masters according to law. The Chinese

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Constitution provides that all citizens of China who have reached the age of 18 to exercise their right to vote and stand for election, regardless of ethnic status, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, or length of residence. It is important to note that under the prevailing one party system in China, people have only limited choice to elect their representative.

The report further argues that Tibetan people have become masters of their own affairs and enjoyed full democratic rights and extensive economic, social and cultural rights. The report maintain that while preparing for the establishment of the TAR, the PRC Central Government conducted full consultation with the Dalai lama and Panchen lama and other members in Tibet.¹⁴

While denying any further revision in the present political set up in Tibet on the lines of Hong Kong and Macao the official report maintain that the “situation in Tibet is entirely different from that in Hong Kong and Macao”. It further argues that the “Hong Kong and Macao issue was a product of imperialist aggression against China; it was an issue of China’s resumption of exercise of its sovereignty”. With regard to Tibetan plea for autonomy it argues “since ancient times Tibet has been an inseparable part of Chinese territory, where the Central Government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction over the region. So the issue of resuming exercise of sovereignty does not exist.”¹⁵

Though the official version of PRC maintains that Tibet is an autonomous region, the prevailing system of ‘democratic centralism’ and party control over the administration has given little scope for autonomy to Tibetans in the present administrative set up. Again, the indifferent attitudes towards Tibetan by the majority Han population in China, who run the government at the local and central levels, and the treatment of the Tibetan as ‘splitters’, limit the entry of Tibetans in the party organs and other decision making bodies.

International Response towards Tibetan Problem

The United Nations

The Tibetan problem was brought before the UN General Assembly in 1959 in its 24th session. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1353 (XIV) of 1959, calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life. Again, the UN General Assembly Resolution 1723 (XVI) 1961, solemnly renews its call for the cessation of practices which deprive

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the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination. The UN General Assembly Resolution 2079 (XX) 1965, solemnly renews its call for the cessation of all practices which deprive the Tibetan people of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which they have always enjoyed. These UN General Assembly resolutions had made little impact on Chinese attitude towards the Tibetan demand for right to self-determination.

The United States of America

The U.S. government has been actively involved in the Tibet conflict since the late 1940s and some non-governmental organizations in America have been able to insert the Tibet question into U.S. domestic politics through the Congress and the human rights community. The US President met Dalai Lama in March 2014 and expressed his concern. Mr Obama also recently reiterated that the US considers Tibet to be part of China, and said that he encouraged “direct dialogue to resolve long-standing differences”.

Britain

Britain formed treaties with the Tibetan government before the PRC invasion of Tibet in 1950. Again Tibet shared a land border with British India before 1947 and Britain maintained a diplomatic mission in Tibet’s capital, Lhasa, until 1947. In all these periods Britain had not explicitly recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet; rather it acknowledged its “suzerainty”. This stand taken by Britain was amended in 2009 when the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband describes Britain’s old position was “based on the geopolitics of the time”. He says this “anachronism” has “clouded” Britain’s ability to get its points across on Tibet on the importance of respect for human rights and of greater Tibetan autonomy. He maintained that the British Government regard Tibet as a part of the People’s Republic of China’.

India

Independent India was not very sympathetic to the Tibetan demand for independence. However, when the PLA entered into Tibet, India did not hesitate to deplore China’s invasion of Tibet. In a note dated October 26, 1950, the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, told the Chinese foreign office how it looked at the event:

In the context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace. This

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statement clearly shows India's stand on the Tibetan issue in the initial period.¹⁶

Again, when the PLA entered into Tibet, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru stated in the Indian Parliament on 7th December 1950:

It is not right for any country to talk about its sovereignty or suzerainty over an area outside its own immediate range. That is to say, since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail and not any legal or constitutional arguments — the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the **voice of the people of Tibet** and of nobody else.¹⁷

In the beginning India had supported the Tibet's claim for self-determination. However, a marked change in India's stand on self-determination was visible after the India- China bilateral agreement of 1954, known as Panchasheel.¹⁸ As per the agreement India had accepted China's claim on Tibet. Though India failed to provide any support to the Tibetans right to self-determination when it had taken up at the UN General Assembly in 1958, India had provided political asylum to Dalai Lama and his followers in 1959.

The 1954 Panchasheel agreement between India and China was clearly violated in 1962 when the Chinese troop invaded Indian territory. Even the Chinese attack did not deter India from supporting the PRC entry into the UN.¹⁹ India had followed a policy of appeasement with regard to China and accepted China's claim on Tibet. The India- China border problem is embedded on Tibetan issue as China had two third of the border with India through Tibet, and India's border with Tibet was a well-settled by Mc Mohan line ²⁰ Thus a solution to the Indo - China border problem also lies in the Tibetan claim for the right to self-determination.

It appears that it was the appeasement policy towards China prompted India to take the official stand of considering Tibet as an integral part of China. Thus even in the changed context of security human security issues were secondary to the narrow economic interests of nation states. The international response towards the Tibetan problem especially in the post cold war period further shows that there is less unity among nation to resolve some genuine human security issues. The 63 year old peaceful struggle of the Tibetan ethnic minority against China is one of the oldest nonviolent struggles for freedom. However the growing significance of global civil society organizations along with the development of ICT, the human security issues get more support from the people across the globe.

Conclusions

The changing dimensions of security and also the global movement towards democracy and protection and promotion of human rights further strengthened the move towards human security. However major nation state actors in the international system are not fully committed to support the human security approach. The ongoing process of globalization prompted nation states to balance their economic interests rather than human security. The existence of nontraditional threats to security of nations demands a multilateral approach to address these issues. The development in the field of ICT and the rise of global civil society organizations strengthened the informal interaction between people living in different nations. A corollary of these developments is that the human security issues attract the attention of people across the globe. Further the blurred boundary between human security and national security on the one hand and national security and international security on the other hand again emphasis the significance of human security. Thus it appears that the Tibetan peoples six decade old peaceful struggle for right to self-determination get the support of global civil society organizations. The decline in the role of nation states in international politics and the increased involvement of global civil society organizations in support human security issues appears to provide a new impetus to the Tibetan struggle for right to self-determination.

Notes

1. Liberal theory believes in global integration and the strategy towards integration, unlike the coercive means of realist is democratization; conflict resolution; and rule of law.
2. Critical constructivist school on security believes that security is a social construction. They emphasize the importance of social, cultural and historical factors, which leads to different actors construing similar events differently.
3. National Interests according to Hans J Morgenthau is defined in terms of national power.
4. Generally developed nations spent more on defence compared to the developing countries.
5. For a detailed analysis of foreign policy determinants see Suresh R *Foreign Policy and Human Rights: An Indian Perspective*. Madhav Books, Gurgaon, 2009
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17. Quoted in L.L Mehrotra, India's Tibet Policy: An Appraisal and Options, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, New Delhi, 2000. P 14
18. (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) mutual non-aggression (iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and (v) peaceful co-existence.
19. In the wake of its full scale and wanton invasion of India in the early hours of October 20, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru said in a broadcast to his countrymen, "Perhaps there are not many instances in history where one country (that is, India) has gone out of here way to be friendly and cooperative with the Government and people of another country (that is, China) and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and then that country returns evil for good". Quoted in L LMehrotra India's Tibet Policy: An Appraisal and Options, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, New Delhi, 2000 p 21
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China-Japan Conflicts : Impact on India

Yogesh Chourasia

The end of the cold war and post 9/11 challenges has transformed the international relations. Long back one of the earliest seminal strategic thinkers, Kautilya had stated that there is only permanence in foreign policy and that is convergences of interests. Accordingly other similarities like religion, ethnicity, languages etc. do not matter much.

In post cold and post 9/11 scenario many pundits of the international system have sustained their predictions that Asia is going to dominate global balance of power. But in reality it is not visible till date. China wanted to dominate Asia as uni-polar power but at the same time wanted multiplicity at the global level and of course herself as a pole. Japan and India wanted both Asian and global power architecture multiple. It is the basic algebra of divergences between China and India, China and Japan, China and ASEAN, China and South Korea etc. In contrast it is the propelling reasons of upgraded Indian presence in almost every Asian platforms and deepening convergences with all Asian powers excluding China. Beside that Japan and India has had a baggage of history against China. Before both world wars, Japan dominated China and during both world wars captured its prosperous province of Manchuria. Since centuries , Japan remained as only Asian imperial power. During the 1868-1912 Meiji era, it became the first Asian country to modernize. It was also the first Asian country to emerge as a world power; defeating Manchu ruled China and Czarist Russia in separate wars before First World War.

China has immense rivalry over South China Sea with ASEAN countries and over East China Sea with Japan. With the growing economic might China wanted to convert it into military might. Japan being a centuries old powerful country is hell bent to oppose it. As security analyst Raja Mohan stated “ For nearly four decades , Japan-China have had closer relations with each other than India. As they clash today, both attach considerable value to their relationship with India, which has the potential to alter larger Asian context. Rising China’s interest is essentially a negative one , to keep the relationship with India tranquil

as it confronts Japan in the east. Tokyo's interest is positive, as it seeks to build a strong strategic partnership with Delhi to balance an increasingly assertive Beijing."¹

The Philippines is a disputant country against China over South China Sea. Philippines President Benigno S. Aquino III called for nations around the world to do more to support the Philippines in resisting China's assertive claims to the seas near his country, drawing a comparison to the West's failure to support Czechoslovakia against Hitler's demands for Czech land in 1938.

Like Czechoslovakia, the Philippines faces demands to surrender territory piecemeal to a much stronger foreign power and needs more robust foreign support for the rule of international law if it is to resist.

"If we say yes to something we believe is wrong now, what guarantee is there that the wrong will not be further exacerbated down the line?" he said. "At what point do you say, 'Enough is enough'? Well, the world has to say it — remember that the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II."²

Since last many years however a tense conflict is emerging between China and Japan over East China Sea. The military standoff between Beijing and Tokyo over the disputed islands in the East China Sea called the Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan is only the most visible of a deepening conflict between the world's 2nd and 3rd largest economies. This conflict has raised many inherent questions about the changing security architecture of Asia-Pacific at one side and about the unipolarity of global order on the other. Mr. Aquino's remarks are among the strongest indications yet of alarm among Asian heads of state about China's military buildup and territorial ambitions, and the second time in recent weeks that an Asian leader has dared to make a comparison to the prelude to world wars.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe caused a stir in Davos, Switzerland, when he noted in January 2014 that Britain and Germany went to world war in 1914 even though they had close economic ties much as China and Japan have now.³

Japan has been locked in an increasingly bitter standoff with China over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, and even South Korea, which has been quieter about Chinese claims, expressed alarm last year when Beijing announced that it had the right to police the skies above a vast area of ocean, including areas claimed by Japan and South Korea. However this issue is very old and even before world wars it existed.

The two countries claim the islands under different elements of international law. Japan's case rests on the principle of "occupation of *terra nullius*", or land without owner; it asserts that when it formally incorporated the islands through a January 1895 Cabinet decision, it had confirmed that they were inhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China.⁴ China claims historical title, stating it has evidence that it exercised sovereignty over the islands as they were discovered, named and used during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and administered as a part of Taiwan by the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).⁵ It argues that the islands were ceded to Japan as part of the April 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War, and therefore should be returned to China under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (1943 and 1945), which stated that Japan must return all territories seized through war.⁶ The key question under international law appears to be whether China established historical title before 1895.⁷ Taiwan also claims the islands based on the same historical title as China.

After the Second World War, the islands were occupied, along with Ryukyu Islands, by the U.S. under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and were reverted to Japanese administration in 1972.⁸ The U.S. plays an important role in the dispute as it asserts that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.⁹

Both sides also disagree over the delineation of their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the East China Sea.¹⁰ With this level of complexity, a judicial or arbitration settlement would be the most logical solution.¹¹

Yet, there is little chance that an international tribunal will be able to examine the issue. Japan does not formally acknowledge that a dispute exists and believes it would therefore be up to China which it says is seeking to challenge Japan's "valid control" of the island chain to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).¹² Japanese officials also point out that, unlike Japan, China does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court.¹³ Chinese analysts say that Beijing has no faith in the ICJ's fairness, as it is a "Western" system that will only produce results "biased against China".¹⁴

In recent years China has increased its defense budget in many folds (\$ 140 billion, globally second after United States) and it has surpassed the combined defense budget of Japan and South Korea. PM Abe is perhaps first after second world war who has majority in both houses of Japanese parliament after December 2012 elections. He is planning to

hold a referendum over 9th article of the constitution which debars Japan to take military way within 2014. If it will be approved by the people then a terse arm race will be witnessed between China and Japan.

India is also engaged in bitter border conflict with China. 17 rounds of high voltage meetings since 2003 till date have not been able to resolve the thorny boundary dispute. Weeks back our President visited Arunachal Pradesh and China sung old saga that AP is Chinese territory. At this juncture India should not tolerate such a kind of jingoistic Chinese mindset and must reply through extending value based support to Japan and ASEAN stating that all maritime disputes must be resolved through amicable means and as per the norms of the international laws.

China has refused to obey 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to demarcate legal boundaries among the nations and insisted that instead of multi-lateral way the disputant countries must resolve the issue bilaterally. The Philippines has already approached to the international agencies. China has sown the seed of mistrust among ASEAN also and in 2012 ASEAN Summit, Cambodia subscribe Chinese version to resolve the issue. Japan is not a weak country by all counts to succumb under Chinese pressure.

East China Sea & South China Sea have become a new global flash points which has the potential to escalate the third world war if not properly managed due to Chinese assertion to prove its new earned economic power into military form. Chinese have declared these issues within their 'core interests' along with Tibet and Taiwan. Japan has also wooed Russia which is still an important military power to reckon with. Russian Far East has been poured by the Chinese influx and ultimate target to Sinification of Russia Far East and capture it after demography will be favorable. Russia has also sensed this overt Chinese design therefore has intensified its strategic relationship with Japan. East and Northeast Asia is facing turbulent time.

Due to growing Chinese assertion there is a possibility of polarization of major Asian powers be it ASEAN, India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Russia and Australia.

The Chinese have perhaps forgotten Deng advice to remain low profile, strengthen socio-economic base and leave thorny border issues for the future generations but instead is on military rampage. This assertion is inciting provocation by regional countries particularly all important Asian power who have baggage of history against China. This polarization is like during both world wars in Europe. Only difference

is now at the outset of the 21st century, countries have huge arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, which is capable to eliminate the humanity and during world wars major powers had limited arsenals. Another difference was Europe fought both world wars after acquiring control over global system but major countries of Asia started fighting when this dominance has yet to be established. This clash of interests among major Asian power may promote United States unilateralism in the global system.

If the pace of prevailing mistrust between China and Japan will prolong than there is a possibility of its spill over to many parts of Asia Pacific and global peace will be really threatened. India being one of the victims of the Chinese aggression must take a policy stand that it will defend its national interests along with maintaining peace and stability in Asia. India must take the principle line of adherence with international laws of the sea and smooth lanes of sea traffic and needless to say that will serve both purposes.

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10. China claims jurisdiction, which includes exclusive rights to resource exploration and development, based on the natural prolongation of its

continental shelf, which it says extends to the Okinawa Trough. Japan claims an EEZ that extends to the median line that bisects the East China Sea. Both natural prolongation and median line principles are allowed under Article 15 and Article 76 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the two countries ratified in 1996. Their overlapping claims leave about 40,000 sq km west of the Okinawa Trough and east of the EEZ's median line disputed. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands fall within the disputed area. "Part II: Limits of the Territorial Sea" and "Part VI: Continental Shelf", UNCLOS, 10 December 1982. Steven Wei Su, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

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Ravinder Sharma, *Paradoxes of Chinese Socialism*, Manak, 2007, Pp-411, Price-Rs 900.

Deng inherited ills of Mao's era. However, the remedies Deng suggested took China to a different direction. Deng and his associates fell into the trap of "China's Americanization". Deng's remedies created "classes" in socialist China. Surprisingly, Deng tried to enrich socialism by using capitalist techniques. Deng allowed privatization to blossom; Deng followed an inequalitarian development strategy; and as a result, a ruling elite emerged in China. True, land still belongs to the state. However in the classical sense, China cannot be called a "socialist state". Yes, Deng is very popular in China; more popular than Mao. Yet, one dares to profess that Deng made a historical blunder by introducing privatization. Privatization is an antithesis of socialism. Privatization and socialism cannot go together. Privatization, foreign capital, corruption, and the revival of Confucianism have already started eating into the vitals of Chinese socialism. Economically, with nine percent growth and \$1.5 trillion foreign reserves, China looks very impressive. However, ideologically China is decaying rapidly. While the wealthy China is facing a "crisis of Faith", the poor China is sitting at the top of a volcano. Chinese rulers are in a hurry to catch up with the west; they are determined to create an urban civilization at the cost 9,60,000 villages. The "peasant unrest" is posing a serious threat to the stability of China. The CPC is aware of the problems but in vain. China's nouveau riche and the middle class are quite happy with the outcome of Deng's developmental strategy. A revolutionary party has become a mere ruling party. Private property is no longer a bourgeois ill in China.

China adopted LPG process back in 1978 and India adopted in 1991 therefore India has not achieved the similar landmarks on economic development plank. Socialism of democratic system and communist system has little difference minus mode of implementation. China today has become one of the important countries of the world and according to recent global estimates by 2028 it will be number one economic power, followed by the United States and India. Basically the Chinese have persuaded nationalism in the name of socialism. In 1979 when USSR entered Afghanistan and USA formed the Mujhedden to erase

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them from Afghanistan, China was one of the collaborator countries with the United States against another socialist country, USSR. It was because China and USSR interests were divergent therefore they were bound to be in conflict mode. It reminds us about the Kautilyan notion that enemy's enemy is friend. After the downfall of the USSR, the same socialist China inked a border deal with Russia in 2005 anticipating that it will not disturb it to expand as global power.

The Chinese have basically soaked socialism into nationalism. Patel wrote a letter three weeks before his death to Nehru about Chinese designs in Tibet and warned him not to believe China. Nehru was intoxicated with idealism therefore he ignored Patel's request resulted into Chinese occupation in Tibet and thorny border dispute.

Dr. Sharma is one of the rarest scholars who has revealed these secrets. His present book is must read for all those concerned who have an appetite to read and write on China. It is also an eye opener for the formulators of policy.

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Book Review

Sudhir Kumar Singh, ***'Sino – Indian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities for 21st Century'***, (Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2011)
PP 438, Price: Rs 995/-

This book, edited by Dr Sudhir Singh of University of Delhi, is a commendable work; it contains a rich database and useful analysis on Sino – Indian relations and their external dimension, contributed by 21 China specialists representing some important academic institutions and think tanks in India and abroad.

The complex nature of relations between China and India, the two Asian giants rising simultaneously, is becoming more and more evident under conditions in which economic compulsions are driving them to engage each other constructively on one hand and strategic issues continuing to divide them on the other. Not surprisingly, the Chinese are viewing the Sino-Indian ties as 'very fragile, very easy to be damaged and very difficult to repair, requiring special care in the information age' (Ambassador Zhang Yan, 14 December 2010, New Delhi). It is another matter that India nurtures a more optimistic outlook treating the bilateral relations as actually 'far more stable compared to two or three decades ago (Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, New Delhi, 16 December 2010).

It will be time consuming to review all the articles appearing in the book, but in an overall sense, it could be seen that all the writers, while trying to reach conclusions on the subject, have kept the 'fragile' nature of the contemporary Sino-Indian relations in their minds. Dr Sudhir Kumar Singh is one such scholar, who has very appropriately, summed up the need for both the nations to 'maximise their national interests at a time when the Asia – Pacific strategic structure is changing'. Other writers have gone further by identifying areas in which such 'maximization' is possible. Mr H. Sudhir and Mr N. Surjit Kumar have given importance to the benefits accruing for India's northeast once Sino – Indian trans-border connectivity . According to three more scholars Mr Tej Pratab Singh, Mr S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni and Ms Yeshi Choedon, other potential fields where India and China can work together could include climate change, global economic and financial reforms, maritime security and the United Nations Peace Keeping.

As expected, some contributors have demanded that India should be pro-active in its dealings with China. Mr Anil Bhat has cautioned New Delhi against China's attempts to 'encircle' India by forging strategic ties with countries in India's neighborhood. As Dr Sudhir Kumar Singh

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sees, it would be necessary for India to take note that the Tibet issue and the Sino-Indian border question are inter-linked. However, his another point that the progressing globalization process may persuade China to accept the autonomy demands of the Tibetans, looks unrealistic considering the fact that China is not likely to give up its present un-compromising position on all sovereignty related issues including that of Tibet. Worth taking notice is also the suggestion of Dr Suresh that New Delhi should support the cause of Tibet's self determination. It is, indeed, bold, but one has to pay serious attention to the likely adverse impact of such support on Sino- Indian relations, if it materializes.

Ms Geetha Govindasamy of University of Malaya, Kulalampur, has given a valid reason for India's approach to North Korea as an area of its peripheral concern. According to her, this is in contrast to China's policy of considering Pyongyang as central to its international relations. Also interesting are remarks made by Dr Sharifah Munirah Alatas, also of the University of Malaya that rather than covertly acting to divert water resources from one country to another, India and China should cooperate in the matter of protecting the shared resource of water supply. One cannot disagree with the opinion of another scholar, Mr Pankaj Kumar Jha, that 'China threat' perception still prevails in Southeast Asia and the regional powers continue to perceive the US as a security guarantor. But, his vision with respect to China-Southeast Asian nations convergence of goals, is rather questionable given the continuing clear signs of Chinese territorial aggressiveness giving rise to regional tensions.

China's domestic goals have always been a factor determining its foreign policy course. Beijing's ties with New Delhi are no exception. China considers a stable international situation and a peaceful periphery as sine-qua-non for the successful completion of its modernization drive by the projected dead line of the middle of the 21st century and correspondingly, has put in place a 'harmonious world' concept for its international relations. Of late, a new 'core interests' element has begun to influence Chinese foreign policy making. Under it, Beijing is showing aggressiveness on all matters concerning 'national sovereignty'; as a result, China's relationship with its neighbours like Japan, South China Sea littorals and India, all having territorial disputes with Beijing, have come under a shadow. India's Prime Minister has himself admitted to China's assertiveness in South Asia. Puzzling to the outside world, is the contradiction between China's quest for a 'win-win' relationship with foreign countries and its preparedness to show aggressiveness

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externally particularly on territorial issues concerning neighbors. Such a scenario does not seem to have received the adequate attention in the book under review. However, despite this omission, the usefulness of the book as a valuable reference material for China scholars both in India and abroad cannot be denied.

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