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Preface

South Asia keeps extraordinary importance within globe. It constitutes around 20 per cent of the global population but its landmass hardly constitutes 4 per cent of the globe. These areas have been under constant colonial rule since centuries before independence in the aftermath of the Second World War. Since millennia this area have been one entity therefore the culture of this area is almost same. Situated south of the mighty Himalayas, geo strategically it is an important area. This puts this area into a special place in the international system. Since independence this area has been known for chronic poverty and gamut of deficiency of basic amenities for the common people. In October 2010, the United Nations has published the list of global hunger index; South Asia dominates this index from the top. However soon after independence, democracy has been accepted by the majority of South Asian Countries as the mode of governance but it has remained unsuccessful to provide adequate results. This area is known for its historical proximity since millennia but due to many burdens of history still regional cooperation either in economics or culture or human resource or disaster management is at bare minimum. In this era of globalization the entire globe is integrating mainly on economic terms but this area remained known for mutual hostilities. Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen has argued that without economic and social empowerment the basic notion of democracy could not be strengthened. Due to the process of globalization many regional groupings of the contemporary world have been able to decrease the pace of poverty with high speed.

South Asia is today waiting at the crossroad of sustainable development. Mutual cooperation is bound to be beneficial for all the countries of the region. Regional cooperation has not properly taken place despite the fact that since 1985 SAARC is in order but intra trade remained under 5 per cent. This situation is extremely dismal in comparison with E.U, ASEAN and newly emerged NAFTA, which came into being even after the formation of SAARC. Common culture could be a strong bridge to connect these societies within south Asia. There is a strong need to implement this reality into action. Due to prevailing tension this area has remained under developed and could not reap the benefits of the process of globalization. It has further aggravated the problem of poverty, which remains root cause of all the anarchies of the globe.

South Asia had been abode of knowledge and prosperity in ancient time. The basic philosophy of the formation of the SAARC was to revive that spirit through eliminating all prevailing curses of humanity from within the region. Unfortunately even after 28 years of its formation SAARC has

not been able to achieve this desired goal. This is an era of globalization where no country could shut out its doors for business from other countries but between India and Pakistan this unfortunate situation is prevailing. India gave Most Favored Nations (MFN) to Pakistan within the framework of SAFTA in 1996 only but despite 2012 declaration, Pakistan has not reciprocated it till date. Current trade volume between both countries is roughly \$3 billion, which is far less than China-Pak \$ 12 billion but some experts estimate that a normalized trade regime could eventually send the figure soaring to \$40 billion.¹ This tendency has promoted illegal trade of immense volume and unfortunately it has become the lucrative source of income for the terror network. During 2008 Mumbai attack, Pakistani President stated that non state actors are responsible for this heinous crime against humanity. The question remains that non state actors are not coming from the heaven but still mushrooming in Pakistan. Since 1989 Kashmir insurgency surge, terror remains as an instruments of Pakistan's foreign policy. Hafiz Saeed is roaming throughout Pakistan and threatening not only Pakistan government but India as well. Pakistan needs to understand that promotion and protection of terror syndicate has reduced Pakistan as nearly failed state. Self grown terror network is the real threat for Pakistan instead of its threat perception from India. Gamuts of Jehadi elements are operating from Pakistan and they have already stated that their ultimate goal is to establish their writ over the Pakistani state. According to World Bank 2013 Report Pakistan ranks 145 of 187 countries in the United Nations Development Programmes Human Development Index. It has the world's second highest out-of-school population (7 million), of which two-thirds are girls. Enrollment and completion rates for primary education are among the worlds lowest. Health coverage is also dismal, with under-five malnutrition rates as some of the world's worst. And the country is also one of the lowest spenders on education (1.9 percent of GDP) and health (0.9 percent of GDP); less than a third of the minimum average for countries at similar incomes per capita.² Pakistan demography however is quite attractive for human development index. Its over 40 per cent population is youth and aspiring for better future. But through Jehadi factories one could not produce jobs but can produce human bombs, this tendency has tarnished the prospects of Pakistani economy since last one decade and slated to sustain in foreseeable future as well. There is strong need to shed this mentality and use Pakistan as a place sitting between the crossroads of opportunities.

In 1960s Pakistan was considered at par with South Korea but South Korea is at the top today and Pakistan is at the bottoms of human development index. Expansion of trade, people to people cooperation between Pakistan and India will be a panacea for the poorest of the poor of both the countries. Economic cooperation with India is mutually beneficial for India and Pakistan but it is more beneficial for Pakistan. According to World Bank

2013 report on Pakistan “The fourth priority should be the regional agenda, focused not only on India but on all regional countries. Completing the trade normalization process with India and granting it MFN status would help Pakistan benefit quickly from the fast growth and large markets”.³

In October 2013 international agencies have released global report of slavery. According to that India is top in the list with 14 million people which is only 7 million less than entire population of Australia. Pakistan is number three and that number is bigger than the entire population of many smaller countries of Europe.⁴ If we have to remove those entire stigmas from our countries of South Asia we need to cooperate.

On Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives & Afghanistan front India’s performance of regional engagement is quite nice but still ample scope for improvement. India has been one of the most important contributors in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan and has contributed \$ 2 billion till date in creating basic amenities. India along with other like minded countries must ensure that after 2014 NATO withdrawal Afghanistan should not fall in the lap of the enemies of the humanity. We need to understand that Bangladesh’s stability is crucial for the promotion and protection of our Northeastern states. We have to extend all possible help to Bangladesh so it could be a better place to live. Bhutan has done excellent development and we need to sustain our support to the process. Nepal has been a critical country since 1996 when Maoist insurgency erupted and till date consumed over 17,000 lives. We need to ensure that constitutional process must be put on place in Nepal after November 2013 constitutional assembly elections. Sri Lanka is another critical country and we need to ensure that our Tamil brethrens must get due respect under an ideal democratic system. October 2013 regional council elections in the east and the north east are a positive step but need to be genuinely empowered. Sri Lanka ruling elite need to understand that without accommodating ethnic minority’s aspirations into the mainstreaming process, it could not regain its harbinger role in the human development index within South Asia. Sri Lanka must use the opportunity of the absence of terror in northeast and devolution of power could be a great help to regain the faith of minorities.

Maldives is small but critical due to political instability. This tiny Indian Ocean country is of paramount importance for the safety of sea lanes of communication and containing piracy within Indian Ocean. India must ensure that democratic process must be completed without any artificial delay.

There are many other similarities within South Asia, which needs to be highlighted like language, music and other important common heritage. If cooperation will prevail then potential of sustainable development together is immense within South Asia. At the outset of the 21st century it

is our moral duty being the member of the civil-society to implement it. It will not ensure all round development to the region but bring global stability also.

Human rights, women rights and protection of environment and water resources are the areas where deepening of relationship within South Asia will be able to yield adequate results.

2400 hundred years, one of the most important ancient Indian seminal philosophers, Kautilaya had stated that king must nurture his/her subjects as a new born baby is being nurtured by their parents. In 21st century it is the moral duty of the ruling elite of South Asia to provide basic amenities to their populace. The elements of convergences need to be utilized by the regional countries of South Asia. If they will do so than needless to say the entire framework of development will take a new turn within the area and a new wave of peace and prosperity will prevail.

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India an Emerging Power in Asia: Response of U.S. and other Nations

Amulya K Tripathy* and Roshni Kujur**

India is a growing power not only in South Asia but also in Asia. India will be the third great Asian power to emerge, after Japan and China. Japan emerged self-consciously as a power. China has made no pretensions in that direction. What will be India's path? Figuring India's direction is not easy. What is the nature of era we are living in, Eastern or Western? Also what is the nature of Indian civilization itself has to be studied. Because whole development of India depends on Indian history and culture.

A century ago, we lived in the Western era of human history. Japan emerged as a power because there seemed to be no alternative to Western power in 1868. Japanese Meiji reformer Yokkaichi Fukazawa said: "Our immediate policy, therefore, should be to lose no time in waiting for the enlightenment of our neighboring countries in order to join them in developing Asia, but rather to depart from their ranks and cast our lot with the civilized countries of the West."¹ Sun Yat Sen. also acknowledged superiority of the West: "We, the modern people of China, are all useless, but if in the future we use Western civilization as a model, we can easily turn weakness into strength, and the old into the new."²

Similarly, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said: "The search for the sources of India's strength and for her deterioration and decay is long and intricate. Yet the recent causes of that decay are obvious enough. She fell behind in the march of technique, and Europe, which had long been backward in many matters, took the lead in technical progress."³ Would these Asian statesmen, if alive today, readily acknowledge the superiority of the West? Many in the West have never felt so insecure, both in their daily lives and sense of future. Remarkably, one man sitting in a cave in Afghanistan has unleashed much of this insecurity. A few young English Muslims aggravated it further. Lou Dobbs has convinced many Americans that outsourcing to Asia is the next big threat to America. Europeans, by contrast, feel threatened when a British citizen of Indian ancestry, Lakshmi Mittal, tries to buy a European steel company, all the while playing by European rules. All these are examples of insecurity.

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If the Goldman Sachs BRICs study is accurate, three of the four largest economies in the year 2050 will be Asian: China, USA, Indian and Japan. It is hard to engage in Western triumph if this triumph does not rest on a conviction of perpetually superior economic performance. Something equally important has occurred in the moral dimension. If anyone had suggested 15 years ago that Western countries would allow the use of torture, he would have been dismissed out of hand. But this has happened. In 2005, Irene Khan, the head of the Amnesty International, said: “Guantanamo is the gulag of our times.” If her statement was untrue, there should have been a rush of denials from the West. If her statement was true, an equally strong chorus of voices would have demanded that this had to stop. Apart from a few flutters of regret, nothing really happened. The gulag continued. This silence of the West has resulted in a profound shift in how leading Asian minds view the West. Instead of seeing the West as a paragon of virtue, they now see an emperor with no moral clothing. The good news here is that many of these “Western” values may not be uniquely Western, and other custodians could emerge.

The West believes that it alone championed “freedom” and “tolerance.” But veteran economist Prof. Amartya Sen points to the Indian emperor Ashoka, “who during the third century BCE covered the country with inscriptions on stone tablets about good behaviour and wise governance, including a demand for basic freedoms for all – indeed, he did not exclude women and slaves as Aristotle did.”⁴

Amartya Sen’s point is that the great divide between the East and West may be artificial, that the values of freedom and tolerance, reason and logic, may not be uniquely Western. Against this backdrop, let me offer concrete predictions about how India will emerge:

My first prediction is that Indians, unlike the Japanese, are going to wear less rather than more Western clothing. Clothing helps define one’s identity. Try to imagine another Mahatma Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru without their trademark Indian garb.

Second, India will gradually drift away from the West. The West will continue to lose the magical place it has enjoyed in the global imagination. Part of this is will be a result of relative economic performance. There was a time when many Asians believed that Westerners were inherently superior. Today, the cultural confidence of Asians is immense. Most people in the West have not noticed this because cultural confidence is intangible. But Asians are fully aware, no longer amazed to see Asians top the lists of leading global entrepreneurs or academic achievers in leading American universities.

But there is another practical reason why many in the West have not noticed the rising cultural confidence of Asians. Most Western opinions are generated by a small group of Western pundits – whether they be in “The

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New York Times” or “Financial Times.” A deep conviction of Western civilizational superiority seeps through their writings. Strangely enough, in our information-rich universe, Western voices continue to speak to other Western voices on the basis of deep-seated assumptions of Western superiority, while the rest of the world drifts from these assumptions.

With the West losing its magical place in the human imagination, it is also likely that the desire to emulate the West will diminish in India and the rest of the world. India will continue with some of the finest political traditions it has inherited from the West: Democracy, a respect for human rights and respect for the rule of law. But increasingly, Indians will claim these traditions as their own, just as Western philosophers happily accepted the work of Islamic rationalists and claimed their ideas as their own.

My third prediction is that, with the growing detachment between the West and the rest, India will once again resume its natural role as the meeting point for the great civilizations. At a time when many in the West are convinced that the West cannot co-exist in peace with the Islamic world, they will increasingly marvel at how India has accommodated many civilizations – including the Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic and Christian civilizations – and how most live in peace with one another most of the time.

A spirit of inclusiveness pervades Indian political and social culture. While the West often tries to discuss the world in black-and-white terms, the Indian mind sees the nuances.

Take Iran as a case study. The West cannot see beyond the relatively new and brief theocratic rule of Iran. Indians however see a rich and deep Persian civilization that has contributed so much to the development of both Asian and Indian cultures. Hence, while the West insists on cutting itself off from Iran, Indians naturally believe in engagement, even though the Indian government disapproves of the Iranian nuclear program.

This capacity for engaging other cultures may well mean that India could play a bridging role between the West and the East. Or, it could play a bigger role of convincing leading Western minds that they should stop seeing themselves as guardians of one leading civilization. A great crusade is needed to convince the West that it is essentially no different from the rest. India may well play a leading role in this crusade.

As India rises to power, some critical questions need to be answered both by analysts of that rise and those in the Indian government determining the strategies to be adopted. The most fundamental of these questions relate to the relationship between India as a rising power, its neighbourhood (South Asia), its region (Asia) and the world. How do these different levels of security inter-relate in the context of a rising power? To what extent does a great power aspirant such as India need to ensure competitors cannot garner undue influence in its South Asian neighbourhood? What

strategies might India adopt to deal with the enmeshed nature of dissonance between its domestic and neighbourhood arenas?

A measure of power that includes analysis at different levels of the global structure is somewhat different from, but not inimical to, more traditional measures. These tend to assess power in relation to population and economic strength, while often ignoring the geopolitical and regional circumstances within which a rising power is required to operate. For example, power transition theorists, and for that matter their critics, often tend to look at issues in this way.

A number of analysts – especially of South Asia – have, however, become interested in emerging powers in relation at least to the regional and global levels, if not the domestic, neighbourhood, regional and global levels we canvass here. This view of power acquisition from the point of view of a power's region or neighbourhood *ipso facto* brings the domestic perspective on power acquisition into sharper focus, since the domestic-neighbourhood linkages are inevitably close – a phenomenon strongly evident in South Asia. It thus differs from the perspective of 'offensive realists', who claim that factors relating to the international order are always dominant.

India falls well short of a power that can function with ease within its South Asian neighbourhood. Indeed, policy makers in New Delhi are caught in a tightly woven, negative inter-relationship between dissonances within India and dissonances in South Asia. And events in South Asia are, in turn, heavily influenced by global developments. India appears powerless to sever these links.

Pakistan in particular is problematic for India. Pakistan has for years sponsored what India regards as terrorism in the Indian part of Kashmir. Pakistani terrorism groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (L-e-T) also seem to operate with impunity in other parts of India. Pakistan is partly covered in its activities directed against India by its relationship with China and partly by its nuclear weapons program, which was in the past actively supported by China (Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, 'Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China', *Washington Post*, 15 February 2004). Pakistan also derives sustenance in its relationship with the US, which views it as a 'front line' state in its struggle with global, violent *jihad*.

China is also actively involved (although not in the 'strategic' sense) with most of India's other neighbours, including Nepal, Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. India is deeply frustrated by these Chinese activities, feeling 'surrounded', but is powerless to do anything about it. Thus India's power *vis à vis* its neighbours is also closely linked to, and circumscribed by, its power *vis à vis* China.

This ability of Pakistan to play as it does in the international sphere, along with its nuclear 'umbrella', significantly diminishes India's capacity to react to domestic factors such as home-grown terrorism, supported from across

the border by Pakistan. An example is the restrained Indian response to the terrorist attacks on Mumbai of 26-29 November 2008 (called '26/11' in India), sponsored directly from Pakistani soil. This restraint was evident despite development of Indian doctrine relating to 'Operation Cold Start' – the idea of a surgical strike.

The lesson here is that even though domestic and neighbourhood problems may be intimately connected (as in the case of terrorism in India), and even though both domestic and international factors are in play in decision making, it may not be possible for a country to shape the neighbourhood issues that play upon its domestic concerns if it is not powerful enough within the *broader* international system to do so. As a country becomes more powerful, however, it will as a matter of course rise to power *vis à vis* both its neighbours and those external powers which seek to support them. But India has not yet reached that stage and will meanwhile need to find other ways to mitigate its situation.

Domestic-neighbourhood linkages and their implications

Independent South Asia inherited a difficult set of borders that were drawn up with scant regard to ethnic, religious or economic factors. Today many borders consequently remain porous and contested and separatist movements are manifest throughout the region. Added to these problems, decolonisation caused severe economic discontinuities that continue to trouble the region to this day.

Since the end of the colonial period, the South Asian sub-region has also been closely and often negatively linked to global pressures. During the Cold War it became a major focus of superpower competition. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, this competition intensified. After 9/11, the region again suffered, becoming the proving ground for the ideological-religious struggle between the West and militant Islam.

Partly because of these negative influences, South Asia has failed to reflect the successes of East and South East Asia either in terms of alleviating poverty or building a sense of cooperative community with a capacity to mitigate the dissonances of the region. Although other factors are also in play, the antagonism between India and Pakistan has vitiated any capacity that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC – founded 1985) may have had to provide a cooperative framework.

In part as a consequence, South Asia remains one of the poorest and most troubled regions of the globe. The 2010 *United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report* notes that the proportion of undernourished people in South Asia is again growing and is now on a par with that of 1990. Pakistan is especially at risk. Struggling with violent *jihadi* terrorism, it has a population of 170 million that is projected to grow by 85 million over the next 20 years. It suffers from chronic environmental problems,

poor literacy rates and a stagnated demographic transformation. In its latest report on failed states, The Fund for Peace ranks Pakistan as eleventh last in terms of fragility and failing states in the world.

In addition to these negative colonial legacies, a host of governance and environmental problems contribute to poverty and cross-border instability throughout the region. A few examples of the many available will have to suffice. Although the Asian Development Bank cites poor governance of ground water as the fundamental cause, farmers in Pakistani Punjab widely attribute their problems to the fact that the upper riparian power, India, is taking more than its fair share of water (ADB: see report of the study as a power point, as cross-linked above, penultimate slide) ; Andrew Bunscombe and Omar Wariach, 'India is stealing the water of life, says Pakistan', *The Independent*, 26 March 2009). In addition, environmentally and economically induced migration from Bangladesh to India upsets the ethnic and religious balance in India, contributes to political and separatist dissonance in the Indian North East and damages India-Bangladesh relations.

In today's globalised setting, the '24/7' reporting enabled by light video cameras and other technologies provides a crucial transfer mechanism for trouble and tension. (But equally, it also provides a mechanism for greater transparency). The riots in Gujarat in 2002, in which up to 1000 people, mostly Muslim, were reportedly killed, have since had a wider impact on Muslim sensibilities through these mechanisms and were a significant factor in recruitment and revenge attacks by *jihadi* terrorist groups in the following years.

This range of negativities within the region has resulted in a situation in which dissonance in one country is often perceived in term of the 'other' across the border. For example, relations within India between Hindus and Muslims are often portrayed as manifestations of Pakistani 'interference'. Mrs Gandhi was fond of referring to the 'foreign hand' as metaphor for machinations by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Division (ISI) and the CIA. Similarly, Pakistan today blames its troubles in Balochistan and elsewhere on Indian 'interference'. While such accusations can in some instances have a measure of truth (which makes them all the more plausible), in part also the tensions they relate to arise from pre-existing sets of difficulties that are locally generated and that cannot wholly be attributed to the neighbour.

As well as factors emanating from within South Asia, two major geo-strategic shifts are now affecting the sub-region. The idea of global, violent, *jihad*, aligned as it is with a growing tendency towards an erosion of syncretic versions of Islam within South Asia, has provided a religious-ideological basis for groups to link up across borders, such as the conspicuous linkage between the Student's Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) in India and L-e-T in Pakistan.

A second, geo-strategic shift affecting South Asia has been the rise of China. China's presence has given a 'Kautilyan' option to the smaller nations surrounding the regional 'giant', India. A cashed-up China is also able to meet their development needs in ways that India has not yet found the means or methods to match. Added to this, a US that is experiencing growing concern about the rise of China in Asia is increasingly viewing its relationship with India as a possible long-term hedge against China's rise. The fact that so many internal and external factors troubling India are tightly enmeshed greatly complicates New Delhi's efforts to alleviate both areas of dissonance. For example, it cannot solve pressing domestic issues such as terrorism without solving the 'problem' of Pakistani interference and support; and it is difficult to solve the 'problem' of Pakistan while the latter is so closely enmeshed with wider global concerns like Beijing's 'strategic' relationship and the role of Pakistan in the global 'war on terrorism'.

Indian 'strategies'

Given the closely interwoven sets of domestic and neighbourhood problems explored above, two approaches would seem to suggest themselves as a 'minimum' of a viable 'strategy' – recognising that 'strategy' may be either implicit or explicit – for India's rise to power. India would firstly need to consolidate its domestic polity in terms of resolute government action to assert democracy and internal security and thus make itself less vulnerable to external interference; and it would need to find a way at least to 'neutralise' the South Asia region as a security factor.

Given the fluidities of a large, heterogeneous and democratic state such as India and the fact 'strategies' may be implicit rather than explicit, we require a proxy with which to test the policies of the Indian state. How the state chooses to dispose of its *available* financial resources would appear to provide such a proxy, if a somewhat crude one.

One indicator of the desire to acquire force projection over time is the percentage of available money that is spent on conventional defence, as opposed to other heads such as internal security, development, education, health and welfare. It is in the budget context that real priorities must be thrashed out by the respective interests within the government. (But we would also note the substantial role of the Army in maintaining internal and border security, which effectively means that the figures quoted below are only partly indicative of the emphasis on internal security over force projection).

In these terms, Indian defence spending has been remarkably constant across the tenure of several governments over the last 17 years, ranging between lows of 12.9 per cent of total spending in 2007-08 and 2008-09 and a high of 15.9 per cent in 2005-06 (Calculated from Government of

India, *Budget Papers, Annexures, 'Trends in Expenditure'*). By way of comparison, expenditure on defence as a percentage of US central government total expenditure is typically in the region of 23 per cent.

Another interesting development within the overall category of security spending is the progressive increase in internal and border security costs in relation to traditional military spending. Since 9/11, the percentage share of homeland security (not including the Coast Guard, state police or Army) in relation to defence spending has risen from 11.76 per cent in 2000-01 to 18.5 per cent in 2009-10 (*Indian Budget and Economic Survey*). Union Government spending on its own as opposed to state police forces also rose by 126 per cent in nominal terms over the same period (Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report, 2008-09*) and concentration on close-in coastal defence also rose dramatically following 26/11.

New Delhi's increasing re-allocation of its over-all security spending towards internal and border security and 'continental' defence against near neighbours like Pakistan tends to detract from military modernization and development of force projection capability. The share of defence spending on the 'blue water navy' – the classic tool of force projection – has remained in percentage terms fairly constant over the last few decades, shifting only from 13 per cent of the defence budget in 1994 to 14.5 per cent today. This percentage share is low for a power seeking a force projection capability: it compares with a percentage share for the US Navy of 26 per cent.

India is also intent on facing internal challenges of poverty and development in preference to ardent power seeking behaviour. This has been particularly pronounced under the UPA government, in office since 2004. The UPA has issued a number of documents attempting to chronicle its successes. Although some of this work consists of hagiography, it may tell us something of value. For example, in its document, *Report to the People 2004-2008*, the government emphasised the 'growth with balance' mantra. Plan expenditure on health is claimed to have more than doubled in nominal terms between 2003-04 and 2008-08; and Plan expenditure on education has increased nearly five times over the same period. Heavy emphasis is placed on uplifting minorities, with special sections on Muslims, the North East and Kashmir. The Eleventh Five Year plan document also emphasises "inclusive growth".

The UPA program has involved two substantial, flagship social uplift programs – one a food for work program under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA – now with the prefix Mahatma Gandhi NREGA) and the other a rural dept forgiveness program. By 2009-10, MGNREGA had evolved into a massive, demand-driven scheme costing about US\$8.4 bn. Although plagued by corruption and incompetence, the scheme has been closely audited and is slowly growing in transparency and effectiveness. Parliamentary reservations for women, the passage of

the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act and a number of other measures introduced by the UPA also signal an interest in diffusion of internal tensions through social and economic reform.

Following the security *débâcle* represented by the attacks on Mumbai of 26/11, India also entered into a comprehensive reform of its governance and internal security apparatus under the vigorous Home Minister, P. Chidambaram. This process is far-reaching in terms of expenditure and initiatives but still incomplete in two important respects: reform of the ramshackled, state-controlled police; and reform of governance mechanisms (Gordon, *India's Unfinished Security Revolution*).

Governance remains parlous and adds a substantial risk to strategies of the central government to 'spend its way' towards a more equal and stable society. As the Ministry of Home Affairs noted in its 2008-09 *Annual Report*: "Naxalites [Maoist insurgents] operate in the vacuum created by functioning inadequacies of field level governance structures H"

Moreover, sub-regional security problems, such as in Kashmir and the North East, mean there has been an uneven spread of benefits and human rights and democracy. In the North East and Kashmir, populations are under the sway of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). There are also problems with the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), even though it is an improvement on the Act it replaced (POTA) (Amnesty International Public Statement 3 March 2008, AI Index ASA 20/003/2008). In addition, there is evidence of use of torture by police and 'encounter' killings throughout India (Gordon, op cit, pp16-29).

Although India's democracy is flawed in some respects, the domestic components of a 'grand strategy' are discernible in the activities of the UPA. Such a strategy, while not necessarily consciously pursued or explicit, involves internal security and governance consolidation and reform, along with measures designed to include all elements of Indian society in the development process, while deferring allocation of significantly greater shares of available resources on power acquisition. This kind of approach of deferring power acquisition in favour of development broadly mirrors the strategy *initially* followed by that other mega-population power carrying a significant burden of poverty – China.

But in India's case, there is a second broad area of risk that needs to be addressed. India's strategies in South Asia are not being pursued with the same determination and vigour as the domestic strategies.

Some assert that India is doing all it can in respect of SAARC and South Asia and that time will be needed "for liberal-rationalism in other [non-Indian South Asian] states to find favour." (Ali Ahmed, 'South Asia at the CrossRoads', *South Asian Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009, pp. 335-345, p. 345). An example of resistance to India's good intentions is trade flows between India and Pakistan, which remain low despite the fact that under

the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) arrangements introduced in 2006, tariffs between the two are nominally low. Although India has granted MFN status to Pakistan, this has not been reciprocated, and meanwhile, Islamabad has signed a FTA with China.

Others argue that despite these manifest difficulties, India as the bigger power should act towards its neighbours and SAARC with “strategic altruism”. One area in which ‘strategic altruism’ could operate is the aid program.

It appears on first glance that India’s aid contribution to South Asia is relatively handsome given its own high levels of poverty. Of the total aid program of 1704 *core* (US \$ 360 million) for 2007-08, 94.6 per cent was earmarked for South Asia. Two countries that could be considered ‘special’, however, make up the lion’s share of this amount. Aid to Afghanistan was Rs 434 *core* and to Bhutan was Rs 731 *crore*. A case can be made to discount most of these amounts: Afghanistan is a venue for India’s strategic struggle with Pakistan, and Bhutan is a tiny, landlocked, strategically important mountain kingdom (population 687,000) that exists on heavy subsidies from India. If these amounts were subtracted, then the remaining sum is quite modest – Rs 539.03 *crore* (US\$114 million) (MEA Annual Report 2007-08). To put the aid program further in context, India’s total aid program of US\$360 million compares poorly with China’s aid program, which the World Bank estimated at up to US\$2 billion in 2007. Even accounting for the fact that China’s economy is over thrice the size of India’s, the proportion spent by India is not nearly as great, and deducting the ‘special’ expenditure in Afghanistan and Bhutan, the expenditure elsewhere in South Asia is minimal. It would seem from these data that there is considerable scope for additional Indian aid to South Asia.

Another feature of India’s South Asia aid program, however, is that Pakistan does not feature in it at all, except for the contribution to the recent floods. Probably this is a result of mutual choice. But even were Indian assistance to Pakistan feasible in non-sensitive areas, it is doubtful such assistance would do a great deal to untangle the knot of suspicion between the two. For India and Pakistan, a political breakthrough has to precede an economic breakthrough.

India’s problems with Pakistan should not, however, be taken as an excuse not to be more actively engaged elsewhere in South Asia. Strategically, India could adopt the tactic of ‘going around the edges’ of Pakistan in South Asia, in order to produce an area of prosperity in which Pakistan would have no option but eventually to participate.

One of the highlights of talks earlier this month in Washington between the U.S. and India was the Obama administration’s description of India as an emerging power not just in South Asia but throughout Asia. A joint statement issued after the talks said Washington welcomes India’s leadership role in helping to shape the rise of a stable, peaceful and

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prosperous Asia. Some analysts say this could sharpen the existing rivalry between India and China and determine Asia's future. "India is a leader in Asia and around the world," said President Barack Obama. "It's a rising power and a responsible global power." President Barack Obama at the India/US Strategic Dialogue. He said relations between the two countries will be a defining partnership in the 21st century.

This is the first time the U.S. has described India not just as a power in South Asia, but in all of Asia, says Teresita Schaffer, a senior South Asia analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS. "I think it is a very important shift in perspective on the U.S. part," said Teresita Schaffer.

That brings up the question, she says, of how India-U.S. relations connect with their relations with China.

"We have an interesting new model developing where nobody is interested in picking a fight with China, but where India and the United States have a strong interest in seeing that as Asia develops - the whole, large region - it develops with a kind of equilibrium among the major players," she said. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake agrees and points to India's recent "look-east" policy and its increasing influence in Southeast Asia. "And I think we've begun to really have a quite serious conversation about how the United States and India can work more together in Asia," said Robert Blake.

But India's increasing influence in Asia and, on top of that, its new strategic partnership with the United States may prove irksome for China, says Stephen Rosen of Harvard University. He says it might tempt China to force India to be deferential.

"Now that India is getting notions about economic growth, strategic partnership with the U.S., a somewhat more extended role globally, China might want to remind India that China really is India's daddy and any time China wants to beat up India it can," said Stephen Rosen.

But Jacqueline Niemeyer of Long Term Strategy Group says China does not have to confront India directly. It is doing so indirectly, she says, by making significant inroads in the South Asia countries surrounding India.

"It has already been publicly revealed that the Chinese are contributing to the port infrastructure in Gwadar in Pakistan, and in Sri Lanka," said Jacqueline Niemeyer. "And now the Indians are also facing a Chinese facility in a port in Bangladesh armed with Chinese supplied anti-ship missiles." She says India is already concerned about China's close military relations with Pakistan. "From India's point of view, China successfully has carried out a strategy of helping Pakistan - building up Pakistan's military, contributing to Pakistan's nuclear programs, contributing to Pakistan's infra-structure," she said.

And Stephen Rosen says China is also concerned about India's strategy in Tibet and its support to Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, who so far has been able to convince his followers that violence is not the answer. But he says the situation might change after his death. "The level of unrest in Tibet may go up and the Indian government may not simply walk away, saying whatever China does is acceptable to us," he said. "It might, but it might not."

Rosen says although India and China are trying to improve their economic and trade relations, both are vying for dominance in Asia.

Analysts agree that the newly-developed strategic partnership between India and the United States can go a long way in shaping Asia's future. They say the crucial factors in that would be the relations between India and China, and also their respective relations with the United States.

Conclusion

The UPA government has a broad approach to India's emergence as a regional and global power but has never articulated it in terms of a strategy. In essence, it is to delay some of the instruments of power projection while India achieves economic development and growth with balance, in an effort to uplift all the Indian people. The focus of this policy is on the welfare of the people and consequent benefits of political consolidation, while not unduly constraining the reforms and growth needed to pay for them. Prominent risks to the strategy include the interlocking problems of security and governance. India has made some significant advances on these fronts in recent years but has much more to do. Another risk relates to the stalled program to be more actively and positively engaged in South Asia, so all can 'rise on the same tide' along with India. Although India has articulated the desire to be more comprehensively engaged with its South Asian neighbours, it has not yet found a way to 'go round the edges' of Pakistan in order to do so. This component of the 'strategy' will be very difficult but deserves a great deal more attention.

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[2] France, Germany, Britain – Responses of Traditional Regional Powers to Rising Regions and Rivals]

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Algeria: Current Issues By Carol Migdalovitz

Limits of 2013 Electoral Mandate in Pakistan

Sudhir Singh

On 11 May, 2013 history has been created in Pakistan. First time since independence an elected government has successfully transferred the power to the elected majority party through internationally monitored election. It never happened in Pakistan since independence. This incident is a matter of pleasure and great satisfaction for a country which has been ruled by army almost half of its existence. At the same time it is a matter of pleasure for the international community too because Pakistan and Afghanistan remain den of international terrorism despite decade long '*Operation Enduring Freedom*' since October 2001 and series of drone attacks targeting areas near Afghan borderland which is safe heaven for gamut of terror organizations. This smooth democratic transition of power could be detrimental for the menace of terror. The focal question remains that the newly elected PML-N government has political will power to do so or not? It is one of the most pertinent research questions of this paper as well.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) emerged victorious and has got 181 seats in the National Assembly of 342 (including reserved seats for women & minorities) . Nawaz Sharif has become third time Prime Minister of the country. In his previous term (1997-1999) he was ousted by military dictator, Chief of the Armed Forces, General Pervez Musharaaf in October 1999.

The ruling Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was ousted due to non performance mainly on price rise and power cut but of course there were other factors which proved detrimental for the electoral marginalization of the PPP. However the PPP was able to maintain its stronghold of Sindh province and formed its government besides becoming opposition party at the central level. The much hyped Imran Khan's Tehreek-a-Insaff stood third party at the central level and formed its government with like minded parties in Khyber Pakhtunwah.

In 1997 election PML-N had two third majorities and the PPP had been reduced to merely 19 NA seats. In May 2013 election the PPP has secured 35 National Assembly mostly from the Sindh province but with its 39 strong members in the Senate (the strength of the Senate is 104 equally divided 23 seats each among all four states, 8 for FATA and 4 for Islamabad)¹, the PPP shall remain important power for consensual democratic governance. In Kyber-Pakhtunwah province the ruling Awami National Party was ousted

and Pakistan Tehrik-A-Insaf (PTI) led by cricket legend Imran Khan has emerged single largest party. It has also emerged as an important player at the national level with over 30 seats in the National Assembly. In Baluchistan , there are many small players. Nationalists have boycotted elections and in some districts less than 5 per cent votes were exercised. In the province of Punjab, which is over populated the PML-N has secured 90 per cent of seats for national as well as provincial assemblies.

How far this electoral mandate will be transformed in action; be it related to India, America, Afghanistan, military, mullah and nuclear safety. Welfare schemes compliance for the poorest of the poor is very ticklish and it is equally difficult to make any judgment right now about the Sharif government. These issues will be properly investigated within this paper. At the end some policy suggestions will be also be made to cope up with the situation.

Alarming Situation

At this juncture of time Pakistan is not confronting with gamut of odds but also facing the alarming situation. The entire surroundings of Pakistan are volatile (Miuns India). Pakistan and Afghanistan still remain as the global leaders of terror export. According to former President, Asif Ali Zardari till September 2012 more than 42,000 civilian and security personnel have already lost their precious lives. Pakistan use to keep Afghanistan under its own suzerainty since last many decades resulted into unbearable violence and needless to say that when by July 2014, NATO led forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan it will lead towards Hobbessian state of nature. Already Tehrik-A-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has threatened the writ of the state since last many years and intended to sustain the process till the rule of the Prophet (Nizam-A- Mushtafa) will not established over Pakistan. Although military professional reputation has been dented by the sustainability of terror but it has been able to safeguard their interests. Sectarian violence is also on rampage and many thousands people have been killed since last one decade through this menace. The health of the economy has also been critical and needs special treatment at urgent basis. The situation in Baluchistan is also critical and threatening the unity of the country. The situation in the financial hub Karachi is not much better and only in the year 2012, more than 2,000 people have been killed.

Sectarian Violence

General Zia-Ul-Haq implemented Hudood Ordinance in 1979. It was claimed by the cohorts of General Zia that it is a Himalayan step towards Islamisation. But one of the biggest sects within Islam, Shia refused to obey the dictates of this ordinance and termed it anti-Shia. The Shias are comparatively educated, progressive and land lord community constituting

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18-25 per cent of the overall population. General Zia appeased Shias at that point of time. It was the time when first elected Prime Minister, Z.A. Butto was ousted by Zia in July 1977 and he was mad for gaining legitimacy for his illegitimate regime. Coincidentally Bhutto was Shia therefore military perceived this movement detrimental to their hegemony. The military encouraged Sunni groups to retaliate and nurtured them. This remains sustainable phenomena till date. In recent year particularly after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 it is on rampage and thus eroded democratic space. Sectarian violence has emerged as a threat not only on democratic future but on Pakistan's unity and integrity. The all hyped TTP although claiming as the harbinger of Islam but killed scores of Shias throughout Pakistan and vowed to sustain the process. In December 2012 by election in Punjab which is main source of political strength to Sharif government, his provincial law minister (Rana Sanullah) struck a deal with these so called jihadi elements and they extended their support to the PML-N in that bye election and May 2013 elections as well. Hafeez Saeed is based in Lahore and despite \$ 5 million on his head declared by the US moving entire Pakistan and receiving donation from PML-N government of Punjab. In this situation it is candid clear that PML-N government is unable to yield any expected results.

Containment of terrorism

Pakistan still remains a den of global terrorism due to gamut of factors. Despite part of the global coalition it has not given up the temptation to use terror as strategic asset. The killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan is an ample proof that it is protecting terror network instead of erasing it. Nawaz Sharif was in Washington in October 2013. During his meeting with President Obama he raised the issue of Drone attacks and termed it as an infringement of the sovereignty of Pakistan. But the question remains that since last 8 years, drone strikes have killed almost 4000 people and even critics of drone strike claim that only 500 among them were innocent. It means that rests were terrorists. How have they taken shelter in Pakistan? Why sovereignty was not infringed due to their illegal presence in Pakistan? At domestic front September 2013 all party meeting gave the mandate to the government to negotiate with the TTP. Till date it has not been started and it is unable to yield any results because TTP declared goal is removal of the writ of the state. In the first week of November 2013 the TTP chief, Hakimullah Mehsud was killed through a drone and now TTP has negated any negotiation and vowed retaliation.

Baluchistan situation

Just after independence Baluchistan was not intended to merge with Pakistan. But Jinnah gave them an assurance that their autonomy will be

respected. Jinnah passed away soon and that assurance remains unfulfilled. It had triggered violence and till date it is sustainable. Asif Ali Zardari government (2008-2013) gave special package to Baluchistan but till date violence is rampant. In May 2013 elections majority of Baluch areas vote share was less than 10%. Baluch groups' declared goal is separation from Pakistan. Thousands of Baluch activists have been disappeared by the security forces and despite Supreme Court only few have been produced. It has posed a serious threat to the unity and integrity of the state. Only through accommodating the genuine grievances it could be contained but successive governments have opted military means to contain this insurgency. Due to this mode of resolution of the crisis, Baluch activists are now fighting a war of separation from Pakistan.

Declining economy and Grim Karachi Situation

In the year of 2006 Pakistan's economy grew with the growth of 8 per cent. After that it is dwindling and growth rate is below 4 per cent in 2013. Newly elected Nawaz Sharif took loans from IMF in September 2013 and somehow averted the crisis but how long it will be sustainable. According to the visiting IMF team to Pakistan "Eleven of 12 IMF programmes since 1998 have been scrapped or abandoned because Pakistan failed to institute reforms. "Governments have tried to 'game' the IMF, and achieved partial success each time," two former Fund officials concluded in a recent paper. This time round, Sharif has promised the IMF to privatize loss-making state industries, reform a faltering energy sector, expand Pakistan's tiny tax base and cut government borrowing. Just 0.57 per cent of Pakistani citizens paid income tax in 2012, contributing to one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio in the world. Public services are woefully under funded. Sharif plans to privatize 32 state-run companies, including two huge gas companies, the state oil company, several banks, the national airline and power distribution companies."²

Karachi is the hub of economic activities and contributes more than 1/4 in the entire economy but remains under the grip of all sorts of violence. The serious nature of the violence could be gauged with the fact that only in the year 2012 it has lost more than 2,000 lives. Law and order situation is grim and within this ambience the prospects of economic growth is dismal.

Charter of Democracy & Consensual Politics

Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were ousted twice by the misuse of 8th amendment between 1988-1999. In 1999 military came into power in the leadership of General Pervez Mushrraf. He ousted both from the country. In December 2006 when both were in exile they inked a deal in London called Charter of Democracy. In March 2008 , Benazir's party the PPP came into power and both PPP and the PML-N were alliance for few

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months. They pledged that they will implement CoD. Under this commitment supremacy of the parliament was established and President became ceremonial. Through 18th amendment this was inserted into constitution and therefore become part of the law.

Pakistan is a classic example of an interesting balance in the equation of power between the powerful political elite and the masses. It suggests that 'the masses are no longer interested in ideologies; instead they are learning to use elections to their own practical ends.'³ Thus, when political elites fail to satisfy their constituencies, a value change occurs. The masses look beyond democracy for other viable options and hence entertain the idea of dictatorship. In 1999 military take over comes within this category and Nawaz Sharif was the victim. 'Coincidentally Nawaz is in power now. He has comfortable majority in the National Assembly but lacks majority in the Senate and three out of four states is being ruled by the opposition therefore there is a possibility that focal points of CoD will remain sacred both for the opposition and the ruling party. Nawaz Sharif must ensure a consensus with the opposition parties on major issues particularly to defend democratic tradition otherwise military take over could be replicated.

Military an Obstacle

Since independence due to sudden departure of the founding fathers and other inherent characteristics, military has been dominant in Pakistan. Till date four military take over (1958, 1967, 1977, 1999) have taken place and military has ruled half of country's existence. Even when military is not in power military has its say over important issues like Kashmir, Afghanistan & Nuclear issue. The power of the military could be gauged by the fact that after December 1988 elections, the PPP emerged victorious and Benazir Bhutto became first women Prime Minister of the country. Before that General Zia was in power and his plane crash in August 1988 necessitated polls. His foreign minister was Sahabzada Yakoob Khan. When Benazir Bhutto became PM she accommodated Khan as her Foreign Minister on the pressure of the military despite the fact that he was elected from the opposition ticket and was Zia's Foreign Minister. It was merely because military was willing to sustain its Afghan policy. Even when civilian regime is ruling, military remains all powerful at least in defense sector and shaping foreign policy as well. It is reflected by the statement of Stephen P Cohen eminent expert on Pak military "Twenty years ago I argued that the central issue of Pakistani politics was rebalancing the civil-military relationship , and that a gradual, staged retreat from politics by the army , coupled with the demonstration of increasing competence by the civilians , might lead to the restoration of full democratic rule in the country. This not only undermined the degree of the military rule in Pakistan's widely supported by people who nominally favour democracy, it also did not anticipate the

severe economic and social problems exacerbated by ten years of flawed democracy.”⁴

Military rulers have always created teller made political parties to contain mainstream parties. During General Zia-Ul-Haq military rule (1977-1988) Nawaz Sharif rose to power and firstly became Chief Minister of Punjab province. He was elevated from his humble businessman background to contain the rising profile of Prime Minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo. Even in 1990 elections ISI did this job as the emergence of IJI (Islami Jamhori Ittehad) to counter balance the expected electoral victory of the PPP. During the 1990s elections, ISI obtained Rs.140 million from a banker and distributed most of this amount to the IJI and other leaders on the instructions of the then President and with the full knowledge of the chief of the army staff [COAS].⁵ In 2012 Supreme Court has given the long pending verdict in this case that money was distributed but accountability and punishment was not decided.

The prominence of the military has undermined the writ of the democratic regimes and prevented cordial relations with India and additionally kept terror as an instrument of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Military through these instruments kept its strategic assets ready to get revenge against India. When ever there is an urge in civilian government to ensure cordial relation with India, military has used these elements to derail the process. Right from the Kargil (1999) till date LOC skirmishes are vindicating this argument. According to an expert

‘ In politics , as in life in general , it is timing that is most crucial. And for now, it can be no matter of controversy that Pakistan is facing not just a crisis of democratic rule of good governance, but the crisis of the state . There seems to be too much at stake right now to wait for a political actor capable of pursuing all targets; civilization, democratization and good governance. And just as some people in Pakistan still await the introduction interest free banking, observe inside and outside Pakistan seem to wait for political actors who do not pursue their own –particular—interests. Everybody knows , they will not show up, even after the army’s return to the barracks.’⁶ Since March 2008 Pakistan is ruled by the civilian government but the dominance of the military remains significant and shaping many important policies beyond their writ.

India/America and Afghanistan

Pakistan India policy has been extremely critical since independence. Pakistani military perceives India as its immortal enemy. The monopoly of the military depends on this policy. In due process of time India has achieved new landmarks of development and Pakistan remains backward. Through three and half wars Pakistani army could not snatch Kashmir from India and therefore has adopted terror as an instrument to contain

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India. In the backdrop of NATO forces withdrawal by 2014 there is every possibility that Kashmir and rest of India will be facing of more terror onslaughts.

America has been very close to Pakistan since independence. It is said that Pakistan is ruled by triple A. Allah, Army and America. Although the space of America is shrinking in due course of time but still it keeps immense influence over Pakistan. But in post cold war scenario the United States has rebalanced its South Asia policy due to two particular reasons. According to Bruce Riedel noted expert of Pak-US affairs "In practice , however, America and its NATO allies are fighting a proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan , Washington , backed by the United Nations, supports the Karzai government while Islamabad backs Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban. A secret report leaked last year , titled, 'The State of the Taliban' held that Pakistan and the ISI are the critical patrons of the Taliban insurgency. According to over 27,000 interrogations of captured Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan , the ISI not only provides safe heaven, sanctuary and funds for the Taliban, its officers meet regularly to plan strategy against the NATO with Omar Quetta shura, without ISI help, the Taliban would not be the force , they are today."⁷

Right from Operation Enduring Freedom till date the US has given \$ 25 billion and security assistance to Pakistan. But Pakistan is not cooperating with NATO forces in Afghanistan. During his October 2013 Washington trip Prime Minister, Nawaz sharif addressed House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 22 October. The lawmakers criticized Pakistan's failure to try the Mumbai terror suspects and urged Sharif to restart the trial soon. The attack was so severe and delivered by so much ferocity that it had surprised the Prime Minister and he often had to be helped by his aids."⁸

This has enraged the US and it has now separated its India policy and perceiving India as an emerging global power. Now Pakistan has lost its previous ground in Washington. India and the United States have emerged as natural allies due to gamut of convergences of interests. In the meanwhile the United States has separated its South Policy from the Pakistan policy and now dealing Pakistan separately. Due to operation enduring freedom, the US gave \$ 25 billion to Pakistan since last 12 years but the level of trust has erased. The United States has understood that Pakistan is nurturing terror despite its pledge of cooperation. During his October Washington trip, Nawaz Sharif tried to establish parity with India but it was snubbed by the United States. Due to ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan since last 33 years, Pakistan has become extremely volatile and only ranks in terms of global violent ridden index after Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to the dominance of the military and pursuance of the concept of Strategic Depth in Afghanistan against India, Pakistan has become part of the problem of the global terror. The US was under impression that Pakistan is cooperating in its war against global terror but

Limits of 2013 Electoral Mandate in Pakistan

after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 at Abbotabad, the US has understood that Pakistan is part of the problem. All leading light of Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda are hiding in Pakistan and of course Pakistan state is aware about this. This situation has made Pakistan one of the worst places on the planet earth and undermined all possibilities of peace in South and South West Asia. Thomas Hobbes is probably witnessing Pakistani situation from his grave and feeling entirely satisfied that whatever he had imagined in his seminal Laviathan it is proving true in Pakistan. Pakistan needs urgent comprehensive measures to contain the Talibanisation of its society. In October 2013, Former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani has stated "The Policy tripod I wrote about has become less sustainable. Among the factors that have changed is the stress within Pakistan. The issue of India as an eternal enemy has come under a lot of strain. Before the Bin Laden raid, Pakistan was a subject discussed only among American foreign policy experts. Now Pakistan has become part of the American pop culture. Pakistan's elite should embrace a new liberal paradigm. There is no eternal enemy of Pakistan, there is no existential threat to Pakistan, it should maintain an effective military, it should maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent, and after that it should focus on education its people. Put our 48% children who do not go to school into schools, open up the economy, organize agriculture, create jobs, take advantage of being at the centre of trade ties from India to Central Asia, from Iran to India, from the Middle East to India and China. For 66 years, the elite have thought that Pakistan is strategically important because it sits at the crossroads of conflict. I say that Pakistan should now look at itself as sitting at the crossroads of opportunity."⁹

Judiciary/Media

Judiciary in Pakistan has been weak since independence. But in last few years it has gained the momentum but it is partial. During PPP regime it was chasing President Asif Ali Zardari but at the same time not so active since Nawaz Sharif has taken over in June 2013. Judiciary must be neutral in any democratic system but in Pakistan it has been pro regime and even legitimized the legalities of military regimes. It is improving but lot is required in this direction.

Media has played positive role in Pakistan. Since last few years due to increasing space of media it has acted perfectly as the fourth pillar of the democracy. But eminent journalist Salim Sahzad was brutally killed by the security agencies just after Osama killing in May 2011 but nothing happened till date. These kinds of incidents are sustainable and have reduced the moral of the media.

Policy Suggestions

It is an uphill task to cope with the prevailing situation. PML-N had two third majorities in previous regime (1997-1999) too but it could not change the game and thrown out of power by the military. The challenges are so grim that it requires plenty of remedies to cope with the situation. First of all, Nawaz Sharif must learn reconciliation policies from former President Zardari and emulate it. He had signed Charter of Democracy (CoD) with Benazir Bhutto in December 2006, when both were in exile in London. Sharif has given due respect to CoD by not to cross decency line while in opposition but it must also be reflected through his policies when he is in power. He must forge a working relationship with all opponents and pursue the things accordingly. For India/America and Afghanistan he must be extremely cautious and does not need to confront the military. He needs to take military in confidence before taking crucial steps. Since last three decades Pakistan has witnessed the devastation of Afghan war on her own soil. Stability and autonomy of Afghanistan is in the larger interests of Pakistan and it must be reflected by Sharif's government behavior.

The PPP government had already given much needed twist to India-Pakistan relations despite the deadly intervention of terror through 2008 Mumbai attack. Sharif must pursue the same formula. Pakistan and India must emulate India-China model where thorny issue of boundary has not been resolved despite many rounds of high voltage negotiations but economic relationship is quite well. They can keep Kashmir issue like that and must go ahead in other cooperative arena.

The Pak-US relationship has been dented a lot since the elimination of Bin Laden in May 2011 from Abbotabad. It has exposed the double game of the Pakistani military. By 2014 US led NATO forces are going to withdraw from Afghanistan. The year 2014 will be crucial for both Pakistan and America. Sharif government must remember that pursuance of military agenda is all set to embolden prominence of the army and reduce the role of the civilian government. It is the issue which will determine Pak-US relationship in foreseeable future.

If Sharif government will be able to foster average to good relations with India and US as well as Afghanistan, it will be positive factor for his government. This process will ensure domestic success of the government too. It will also helpful to contain sectarian violence which has emerged as an important menace. Baluch situation is beyond the debate of autonomy therefore it needs special efforts.

Economic improvement is also connected by and larger with the compliance of these comprehensive policies. Needless to say that challenges are of Himalayan size but better policies with the strong will power could ensure better result for Pakistan. It is a situation which ensures the solid resolution

of now or never. He has to fix the economy as well and for that he needs to take strong action instead of shedding crocodile tears.

Concluding Remarks

Right now Pakistan is confronting one of the worst times in its entire history of 67 years. Militancy, sectarian violence, criminal syndicate and terrorism all menace are on rampage. Economy is not picking up. People are frustrated. Nawaz Sharif has to confront all these prevailing burning issues. But his options are limited. First important and powerful obstacle is military because any real progress in these turbulent issues will be against the interests of the military. Secondly, the situation is so grim that it could be safely said that Pakistan is a failing state. Managing this mess needs immense dedication and political will. It also required speedy economic growth with inclusion of ethnicity and region. It also needs abnormal transformation in the vision of the rulers. Former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani has rightly stated "The Policy tripod I wrote about has become less sustainable. Among the factors that have changed is the stress within Pakistan. The issue of India as an eternal enemy has come under a lot of strain. Before the Bin Laden raid, Pakistan was a subject discussed only among American foreign policy experts. Now Pakistan has become part of the American pop culture. Pakistan's elite should embrace a new liberal paradigm. There is no eternal enemy of Pakistan, there is no existential threat to Pakistan, it should maintain an effective military, it should maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent, and after that it should focus on education its people. Put our 48 per cent children who do not go to school into schools, open up the economy, organize agriculture, create jobs, take advantage of being at the centre of trade ties from India to Central Asia, from Iran to India, from the Middle East to India and China. For the last 66 years, the elite have thought that Pakistan is strategically important because it sits at the crossroads of conflict. I say that Pakistan should now look at itself as sitting at the crossroads of opportunity."¹⁰

It is an open secret and matter of deep satisfaction that it is maiden opportunity when peaceful democratic transition has been completed in the backdrop of country's turbulent history. But the fact remains that whenever democracy comes in Pakistan it is becoming prone to military intervention. Right from Z.A. Bhutto till 1999 it has been the reality. First few months of Sharif have been problematic and violence is increasing and foreseeable future could be ticklish to deal. NATO withdrawal is scheduled for 2014 and this will be litmus test for democratic experience. The fact remains without a stable Afghanistan, Pakistan could not be stable. But the problem lies that army did not think on the same page.

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Real actions on these issues are not easy but if Pakistan has to remain as a sustainable country it has to achieve all these goals. Sharif has just completed honeymoon period in his new avatar of Prime Minister after 14 years but he is aware about the fact that he has limitations. In present state of Pakistan it is enormous. The most turbulent issue for him will be civil- military relations particularly in the wake of post 2014 NATO withdrawal in Afghanistan. Second serious threat will be from the Jehadi network. Sharif has struck a deal with them and came into power but how he will deal with them now it is important.

Only through consensual politics some slow but steady progress could be made. These are the practical limits of the mandate given by May 2013 election to Nawaz Sharif.

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Small neighbour, big stakes: Geo-strategic importance of Maldives to India

S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni

The geopolitical location of India as a hub in the Indian Ocean beset with relatively smaller neighbours like Maldives poses a challenge as well as an opportunity. The challenge is to calibrate India's interests into the overall regional security architecture by taking into account not only the major powers and extra regional actors but also the smaller powers in the area. India as an emerging power and an important player in the Asian century has stakes not just in the economic angle but in the strategic sense too. India has the potential to be a major power in Asia in general and the Indian Ocean in particular but some aspects of her power have not been fully utilized. Relations with countries like Maldives hold special import due to their impact on the overall strategic calculus of India. It is pertinent to first locate India's significance in the Indian Ocean and vice versa and bring out the position Maldives in the scheme of things to discern the link between the tiny island and its mega neighbour.

Indian Ocean to India

The Indian Ocean Region possesses a wealth of resources, both living in the form of abundant marine life and non-living in the form of mineral and ore deposits and fossil fuel. The Indian Ocean is one of the principal sea routes of the world. An estimated 40% of the world's oil production comes from the IOR.¹ According to Robert Kaplan, the Indian Ocean currently accounts for half of the world's container traffic². It is not only the economic component of the Indian Ocean that highlights its importance. Being the only all-time navigable ocean (while the others are covered with ice in many regions), Indian Ocean gains added fillip. For India, the Indian Ocean is the lifeline of its economy, with nearly 90% of trade sea-bound. Also its energy security is ensured through the transportation of oil from the Persian Gulf as India imports about 70 percent of its oil through the Indian Ocean Region to its various ports. The disruption of energy flows in particular is a considerable security concerns for littoral states, as a majority of their energy lifelines are sea-based. Since energy is critical in influencing the geo-political strategies of a nation, any turbulence in the supply has serious security concerns.

Named after India and bordering all of its 7512 km shoreline, Indian Ocean assumes increased importance. India's prime position in the Indian Ocean has provided the platform in ancient times to forge extensive contacts, both trade and cultural, with many parts of the world. That influence in some areas endures to this day. The significance was lost in the later years. Now, there is increased pressure to relook at this facet of national power – sea power.

Sea power possesses as one of its components the ability to utilize the sea to achieve national interests. As a maritime economy, India primarily depends on the sea. The safety of the sea lanes is thus paramount to India's economic strength. India as a growing economy has quadrupling oil needs and depends heavily on oil imports. With a population that would be the highest in the world in the next few decades, India's energy needs are ever increasing. India is currently the world seventh largest oil consumer and is expected to become the fifth largest by 2020. As one of the largest consumers of petroleum products, India's energy security is of paramount importance. A major portion of this is to be fulfilled by imports while other means of transport like the pipelines over land or under the sea are still on the drawing boards, ships through "vulnerable sea lanes" will be the major routes³. The Persian Gulf has emerged one of the main suppliers of energy fuel. Thus, the safety of SLOCs is a prime strategic and economic requirement.

Not only economic but security issues also retain India's interest in the Indian Ocean Region. Piracy off the African coast especially the Somali waters, has now been acknowledged to be a global concern. The sea lanes cross African waters which have become a security nightmare with Somali pirates hijacking many ships and now holding hostages for ransom. The problem has heightened to such magnitudes that it has warranted an international response. As one of the closest neighbours, India has much at stake to keep the waters safe. India's maritime economy and energy dependence make SLOC safety a crying need. The Indian Navy has played a very active role in curtailing and at times preventing possible piracy attempts and also succeeded in rescuing hijacked ships. The movement of the pirates further east towards India's western shores only means need for more vigil and investment of men and machines. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard launched 'Operation Island Watch' in December 2010 designed to man the uninhabited island territories of India to prevent them from becoming havens for pirates. The task force consists primarily of three to four ships that are based along the western seaboard along with land based Dornier DO 228 aircrafts for long-range reconnaissance.⁴

India has for long, adopted a land-based approach to defending its territory. However, the long, porous and largely unguarded coasts now pose a grave threat. The non-state actors like terrorists could use the waters to reach

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the mainland comparatively easily or could exploit the remoteness of islands around India to use them as bases to launch attacks.

The significance of the Indian Ocean and its importance to India cannot be overemphasized. American Naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan envisioned “In the 21st century the destination of the world will be decided upon its (Indian Ocean) waters”.⁵ The Indian Ocean region now houses more than half the world’s armed conflicts. It is also witnessing strategic developments like the rise of China and India, American interventions and now withdrawal in Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamist terrorism, growing incidence of piracy in and around the Horn of Africa, and the problem of diminishing fishery resources. The Indian Peninsula juts into the Indian Ocean thus providing us unhindered access to far-flung areas of not only Asia but Africa too⁶. India’s influence is growing and this is being acknowledged even by external powers. In its 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review the US for example sees India as a “net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond”.⁷

Strategically too, Indian Ocean has remained the mainstay of Indian naval ambitions. In fact, the publication of India’s new *Maritime Doctrine* is quite explicit on the central status of the Indian Ocean in Indian strategic thought and on India’s determination to constitute the most important influence in the region as a whole⁸. India’s Maritime Doctrine identifies the arc extending from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits as being an area of interest. The Indian Navy in its attempt to achieve blue water status would view the Indian Ocean as its principal area of vision and expansion. One of the tools that could fulfill India’s aspirations to exert influence is the capacity building of the Indian Navy⁹.

India’s potential of being a future superpower or great power rests on her ability to utilize the strategic value of the Indian Ocean and optimize the benefits. As Australia’s Ambassador to US¹⁰ opines ‘In the long-term the Indian Ocean is going to be massively more significant in global politics than it has ever been before!’ India’s future thus is intrinsically linked with the Indian Ocean as a naval power - overseeing and having a strategic role.¹¹

By Geoffrey Till’s definition, sea power is the ability to possess control over a defined area and has the following constituents namely, not only the physical strength or number of ships possessed; the financial capability to maintain a force; maritime geography that factors in the topography of coasts, presence of harbours, access to open ocean; easy link between the other parts and these assets; maritime economy and doctrine or the conceptual component to put the limited resource to optimal use but more importantly the capacity to influence the behaviour of others by events at sea¹². Thus the sea and sea power continue to occupy a significant position in a country’s strategic calculus. India with all its advantages related to the sea could be a strong sea power.

Maldives and the world

Located in the Indian Ocean just across the Equator, Maldives is a group of 1190 islands separated as ring-like atolls. It is among one of the world's smallest countries. However it assumes significance as it lies astride major maritime routes of the world. Recently, the growing concern regarding rising sea levels across the globe have triggered fears that this tiny island country could be submerged in the next decade. With a population of less than quarter of a million, Maldives is a micro state. Like other micro-states, Maldives also has small size, narrow resource base, difficult geographical configuration and relative proximity to big neighbours. Its security dependence has been implicitly accepted by a powerful regional neighbour in India.

As a country that is located directly in the path of major sea routes, Maldives needs to ensure sea lane safety. The large exclusive economic zone could also pose a problem for the tiny nation. The numerous islands makes it virtually impossible to police. It could give unchecked space for illegal activities like contraband smuggling, narcotic and human trafficking. Worse still, secluded islands could become havens for terrorists and even pirates. This is particularly worrying for India as her island territories such as Lakshadweep are just 60 nautical miles away from Maldives. The recent increase in piracy incidents off Somalia and its feared spread to other Indian Ocean regions highlights the importance of countries like Maldives.

The vulnerability of major sea lanes to piracy especially around countries like Maldives that have inadequate manpower and equipment to monitor the seas, is another cause for concern. There is also an environmental element attached to this. If the large variety of ships that ply through these waters illegally dump toxic wastes and other unwanted substances around its vicinity, the country's economy will suffer. This is because Maldives is a tourism dependent economy.

Illegal and overexploitation of marine resources could be yet another issue for this island nation. If such activity is undertaken by foreign trawlers, it could elicit adverse response from local fishermen who could either attack such trawlers or adopt other tougher measures like piracy. Thus "the need to maintain round-the-clock surveillance and reconnaissance of the Exclusive Economic Zones is perhaps the biggest challenge before Maldives and has the potential to undermine national security"¹³.

In September 2007, a bomb targeting Chinese, Japanese and British tourists went off in Malé's Sultan Park. This has raised fears that the islands could become havens for terrorists who could use them as bases to target India's western seaboard and even Europe.¹⁴ This together with the fact that a moderate version of Islam is being replaced by the more hardline Wahabi and Salafi forms raises tension. There are even reports of Maldivians undergoing training in Pakistan and ties with the Al Qaeda. Both the ruling

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and opposition parties have been seen to be inadequate in dealing with extremists.

The domestic political climate of the island nation is in a flux and the rise of Islamic extremism is also to be closely watched. While the country practiced a 'moderate form of Islam', recent upheavals and the emergence of radical elements in Maldivian society add to the heightened attention. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism is the looming threat to the small nation state. As early as 2007 a report compiled by attorney general Dr. Hassan Saeed and cabinet members in March called for "an overhaul of Maldives' Supreme Islamic Council, even school curriculum and media"¹⁵ to disseminate moderate Islamic teachings. The destruction of the historical artifacts at Male museum, the SAARC monument and Buddha idols and call for closing down of spas spread across the country, banning of liquor throughout the country and the implementation of the Sharia Law all show the looming threat of fundamentalism in an otherwise moderate Islamic country.¹⁶

Maldives - then and now

From the strategic angle it is essential to have a brief look at Maldives political history to understand the impact of the recent change. Being a part of the pan Asian cultural and economic exchange in ancient times, Maldives carries colonial influences too. In the ancient times it supplied cowrie shells that were used as currency all over Asia. Later during the sixteenth century it came under the influence of colonial powers like Portugal, Netherlands and England. However later it was ruled by Sultans for a long time before it was declared a republic in 1968 under Mohammed Nasir. Later, Maumoom Abdul Gayoom ruled for 30 years and declared Maldives an Islamic republic. His rule was marked by religious radicalization and political instability as three attempted coups to oust him from power were made. In fact, India played a principal role in averting the coup in 1988 that attempted overthrow the government of the then President, Gayoom, when they rescued hostages aboard the boat *Progress Light* and apprehended the hijackers. The mission titled *Operation Cactus* is seen as an example of India's readiness to step in whenever the island country is in trouble.

Now there has been another coup in which the President Nasheed was overthrown. India brokered a peace deal between the opposition and the incumbents. The fresh elections that were held on September 7, 2013 have now been cancelled by the Maldivian apex court. The democratic process thus needs to be completed by November 11 which the constitution of the country has set as the date by which a President sworn in.¹⁷ The new date for elections slated to be held on November 9 has been opposed by the Progressive Party of Maldives.¹⁸ India is watching the developing situation closely.

Benevolent India

The tsunami of 2004 brought extensive destruction to this island nation. India extended ready assistance for subsequent relief operations. Named *Operation Castor*, the Indian Navy carried relief material to far flung areas and reached areas with non-existent harbours using helicopters. India dispatched *INS Mysore*, *INS Udayagiri* and *INS Aditya* equipped with rescue helicopters, water purification plants and medical teams, supplies and relief equipment to Male. The Indian Coast Guard Ship *ICGS Vigraha* transported relief material to the South and North Nilandhe Atoll of southern group of Maldives¹⁹.

India has also been undertaking hydrographic surveys in 2006, 2007 and 2009 and has brought out the navigational charts of Male Atoll, Northern Male Atoll and approaches. The survey for claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) under UNCLOS by Maldives has also been undertaken by India.

India has extensively assisted Maldivian armed forces by providing equipment, training and technological facilities to help monitor the security of this island country. The DOSTI series of joint exercises is a bi-annual event involving the two coastguards. In 2006, India transferred the fast-attack craft *INS Tillanchang* to be used for patrol and search and rescue operations in Maldivian waters in an effort to check illegal poaching and drug trafficking.²⁰ Indian navy vessels patrol along the archipelago's many coastlines and watch over its sea lanes.²¹ In April 2010 India transferred the multi-purpose helicopter *Dhruv* to MNDF and even performed the refit of the CGS *Huravee*, a Trinkat Class fast attack craft built for the Maldives Coast Guard and transferred in 2006.²² In October 2011, a Dornier maritime patrol aircraft was based in Male for three weeks to carry out surveillance and keep up the anti-piracy vigil of the Indian Ocean region.²³ Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has also set up a chain of coastal radars on all 26 atolls for the island nation. This would be linked with the already existent coastal radar system on Indian soil. The training of elite forces of the Maldives National Defence Forces (MNDF) in counter insurgency warfare has also been conducted in Belgaum.²⁴ There is also a proposal to commence ferry service between India and Maldives.²⁵ This would substantially reduce the transit time for cargo transported from Kerala and Tamilnadu which is now being routed through far flung ports like Singapore and Dubai. A feasibility study of development of the Kulduffushi port in Maldives is also proposed to be undertaken.

Climate change is also one of the top concerns of Maldives as rising sea levels are feared to literally wipe the country off the face of the earth. The Maldives cabinet in 2009 highlighted the importance of climate change by holding a meeting underwater where they signed a document calling all nations to cut carbon emissions the principal reason for temperature

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increases which directly affect sea levels.²⁶ In the effort to address climate change, the country also seeks India's help in accessing new technologies and data-gathering.²⁷ India has already promised to share energy efficient technologies and award scholarships to Maldivian students to pursue coastal zone management and adaptation courses.²⁸ In fact, India is also being seen as possible relocation country of the future. The ousted President Nasheed had actually announced setting aside of an yet-undisclosed portion of the tourism revenue to create a Global Warming Relocation Fund that would help the entire population by buying land in countries like Sri Lanka, India or Australia.²⁹

Assistance has been extended in a variety of areas including trade and investment, food security, fisheries development, tourism, transportation, information technology, new and renewable energy, communications and enhancing connectivity by air and sea. According to the CIA Factbook, India is the third biggest trading partner of Maldives.³⁰ India has invested extensively in Maldives. India-Maldives bilateral trade stands at 83.49 Million US\$ and heavily in favour of India. While Indian exports to the Maldives (2009-10) were worth 79.86 Million US\$, imports were little over 3.63 Million US\$. However, the bilateral trade declined substantially from the previous year due to the impact of global recession on the country's tourism industry. Indian imports from the Maldives primarily comprise scrap metals while Indian exports to the Maldives include agriculture and poultry produce, sugar, fruits, vegetables, spices, rice, atta, textiles, drugs and medicines, a variety of engineering and industrial products, sand and aggregate, cement for building etc. In the recent past, GMR Infrastructure Global Limited, a subsidiary of GMR Infrastructure, Suzlon Energy Limited and Shri Educare of Delhi have signed agreements in developing an international airport at Hanimadhoo, to set up a 25 MW wind farm in the Southern Province of Maldives and taking over the management of Ghiyassudin School in Male respectively. Another company Universal empire infrastructure limited is setting up a knowledge and medical hub in Maldives through a \$200 million joint venture.³¹ The Tata owned Taj group of hotels has invested in the tourism sector with a high-end resort and spa. Construction of a hospitality and tourism studies centre is also underway. Apollo Hospitals (India) has also signed an Agreement with the Government of Maldives in January 2010 to manage the affairs of the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital (IGMH), Male. It was opened in 1995 and acts as the principal tertiary care hospital in the entire country. The hospital will undergo massive renovation with a Rs 37.24 crore assistance from India. Even today, more than half of all Maldivians visiting India seek medical care. The MoU was signed during the Prime Minister's visit to Maldives last year.³² India will also soon build the National Police Academy of Maldives. Two-way trade between India and the Maldives was around Rs.400 crore in 2009-10. India's state-owned banks have invested in the Maldives economy by extending credits to sectors such as

housing.³³ The signing of trade agreements by Indian companies with the Government of Maldives and the assistance offered by the Indian government to Maldives promotes stronger economic linkages between the two countries.

However, the airport project has run into rough weather with the present Maldivian government terminating the contract with GMR.³⁴ India has reacted by putting on hold \$25 million government budgetary aid to the country.³⁵ The Chinese entry into areas where India has had a stake is of particular concern.

Tread of Red

This can be seen as part of the Chinese foray to gain a foothold in the entire Indian Ocean region. China's trade ties are booming with the Chinese government offering preferential loans to companies taking up infrastructural projects in Maldives. Chinese tourists are also making Maldives their favourite destination. Nearly 22% of all tourists were Chinese in 2012. China plans to develop transshipment ports in the islands of Ihavandhoo and Maarandhoo Islands, in the Haa Alif atoll incidentally closest to India and Sri Lanka³⁶. There are reports of the establishment of a Chinese naval submarine base in Marao, an island in Maldives.³⁷ China has also opened an embassy, the first by a non-South Asian country, just days ahead of the November 2011 SAARC summit meeting.³⁸ The Maldivian President Waheed Hassan has visited China to attend the Second China Eurasia Expo at Urumqi the capital of Xinjiang. The Chinese have signed assistance to the tune of \$500 million including a preferential loan of \$150 million to build 1500 houses in Maldives. Chinese imports have more than doubled in a year to reach \$68.9 million.³⁹

The fears of increased Chinese presence have heightened with allegations that the GMR contract was terminated by "vested interests" who wished to give the airport operation contract to a Chinese firm. Just a day after the termination, Chinese defence minister Gen Liang Guanglie met his Maldivian counterpart to pledge firming up of military relations between the two countries.⁴⁰ IT and communication areas are watched keenly by India with reports of Chinese telecommunication companies proposing to develop Maldivian IT infrastructure. This does not augur well for India as China "can utilize" Maldives network once the Smart Maldives project is implemented.⁴¹

Conclusion

India has been a constant supporter of Maldives in times of development and security need⁴². The significance of the geostrategic location of the island nation in the Indian Ocean only augments India's interest in it. The

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vital sea lanes that move the major part of world trade pass through Maldivian waters. With the shift in the locus of piracy incidents to African shores, the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean gain added importance. The remoteness of various islands of Maldives poses a challenge as they could form safe havens for pirates or other criminal elements. India is helping the MNDF in monitoring the islands by setting up a chain of radars that are networked. India has also donated helicopters like Dhruv and other equipment for maritime reconnaissance. It is continuously conducting joint exercises with the Coast Guard of Maldives. Now this Dhosti series includes Sri Lanka too.⁴³ Thus, India in its interest in the Maldives demonstrates its responsibility of being a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region.

India extended immediate relief in the wake of the tsunami destruction in 2004 to neighbouring countries including Maldives. The possible submergence of the entire country due to rising sea levels resulting from climate change effects is another important problem. India continues to share technology that would help monitor climate change. Maldives is also looking at India as a future destination for migrant populations if the country submerges.

India is one of the most important trading partners of Maldives. The commercial relations are only set to grow with India investing in a variety of areas. Both enjoy MFN status in trade relations. India also has extensive political relations with this island state. In fact, India was the first to accord recognition to Maldives. Maldives had also sought India's support to quell a coup that sought to oust Maumoon Abdul Qayyoom. India successfully put down the attempt. In November 2011, when Manmohan Singh attended the SAARC Summit in Male, he became the first foreign head of government to address the Maldivian Parliament or Peoples' Majlis ever⁴⁴. This is yet another example of the level of friendship between the two countries. In the recent change too, India played a major role in brokering peace between the factions. China's attempt at increasing its influence in the region through strengthening of ties with Maldives is yet another point of concern. Thus, India and Maldives possess strong strategic, economic, and political reasons to sustain and nurture their relations. The regime change and the rise of Islamic fundamentalists in Maldives' political arena are to be watched intently by India. Its vulnerability to piracy and even terrorist activities make Maldives an important element in India's Indian Ocean security calculus. Maldives requires help from India as its closest big neighbour and the value of the island nation in shoring up sea lane safety emphasise the mutuality of interest for a strong and deep bilateral relationship.

While India needs to engage big powers in the region and beyond, it is also pertinent that India takes special interest in enhancing close ties with small island nations like the Maldives for mutual benefit and regional security purposes. It would be in keeping with its Indian Ocean ambitions and ensuring general regional peace and stability that such effort is taken.

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India-Sri Lanka Relations in the Post-LTTE Era: The Way Forward

Sumit Kumar* and Rima Basumatary**

Sri Lanka has been going through a transitional phase since the elimination of the LTTE in 2009. While the end of the civil war successfully brought an end to decades' long movement launched under leadership of LTTE Chief Prabhakarn for establishing a separate Tamil Elam (state), it was hoped that the Sri Lankan Government would be able to maintain peace, security, and improve economic growth in the country, and also ensue all around development of the Tamil community. Unfortunately, however, over three years the prevailing situation in Sri Lanka has not been encouraging as far as the ethnic problem is concerned. The condition of a large section of the Tamil minority is deplorable. Many of them displaced in the war have continued to live in temporary shelters. What is more worrying, as some analysts perceive, is the lack of political commitment in the Sri Lankan Government to address the problems of the Tamil Community.

As Sri Lanka is a close neighbouring country of India and the Sri Lankan Tamil people have ethnic and historical connections with the people of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, any policy initiative of the Sri Lankan Government with regard to its Tamil people has direct bearing on India-Sri Lanka relations. At the same time, India is also apprehensive about the increasing clout of China and Pakistan in Sri Lanka. The issue of fishing dispute is another area where both the countries are having problem. Viewed in this context, the present paper tries to examine the nature of the prevailing political impasse in Sri Lanka, India's policy towards Sri Lanka in the post-LTTE era. It then examines contentious issues between the two countries. Finally, the paper prescribes certain suggestions for strengthening the relationship between the two countries.

II

The ethnic conflict between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka goes back to the British period. This ethnic conflict got added importance in Independent Sri Lanka, when the majority Sinhalese

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community, which comprises 74 per cent of the population, had allegedly marginalized the Tamils in political, economic and cultural terms.² For instance, in 1948 immediately after Independence, a controversial law was passed by Sri Lanka Parliament, called the Ceylon Citizenship Act, which deliberately discriminated against the Tamil ethnic minority by making it virtually impossible for them to obtain citizenship in the country.³ In the following years the conflict between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority became further intense, resulting in the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran in 1976, which started demanding a separate state for the Tamil minority consisting of historically Tamil-speaking northern and eastern provinces of the island. As the Sri Lanka Government did not pay attention to the demand of the Tamil community, a Civil War started in Sri Lanka in 1983. This in turn created complete chaos and severely affected normal life in Sri Lanka. Sensing the gravity of the War and having pressure from the state of Tamil Nadu, apart from other reasons, India soon got actively involved in bringing both the sides to the negotiating table, which resulted in the signing of a peace accord providing a certain degree of regional autonomy in the Tamil areas. This development led the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) to control the regional council and it called for the Tamil militant groups to lay down their arms. Later, India also sent its Peace Keeping Forces to Sri Lanka in 1987. But, the situation could not improve in Sri Lanka, with both Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE having continued to fight with each other through the 1990s. However, rays of hope surfaced in 2002 when in a significant development Norway facilitated the signing of a permanent ceasefire agreement.⁴ As a result, in August, the Sri Lankan Government agreed to lift the ban on the LTTE and paved the way for the resumption of direct negotiations with the LTTE.⁵ This in turn generated hopes that both the side would explore all the means to find a permanent solution to the Tamil problem, allowing peace to prevail in Sri Lanka in general and in the Northern Province in particular. But, these hopes soon dashed when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru reservoir on July 21 and cut the water supply to 15,000 villages in Government-controlled areas.⁶ This and other events finally led to the last phase of the war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government in 2006, which came to known as Eelam War IV.⁷ In the following years the Government steadily gained control of the areas previously dominated by the LTTE, first on the eastern coast, and then in the north of the country. Unlike previous Sri Lankan Governments that aimed largely to contain the LTTE, or to pressure it into negotiations, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse fought an explicitly exterminationist campaign to uproot and destroy the rebels outright. Finally, the War ended in 2009 with the complete elimination of the LTTE and the killing of the LTTE Chief Prabhakaran.⁸ While the success of the Sri Lankan Government enabled it to establish its sovereignty over

the LTTE-occupied territory, the situation which emerged after the war was very horrifying and posed a bigger challenge for the Government to deal with. Some 260,000 people, comprising most of the civilian population of the former rebel-held territories in the north, were detained in camps pending security clearance and landmine sweeping in their villages. Many towns and villages in Sri Lanka's north were damaged beyond recognition because of repeated artillery and aerial bombardment over two decades, and remain abandoned and depopulated. At the end of the war, the population of the northern district of Jaffna was 30 per cent lower than it was in 1981. Most major roads, railways and other infrastructure, such as electricity networks, were badly damaged.⁹ Three years on, though the Sri Lankan Government claims that that 90 per cent of the war-displaced people have returned to their homes in the Northern Province and the situation has been fast improving, the ground reality tells a completely different story. Thousands of Tamil minorities are forced to leave in temporary shelters. There is huge military presence in the region and there has been no serious attempt from President Rajapaksa's side for devolution of political rights to the these minorities. However, in the recent months, the Sri Lankan Government's decision to hold the provincial elections in the Northern Province is being considered a first major step in the direction of proper reconciliation of the Tamil minority. In September this year the elections to the Northern Province Council was held, in which the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) secured two-third majority, winning 30 out of 38 seats (28 direct and 2 bonus seats) while ruling United People's Freedom Front (UPFA) got seven seats and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) won one seat.¹⁰ C V Wigneswaran was sworn in as the first elected Tamil chief minister of Northern Province on October 07, 2013.¹¹ It should be hoped that President Mahinda Rajapaksha will further continue to take active involvement in bringing the minorities to the mainstream society.

III

Sri Lanka has always been a very important neighbour for India and it has acquired an added significance for New Delhi over last some years for various reasons. First, as India has, as mentioned earlier, close cultural historical links with Sri Lanka, the prevalence of insecurity, underdevelopment, ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka would have direct repercussions for India. Second, India sees Sri Lanka as a good investment destiny, which requires a stable and cooperative partner in Sri Lanka. Third, insecurity and instability in Sri Lanka or, for that matter, in any South Asian countries may provide an opportunity for external powers to step in the region, which in turn, would adversely impact India's national interests. Given this reality, when the Civil War entered its final phase in Sri Lanka in 2008, India adopted a calculated polity to deal effectively with the unfolding situation in Sri Lanka. Thus, on one hand New Delhi chose not to interfere in Colombo's decision to completely abolish the LTTE militarily.

On the other hand, India restated its stand that a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka should be explored. In this regard, India has been pushing for the implementation of the 13th Amendment as an interim measure until a final solution is reached through the processes of the APRC. At the same time, New Delhi extended relief assistance to the victims and displaced people in the War, including a mobile Indian Army field hospital with medical staff to care for injured civilians evacuated by the ICRC— for the waves of displaced persons who entered government territory. In 2009 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a grant of 5 million for relief and rehabilitation in Sri Lanka.¹² The Indian Government of India has supplied 250,000 family relief packs, over one million roofing sheets and 400,000 bags of cement for constructing temporary housing and established an emergency medical unit which treated over 50,000 people.¹³ During the visit of President Mahinda Rajapaksa to India in June 2010, Indian Prime Minister announced to reconstruct 50,000 houses in Sri Lanka and a pilot project involving construction of 1,000 houses has already completed in the Northern Province. Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of the development credit given by the Indian Government. Under a line of credit of \$167.4 million, the tsunami-damaged Colombo-Matara rail link has been repaired and upgraded. India is involved in projects for renovation of Palaly Airport, Kankesanthurai Harbour, construction of Cultural Centre in Jaffna, interconnection of electricity grids between the two countries and other development works. To sensitize the conflict areas for resettlement, seven Indian demining teams have been working tirelessly in this region. New Delhi has also supported the revival of the local economy through a wide-ranging programme for agricultural renewal, with funding worth \$6 million. It included supply of seeds for the Maha and Yala seasons in Sri Lanka in 2010-11, supply of tractors and other machinery to farmer organizations in Northern Sri Lanka, and 500 tractors with four implements each (rotovator, tiller, cage-wheel and disk plough) to farmer organizations and agrarian service centres in the Northern Province. In addition, about 90,000 starter packs of agricultural implements were supplied to resettling families.¹⁴ The assistance from India has indeed played a very important role in healing the wound of war-affected people and it would also help India to gain the lost goodwill of the Sri Lankan Tamil community and silence critics from Tamil Nadu that the “interests of their brethren are ignored in favour of good neighbourly relations.”

At the same time, high-profile visits aimed at transforming the bilateral relationship also started taking place between the two countries. First such visit in the post-LTTE phase was of President Mahindra Rajapaksa to India in June 2010 and he held a detailed discussion with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on a wide range of issue including economic cooperation, security, the problems of the Tamil minority and others. During the

discussion Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasised that a meaningful devolution package, building upon the 13th Amendment would create the necessary conditions to evolve a political settlement acceptable to all communities for lasting peace settlement.¹⁵ A 12-member Indian Parliamentary delegation, headed by the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, Smt. Sushma Swaraj visited Sri Lanka from 16-21 April 2012. Political relations have been marked by high-level exchanges of visits. G.L. Peiris, Minister of External Affairs of Sri Lanka, visited India for the eighth meeting of the India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission which was held on 22 January 2013.¹⁶ In June 2013 a delegation led by Ravi Shankar Prasad visited the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.¹⁷ These visits have clearly underlined the fact that both the countries are deeply interested in cementing their relationship.

This appears true on several accounts. For instance, over last three years economic cooperation between the two countries has rapidly increased. Sri Lanka has become India's largest trade partner in South Asia and India has become Sri Lanka's largest trade partner globally. According to some statistics, bilateral trade between India and Sri Lanka in 2011 reached \$4.86 billion, which was about 66 per cent higher than 2010. India's exports to Sri Lanka increased to US\$ 4.3 billion, which was an increase of about 17.59 per cent as compared to corresponding period of 2011. Sri Lanka has also emerged as a priority destination for investment from India. India was the second largest foreign direct investor in Sri Lanka in 2011 with an investment of US\$ 147 million.¹⁸ No progress has been made between the two countries on the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). CEPA has been under discussion since 2003, and a nearly final draft was completed in July 2008.¹⁹ Many analysts and even the Indian government hoped, the agreement would be signed during President Rajapaksa's visit to New Delhi in June 2010, but only continuing "extensive consultation" was announced. CEPA would expand on the India-Sri Lanka free trade agreement (FTA), which came into effect in 2000 and has led to a more than five-fold increase in trade since then. The FTA deals only with goods; CEPA would go beyond this to cover investments, services, customs procedures, consumer protection and a range of other areas. CEPA has come under fire from some business interests in Sri Lanka, as well as nationalist political parties like the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), who fear that Sri Lankan businesses will suffer from Indian competition.²⁰

Cultural cooperation between the two countries goes back to ancient times and has been a very vital part of the relationship. In recent times India has expressed its commitment to the restoration of important Buddhist Museum in Kanady and working on the restoration of Thiruketheeswaram Temple in Mannar. India and the Sri Lanka have also commemorated the 2600th year of the attainment of enlightenment by Lord Buddha through joint

activates. India has increased three-fold in scholarship support, offering about 290 scholarship slots annually to deserving Sri Lankan Students.

IV

These positive and encouraging developments, however, must not blind us towards the challenges the relationship is facing. One issue which has remained a major bone of contention between the two countries is the issue of fishing dispute. India wants that this issue should be resolved under the terms of an October 2008 agreement, which, among other things, allows Tamil Nadu fishermen with valid licenses to fish in Sri Lankan waters.²¹ In fact, during the visit of President Mahinda Rajapaksa to India in 2010 Indian Prime Minister and President Mahinda Rajapaksa agreed to revive meetings of the India-Sri Lanka Joint Working Group on Fisheries and stressed the fact that the use of force cannot be justified under any circumstances and agreed to continue discussion on a draft memorandum of understanding on fisheries. However, this issue has become more contentious than ever before. In fact, in 2011 this issue took a very form in late January 2011 when two fishermen from Tamil Nadu were found dead, one reportedly strangled and the other shot. Tamil Nadu fishermen complained the two were killed by the Sri Lankan navy.²² In the following months, numerous groups of South Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have been arrested by opposing navies. On 2 April 2011, four fishermen from Tamil Nadu went missing; bodies of two were eventually found and reportedly showed signs of torture.²³

This in turn generated great concern and protest in Tamil Nadu and the DMK and other parties complained about New Delhi's failure to protect fishermen from their state. In part for these political reasons, recent incidents have provoked strong reactions from the Indian Government and subsequently, the then Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, visited Sri Lanka in late January 2012 specifically to discuss the issue. During the discussions, she expressed the deep concern of the Government of India at the recent violent incidents in the waters between India and Sri Lanka, which had resulted in the tragic death of two Indian fishermen. She stressed that these incidents should be fully investigated and all steps taken to prevent their recurrence in future. The Sri Lanka authorities emphasized in this regard that it is the consistent policy of Sri Lanka to treat in a humanitarian manner all fishermen, including those from the Indian fishing community, who cross into Sri Lanka waters. Given the very close bilateral relationship between the two countries, any development which impacts on the wellbeing of the Indian fishing community pursuing their livelihoods in the waters between the two countries, is of the utmost concern to Sri Lanka. The Government of Sri Lanka is therefore committed to ascertaining the facts behind the incidents. While continuing with further inquiries, the Sri Lankan authorities have requested that additional information be made available by the Indian side. But, no improvement has taken place

since then. Another case of flare-up occurred on February 24, 2013 when Tamil Nadu politicians and media accused the Sri Lankan Navy of attacking Indian fishermen in the area while the Sri Lankan Navy and the media in Colombo claimed there was a mid-sea flare up between Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen and when the Navy arrived it was already settled. Indian reports said quoting unnamed Tamil Nadu fisheries officials that the Sri Lanka Navy men surrounded the fishermen's boats beat them up and took the GPS equipment. They also alleged that the Navy cut the fishing nets and threw their catch into the sea.²⁴

The problem of the Tamil minority is another constrain in deepening the bilateral ties between India and Sri Lanka. While India wants that the Sri Lankan Government should start the process of power devolution to the people of Northern Sri Lanka under the broader framework of 13th Amendment and in fact, on several occasions President Mahinda Rajapaksa has also assured of doing it, yet in reality no substantive development has taken place. Rather, the Rajapaksa regime has considered the Thirteenth Amendment as an obstacle to establish a full-blown unitary state system of its choice. The hardliners in Sri Lanka believe and even the Government has taken a covert stand that the solution to the Tamil minority issue should be home-made and not one imposed from the outside. This clearly shows that the Sri Lankan Government does not want India to play a constructive role in solving the problem. At the same time, it has paid no attention to the grievances of the Tamil minorities, whose socio-economic conditions are pathetic and virtually exercise no political right and freedom. India is disturbed at the fact that even the relief assistance given by India and international agencies are not reaching to the displaced people of the War and there is huge presence of military forces in the areas of the Northern Province.

Increasing cooperation between Sri Lanka and Pakistan is another bone of contention in the relationship.²⁵ Pakistan has been a strong supporter of the Sri Lankan Government against the LTTE. Pakistan has voted in against the UN resolution on Sri Lanka for Human rights violation of the Tamil minority.²⁶ Pakistan has also increased military cooperation with Sri Lanka, becoming a major supplier of military hardware to Sri Lanka over last some years.²⁷ In November 2010, Pakistani President Zardari and Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa agreed in Colombo to take the relationship to "new heights." The two leaders reportedly agreed to enhance intelligence-sharing on terrorism and President Zardari reportedly offered to train Sri Lankan police and other security officials in counter-terrorism, as well as extended \$200 million in soft credit to facilitate trade. The presidents also signed agreements on visa waivers for officials and diplomats, cooperation on customs matters, strengthening cultural exchanges, as well as a memorandum of understanding on agricultural co-operation.²⁸ This in turn has generated deep concerns with the military and foreign policy establishments of the India Government.

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India is also disturbed and concerned over China's increasing clout in Sri Lanka. While Sri Lanka-China relationship have been cooperative and friendly, in recent years both the countries have taken initiative to accelerate their bilateral ties to another high point. During the final phase of the Civil War in 2008-09 China provided timely and necessary military assistance to Sri Lanka and protected it from the criticism of the International community for the human right violations. China came to the rescue of Sri Lanka by opposing the UN Secretary General's panel on the alleged human rights abuses during the last phase of the war and this year.²⁹ In 2009 China was, in terms of commitments, Sri Lanka's biggest aid donor, responsible for \$1.2 billion out of a total of \$2.21 billion offered.³⁰ China has extended large-scale financial assistance for construction of an airport in Hambantota, a Colombo-Katunayake expressway, a coal power plant at Norochcholai, and a performing arts centre in Colombo. In all, Chinese financial assistance formed over 50 per cent of the total funds Sri Lanka has mobilized for construction and development projects since President Rajapaksa came to power in 2005.³¹ According to the country's Board of Investment, Beijing is its biggest investor, too. The increasing cooperation between China and Sri Lanka in turn has enabled China to strengthen its physical existence in Sri Lanka through big and controversial projects, but it has also got access to far deep into the Sri Lankan territory. At the same time, it has also acquired a dominating role to play in the Sri Lankan economy. As a consequence of these developments, India today does not enjoy its tradition reputation, prestige and influence in Sri Lanka. India also fears that increasing clout of China in the Island may create security problems for it. This is the reason that New Delhi rang the alarm bell at the construction of the port at Hambantota by China, saying that Beijing would use the port military purposes, although China and Sri Lanka have declared claim the facility is strictly for commercial purposes.³²

However, it is also equally true that India should blame none but itself for some of the challenges facing the relationship. For Instance, when the Rajpaksa regime approached the Indian Government for offensive weapons during the final phase of the Civil War, India did not see any merit in the demand of the Sri Lankan Government. This in turn allowed China and Pakistan to step in by generically providing military assistance to Sri Lanka. Similarly, President Rajapaksa approached India for the construction of the port at Hambantota. But India did not show any interest in the project.

V

From the foregoing pages it becomes clear that while India-Sri Lanka relations have improved in the post-LTTE era and both the countries are trying to deepen and diversity their bilateral cooperation, there are equally some serious challenges which both the countries need to tackle effectively so that the relationship can march to a high level. Despite these challenges, what is the silver lining is the fact that both the countries recognise that

they need each. For instance, Sri Lanka needs India for its own peace and long-term development. On the other hand, India understands it very well that its ambition of becoming of a global power is very much dependent on peace in its neighbourhood. Given this ground reality, both the countries can take many steps in strengthening their bilateral ties. For India, it should increase the assistance being given to Sri Lanka for the displaced people of the War. India should play an active role in facilitating a durable political solution to the Sri Lanka's ethnic issue. India can play an important role in providing reconstruction assistance from other countries to Sri Lanka. New Delhi should focus on winning the heart of the majority who feel that India wants to dominate over Sri Lanka, which India can do by increasing cultural exchanges and education fellowships. As the financial condition of the Sri Lanka in general and the people of the Northern Province in particular is not good, the Sri Lanka Donor Conference countries, which include the United States, the European Union, Japan and Norway, can be persuaded to invest, especially in the north-east, in manufacturing and services industries that could offer numerous job opportunities to the Tamil youth.

India should also focus on developing hydel and wind power resources in Sri Lanka with a buy-back arrangement. Tourism is yet another goldmine for bilateral relations. For instance, in 2011, more than 125,000 Indian tourists visited Sri Lanka, making up nearly 20 per cent of the tourists to the island. Sri Lankan tourists too are among the top ten sources for the Indian tourism market. In 2011, nearly 200,000 visas were issued by the Indian High Commission in Colombo to facilitate travel between India and Sri Lanka. The number is expected to go up with the opening of new Indian Consulates in Jaffna and Hambantota. It is expected that two-way tourism and connectivity will get a further fillip with the commencement of ferry services between Colombo and Tuticorin, as well as Talaimannar and Rameswaram. On its part, Sri Lanka could revive visa-on-arrival facility for those India visitors who come for business and tourist purposes. Finally, both the countries should evolve a mechanism for providing a permanent solution to the issue of fishing dispute. In doing so, some of things that can be done are the following: the Sri Lankan Navy should take greater care in dealing with Indian fishermen who enter unknowingly into the Sri Lankan waters. Navies of both the countries can also hold joint patrolling to avoid shooting incidents due to mistaken identity. Developing fish farming extensively in Indian waters would prevent India's fishermen from venturing into other waters in search of a big catch. As Global Positioning System (GPS) provides the fastest and most accurate method for fishermen to navigate, measure speed and determine locations, this instrument should be fixed in every boat on a priority basis.

To conclude, the relationship between India and Sri Lanka has significantly improved in the post-LTTE era, with both the countries witnessing close

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cooperation and coordination in several areas including trade and commerce, agriculture, education, defence and tourism and others. However, it is equally true that Sri Lanka does not want to remain dependent on India completely. This is one of the reasons which Sri Lanka is expanding its ties with China, Pakistan, European countries. This in turn poses a great diplomatic challenge before India to sustain its influence in Sri Lanka in the future.

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India-Bangladesh Relations: Issues, Problems and Recent Developments

Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas*

I

India viewed the emergence of Bangladesh as a major turning point in the history of the subcontinent to its great advantage as the creation of that country transfigured the basic India-Pakistan power balance as well as introduced a new element in the sub-continental politics. One of the important objectives of India's support to Bangladesh's liberation struggle was to overcome geo-strategic weakness *vis-à-vis* Pakistan. Extrication of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh, it was hoped, would serve India's vital strategic interest of having a neighbouring friend on its western front. Unfortunately, however, due to various reasons these hopes soon vanished and a number of issues surfaced that clouded the relationship between these two neighbours. Indo-Bangladesh relations took a downward slump in March 1972 when grumblings were heard among political circles in Bangladesh over the Indo-Bangladesh trade pact. As the decade of 1970 rolled on, more issues, such as the dispute over the maritime belt, Indian support for the pro-Mujib guerrillas, the sharing of Ganges waters, the disputes over the Muhurir Char and Purbasha islands in the Bay of Bengal, seriously undermined friendly relations between India and Bangladesh. It is only recently that relations between the two neighbours have again improved.

Still, caution, suspicion, mistrust and cooperation almost coincide in Indo-Bangladesh relations. As a territorially small country, surrounded on three sides by India, Bangladesh obviously faces a high level of security dilemma. Time and again, Bangladesh's policy makers have sought to balance India's influence and power by developing ties with powerful countries outside the region. Suspicions about India's possible plans to dictate and control Bangladesh dominate its domestic political culture. For India, its failure

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to have Bangladesh as a totally trustworthy friend remains a source of discontent and frustration. This article, therefore, presents an assessment of the current divergences in Indo-Bangladesh relations and attempts to understand the sources of discord between these two countries. It presents an assessment of the current divergences in Indo-Bangladesh relations and attempts to understand the various factors and forces that shape both countries' positions regarding these issues and influence the overall pattern of Indo-Bangladesh relations.

II

No one can possibly deny the fact that foreign policy being a dependable variable is conditioned by a large number of factors.¹ Among such mixed determinants of foreign policy, domestic factors are particularly important. Indeed, the domestic sources of foreign policy are so numerous that the task of tracing the way in which they guide that policy constitutes a profound theoretical challenge. The literature on India-Bangladesh relations often highlights the importance of geographical realities in depicting Bangladesh's security dilemma vis-à-vis India. The problem of demarcation of the boundary has plagued Indo-Bangladesh relations in the past. The problem arose largely due to constant change in the course of rivers or the appearance of tiny islands called *Chars*, caused by fluvial deposits on the riverbeds. Often termed as an India-locked country,² Bangladesh shares 4,094 kilometres of land border on three sides, and the fourth side opens towards the Bay of Bengal.³ With the Indian plans to modernise its naval forces and transform it into a blue-water navy, Bangladesh's policy options on the southern vicinity are also highly restricted. Sharing of common borders also creates a scope for generating a horde of disputed issues like illegal migration, cross-border criminal and terrorist activities, and so on.

More importantly, as a lower-riparian country, Bangladesh remains highly dependent on India for sufficient and regular flow of water in its 54 common rivers, which constitute the economic and environmental backbone of this agrarian country. Geographic realities often allow India to pressurise Bangladesh to comply with its demands or policies. The long-drawn Ganges Water Sharing dispute is viewed by many authors as a perfect example of using geographical advantage for political leverage by India⁴. Indian allegations about cross border illegal migration or Bangladesh's support to anti-Indian insurgent activities in the border areas also reflect such geopolitical ploys. Under Mujib, the undefined boundaries were delineated with ease in 1974 as both sides gave up small territories, which, it was felt, could be administered better and more conveniently by the other. When, however, relations with Bangladesh cooled down, India was less obliging in 1979 over the *Muhrir Char*. Moreover, in 1987, New Delhi took control of *Purbahsa Char* (the New Moore Island) near the *Sunderbans* despite strong claims over it by Bangladesh. The latter acquired greater

significance as this small patch of mud got mixed with prospects of oil in the region. In Bangladesh, on the other hand, India's overwhelming geographic presence itself is always viewed as a constant source of security threat. Geographic realities often result in a stereo-typed vision about the Indian threat, which hinders beneficial cooperative ventures with India.⁵ Thus in analysing the outstanding issues between the two countries, the geographical perspective would remain a key factor.

III

Geographical dictates compel Bangladesh to be dependent on India for the flow of water for its 54 international rivers. The initial discord arose over determining the share of water flow of the Ganges River.⁶ The Farakka Barrage dispute, however, proved to be the most persistent issue between the two neighbours. To put it briefly, this dispute originated in the early 1950s and continued after Bangladesh's independence.⁷ The problem arose because the rivers in the old delta covering parts of West Bengal are moribund. The Hooghly River, therefore, clogs up with silt and thereby seriously endangers the operation of the Calcutta port. India constructed a barrage at Farakka to increase the flow of water through the Hooghly River to flush out the silt from the Calcutta port. Mujib's Government was aware of the dangers to Bangladesh's agriculture due to decrease in water supply during the dry season, but shrewdly recognised that it was a 'technical' problem, which could only be resolved through mutual good will and co-operation.⁸ Both the countries searched for an amicable solution to the problem during the 1970s and 1980s but failed to reach any agreement. In the meantime, the diversion of Ganges water at Farakka had a tremendous economic and environmental impact on Bangladesh. After several abortive attempts to develop a comprehensive framework of water sharing, finally Bangladesh and India signed a 30-year water sharing treaty in 12 December, 1996, when the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh signed an accord for tackling this dispute.⁹ This treaty was possible due to the change of guard in both the countries. While the United Front Government headed by H.D. Deve Gowda came into power in India, Sheikh Hasina Wajed won elections in Bangladesh. This created a congenial environment for the tackling of the long standing dispute. India's External Affairs Minister, I.K. Gujral who was earnestly trying to repair the bridges of India's friendship with its neighbours without expecting immediate reciprocation on their part, particularly facilitated this accord. The credit for concluding the accord should also go to the West Bengal Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, as the brunt of consequences of the Treaty had to be borne by West Bengal.¹⁰

The provision on long-term augmentation of waters of the Ganga during the dry season is, however, very weak in the Treaty. The two Governments

have only recognised the need to co-operate in this area. There is no commitment to pursue any proposal. In any case, it is very unlikely that the proposal already submitted - i.e. the link canal proposal by India in the upper ridges of the Ganga in Nepal - will be pushed. However, there are two other proposals, which need serious consideration. One of them is to link the Brahmaputra with the Padma (the name of the Ganga in Bangladesh) within the territory of Bangladesh mainly through the existing river channels. The other proposal is to construct a dam in the Bhutanese territory on the river Sankosh, a northern tributary of the Brahmaputra in order to divert 15,000-20,000 cusecs of water through Teesta and Mahananda to join the Ganga at Farakka.¹¹ These proposals can pave the way for a long-term solution of the problems concerning distribution of Ganga waters at Farakka between India and Bangladesh.

Besides this, the recent visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, to New Delhi was likely to open new dimensions of India-Bangladesh relations in every aspect. Of course, Bangladesh has concerns on specific issues such as India's stand on the waters of the 54 common rivers, especially the Farakka Barrage and Teesta River. The impact of the proposed Tipaimukh dam on the Barak River on Bangladesh's ecology is a pertinent issue. India has, however, repeatedly assured Bangladesh that this project will not be started if it harms Bangladesh in any manner.¹² Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has personally given this assurance. The 37th Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) meeting was held in New Delhi from March 17-20, 2010. In the last technical level meeting held in Kolkata in February 2012, both sides exchanged data at Dalia in Bangladesh and Gazaldoba in India. The first meeting of the Sub-Group under India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission for Joint Study on India's Tipaimukh Hydroelectric Project was held in New Delhi on August 27-28, 2012. The Terms of Reference for conducting the Joint Study was finalized at this meeting and the Indian side handed over the Detailed Project Report conducted by India on the Tipaimukh project to the Bangladesh side.

IV

Whatever might have been the implication of Bangladesh's dependence on foreign aid for its India policy, the poverty of Bangladesh has undoubtedly given impetus to a large-scale migration of Bangladeshi nationals for seeking better economic opportunities in India since 1974. One of the most sensitive issues that confront Indo-Bangladesh relations relates to the alleged illegal migration of Bangladeshis to the North-eastern part of India, especially Assam. From Assam to Tripura and from Meghalaya to Manipur, the entire area of North-eastern India, as it is lyrically called 'seven sisters,'¹³ particularly Assam, has remained in the grip of acute tension over the issue of foreign infiltration for a long time. The movement to detect and deport foreigners picked up in Assam in 1979 and fanned out to other states of North-east. The Assam movement, the driving force

behind which, was the student community, had a dual character.¹⁴ On the one hand, it was directed against the 'foreigners' in the region, who threatened to erode the regional, linguistic-cultural identity of the native populace. On the other hand, it was a manifestation of frustration, which was the result of years of neglect of this region by those at the helm of affairs in New Delhi.

The apprehension of erosion of cultural identity of natives of the North-eastern region of India as a result of unabated migration from Bangladesh roused them to launch a movement to stem the source of the foreign infiltration. The Government of India took steps to control the influx, but the problem persisted due to Dhaka's denial of migration of her people in to India and the responsibility to take back the deported people. Dhaka also objected to New Delhi's decision concerning barbed wire fencing around Indo-Bangladesh border to check further infiltration.¹⁵ It is, however, heartening to note that this issue has lost much of its heat since 1992 when the then Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Khaleeda Zia, acknowledged the existence of the problem during her New Delhi visit that year and assured to take steps to prevent infiltration into India. Since the Bangladeshi immigration is largely from particular districts, India and other donor states can provide developmental aid to these districts to make India less attractive for people of these districts. However, the massive illegal immigration poses a grave danger to Indian security, social harmony and economic well-being. India has compromised on all these aspects so far. It is time to say enough is enough."¹⁶

It is high time that the Indian government had a *proactive policy rather than a reactive policy* on this issue. The need of the hour is to understand that it is no longer a humanitarian problem but a security problem, which has become a hydra headed monster. Time has come to deal with it assertively but without hampering bilateral relations. It is time for both countries to understand the seriousness of the issue and set up time bound measures once and for all. This will help in its final solution and the problem will not emerge cyclically as it often does.

V

An important factor that complicated tensions in India-Bangladesh has been the uses of foreign policy by those post Mujib leaders of Bangladesh, who lacked legitimacy and popular support. It is generally argued that the foreign policy of a country is tailored to serve the national interest of that country. Scholars like Morgenthau, Gibson, Modelski, Northedge, Hass, Whiting, and Appadorai, etc., for instance, emphasize the significance of national interests as goal of foreign policy.¹⁷ Implied in this assumption is the belief that foreign policy is beyond the partisan politics of a country and it equally serves the various segments of the society. Rosenau's view, for example, that foreign policy is an adaptive behaviour typically represents this belief.¹⁸ In order to secure survival of their regimes they used anti-

India policies to divert people's attention from their authoritarian rules and internal difficulties.¹⁹ However, the change of guards in both Dhaka and New Delhi created a conducive environment for restoration of cordial ties between the two neighbours. In Dhaka for instance, the sole surviving daughter of the father of Bangladesh Nation, Mujibur Rahaman, who was assassinated in 1975, came to power in Dhaka in 1996. She displayed maturity while dealing with India.

On the other hand, the non-Congress leader in India, I K Gujral, realised the adverse implications of India's tense relations with her neighbours for its overall international standing. Accordingly, he pursued a policy (first as Foreign Minister and then as Prime Minister), which is popularly known as the 'Gujral Doctrine'. This policy emphasised on earning the goodwill of these neighbours to serve India's long-term interests through abandoning the policy of expecting immediate return for India's goodwill gestures. This policy was not new; this was somewhat similar to the good neighbourliness policy pursued by the then Foreign Minister, A. B. Vajpayee, during the Janta regime in the 1970s. But as indicated earlier, Gujral could induce better response from most of the neighbours including Bangladesh due to assumption of power by friendly democratic regimes in these countries. Not surprisingly, seemingly intractable issues like the Farakka dispute could be meaningfully addressed.

It was heartening to note that the BJP-led Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee continued with India's peace initiatives in South Asia in general and Bangladesh in particular. The inauguration of 'people's bus service between Calcutta and Dhaka in June 1999 was a milestone in improving Indo-Bangladesh relations. Significantly, the Prime Ministers of both nations were present, along with the West Bengal Chief Minister to receive the first bus. The very fact that the Indian Prime Minister chose to travel to Dhaka, amidst the Kargil conflict with Pakistan, underlined his urge for friendly ties with the Bangladesh. Besides, to lessen the trade imbalance in India-Bangladesh trade, New Delhi agreed to allow duty free entry of selected Bangladeshi goods without insisting on any reciprocal arrangement. India also extended a Rs. 200-crore credit line valid for three years to help Dhaka buy transport equipment and capital goods from India. On her part, Sheikh Hasina displayed political sagacity in countering anti-India campaigns of fundamentalists groups.²⁰ The Bangladesh Commerce Ministry also favoured the Cabinet decision on the Indian proposal for movement of Indian goods through the Bangladeshi territory.²¹

The Congress led Government in India, which came in power in the summer of 2004 continued with friendly policy of its predecessor. To remove irritants and to give a positive thrust to bilateral relations, the then Indian Foreign Secretary, Shiva Shankar Menon visited Bangladesh from June 24 to June 26, 2007.²² A sore point in the bilateral relationship of India and Bangladesh is the use of Bangladeshi territory by the insurgents and

terrorists. During a recent meeting, India wanted that the Bangladesh Government should dismantle the Islamic religious schools near the common border and inside Bangladesh because these are allegedly providing training facilities to anti-Indian insurgents. While, Bangladesh has always denied the presence of such facilities, it nevertheless agreed to monitor closely the activities of the religious schools known as Madrassas.

Both the Foreign Secretaries also identified completion of boundary demarcation, exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions as priorities that require early resolution. Menon stated that India would like to solve these problems as quickly as possible. He said, "nothing holds us apart (on the issue)...if it suits us both, if it suits the situation on the ground, we will implement it soon."²³

During the 14th SAARC Summit Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, promised that India would accommodate duty-free access of products of the LDCs in the SAARC region, including Bangladesh, by December 2007. India now wanted to put into practice this promise. Bangladesh has been claiming for a long time that its exports to India were suffering because of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers. To remove these alleged 'non-tariff barriers' Dhaka and New Delhi signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to standardise their quality controls for certification, testing, measurement and quality assurance systems. Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) representatives and an Indian External Affairs Ministry official representing the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) signed the MoU. This step is likely to satisfy a long-pending demand of Bangladesh, which thinks that it will help the country to expand its market in India. The recent bi-annual border talks between India and Bangladesh for the five-day DG level talks, a 20-member Indian delegation was led by Border Security Force (BSF) chief Subhash Joshi, while Bangladesh was represented by a 19-member team headed by Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB)'s DG Major General Aziz Ahmed. Issues like cross-border movement of criminals, and smuggling of firearms and narcotics, including Phensidyle, heroin and Yaba, into Bangladesh were in the agenda. Two sides also signed a Joint Record of Discussion during the conference. Besides, the recent Indo-Bangladesh cooperation in the power sector has entered a new phase, with the two countries breaking ground for a 1,320-MW coal-fired power plant and inaugurating a joint transmission line that will export 500 MW from India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh joined the inauguration of the cross-country transmission line and the laying of the foundation stone for the Maitri Thermal Power Project through video conferencing, while his Bangladeshi counterpart Sheikh Hasina was present at a sub-station in western Bheramara, about 240 km from here. In this context Prime Minister Singh said "Today's inauguration represents an important milestone in connecting our two countries and the broader region through a growing wave of cross-border energy links and trade."²⁴

VI

Sheikh Hasina, who started her second term as Prime Minister of Bangladesh on January 6, 2009,²⁵ paid an official visit to India on January 2010. This was her first visit to New Delhi during this term. As Awami League is known to be sympathetic towards India due to many historical as well as political reasons,²⁶ therefore it is quite natural that Indo-Bangladesh relations have got a boost and both the countries have already initiated some of the important moves, despite evoking a strong reaction from the opposition-led Bangladesh National Party.

In that sense, the agreements and understanding that emerged from Sheikh Hasina's India trip constituted a step in the right direction. Apart from increasing the number of Bangladeshi commodities for free entry into Indian markets to improve the trade imbalances, India also agreed to provide a US\$1 billion loan to Bangladesh spread over a 20-year term at 1.9 percent interest. A loan from the World Bank accrues interest at the rate of 5 percent.²⁷ This is the highest amount of credit India has offered to any country, which Bangladesh will utilize to develop its infrastructure.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina made a very pertinent observation in her press conference in New Delhi during her recent visit, "strong anti-Indian sentiments have always been there but if the common people benefited from India-Bangladesh relations, negative forces would be subsumed".²⁸ It is now for India to implement the agreements on the ground as soon as possible. Delay will only weaken the enthusiasm in Bangladesh, which is clearly in favour of India. In the larger context, it could create a South Asia development quadrangle when the land connections between Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan through India become operational. One visit cannot achieve everything. But a great beginning has been made through it.

Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh accompanied by EAM, Chief Ministers of 4 States (Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram) neighbouring Bangladesh, and an official & media delegation visited Dhaka on September 6-7, 2011 at the invitation of PM Sheikh Hasina. Ten Agreements/ Protocols/ MOUs including a Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development and Protocol to the Agreement concerning demarcation of the Land Boundary between India and Bangladesh were signed. PM announced the commencement of unfettered 24-hour access across the Tin Bigha corridor to Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves as well as duty-free import of 46 textile items (subsequently expanded to all items, except 25) from Bangladesh.²⁹ Earlier Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina accompanied by a 123-member delegation had paid a State visit to India from January 10-13, 2010. The Prime Ministers of the two countries agreed to put in place a comprehensive framework of cooperation for development of the two countries based on their mutually shared vision

for the future. A Joint Communiqué issued during the visit outlined various initiatives.

The first meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Consultative Commission was held on May 7, 2012 in New Delhi. The External Affairs Minister of India and Bangladesh Foreign Minister and their respective delegations discussed all bilateral matters and assess progress of implementation of the 2011 Joint Statement and 2010 Joint Communiqué. Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Mohamed Mijarul Quayes visited New Delhi on July 24, 2012 for Foreign Office Consultations and held discussions on the entire gamut of bilateral issues. Home Secretary R K Singh visited Dhaka from October 15-17, 2012 leading a 10-member delegation to attend the 13th Round of Home Secretary Level Talks. 3rd Meeting of the India-Bangladesh Task Force on Human Trafficking was held in Cox's Bazar on December 8-9, 2012. The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh in a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, on the sidelines of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York on September 28, 2013.³⁰ The above visits illustrate that present UPA Government and AL Government are very much concern about a close relationship for economic as well as over all development for both the countries.

The President of India Mr. Pranab Mukherjee paid an official visit to Bangladesh from March 3 to 5, 2013. This visit assumed significance for two reasons: one, it happened at a time when the country is once again reliving the experience of the 'liberation war spirit'; and two, through the visit India tried to consolidate its bilateral relations with Bangladesh which has seen an upswing in the last couple of years. During his visit Bangladesh Government honoured Pranab Mukherjee with the nation's second highest award for his valuable contribution to the country's liberation war in 1971. He was handed over a crest of 'Bangladesh Muktijuddho Sanmanona' (Liberation War award) at a ceremony at the Darbar Hall in the Bangladesh Presidential Palace (Bangabhaban) by President Zillur Rahman. Mukherjee was also conferred the degree of Doctor of Law Honoris Causa by the University of Dhaka. Besides, the Indian President held meetings with all top leaders of the Awami League Government and also he met General Ershad, who called on him and discussed the Teesta and land border issues.³¹

The two very important issues for Bangladesh are Teesta river water-sharing deal and land boundary agreement. During this visit Mukherjee underlined the need for building consensus on the two key issues to improve ties with Dhaka. He also pointed out that in a democracy there are "divergence of views on many issues but there are some areas where there is a consensus and developing good relations with Bangladesh is one such area on which there is consensus". He also stated that the sharing of waters of all common rivers was a priority issue for both countries and "We have successfully

forged agreements in the past and are hopeful of arriving at an early accord on the sharing of the Teesta waters.” He pointed out that Bangladesh could pave the way for greater integration between South and South East Asia by giving transit through Bangladesh. Because it has a unique geographical location that can make it act as a bridge between South and South East Asia. Mr. Mukherjee, along with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, jointly inaugurated the locomotives and wagons supplied under the \$800 million line of credit extended by India, reflecting growing bilateral ties in the infrastructure sector.

The only sour part of the visit was the cancellation of the scheduled meeting with the Indian President by the main opposition leader, Khaleda Zia. Khaleda’s political advisor Shamser Mobin Chowdhury is understood to have cited security reasons for her calling off the meeting with Mukherjee in view of the two-day general strike called by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s ally Jamaat-e-Islami. During her visit in November 2012 Khaleda met with Indian President and she expressed the desire to make ‘a new beginning’ in her relationship with India and promised not to support insurgent elements in the northeast even if she comes to power. But she has chosen to side with the Jamaat, which is the main actor behind the present political turmoil in Bangladesh. This also exposes her leanings towards the anti-liberation forces in Bangladesh. The BNP has to overcome this dilemma before it makes a new beginning with India. The visit of the Indian president to Bangladesh has made clear that the security situation in Bangladesh is under control and it is the BNP which has to overcome its mental block.

VII

The events and issues discussed above illustrate that no foreign relations issue for Bangladesh attract the kind of attention and raises emotions among its peoples, as ties with India do. This is very significant and makes it abundantly clear that the two countries are more than just close neighbours. Bangladesh covers a relatively small territory. But it has enormous potential and considerable strategic significance. Close relations with India to resolve all major irritants should be a key requirement for it to make a new beginning.

Undeniably India, as an acknowledged regional and aspiring global power, has the added responsibility to understand and respect the sensitivity of Bangladesh, a smaller neighbour. It must act like an elder brother and not as a big brother.

India needs Bangladesh’s involvement and cooperation for its much-talked-about “Look East” policy to be successful. It is often argued by experts that a sub-regional unit comprising Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the North-eastern states of India could be made an engine for economic growth because they offer many opportunities to explore and exploit natural and

human resources for mutual benefit. Later, the sub-region could extend its links with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.

An economically strong, secular and democratic Bangladesh is crucial for New Delhi and the rest of the region. A democratic and secular India, and Bangladesh, that has started its renewed march towards a stable democratic polity despite the muscle flexing by some extremists, should work together for a stable South Asia. Sheikh Hasina government has shown considerable courage and conviction of free its soil from anti-Indian activity. Many would, therefore, hope for suitable reciprocal gestures to strengthen the polity.

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India's Approach towards Nuclear Weapon Free World and Global Peace

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It was the destructive power of the nuclear weapons as manifested in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War that necessitated steps towards a nuclear weapon free world. Though nuclear weapons are not used in any war since the end of Second World War, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons by the nuclear haves and proliferation of nuclear weapons to the nuclear have-nots pose a major threat to global peace. The paradox with regard to nuclear weapon is that while the nuclear weapon powers consider the possession of it as a means to ensure their peace and security, the non nuclear weapon powers regard it as a threat to their peace and security. Thus both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons goes on unrestrained. There are mainly two approaches towards a nuclear weapon free world. The creation of nuclear weapon free zone in different regions of the world is one such approach. Negotiating treaties towards non proliferation along with nuclear disarmament for the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is another one. Several initiatives were undertaken towards these two directions by nation states in the last sixty eight years without much success.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone is defined as an “area in which the testing, production, stationing and use of nuclear weapons are prohibited by agreement between states of the zone. Conditions may vary but usually include a provision that nuclear weapon states undertake to abide by the provisions creating the zone and in particular, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapon against states in the zone.”¹ As per the UN General Assembly definition, “a nuclear weapon free zone is a zone recognized by the General Assembly of the UN, which any group of nations in free exercise of their sovereignty has established by virtue of a treaty or convention.”²The conditions include, “total absence of nuclear weapon to which the zone shall be subjected” and establishment of “an international system of verification and control”. To guarantee compliance with the obligation

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deriving from that statute”³ It also requires nuclear weapon states to respect the total absence of nuclear weapon from area, not to contribute in any way to a violation of a zone’s nuclear free status, and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapon against nuclear weapon free zone member states. ⁴ One such proposal towards the creation of nuclear weapon free zone is the Pakistan initiated South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SANWFZ).

Pakistan’s SANWFZ Proposal and India’s Response

The Pakistan initiative towards SANWFZ can be traced to its Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi’s letter to the UN Secretary General, on 20 August 1974 in which he requested that an item entitled Declaration and Establishment of a Nuclear- Free-Zone in South Asia be included in the Agenda of the twenty ninth session of the General Assembly.⁵ Pakistan took such a step in response to India’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion of 18 May 1974. On 19 September 1974, the General Assembly Steering Committee formally approved the inclusion of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone proposal in its agenda. In the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly the Pakistan Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed warned that the underground nuclear explosion detonated by India in May 1974 might have removed restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons in the region.⁶ He maintained that in addition to getting a solemn undertaking from all nuclear weapon states “not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon states”, it was necessary to pursue “one other line of action, that is, the nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia.”⁷ Defending the importance of Pakistan’s proposal he stated: “It is now widely recognized that the goal of general and complete disarmament can be brought nearer by collateral measures such as the establishment of nuclear free zones in various parts of the world.”⁸ He further maintained that in addition to Pakistan all “other countries of South Asia have also proclaimed their opposition to the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region, or their acquisition.”⁹ He specifically mentioned that “the government of India also has repeatedly asserted that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapon and remain opposed to military uses of nuclear energy.”¹⁰ Pakistan wanted this unilateral declaration of each country in the region to be translated into a multilateral agreement on renunciation of nuclear weapon for ever.¹¹ He sighted the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a model for the South Asian countries to follow and claimed that this treaty “not only contains an unequivocal commitment by the regional states not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, it establishes a regime for independent observation and verification of explosion conducted for peaceful purposes as a safeguard against the diversion of peaceful nuclear programmes to military use.”¹²

The treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 was the second but only international instrument which has created a NWFZ in a populated area. The first NWFZ treaty being the Antarctic treaty of 1959 which established a demilitarized NWFZ prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons in Antarctica, an uninhabited area. The treaty of Tlatelolco declared Latin America a NWFZ and so prohibited the testing, manufacturing, production and acquisition of nuclear weapon directly or indirectly even on behalf of third parties in Latin America. The ban in Latin America extends to possession, receipt, deposit and installation of nuclear weapons. Four countries in the Latin American region; Bahamas, Cuba, Guyana and Surinam have not signed the treaty. Argentina has signed the treaty but has not ratified it. The states outside Latin America are not parties to the treaty but such extra-zonal states who control certain territories in Latin America are requested to sign, an Additional Protocol I. The Protocol extends the denuclearization to those territories for which Extra-zonal states are de jure or de facto responsible. The Additional Protocol I was signed only by Britain and Netherlands, but the US and France to whom it is applicable have not signed it. All the nuclear powers are called upon to sign an Additional Protocol II. This Protocol demands the nuclear powers not to take recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use against the contracting parties, to respect the treaty provision and not to contribute to the carrying out of acts violating the obligation undertaken by the signatories. The Additional Protocol II was signed and ratified by US, Britain, France and China, but the former Soviet Union has not signed as it considers that the treaty violates the principle of the freedom of navigation.¹³ Pakistan wanted to prohibit the testing, manufacturing and acquisition of nuclear weapon by the South Asian countries through a treaty similar to the Tlatelolco treaty.

India strongly opposed the Pakistani proposal to declare South Asia as a NWFZ. The Indian Permanent Representative in the UN, Rikhi Jaipal stated that it would not be desirable to declare a particular area as a nuclear free zone without the prior consensus of the regional countries. He maintained: "The Pakistani proposal for a nuclear free zone in South Asia has neither been precisely defined nor has it arrived as a result of discussions among the countries concerned."¹⁴ But such consultation would not have helped much in arriving at a consensus as India and Pakistan followed a different approach on nuclear issue.

India was of the view that South Asia "is an integral part of the continent of Asia and the Indian Ocean area as a whole"¹⁵ and that South Asia was not a geographical entity like Africa¹⁶ or Latin America.¹⁷ India maintained that the presence in Asia of countries belonging to "military alliance and existence of nuclear weapon powers would have a vital bearing on the viability of a nuclear-weapon-free zone."¹⁸ India perceived threat from the nuclear China, the US and Pakistan. The Pakistani representative Agha

Shahi, while introducing the draft in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 15 November 1974, maintained that the existence of alliances with great powers has not prevented the establishment or consideration of nuclear weapon free zones in other areas. “Nor is the proximity of nuclear weapon powers an inhibiting factor in the creation of denuclearized zones. This fact should not militate against but should be yet another reason for the creation of nuclear weapon free zones. For it is through collateral measures that smaller states can ensure their survival and security”.¹⁹

India rejected these arguments and opposed Pakistan’s plea that “the UN must have an important role in assistance of the region to work out the legal structure of the proposed nuclear weapon free zone”²⁰ on the ground that the General Assembly should not impose nuclear free zones prior to the holding of consultations among the countries of the region.²¹

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met to sort out the differences in their approaches towards the SANWFZ proposal. But the talks ended without achieving anything concrete.²² Since the differences were irreconcilable, the two delegates tabled separate draft resolutions before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. While presenting the Indian draft resolution on 15 November 1974, the Indian delegate, Kewal Singh emphasized the need for prior consultation among countries in the region. He said: “our draft supports the creation of nuclear weapon free zones in appropriate region of the world by a process of consultation and agreement, among the states concerned. However, it avoids any prejudgment concerning the concept feature or delineation of the zones. Those are matters best left for discussion and eventual agreement among the interested countries.”²³ In fact, the concept of NWFZ itself was against India’s nuclear policy. India considered the NWFZ as the backdoor entry of NPT which it termed as discriminatory.

In fact the approach of India and Pakistan towards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was different. Though both India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT, fundamental differences existed in their respective approach. India’s stand was that the nuclear proliferation could be contained by a non-discriminatory treaty which address to both vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. The Indian delegate, Azim Hussian while rejecting the NPT stated in the UN “a non-proliferation treaty therefore, if it is to be effective, viable and generally acceptable, should prevent both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon powers from proliferating. It should contain an acceptable balance of obligation and responsibilities. It should be a real and meaningful step towards disarmaments. It should not in any way hamper the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose; after most serious and careful consideration it is the view of the Government of India that the draft treaty does not conform to these principles and therefore, my government cannot subscribe to it”.²⁴

Pakistan, contrary to India's stand on NPT, maintained that the linkage between vertical and horizontal proliferation was fallacious. The Pakistan delegate, Akhund stated in the UN that there is a self-evident fallacy in the reasoning of those who would establish a direct link between so called vertical proliferation and horizontal proliferation. The truth is that the spread of nuclear weapons or of the uncontrolled capability to manufacture such weapons to more and more countries will not make it easier to bring about nuclear disarmament but will make that goal yet more difficult to attain.²⁵ Even though Pakistan had no basic disagreement with the treaty and criticized India's stand on the NPT Pakistan was of the view that it would not sign the NPT unless India did so.

In the First Committee meeting, India reiterated its stand on SANWFZ proposal. Its delegate, Kewal Singh on 15 November 1974 stated: "There can be no question of imposing on India's nuclear programme any regime that is not universal and non-discriminatory and to which India is not a party."²⁶ India wanted the whole world should be declared as NWFZ.

The Pakistani draft resolution on SANWFZ in its preamble though recognized the right of states to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purpose and as an instrument of development and progress, it pointed out "the dangers of diversion to military purposes inherent in the development of nuclear energy."²⁷ The draft resolution also expressed the conviction that the establishment of such zones in various regions of the world was an "effective method of halting nuclear proliferation and would strengthen the security of regional states against nuclear threat."²⁸ The preamble also outlined some of the elements entailed in the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones. It referred to the commitment of the states concerned to use exclusively for peaceful purposes nuclear materials and facilities under their jurisdiction and to prevent testing, use, manufacture, production, acquisition or storage of any nuclear weapon or nuclear launching devices and to an equitable and non-discriminatory system of verification and inspection and an undertaking by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapon against the regional states.²⁹ Therefore, in effect the preamble part of the Pakistan draft resolution itself denied the peaceful use of nuclear energy without verification and inspection.

While opposing the Pakistani draft resolution, the Indian representative, B.C. Misra said that halting proliferation could not be done merely by binding the hands of the non-nuclear powers.³⁰ Referring the inspection and verification system envisaged in the preamble of the Pakistani draft, he maintained that India was in favour of universal functional and non-discriminatory safeguards which applied to all, whether they be nuclear weapon states or non-nuclear weapons states and that they should apply to all programmes. He stated: "it is not possible for us to agree to a system of verification and inspection which would be applicable to the

peaceful activities of non-nuclear weapon states only, or at best, applicable to the peaceful activities of all states, while leaving open the military activities of nuclear-weapon states”.³¹ India was against accepting international inspection or any other constraints implied in a nuclear free zone since it asserted that its nuclear programme was for peaceful purpose only.³²

With regard to the operative part of the Pakistani draft resolution which noted the affirmation of the states of the region that they intended to pursue their nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes only and would not acquire nuclear weapons,³³ the Indian representative said that India had made repeated statements that its nuclear programme was only for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But he pointed out that these statements were of a unilateral nature and “if any international commitment is to be entered into by the Government of India it has to be on a particular basis.”³⁴ India was not willing to convert its unilateral assertion that it would use nuclear energy only for peaceful purpose into a multilateral agreement as desired by Pakistan. Referring to the operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which endorsed in principle, the concept of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia,³⁵ the Indian representative reiterated the Indian stand that South Asia was an integral part of a large region and it was not possible for India to agree to the endorsement of the concept of nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia even in principle.³⁶ The third operative paragraph invited “the states of the South Asian region and such other neighborly non-nuclear states may be interested in initiate consultation with a view of establishing a nuclear weapon free zones”³⁷ It further urged them in the interim period to refrain from any action contrary to the achievement of these objectives.³⁸ The fourth operative paragraph expressed the hope that all states and in particular the nuclear weapon states would lend their full cooperation for the effective realization of the aims of the resolution.³⁹ Commenting on the operative paragraph 5 which stated that the UN Secretary General should convene a meeting for the purpose of consultation envisaged in the operative paragraph 3,⁴⁰ the Indian representative said that the Secretary General should not get involved in such consultation without prior agreement of the states concerned. He also made it clear that India was not obliged to enter into any consultation envisaged in the resolution.⁴¹ Thus, India had totally rejected the Pakistan draft resolution. The Indian delegate maintained that the concept of NWFZ could be put into operation only if all the countries in the region agreed as it involved the vital security interest of the states. India had termed the proposal as “geographically limited non-proliferation treaty.”⁴² In fact, India was not prepared to give up its nuclear weapon option forever, unless other nuclear weapon powers also agreed to surrender their right to produce nuclear weapons.

Last minute attempts were made to work out a common draft based on Indian as well as Pakistan draft resolutions. But the attempts did not

succeed. There was also an attempt that both resolutions could be put to vote and that India and Pakistan should vote for both the resolutions. But it was rejected by Indian because it did not agree with the Pakistan's draft. Consequently both drafts were put to vote in the First Committee and Indian draft resolution obtained 90 votes in favour, none against, while 32 abstained. Among the South Asian countries Nepal and Srilanka voted for both resolutions, while Bangladesh and Bhutan voted for the Indian resolution alone. Pakistan draft resolution had secured 84 voters in favour, two against and 36 abstentions.⁴³ India and Bhutan voted against the Pakistani draft. In the General Assembly, 104 voted for India's resolution while 96 voted for Pakistan's resolution. China⁴⁴ voted for the Pakistan's resolution. While the Eastern bloc countries voted for India's resolution the countries in the Western bloc abstained from voting on both the resolutions.⁴⁵

From the Pakistan point of view, India's acceptance of the Pakistani draft resolution on SANWFZ would subject India to international pressure for verification and inspection of all its nuclear installations. Pakistan considered that this would prevent India from becoming a nuclear weapon power. Pakistan by introducing the SANWFZ proposal in the UN General Assembly, which was not acceptable to India, had brought to light Pakistan's security predicament in the South Asian region in case great powers withdraw their military presence from the Indian Ocean.

India's security predicament,⁴⁶ has rightly been pointed out by Ashok Kapur as "India's acceptance of Pakistan's proposal would have meant that there could be international verification and inspection of all Indian nuclear facilities and China could conceivably participate in policing the Indian programme."⁴⁷ Further, since South Asia was an integral part of a larger region, a South Asian zone could deprive India of the option to develop nuclear weapon when China becomes a threat to India.⁴⁸ In this connection it is important to note that Pakistan had prepared the SANWFZ proposal after consultations with China.⁴⁹ Pakistan supported when China exploded its nuclear device in 1964; the then President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan called it "the most impressive achievement."⁵⁰ The Pakistani press rightly noted that the creation of a SANWFZ would embarrass India while it suit China's strategic objectives.⁵¹ India rejected Pakistan's SANWFZ proposal as it was against India's security interests. It is the same security considerations which had prompted India to reject the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

NPT – How effective is to prevent nuclear proliferation?

It was the China's nuclear weapon explosion in 1964 prompted the nuclear weapon powers to initiate NPT in order to prevent further nuclear proliferation. The NPT was mainly point towards certain obligations to be

undertaken both the nuclear weapon powers and non nuclear weapon states. However among these obligations emphasis was made only on the obligations to be followed by the nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS). These obligations include;

- i. Nuclear weapon states (NWS) are not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them.
- ii. NNWS are not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from any transferor, and not to manufacture or acquire them.
- iii. NNWS must place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.
- iv. All Parties are obligated to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- v. All Parties must pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.⁵²

One of the major deficiencies of the treaty is that it fails to address the security concerns of the non nuclear weapon states. Again the treaty does not have a built in mechanism for noncompliance. In case of noncompliance with IAEA safeguards, the IAEA Board is to call upon the violator to remedy such noncompliance and should report the noncompliance to the UN Security Council and General Assembly. The UN bodies may impose specific penalties, such as curtailment or suspension of assistance, return of materials, or suspension of privileges and rights. An incentive to comply is peaceful nuclear assistance.⁵³

The fifth obligation under the treaty maintain that effective measures relating to the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control is to be taken. However no such effective measures were taken in good faith for complete disarmament and thereby to ally the fear of nonnuclear weapon states signatories and those states which are outside the treaty. Thus the treaty was not effective neither to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation, as it fails to address the security concerns of NNWS, nor the vertical proliferation, as NWS stockpile more and more nuclear weapons. It also had failed to take effective steps towards complete nuclear disarmament and promoting international peace.⁵⁴

Nuclear Weapons and Global Peace

During the Cold War, the critics of balance of power theory maintained that global peace was conditioned by the operation of balance of nuclear

terror. Nuclear weapons and its destructive capability have manifested that it cannot be used by nation state as a means to win war. In the international politics its deterrent value is more than its actual use in wars. As a consequence of the nuclear deterrence international politics was heavily militarized with nuclear weapons. However, the destructive power of the nuclear weapon pose a major threat to the global peace and security especially with the emergence of non state actors involved in international terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. The command and control of the nuclear weapon system by a legitimate state authority is very important. In a political system which is not democratic in nature and less stable and lacks transparency in the administration, the possession of nuclear weapons pose a major threat to global peace and security. Again the possibility of clandestine nuclear trade in the context of state sponsored terrorism and the involvement of non state actors pose a threat to global peace.⁵⁵

The nuclear weapons have massive destructive power to annihilate mankind several times. It is equally important to safeguard the nuclear weapon technology as well as storage of this weapon system. It appears that once the nuclear weapon powers agree to eliminate this weapon system its deterrent value also disappears. Thus it is imperative to negotiate steps towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon powers and non nuclear weapon states. Both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons has to be ended. Since the existing treaties to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons are discriminatory in nature it is ineffective to achieve global peace and security. This was well reflected as the number nuclear weapon powers are increased from five to seven and even more after the conclusion of the nuclear non proliferation treaty.

The end of Cold War marked the end of ideological divide in the international system. The ensuing globalization process has brought nations much closer to each other than ever before in human history. The existence of global problems in the field of security, environment and economics demand a global approach. In this context the issue of nuclear proliferation both vertical and horizontal has to be addressed at the global level. The proposed world nuclear convention would be an effective step in initiating a global approach toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and maintaining global peace.

Global Peace in the Post Cold War Period

During the Cold War period there was some discipline among the actors of the international system, as nations in each bloc were controlled by a super power. The change in the international power structure from bipolarity to multi polarity or non polar world appears to have given smaller powers the freedom to act according to its will. The entry of non state actors especially in the context of international terrorism and state sponsored terrorism pose a major threat to global peace in the post cold

war period. Another notable feature of the post cold war era is the existence of global issues in the field of security, environment and economy. None of these issues can be solved by one power, whatsoever powerful. This provided nation states an opportunity to work together and take collective action.

With the end of cold war the concept of security has increasingly come under scrutiny from scholars of international relations. In the classical formulation, security is about how states use force to manage threat to their territorial integrity, their autonomy and their domestic political order, primarily from other states. Some critique of classical formulation of security opined that the protection and welfare of the individual citizen is central. The conception of security that is centered above all on the sanctity of the individual may be called human security. From the human security perspective also nuclear weapons pose major threat to humanity especially in the context of international terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. Again, scarce resources are used for accumulating nuclear weapons instead of alleviating poverty which pose a threat to human security. The energy crisis and the threat of climate change demand greater use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thus most of the post cold war global issues in the field of security, environment and economy can be solved through the elimination of nuclear weapons and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The use of nuclear weapons for hard bargaining in international politics appears have less application in the post cold war period. And so is the deterrent value of nuclear weapon, as the number of nuclear weapon powers are increasing slowly but steadily. The demand for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is also increasing. The dual application of nuclear technology necessitated an effective international mechanism to monitor the use of nuclear technology. States that can enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel can more readily acquire the capability to create a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a truly international and nondiscriminatory regulatory system is needed to govern nuclear technologies at the global level. Any further lapse in this direction would be disastrous, as pointed out by Graham Alison, that the global nuclear order may be as fragile today as the global financial system was a few years ago, but if the nonproliferation regime collapses there will be no bailout.⁵⁶ India as the largest democratic country with the nuclear weapon capability appears to have a special responsibility towards the initiating a nuclear weapon free world.

Idealism vs. Realism - India's approach towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World

India's approach towards a nuclear weapon free world is a combination of idealist and realist considerations. On the one hand, India took the initiative

to a nuclear weapon free world through nuclear disarmament. And on the other, India pursued nuclear weapon programme and strongly opposed the discriminatory international nuclear treaties which make a distinction between nuclear haves and have-nots.

India had been the first country which in 1954 called not only for a standstill agreement on all nuclear testing but also for a Convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive Action Plan to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. These efforts have stemmed from India's firm belief that global security can only lie in the total elimination of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. No country can feel secure as long as thousands of nuclear warheads, capable of destruction of human civilization many times over are retained by a handful of countries and this is sought to be justified by the disingenuous assertion that deterrence provides security for nuclear weapon states, while ignoring the security requirements of non nuclear weapon states. India also believes that step by step approach as envisaged in the NWFZ proposal only strengthen the nuclear hegemony of nuclear weapon powers and not in fact contribute to nuclear disarmament. India's commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons therefore stems as much from a position of principle as from a clear perception of its own security. It was the same considerations which prompted India to take initiative for an action plan to nuclear disarmament.

The essential features of the action plan are: (i) there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating nuclear weapons in stages. (ii) all nuclear weapon states must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be part of the process. (iii) to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal. (iv) changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. (v) Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a Comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United Nations⁵⁷

It is in keeping with this approach that India has recently submitted a Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament to the UN General Assembly, containing initiatives on nuclear disarmament. These proposals have also been submitted before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. They are a set of practical measures for working towards the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. The measures suggested include:

- i. Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- ii. Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines;
- iii. Adoption of measures by nuclear weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental use of nuclear weapons;
- iv. Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on 'no-first-use' of nuclear weapons;

- v. Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States;
- vi. Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and
- vii. Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe.⁵⁸

Again the nuclear doctrine of India also specifically stated “global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective. India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at an early date.”⁵⁹ Thus in pursuance of idealist principles India had initiated several measures towards nuclear disarmament.

It is the realist considerations which prompted India to keep the nuclear weapon option intact for a long period and eventually declare itself as a nuclear weapon power in May 1998. Though such an action is contradictory to the declaratory principles, it is deeply rooted in the military security considerations. It also appears to be based on the belief that a nuclear weapon power could play a more effective and assertive role towards nuclear disarmament than that of a NNWS.

Conclusion

The nuclear weapon free world is imperative for global peace. The spread of nuclear weapons especially in the context of international terrorism and state sponsored terrorism makes the threat more grave and imminent. Though the destructive powers of nuclear weapons manifested during the Second World War little progress has been achieved in the realm of nuclear disarmament. The theory of deterrence encouraged nonnuclear weapon states to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The critics of balance of terror theory maintained that a third world war was averted mainly because of balance of nuclear terror. Whatever be the justifications for nuclear weapons, they pose a major threat to mankind. It appears that nuclear disarmament with the active involvement of both the nuclear weapon powers and non nuclear weapon states is the only solution to overcome this threat.

There are mainly two approaches towards nuclear weapon free world. The creation of nuclear weapon free zone in different regions is one such approach. Another approach is to initiate treaty for the non proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Though several steps were initiated towards these two directions nuclear disarmament is still remain as an unresolved global issue. The nuclear weapon powers are reluctant to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons from their military

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security strategy. Thus as long as vertical nuclear proliferation continues the chances of limiting horizontal nuclear proliferation are scanty. In this context the need for a new approach towards nuclear disarmament, by incorporating the military security considerations of nuclear haves and have-nots cannot be overemphasized.

India's approach towards nuclear weapon free world is based both on the idealist and realist considerations. On the one hand India championed the cause for nuclear disarmament and on the other it pursues a nuclear weapon programme. It is the military security concerns which prompted India to adopt such an approach. India rejected the NPT as it considers discriminatory and does not suit its military security concerns. It also has rejected the SANWFZ proposal under the same considerations. India wanted the whole world to be declared as nuclear weapon free zone and does not believe in step by step approach. India's nuclear weapon programme is also appears to be based on the belief that a nuclear weapon power could play more assertive role towards a meaningful nuclear disarmament than a NNWS.

However any breakdown of the existing fragile global nuclear non proliferation regime would have adverse impact on India's military security. Therefore, India will have to be in the forefront of the movement for a nuclear weapons free world, as a reluctant nuclear weapon power with a minimum deterrent and an active disarmament agenda.⁶⁰ In the post cold war period also the nuclear weapons are the main component in the military security paradigm of both the NWS and NNWS. In this context, a nuclear weapon free world is possible only if nation states especially the NWS decide to remove the nuclear weapons from their respective military security doctrines. Till that time, global peace would be hostage to nuclear weapons.

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the principle of freedom of the sea. The US and its allies also abstained on the Pakistani draft because they did not want to undertake any obligation as envisaged in the operative paragraph 4 of the Pakistani draft resolution. They did not vote in favour of the Indian draft because Pakistan was an ally of the West. Even though the Soviet Union and the US had given different explanations to their votes, they were not prepared to eliminate their nuclear presence from the Indian Ocean. The differences between India and Pakistan had given yet another opportunity to the great powers to continue their nuclear arms buildup in the region.

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Recent Political Development in Nepal: Foreign Policy Challenges for India

Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta

Nepal being one of the closest neighbours of India has always been a cause of concern for the political and diplomatic community within India. More so in view of its immense strategic concerns as it is a buffer state between India and China, which is the toughest and most unpredictable power within the vicinity of southern Asia. Accordingly, a disturbed neighbour, howsoever tiny it may be is always a source of conflict and irritation. The internal disturbance within Nepal will always have tremendous potentials to trickle down across its border into India. Therefore, this paper is an endeavour to provide an analysis of the recent development in Nepal and enumerates the challenges that it has thrown to the diplomatic community and foreign policy office within India.

Elections to its 601-member Constituent Assembly are scheduled to be held on November 19, 2013. Nearly 33 political parties are in fray. Nepal has already witnessed 19 Prime Ministers in 19 years of its democratic history. Could there be a more vibrant democracy than this? The prevailing political scenario in Nepal has throws a real challenge to those who are optimistically looking for a stable Nepal where elected leaders would write an inclusive and democratic Constitution rather than involve themselves into forming and dismantling government with permutations and combinations of alliances of political parties all for grabbing power. Therefore, it makes it imperative to analyse the political development in Nepal and challenges to Indian Diplomatic community.

Recent Developments

Chief Justice KhilrajRegmi was sworn in on March 14, 2014 as head of an interim government of Nepal that will guide the country towards elections by June 2013. This move by Nepal's Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi to become the Prime Minister of Nepal as head of the 'election government', is fraught with serious constitutional and political ramifications. This is a matter which requires to be explored in accordance with the most important ethos of democracy i.e. 'separation of powers'. This development took place after the leaders of four leading political parties met the Chief Justice and supposedly requested for the same. Despite dissent within the ranks the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified-Marxist-

Leninist) have agreed to this proposal. The move by the judge is said to be for helping to end the political and constitutional crisis in which Nepal has plunged recently.

It makes it obvious that Chief Justice wishes to lead the government driven by compromise for power. A statesman-like judge would have out-rightly rejected such a proposition as it is against the norms of democracy and 'separation of power' which ensures constitutionalism within a democratic political regime. More so when Nepal's interim constitution bars judges, including the Chief Justice from assuming any role which is not of a judicial nature without the prior consent and approval of the judicial council.

Like most democracies Nepal's judiciary is legally separate from the executive and legislative branches and has increasingly shown the will to be independent of political influence especially amidst political turbulence that Nepal has been witnessing. The will of the judiciary has been evident from its actions and conduct over last so many years. The judiciary possesses the right of judicial review under the constitution. Justice Regmi must be aware of the future consequences of the convergence of judicial and executive powers in one hand. It seems he has failed to calculate the loss of perpetuating a bad precedent. Even if for a while one accepts his benevolent argument; undoubtedly the move carries with itself tremendous potentials of gross misuse by some immature, power hungry and crafty member of judiciary in future. One can only imagine if this precedent set by the present Judge Prime Minister of Nepal is misused in future; as it has tremendous potentials to proceed to absolutism.

This indeed is a bad statecraft and highly unbecoming of a judge and judiciary. It reminds of Lord Acton's oft quoted statement power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Concentrating of executive and judicial power in one hand would amount to absolutism as stated above. Therefore, there is no guarantee as to how such power shall be used in future. This is going to place the people of Nepal between the devil and the deep sea, given the political turmoil and instability that they are witnessing since the overthrow of Monarchy.

The power struggle so far was confined only to the political arena of Nepal's polity. Present development will soon percolate the deadly virus of reckless power struggle into judiciary and would be further detrimental to the political system of Nepal. The present development has potent danger of politicization of judiciary which is one of the most powerful and sacrosanct organ of the government.

Reportedly on March 8, 2013 senior party leader and former Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal said that the leadership of the election government should not be given to Khil Raj Regmi without his resignation as the Chief Justice. He has rightly pointed in view of the dangers indicated above about the concentration of powers negating the 'separation of powers'. It

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would still have been better if the premiership would have been given to a retired person from judiciary.

The Backdrop

King Gyanendra of Nepal was overthrown by the aspirants and champions of Democracy on the ground of monarchy being fortified authoritarianism and a Constituent Assembly was elected to draft a democratic constitution of Nepal. The constitution should have been adopted way back in May 2010, two years after the formation of the 601-member Constituent Assembly in 2008. However, the drafting was stalled because of the Maoist members in the constituent assembly insisted on introducing federal restructuring on ethnic lines, while others wanted a multi-ethnic federal solution.

The deadline was repeatedly extended and was finally breached in May 2012 leading to the dissolution of the assembly. Subsequently, Prime Minister BaburamramBhattarai (belonging to Maoist Party) declared that his government would hold elections for a new constituent assembly by March 2013, though in the beginning it was announced to be held in November 2012. The announcement seems to have led to a political brinkmanship both for the people of Nepal and the future of democracy.

Such a naught has been brought to the people of Nepal because the political parties were failing to agree on whether to have the elections under the Bhattarai government or a caretaker national unity government. The political tug-of-war was mainly between the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN-Maoist), The Nepali Congress, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist).

Stonewalling by Political Parties

The opposition forces were demanding that the present Prime Minister must resign in favour of a national coalition to organize the elections. Probably the fear within the opposition was that the given dispensation of Maoists shall use the state machinery to secure greater number of seats within the constituent assembly.

On the other hand, major role has been played by the Maoists who were dominantly instrumental towards bringing down the Monarchy thereby selling the hope for people's democracy to the Nepalese citizens. They were demanding to conduct the elections under a caretaker government, fearing that it might lead to a probe into the financial excesses of party leaders and other irregularities that they have resorted to in the past.

The Stalemate

Nepal at present seems to have plunged into a deeper political and

constitutional crisis with no signs of a durable solution in near future. Before Nepal can proceed with election, the government needs to amend the interim constitution to allow for the election of another Constituent Assembly and change the faulty voting age clause. There is no parliament to do the same as it stands dissolved. The way out is an ordinance to be promulgated by the President. President Ram BaranYadav, who is from the opposition Nepali Congress, has refused to do so. There are rare instances over the last five years where the political parties of Nepal have come to agree or have arrived at consensus on important issues.

There are several outstanding issues on which either a consensus or a temporary solution requires before election is held. As reported the current voter rolls have nearly six million fewer voters than in the 2008 polls, and four million less than the census figure of eligible voters. This disenfranchisement, deliberate or otherwise, need to be addressed. Several key constitutional vacancies like the appointment of Election Commissioners require to be completed.

The real cause of stalemate is the hyper politicization of the political parties in Nepal who have also contributed towards radicalization of the ethnic groups of Nepal on settling the core issue of federalism. This has also led to the erosion of institutional legitimacy of constitutional assembly in the eyes of people and observers of development regarding constitutional writing in Nepal.

Foreign Policy Challenges for India

India is Nepal's immediate and one of the most important neighbours and for historical, economic and geopolitical reasons; both the countries maintain good relations with occasional bickering. Therefore, Nepal is of strategic importance for India and one of the strong determinants within India's Foreign Policy matrix. Accordingly, India requires to watch closely the day to day development within Nepal, more so in view of India's stake in Nepal as well as the existing outstanding disputes between the two countries, which are as follows:

- (a) The construction of Laxmanpur Dam by India, allegedly without Nepal's concurrence. This led to inundation of Nepal villages in Banke district.
- (b) Withdrawal of Indian Army from Kalapani.
- (c) India's mediation in the repatriation of 100,000 Bhutanese refugees stranded in Nepal.
- (d) Anti-India activities from the soil of Nepal.
- (e) Nepal's closeness towards China.

Slowly and gradually the bitterness between the two countries seems to have been on rise, which becomes evident from number of developments

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that have been taking place in the recent past. Recently towards the end of March 2013 Nepal ordered five private schools that teach Indian studies and subjects to stop new admissions. The Ministry of Education asked these schools, conducting examination under Central Board of Secondary Education not to admit new students for the next academic area. The decision affected nearly 6000 students enrolled in these schools that are running under the Indian educational system. Indian government grants scholarships to more than 2,000 Nepalese students every year. Last year CPN-Maoists banned the screening of Indian movies and the entry of vehicles with Indian number plates into Nepal.

Such incidents speak volume about the growth of anti-India forces and anti-India feeling within the Nepalese leadership and populace. Therefore, it makes it imperative that India must mobilise its economic, diplomatic and if need be military resources to contain the anti-India sentiment within Nepal and simultaneously make endeavours to wean away Nepal from China and other such powers which are not conducive to regional peace and security.

Maoism for long has been supported by anti-India groups. There is enough information in the newspapers that there were established linkages between the Maoists and the LTTE, some Islamic Fundamentalists organizations, through the ISI of Pakistan. All such organizations work against the interests of India. Therefore, the increasing insurgency in Nepal would have enough potential to increase anti-India activities.

Strong Anti-India Stand of Maoists — one of the strong bases of Maoists popularity is their anti-India stand. This makes it quite obvious that the rebel group can never be taken into confidence if India ever tries to provide its good offices for negotiations and peace.

Deterioration in Indo-Nepal relations means enhancement in Sino-Nepal and Pak-Nepal bonds — Nepal is a buffer-state between the two giants, China and India. Growth of hostility between India and Nepal would provide an opportunity to China to intervene and wean away Nepal, which would further invite strategic disadvantage to India. China is eagerly waiting to enter the Indian sub-continent via Nepal. It would obviously be fatal to the Indian security matrix.

Therefore, the present imperative is that India must play a pro-active role in view of the impending elections in Nepal for re-constituting the Constituent Assembly. Strength of the ties between India and Nepal would largely depend upon the extent of pro-activeness on part of India towards organizing a peaceful and fair election whereby the legitimacy of Nepal polity is upheld. India also requires to cultivate those Nepalese leaders who have a soft stand towards India.

Nepal and China are planning for greater economic linkages and there are proposals for connecting the two countries with as many as ten

roadways. China has also promised to construct a railway line from Lhasa to Khasa at the Nepal-China border within five years. China has also agreed to provide assistance worth about Rs.460 million to Nepal for the construction of Syaphrubesi-Rasuwadhi Road. Nepal's engagements with China have increased manifold with the visit of delegations both at State and Non-state levels. Apart from visits at the official levels, private visits by political leaders, journalists and academicians are also sponsored by China as part of public diplomacy. During these visits Chinese authorities have reportedly assured all kinds of support to the Maoist government, aimed at laying the foundation for a 'New Nepal'. There has been mushrooming growth of China Study Centres (CSC) all along the Indo-Nepal border and these Centres disseminate the benign role of China and caution the Nepalis about the India's hegemonic intentions. There is a growing awareness in India about the Maoists developing close relationship with China, much to the displeasure of India. However, political leaders from Nepal including Prachanda have reiterated that they will not side up with one against the other and that they share deep civilizational and cultural ties with India.

India has been facing a complex set of challenges when it comes to dealing with and handling Nepal. The complexity lies on account of following grounds:

- Should India favour democracy or monarchy in Nepal?
- Which of the democratic forces within Nepal should India support—Left, Ultra Left, Congress or other centrist parties?
- How to keep a Democratic-Republic Nepal dominated by Radical Left parties strongly tied to itself?

Democracy has its own pitfalls. A multiparty democracy has proved a nuisance for Nepal and has led to a more complex political system. Monarchy ensures a single centre of power hence is easier to deal with. A democracy would demand far more advanced and careful diplomacy on the part of India as any negotiations get protracted for nothing. Yet India has favoured that democracy should be re-installed in the Nepalese country for the following reasons:

A diplomatic step keeping in mind the eyes of the world — India is the largest democracy in the world and a power to be reckon with in the proximity of the South Asian region. Since India is a strong contender for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, it cannot afford to support anti-democratic endeavours. It has to support democracy in Nepal even if it is against the national interests of India. Therefore, India faces a real set of complex challenges to its foreign policy towards Nepal.

Maoist literature speaks of creating a "Compact Revolutionary Zone" stretching from northern Andhra Pradesh through central and eastern India to Nepal. It is a constant source of threat to the Indian border. Indian

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government worries that with the advent of one-man-rule, the revolt could spin out of control and Nepal may become a breeding ground of terrorist groups and drugs trafficking. This theory is strengthened further by the fact that during the last phases of decade long insurgency, Maoists controlled over 73 of the 75 districts of Nepal. They were virtually running a parallel government in rural Nepal.

India shares around 1,600 kms of its border with Nepal. There are apprehensions that the monarchy in Nepal might not be successful and the vibrancy of the rebel movement may be stimulated with the downfall of democracy in the country. If this happens India will have to invest on ensuring the security along the long border. Presently the Indo-Nepal border is a porous one.

Nepal has a potential of 80,000 to 1, 50,000 MW of renewable non-polluting hydel power. Both countries had already entered into the Mahakali Project Agreement. But the negotiations were mainly with the Nepali political leaders. The agreement could not proceed further. India may suffer in terms of its exports, as 42.3% of Nepal's chief imports comprise of goods and services from India. According to US government data, India is Nepal's biggest trading partner, taking 59.2% of its exports and providing 55.4 percent of goods imported to the neighbouring Himalayan country. India, thus, has a high economic stake in Nepal, which it cannot afford to lose.

The Chinese challenge is real. With the end of 240-year-old monarchy, Nepal's politics would chart a new path is a reality. Nepal, being a sovereign country would like to deal with India on an equitable basis. Given geographically contiguous, culturally similar and economically closer relationship with India, Nepal perhaps also realizes that it would be quite impractical to ignore its southern giant neighbour at the behest of building strategic ties with the northern giant neighbour. Also, geopolitically, being sandwiched between the two Asian giants, according to some experts on Indo-Nepal relations, Nepal does benefit from following an equi-distance policy.

However, for the Nepalese Maoists, growing Chinese engagement may be a win-win situation in line with their 'policy of equidistance', which has been deliberately adopted to counter-balance India's influence in Nepal. The increasing Chinese engagement fairly indicates that China is wooing Nepal as a new strategic partner. Chinese may also be aiming to influence the process of drafting of the new constitution to ensure that China's long-term interests are served in hydropower and other strategically important projects. Chinese economic and political presence in Nepal shall also serve the Chinese avowed policy of 'encirclement of India' by providing one more foot-step.

India's omnipresence in the vicinity of the South Asia shall be belittled by

the presence of any foreign power in its proximity. Therefore, any foreign presence in Nepal is a concern for India. Recent Chinese insistence on closing the Indo-Nepal open border is a matter of concern for both countries. The Indo-Nepal relationship was acknowledged as “unassailable” during the official visit of Nepalese Prime Minister, Puspa Kamal Dahal to New Delhi in September 2008. However, Nepalese political leaders must keep in mind that an ‘equi-distance policy’ can only come at the expense of India-Nepal relations.

For India, on the other hand, the challenge is to support Nepal to gain economic and political stability without being domineering and create a win-win situation. In fact, India has to deftly handle its Nepal policy keeping in mind the growing Chinese influence in Nepal. Therefore, peace and stable polity of Nepal (democracy or monarchy) is always in the larger economic and strategic interests of India.

The Indian government immediately after the political upheavals in Nepal took a strong step by denouncing the acts of the King and asked him to restore democracy as soon as possible. The Indian step appears as though the diplomatic community within the country did not achieve much. Hence, it is not a well thought out reaction. India needs to think more pragmatically in view of the failing democracy in Nepal which would never be in India’s interest. It is because democracy in the tiny state of Nepal has always been unstable, volatile, and vulnerable to outside manipulations. It creates multiple centres of power hence carrying out negotiations on any relevant issues of concern to both countries also, becomes a cumbersome process.

Monarchy means, just one centre of power. Negotiation and striking a rapport and dealing with one centre of power will be a much more stable, easier and less time consuming process. Hence, given the immense economic opportunity between the two neighbours, and common concern about containing internal conflicts, the long-term prospects of hydroelectricity, India requires to groom its neighbour in the right direction so that cooperation is maximized and conflict is minimized. This makes it imperative that there be a stable polity within Nepal, the chances of which are higher when there is one stable centre of power.

The various problems and apprehensions of India, which have been enumerated above could be well taken care of if there is one stable centre of power. The pace of progress also will be faster than it is now or would be under democracy. The problem becomes more complex when both the countries are experiencing democratic governance and frequent changes of head of the government. Indeed this is the bane of a parliamentary democracy.

Moreover, the spontaneous reaction of India is contradictory in itself. This is because India has been supplying arms and other logistical support to the Royal Nepal Army, knowing fully well that it is totally controlled by the

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King. Thus, strengthening the hands of the King on the one hand and speaking about furthering the cause of democracy in Nepal is antithetical to each other.

The inevitable interest of the international Islamic fundamentalist organizations in the Maoist insurgency of Nepal (primarily seeing the only Hindu Nation of the world in jeopardy and using it as a corridor to India) has already been established through various newspaper reports. These organizations have also been providing funds to such insurgents. The small insurgent groups in the past did become the dumping grounds of LTTE's obsolete weapons. Knowing this, Gyanendra took the decision to contain the Maoist terrorism on one hand, and cut the chances of any kind of support from the Nepali parliament on the other.

What motivated him to take such a bold step? It is still a mystery. India and China both have taken a pro-democracy stand. This is not a pragmatic and mature diplomacy on part of India. India like any other country must promote its national interest first, and then ensure peaceful centres of power in its vicinity. The containment of the Maoist insurgency by strengthening the hands of the King and the Royal Nepal Army will always be in the great security and strategic interests of India.

Conclusion

The date for election is yet to be ascertained and declared by the Government for Constitutional Assembly elections. The breakaway Maoists party, CPN-Maoist, has vowed to disrupt them if Chief Justice and Prime Minister, Khil Raj Regmi, does not resign and the government is not replaced by a 'national unity government' formed by the political parties. Other splinter groups within the country are also following the suit. Hence, political turmoil that has come to the fore is yet exploring the time and space to get settled and bring the politics of Nepal on the rails.

On the other hand, International Monetary Fund has said that in a spill-over of India's economic slowdown, Nepal's growth rate is expected to drop to 3.8 in 2012-2013 amid a political deadlock in the country. It is quite disheartening for the people of Nepal that the same political class who came together to overthrow the Monarchy failed to draft the Constitution and got embroiled into a vicious and malicious power struggle. They are now facing the challenges of bitter power struggle among themselves on account of severe lack of inter-party as well as intra-party democracy. This is quite evident from the consequent to the installation of Prime Minister Regmi, a fold from within the Maoist Party came on the streets to organize protest against the decision of its own party bosses. There is hardly any doubt that a protracted spell of political uncertainty can cause major crisis in Nepal and consequent repercussions for India and especially the northern India. Under the present circumstances where

fractious politics is the order of the day, elections in near future seems a remote possibility. Even if it takes place towards the end of June 2013 without any spell of ethnic violence, and with a workable majority for any of the political party, it shall be a dream come true for the people of Nepal. Political scenario of Nepal is changing fast as opposition parties are building alliance to stage further protest on streets of Nepal against the arrangement arrived at by the four political parties mentioned above. Gap between the President and the Political Parties is ever widening. 'National unity government' to hold the election as demanded by the opposition is sounding like a misnomer in the wake of recent development. President is failing to provide guidance and guardianship to the competing political parties. The cold war among the President, the PM and the opposition is now really turning hot. The ultimate suffering will come to democracy of Nepal and the people of Nepal. Nepal politics is in mess and is failing fast in its endeavour towards smooth transition to democracy. It is indeed on a path to become a case of failed transfer of institutional power. Democracy building is difficult and may take time but a lot depends on the spirit of tolerance, mature leadership, vision, and outlook and personality make-up of its leaders. Nepal seems to lack on all these. The political leadership is acting more in terms of their own vested interest for power rather than in the interests of the people of Nepal and the Nepal polity. For now the infertile culture and inability of the social agents of democracy has led to the deficit of democracy in Nepal. The democracy in Nepal is sickening. Present crisis is an extraordinary one as there was no provision for a second Constituent Assembly in the interim constitution; therefore it requires an extraordinary solution. The same may be looked for but keeping the interest of masses in Nepal and Nepal polity.

The installation of Regmi as Prime Minister may have paved the way for elections theoretically but it seems a far cry at this stage given the difference within the Maoist parties. The ten-month-deadlock may have come to an end but this sounds the beginning of another problem which shall soon unfold within Nepal because of erosion of democracy and democratic institutions. It is very difficult to predict that the elections shall be held in the designated month i.e. in June 2013.

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Turmoil in Pakistan Increases Threats to India and Afghanistan

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The book *After Abbottabad: Terror to Turmoil in Pakistan* (Pentagon Press), authored by this writer and released in November 2012, dwelt upon (a) how the US special forces meticulously planned and executed Operation Neptune Spear succeeded mainly because Pak army/Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) were kept out of its loop, (b) how Osama bin Laden being ensconced in the garrison town Abbottabad-that too close to Pak army's Kakul Pakistan Military Academy- exposed Pak army/ISI, as he could not have stayed there for so many years without their close support and (c), how the fallout of (a) and (b) resulted in turmoil being added to terror in Pakistan how that in turn would adversely impact on Afghanistan and India-focusing more on India. Much of what was brought out in the (c) portion of the book turned out to be true for Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. By May 2012, with the melting of snow, a build-up of renewal with fresh thrusts of infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) and attacks by terrorist groups into India's Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) with active supported Pak army/ISI began.

While how the build-up referred to in 2012 developed into fresh tactics of Pak army against India in 2013 have been elaborated upon in this article, two very recent incidents will have their respective negative effects on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

On Nov. 1, 2013, three missiles fired by an American drone killed Hakimullah Mehsud, the ruthless of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban/TTP) and a number of other terrorists, including senior TTP members Abdullah Bahar Mehsud and Tariq Mehsud, as they were returning from a meeting at a mosque in Dande Darpakhel, North Waziristan. This attack has triggered yet another crisis with senior Pakistani politicians accusing America of causing a serious setback to a peace process between Pak government and TTP. Coming close on the heels of Pak PM Nawaz Sharif's October 2013 visit to the US, when he made yet another request to US President Barak Obama to terminate drone attacks, which was turned down, this attack may further deteriorate US-Pak ties. With at least 55 members of Nawaz Sharif's government representing some or the other jihadi outfits, TTP being a major factor for Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and the TTP stepping up violence to avenge this attack, there does not seem much hope of any peace in Pakistan.

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On the night of November 3- 4 2013, Naseeruddin Haqqani a senior member of the Afghan Taliban and financier for the militant Haqqani network was killed reportedly by unknown persons, who took him to Bhara Kahoo, an area outside Islamabad, and shot him dead. The younger brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Group responsible for deadly attacks on US and NATO forces and abduction of a US soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, still in its custody, Naseeruddin had been living in Rawalpindi for many years with his family and reportedly not been involved in militant activities against foreign forces in Afghanistan.

While both these incidents will have fallouts of further violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, India's cease fire with Pakistan began to get violated by Pak army and the terrorist groups it supports since some time after US forces eliminating Osama bin Laden in May 2011. However what is far more worrisome for India is that cross-border intrusions and violations by Pak army in Jammu and Kashmir since the beginning of 2013, have been in concert with China, which has 20,000 troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and has been making many intrusions and incursions into Indian territory in Eastern Ladakh.

A large number of violations of the Line of Control (LoC) by Pakistan army and also very many unusual intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by Chinese troops-that too in Eastern Ladakh-in this year itself, have yet again exposed the government's ineptness in dealing with its two intransigent neighbours. While Pak army has exceeded itself with two heinous violations of the cease-fire by its border action teams (BAT-comprising Pakistan army and terrorists raised and supported by it) of beheading two Indian soldiers and killing five on Indian soil amidst a large number of violations to induct terrorists across the LoC, the intrusions by Chinese troops/constabulary of pitching tents and vandalizing Indian equipment, followed by many other incursions amount to a new high in their "perceptions" of the LAC. Not only the LoC and LAC, but even the International Boundary (IB) from Akhnoor to Kathua has been violated at Hiranagar and Samba, automatic fire and mortars have been rained on the entire border belt of villages, causing fear and evacuations of thousands of people.

Two highly successful tourist seasons in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) with all hotels and houseboats full, had proved to be very frustrating for Pak army, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistani jihadi/terrorist groups –raised/supported by Pak army- and their flunkies/agents in the Kashmir valley. The much improved state of security in J&K making for successful tourist seasons was largely owing to Indian Army's vigil on the Line of Control (LoC) becoming more effective by the barbed wire fencing, surveillance devices installed and active patrolling.

Some progress in talks between New Delhi and the elected civilian government of Pakistan has resulted in a boost to trade between India and

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Pakistan. With major complexes for facilitating trade and road freight movement constructed on both sides of the International Boundary between India and Pakistan at Wagah, near Amritsar, Punjab and Chakan Da Bagh, on the LoC had begun functioning. The spurt of visits by Pakistani business delegations to New Delhi and even Mumbai –where in October 2011, they were accommodated in the same Taj Mahal Hotel targeted by Pakistani Lashkar e Taiyyaba terrorists during their 26/11 attack. Pakistani traders came to New Delhi in May 2012 to fill up one of the pavilions of Pragati Maidan to showcase their popular products for attracting Indian traders and public. And all this trade dialogue was filled with much talk about Pakistan conferring ‘most favoured nation’ status. Writing about all these activities in a number of articles, I also kept mentioning how trade was continuing along with cease fire violations along the LoC and terrorist attacks in Kashmir Valley. In my last book titled *After Abbottabad: Terror to Turmoil in Pakistan*, released in November 2012, I brought out how Pak army and jihadis were upping the ante in anticipation of the drawdown of US/coalition forces in 2014 and their plans to substantially step up terrorism against India thereafter.

Intercepts of radio transmissions between Pakistani jihadis, their directors/handlers and their supporters in the Valley in 2012 expressing the frustration at the progress of peace in the Valley and urgent instructions for resumption/increase in momentum of terrorist attacks and spark off tension between security forces and the public, create communal situations leading to violence/bloodshed and incidents which indicated a renewal of attempts to violate the cease fire along the LoC to facilitate entry of Pakistani terrorists into J&K to flare it up again.

Year	Terrorists killed along the LoC	Terrorists killed in hinterland	Total
2011	17	78	95
2012	10	63	73

The chart shows figures of terrorists casualties in 2011 and 2012. In the first half of 2013 itself, the pattern and statistics of Pak army supported terrorist attacks and ceasefire violations in J&K has been: 20 in January, 24 in February, 29 in March, 28 in April, 27 in May-with 11 incidents on May 24 and 20 incidents in June-. Between July and October 2013, almost another 200 attacks by entering Indian soil/violations by automatic fire and mortar bombardment have been added to these figures. While on 26 September 2013, terrorists highly trained by Pak army or possibly Pak army special forces personnel themselves crossed the IB and attacked a plice post in Hiranagar and 16th Cavalry tank regiment in Sambha, in two weeks of October alone there were at least 100 violations across IB by automatics fire and mortar bombardment.

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The major differences compared to earlier years are: Pak army's direct involvement with terrorist groups sponsored supported by it; not only participation but Pak army's BATs including terrorists and crossing the LoC to jointly engage Indian troops; while what began in 2012 was spread over the old/former terrorist strongholds like Kupwara, Sopore, Anantnag, Pulwama etc., in 2013, Srinagar got added to the list; the attacks being launched against state police and paramilitary forces-particularly CRPF and BSF- are more daring/innovative and the network of cross-LoC directors /handlers and Kashmiri separatists/agents has been strengthened; many attempts have been made to create communal/anti security forces disturbances and the frequency of attacks both on the LoC and other parts of the Valley. These are sure indicators of renewed moral, material and monetary support by Pak army for renewing violent terrorist attacks in J&K and also to other parts of India. All these new trends and actions are part of a pattern which began in 2012 and aimed at stepping up even further after American/coalition forces leave Afghanistan in 2014. Indian restraint is emboldening Pak's military-mullah combo all the more.

On 20 May 2013, when J&K Chief Minister Omar Abdullah interacted with the media at the Foreign Correspondents Club of South Asia, New Delhi, I pointed out this pattern of renewal of Pak-sponsored terrorism in JK since 2012 after two very successful tourist-filled summers and also as a build-up in preparation of 2014, when US would exit from Afghanistan. I also mentioned that Hafiz Saeed had issued a threat of stepping up terrorism in the Valley and that threats and attacks on sarpanches had been stepped up. Mr. Abdullah outrightly denied my contention on both counts. He dismissed what I referred to as a build-up of cross-LoC incidents as "seasonal" and said attacks on *sarpanches* were nothing new or worrisome.

Throughout 2012 and till August 2013, New Delhi remaining highly committed to the so-called peace process and talks/ showing great resolve not to get affected by even the barbaric beheading of two Indian soldiers by Pak army's BAT, umpteen attacks on Indian army/security forces and Kashmiri public and again in August a BAT killing five Indian soldiers-both times entering Indian territory, absolutely beats imagination. And then the statements issued by Indian political leaders vis a vis some denials and lies by Pakistani leaders/officials are nothing short of annoying and frustrating to those guarding India's borders, the fraternity of retired servicemen and also the public at large.

Defence Minister AK Antony's initial statement that the attackers were terrorists dressed in Pak army uniforms, contradicting an already issued statement by the Army and the defence ministry that this attack was by Pak army personnel with terrorists came under much criticism by public as well as the opposition.

Reportedly, Pakistan High Commissioner, Salman Bashir reaction to the

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August 6 (2013) killing of five Indian soldiers may have been based on an “afterthought”. Bashir claimed the Indian DGMO did not raise the killings with his Pakistani counterpart in a hotline conversation hours after the incident. Indian Army reportedly said the August 6 scheduled talks were at the staff level, and the DGMO himself did not speak to his counterpart. “By the time we had the specifics of the attack, the DGMO sought, by the same evening, an unscheduled call for 10 am the next day. At that call, the DGMO strongly took up the matter,” a senior Army officer reportedly said “There was no afterthought at all,” he added.

“On the morning of August 6, there was a hotline conversation between DGMO of the two sides and I am told that the Indian side did not mention any violation of the LoC at that time,” Bashir said in a TV interview. “So, it seems to me that a lot of constructions are being put on the incident. As I have said, I am not able to put specifics of it,” he added. Bashir suggested that India’s second official reaction in which it blamed the Pakistan army may have been an afterthought. He was asked if he really thought that India did not initially believe that the attack was carried out by Pakistan army regulars. “I would not say that this is the conclusion I am drawing but it is very evident from the way things have happened in terms of the statements, that there is what I say an afterthought that is involved,” he said.

There has been no acknowledgement from Pakistan about any exchange of fire on the LoC which could have resulted in the incident. Pakistani PM Nawaz Shairf, though, expressed sadness over what he described as loss of precious human lives in a statement, it is quite obvious that he is not and may not in the future calling the shots in Pakistan. Sharif also said that he was looking forward to his meeting with Singh in New York in September as he wanted to build trust with India. He said it was incumbent upon the leadership of both sides not to allow the situation to drift and to take steps to improve the atmosphere by engaging constructively with a view to building trust and confidence.

Meanwhile, in an interview to the same TV channel, external affairs minister Salman Khurshid said Pakistan’s civilian government must accept responsibility for the attack. “The responsibility must rest with the government. Our meeting point is the civilian elected government of Pakistan, not the Pakistan army or any other agency,” he said. Referring to Sharif’s statement on killing of five Indian soldiers, Khurshid rued that there was no indication of acceptance of responsibility for the attack even if there was regret. “Whether I can expect or not, we have said that we expect responsibility. That hasn’t happened, one. Two, the other concern of what we have been expecting... culpability for what happened in Mumbai. There is no indication of that. And, finally, the statement doesn’t take into account, the outreach and the extra mile that India has periodically gone to overcome great difficulties posed,” Khurshid said.

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On 08 August, 2013, after much criticism, Mr. Antony issued a statement which read: “The brutal and unprovoked attack on an Indian patrol on our side of Line of Control (LC) on August 6, 2013 outraged us all. When I reported the incident to the House, it was Government’s obligation to report the facts as we knew them at that point of time, and my statement was based on the available information. Since then the Chief of the Army Staff has visited the area and gone into the details of the matter. It is now clear that the specialist troops of Pakistan Army were involved in this attack when a group from the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) side crossed the LC and killed our brave jawans. We all know that nothing happens from Pakistan side of the Line of Control without support, assistance, facilitation and often, direct involvement of the Pakistan Army. Those in Pakistan who are responsible for this tragedy and the brutal killing of two soldiers earlier this year should not go unpunished. Pakistan should also show determined action to dismantle the terrorist networks, organizations and infrastructure and show tangible movement on bringing those responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008 to justice quickly. Naturally, this incident will have consequences on our behaviour on the Line of Control and for our relations with Pakistan. Our restraint should not be taken for granted; nor should the capacity of our Armed Forces and resolve of the Government to uphold the sanctity of the LC ever be doubted.

On 9th August 2013, after the Eid festival, there were clashes reported in Kishtwara. The trouble in Kishtwar started as a bike rider was trying to make his way through a procession of Muslims going for Eid prayers. The bike rider reportedly entered into a heated argument with members of the procession. Anti-India slogans were raised led to clashes between the two sides.. These clashes resulted in two people dead and twenty more injured.

Lt Gen Raj Kadyan, former deputy chief of Army who I interacted with, reiterated what he wrote in a recent article in Indian Defence Review;” In just three weeks the Kishtwar riots have entered the penumbra of media attention. Before they fade from memory certain points need to be made. These riots are a vivid reminder of expulsion of nearly four lac Pandits from the Valley. Resemblance is uncanny. The same Hurriyat leaders who had engineered the expulsion of Pandits from the Valley have been behind inciting the Kishtwar riots. There were two prominent players involved in cleansing out Pandits from the Kashmir Valley. Syed Ali Shah Geelani was the Amir of Jamait-e-Islami which controlled the network of mosques in Srinagar. It was these mosques that broadcast the message 24 hours a day to terrorize the Pandits. The message as translated from Kashmiri was: “We do not want Pandits in Kashmir. We just want their women.” Its ominous import was unmistakable. Little wonder that Pandit families with young women were the first ones to run away. The other leader was Muhammad Yasin Malik who led his then underground group

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JKLF in carrying out selective target killing of prominent Pandits. This added to the terrorization and accelerated the exodus. The Hurriyat has cleverly kept a few Hindus and Sikhs for window dressing to give their 'freedom struggle' a façade of secularism. These minorities are intended to be kept safe only till the 'freedom' is attained and then they along with the Shia Muslims will meet the same fate as the Pandits. Kashmir Valley is envisaged to become a 100% Sunni fundamentalist State, another North Waziristan, whenever it suits Pakistan or its acolyte, the Hurriyat leaders."

During interaction with this writer, former Army Chief and Member of Parliament, General Shankar Roychowdhury reiterated what he wrote in a leading daily: "Restraint under all provocations seems to constitute the Indian government's core Pakistan policy. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh seems to have detached himself from any public pronouncements and devolved complete authority to the external affairs minister Salman Khurshid. Mr Khurshid is seen at his happiest when riding his pet hobby horse of peace at any cost with Pakistan. Undoubtedly, peace is an important objective as long as it is kept in mind that plausible denial of provocation is a standard response of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan's denial was seen most recently in respect of the revelations made in custody by both Indian Mujahideen co-founder Yasin Bhatkal and an expert bomb maker of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba Abdul Karim Tunda. Given that India has consciously ruled out any option of retaliation in kind, the question is: Are there now any limits on the extent of forbearance by India in respect of habitual prevarication by Pakistan?"

Professional armies are trained to retaliate immediately to any enemy fire or attack, an instinct which has enabled a large percentage of Indian public to enjoy reasonably secure environment, unlike those residing near/on India's borders with Pakistan and China, who suffer much more when the responses to such attacks are not commensurate. There are many instances of Indian Army battalions on the LoC responding promptly and appropriately to violations/unprovoked fire or attacks on their posts, but for the violations mentioned, or since 26/11 and so many and particularly in 2013 at least, there is a strong perception by many watchers that government is bending backwards by not wanting/ very subtly restraining to approve or actually preventing basic border management pertaining to India-Pak/Sino-Indian context. Not only the LoC and LAC, but even the International Boundary (IB) from Akhnoor to Kathua has been violated. Beginning from attacks by Pakistani terrorists highly trained by Pak army/ possibly Pak army special forces personnel at Hiranagar and Samba on 26 September, in October, automatic fire and mortars have been rained repeatedly on at least 50 BSF border outposts and on the entire border belt of villages, causing fear and evacuations of thousands of people. These attacks by Pak rangers across the IB may not have been repeated and so extensively, had the retaliatory response been timely and appropriate.

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Since the 1993 bombings in Mumbai (just before which the relationship between ISI and Dawood Ibrahim/his Mumbai underworld underlings got cemented), attack on Parliament, 26/11 terrorist attack by ISI, LeT, al Qaeda etc, or the 2013 attacks by intrusion across the LoC and the very recent ones across the International Boundary (IB)-all went un-retaliated, or at least, not appropriately enough. How will we produce a leader or a party like Indira Gandhi, who at least till 1971 had her national security instincts in place? Her response to the Chinese upping the ante in Nathu La, Sikkim in 1967 overturned her own father's disastrous policy on China and who in 1971 did everything right till the Simla talks, when she fell for Zulfikar Bhutto's dramatics and lies. Pakistan will very well understand the language of (a) immediate or earliest without fail retaliation of any military or terrorist attack and (b) if the Indian government exercises political will to strike by covert means at terrorist leaders who motivate the masses at Muridke, Karachi, Lahore or anywhere else in Pakistan. Such retaliation requires not only Indian Army's quick and unrestrained responses on the LoC or the IB, but also for the Indian government to exercise the political will to launch covert operations into Pakistan to strike at terrorist leaders and training/staging camps. India's response in 1999 to the Kargil intrusion was only about six months late as Pakistan army had raised 12 battalions of Northern Light Infantry which had begun crossing the LoC in late 1998 itself, when Musharraf was still the DG Military Operations. Forget about a leader or a government responding like in 1967 and 1971, today India is caught in a web of vote-bank / twisted secularism politics, in which our key leaders are vying to score self-goals on national security and refusing to orient their instincts or straightening their spines to maintain this independence after ten centuries of being marauded, converted by the sword and ruled. All it can do, it seems so far, is to hope and pray that on the principle of no matter how long the night there has to be a dawn, wait and watch as it loses more trained soldiers, constabulary and innocent citizens alike.

Chinese very well understood the kind of message sent by the fierce Indian retaliation in Nathu La, in 1967. When PLA upped the ante there with repeated instances of small arms and heavy mortars, killing some Indian officers and soldiers, then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi, holding charge of defence ministry also, sanctioned use of artillery requested for by the Nathu La brigade commander. Indian Army's ensuing action resulted in killing about 400 PLA troops and destroying many bunkers and vehicles. In 1986, a PLA unit marched seven kilometers inside across the LAC at Somdurong Chu, Arunachal Pradesh. Then Army Chief General K Sundarji ordered airlifting troops and surrounding their camp by pitching tents a mere 10 meters away, as artillery guns were positioned on nearby heights. The Chinese withdrew. And while Chinese have not resorted to bullets, bayonets, mortars or missiles/rockets since at Nathu La in 1967, unlike Pakistan, there is no saying when that may change as their incursions

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have been rising. Even without any firing Chinese have disturbed peace and tranquility often enough. Will New Delhi assert itself? If so, when and how?

(This paper is based on the book by this author mentioned in the first paragraph, a number of published articles by this author and discussions in seminars, round tables, conferences as well as some papers presented/published) Alumnus of St Columba's School, New Delhi, National Defence Academy and Indian Military Academy) Col. Bhat gave 18 years of excellent service to the Indian Army. Posted on many key locations including Northeast & Kashmir, Bhat has vast knowledge of security issues. He is regularly appearing on TV Channels and contributing in print media on security issues. He is based in New Delhi.