

# Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific Region: Boosting Indo-US Maritime Security Convergence

Dr. Mohor Chakraborty

## Introduction

The first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century has been witnessing a momentous change in the Asian security architecture in general and the Indo-Pacific security architecture in particular. The most significant transformation that has taken place is perhaps the renaming of the Indian Ocean Region to Indo-Pacific and the call for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). India's reckoning and emergence as a responsible maritime actor and stake-holder in the Indo-Pacific strategic order has enthused and necessitated the development of alliance relations with major regional and extra-regional powers. The expansionist policies of an assertive China, manifesting the offensive realist rationale of a power-maximiser have consequently evoked proportional responses from regional states for ensuring the balance of power, uninterrupted freedom of navigation and over-flight, given the geo-strategic and commercial sensitivities of the Indo-Pacific. Facilitated by the outreach of India's 'Act East', Indo-Pacific policies, and the rejuvenation of the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), the most significant extra-regional power, the United States (US) has promoted the evolution of a concert of "like-minded" partners, in an attempt to balance China's hegemonic overtures and geo-political contestations and assertive sovereignty claims over the contested South China Sea.

The South China Sea, expanding over 3.5 million sq. km. is a strategic gateway serving a third of international maritime traffic. It has been mired in a protracted conflict stemming from overlapping claims to sovereignty over disputed islets, island regimes and its impact on maritime demarcation among China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Connecting the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait to the southwest and commanding access to the East China Sea to the northeast, the strategic location of the South

China Sea and its bounty of natural resources, including both organic and inorganic resources, minerals, marine livestock/flora, fauna and energy reserves, have catapulted it to the core of the global geopolitical computations. In view of its significance as a “global commons” site, it has been rightly acknowledged that a situation of volatility or instability would trigger serious consequences for global trade and commerce, in addition to dismantling the ambience of peace, security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. It is in this context of a volatile maritime Indo-Pacific order that the paper attempts to situate the changing security dynamics and emerging trends in Indo-US maritime engagement, with the converging traits of the Indo-Pacific policies of New Delhi and Washington forming the pedestal for securitising the maritime domain.

### **Converging Trends in the Indo-Pacific Policies of India and the United States**

The Indo-Pacific policies of India and the US share certain converging trends and constitute the pedestal for securitising the maritime domain. The Indo-Pacific region has evolved as a pedestal for Indo-US maritime policies, as envisioned in the US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (2015), National Security Strategy (2017) and National Defense Strategy (2018). India's rationale of greater strategic coordination with the US was initiated under its former President, Barack Obama administration's 'Pivot to Asia' policy, which identified India as a solid pillar of its strategic pivot in the Indo-Pacific. As part of its anti-China “pivot”, Washington's shoring up of strategic cooperation with India continued unabated under the presidency of Donald Trump. The Trump administration's use of the “Indo-Pacific” label, not only echoed the “importance of India's rise”, but also acknowledged the vital role that India envisages to play in the region. The US' National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) underscored the imperative of strengthening Indo-Pacific alliances through a policy of collective response with partners that uphold a shared respect for sovereign, fair, reciprocal trade practices and rule of law. Therefore, the US' reinforced commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law underscores its stance of safeguarding a FOIP.<sup>1</sup>

The Indo-Pacific policies of India and the US have the following converging trends: India's Indo-Pacific policy primarily seeks to promote, safeguard and evolve a common rules-based regional order, which

“equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons”, ensuring the prospects of “equal access as a right under international law to the use of common spaces on sea and in the air that would require freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.”<sup>2</sup> The US’ Indo-Pacific policy is a “principled vision” premised on integrating a “community of countries that respects the rule of law, stands up for freedom of navigation in the seas and skies above, promotes open commerce, open thinking and, above all, defends the sanctity of each nation’s sovereignty. So it is free and open, does not exclude any nation, but does ask each nation to respect and promote those principles that we hold in common.”<sup>3</sup> The implications of Washington’s strategies, the NSS and NDS for its policy in the region in general and vis-a-vis India, in particular are worthwhile to be discussed in this context. The NSS acknowledges China’s spree of building and militarising outposts in the South China Sea as a threat to “the free flow of trade”, “sovereignty of other nations”, and “undermining regional stability”, in addition to rueing Beijing’s ambitions of sustaining a military modernisation campaign to constrain US access in the region. It thus underscores the “real world integration of our complementary strategic visions” as the region faces an increasingly complex security ambience. As Washington identifies its commitment to respond to the “calling” by the regional states as a guarantor of the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, it welcomes “India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner”, as well as a compatriot in the QUAD architecture.<sup>4</sup> The NDS categorises China both as a “revisionist” power, which employs coercive policies to undermine the rules-based international order and a strategic competitor using “predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea”, thus posing a central challenge to US prosperity and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Under such circumstances, Washington aspires to maintain a favourable balance of power by strengthening regional alliances and partnerships, coordinating bilateral and multilateral security relationships to preserve the free and open international system, and facilitate the creation and sustenance of a networked security architecture, “capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains”.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, spurred by the common threat to regional peace and stability emanated from China, the bilateral coordination between India and the US has been witnessing an upward trajectory amidst the changing regional security architecture, bolstering their objective of securing a FOIP.

## **Indo-US Maritime Cooperation: Basic Policies and Guidelines**

The various editions of the Indian Maritime Doctrine (2004, 2007, 2009 and 2015), have expanded the two areas of interest southwards and westwards by incorporating the South-West Indian Ocean and Red Sea within its primary areas of interest and the South China Sea as its secondary area of interest. Thereby, the doctrines have dilated the geographical scope of the Indian Navy's outreach. The Indian Navy envisages emerging as the net security provider in the Indo-Pacific region, to render "unstinted support for the security and economic prosperity" of its maritime neighbours,<sup>6</sup> act as the first responder and fulfil its military, diplomatic, constabulary and humanitarian role. In the Indo-Pacific domain, the rationale of preserving the rules-based maritime order forms the *sine qua none* of the Indian and US navies. Working towards the development of a "modern and multi-dimensional navy", the latest version of its Maritime Doctrine, *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS – 2015)*, recommends a steady increase in the Indian Navy's operational footprints across its areas of maritime interest and operational engagement with foreign navies, within a growing cooperative framework. Significantly, it emphasises development of the Indian Navy's force levels and maritime capabilities, with steady focus on indigenisation, for exercising deterrence, projecting maritime power, providing maritime security, safeguarding maritime interests and enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness.<sup>7</sup>

The Indian Maritime Doctrine also emphasises the need for bolstering maritime infrastructure, capacity-building and shared Research and Development (R&D) initiatives with India's partners. India's Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCCPP); the Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan (MIPP) and the Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan (INIP) have provided the fulcrum for realising the Indian Navy's vision of emerging as a blue water naval force. The MCCPP's impetus on capacity-building has laid down the template for development and modernisation of the naval force through a 15 year window (2005-2022), aspiring to build a three-dimensional force. The ambitious Plan is poised to raise the Navy into a "brand new" avatar by 2027 and evolve into a "world-class navy" by 2050, galvanised by the proposed contingent of 200 ships, 500 aircraft and a handsome submarine fleet, including the first indigenous aircraft carrier 'Vikrant'.<sup>8</sup>

As identified by the INIP, the Indian Navy has progressed substantially in the sphere of indigenisation within the framework of the '15 Year Indigenisation Plan (2008-2022)', on its initial journey from a 'buyer's

navy' to a 'builder's navy'. India's thrust on opening up the defence sector for private partnership facilitates foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) to enter into strategic collaboration with Indian firms. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) - 2016 introduced the Indigenously Designed Developed and Manufactured as a category for acquisition, which, along with the 'Buy and Make Indian' categories would assist global OEM and Indian companies to forge partnership for co-development and co-production.<sup>9</sup>The avenues have been further widened within the ambit of the Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP), germane with the ambitious vision of catapulting India into the world's top five manufacturers of defence platforms with active participation of the public and private sectors.

The DPEPP - 2020 envisages a turnover of US\$ 25 billion including export of US\$ 5 billion in aerospace and defence goods and services by 2025. In order to boost Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into defence production, it proposes allowing 74% FDI under the automatic route for "niche technology areas" and spells out the provision of promoting export through "Government-to-Government agreements and line of credit/funding". As an overarching guiding document to provide a focused, structured and significant thrust to defence design, production capabilities and international collaboration, the DPEPP emphasises self-reliance in defence manufacturing, promoting the export of defence products, creating an ambience conducive for R&D, innovation etc. with the objective of steering India's integration with the global defence value chains and emergence as a defence manufacturing hub and investment destination.<sup>10</sup> Towards this end, the Government of India's proposal of allocating US\$ 130 billion for modernisation of its forces over the next five-seven years gains prominence, particularly with its emphasis on bolstering naval capacity with the proposed addition of 200 ships, 500 aircraft and 24 submarines, improving upon its present contingent of 132 ships, 220 aircraft and 15 submarines.<sup>11</sup>In this context, the 'Make in India' initiative, particularly its defence manufacturing component, has opened greater avenues of collaboration between India and the US, with respect to joint development and production of defence equipment. Within the framework of 'Make in India', as the country envisages indigenous development of future platforms including Project 75 (I)-class diesel-electric submarines, Project 17A-class frigates, Visakhapatnam-class destroyers, Tejas fighter aircraft, HJT-36 Sitara intermediate trainer aircraft and light utility helicopter, it acknowledges the pertinent role that the US defence industry can play. This would supplement India's technological capability in critical modules and components like naval weapons systems, gas turbine jet engines and

aviation platforms such as maritime patrol aircraft, drones, carrier-based fighter jets and naval utility helicopters, where India aspires indigenisation.<sup>12</sup>Besides, the Information Technology (IT)-Artificial Intelligence based coordination in maritime defence between India and the US deserves mention: first, the Information Fusion Centre - Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) has been established by the Indian Navy in December 2018 to serve as a collaborative hub for coordinating and disseminating analysed maritime security and safety information with littoral countries and international agencies, thus facilitating cooperation in the sphere of Maritime Domain Awareness between the two countries. Secondly, India and the US could also enhance interoperability for bolstering Maritime Domain Awareness by leveraging the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) system loaned to the Indian Navy by the US. Regarded as the great enabler in ship-to-ship operational dialogue in both text and Web-based formats, the CENTRIXS operates through a collection of coalition wide area networks or “enclaves”, with CENTRIXS-J already operational for the United States and Japan.<sup>13</sup>

### **Maritime Collaboration between India and the US: Major Trends**

The US recognised India's stature as its “Major Defense Partner” (MDP) under the National Defence Authorisation Act in 2017. Following this acknowledgement, bilateral defence relations have been upgraded to the highest level of institutionalised security engagement. This has been manifested in the 2+2 Dialogue, the signing of the Industrial Security Annex in 2019, *Indo-US Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement* (LEMOA signed in August 2016 and operational in 2018), the *Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement* (COMCASA) signed in 2018 and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geospatial Intelligence in 2020. While the LEMOA gives both countries access to designated military facilities on either side for the purpose of refuelling and replenishment in four primary areas like port calls, joint exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the COMCASA, which has been acknowledged as the first-ever secure communication link between the Indian Naval Headquarters, US Central as well as Pacific Naval Commands, facilitates interoperability between the militaries, transfer of high-end military platforms as well as secure encrypted communications.<sup>14</sup>The Indian Navy, which has been projecting its ambition and responsibilities as a net security provider in the region, is recognised as the biggest beneficiary of the LEMOA. Of the four foundational agreements, the *General Security of Military*

*Information Agreement (GSMIA)* and COMCASA, the India-specific version of the *Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA)*, were signed in 2002 and 2018 respectively, while an extension of the GSMIA, namely the Industrial Security Annex was signed in 2019, as mentioned above. More recently, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geospatial Intelligence has been signed in October 2020.

Hailed as the fourth arm of the foundational agreements, the signing of the BECA facilitates India's real-time access to US geospatial intelligence that will enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed drones. Through the sharing of information on maps and satellite images, it will help India access topographical and aeronautical data, and advanced products that will aid in navigation and targeting.<sup>15</sup> Committed to expanding the scope of India's MDP status, by embarking upon "mutually agreed upon steps to strengthen defense ties further and promote better defense and security coordination and cooperation", the two countries are intent on collaborating in advanced defence equipment and technology at a level commensurate with that of the closest allies and partners of the US. These initiatives have been supplemented with the US' offer to India for considering the sale of Sea Guardian Unmanned Aerial Systems; and building on the implementation of their "White Shipping" data sharing arrangement for facilitating Maritime Domain Awareness. Furthermore, under the COMCASA, India will not only be able to obtain critical defence technologies from the US, but also gain access to critical communication network of the US armed forces and real-time American intelligence about the presence of Chinese warships, submarines and aircraft in the Indian Ocean.<sup>16</sup> On the whole, these agreements have deepened India's defence relations with the US, particularly in the maritime sphere and pertaining to Maritime Domain Awareness.

Of the most significant developments in the domain of Indo-US defence coordination, the launch of the 2+2 Dialogue in September 2018 deserves mention and analysis. This momentous dialogue reflected the shared commitment of India and the US towards developing an institutionalised architecture for providing "a positive, forward-looking vision for the India-US strategic partnership and to promote synergy in their diplomatic and security efforts", premised on the democratic values of freedom, justice and adherence to rule of law. An important outcome of the dialogue was the bilateral convergence on working towards "regional and global issues, including in bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral formats", in addition to establishing secure communication

between India's Ministry of External Affairs and the US' Secretary of State on the one hand and between India's Minister of Defence and the US' Secretary of Defense, on the other. These initiatives were aimed at sustaining "regular high-level communication on emerging developments".<sup>17</sup>

An important outcome of the Dialogue, heralded as a "milestone" in boosting India's defence preparedness and capabilities, and indicating "growing trust between the two countries", has been the signing of the COMCASA. It will provide facilitated access to advanced defence systems, thereby enabling India to optimally utilise and fully exploit its existing and proposed/purchased platforms of US origin. Additionally, it signified their willingness to ensue negotiations on an Industrial Security Annex (subsequently signed in 2019) to support closer defence industry collaboration and offer real-time data-sharing with the Indian military over secure channels, thus providing greater awareness and intelligence inputs, through accessing the CENTRIXS mounted on-board naval ships.<sup>18</sup> Its signing places the US in a position to transfer highly secure, coded communication equipment with the military platforms it sells to India, reversing the latter's dependence on commercially available, less secure systems on high-end platforms like C-130Js and the P8I maritime surveillance aircraft, among others. It also fulfils the mandatory requirement for India procuring the armed version of the 'Sea Guardian' drones from the US, since they are critically dependent on a highly secure data and communication system link. Another implication of the Dialogue is the decision taken by the two countries to foster engagement between the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Indian armed forces, in particular, the exchanges between the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the Indian Navy, underscoring the importance of deepening their maritime cooperation in the western Indian Ocean. The decision to exchange personnel is the recognition of the interests and a practical step towards institutionalising a mechanism to interact with the Western Naval Command.<sup>19</sup> These developments have been accompanied with the decision to establish an Indo-US tri-services exercise in order to enhance personnel exchange and interoperability. In an endeavour to support and facilitate bilateral coordination in the maritime domain, India and the US are determined to commence exchanges between the US Naval Forces Central Command and the Indian Navy. In addition, the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue beckoned plethora of possibilities for India and US to collaborate, with respect to the former's inclusion among the top tier of countries entitled to license-free exports, re-exports and transfers under License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-



1). It also reinforced the commitment to explore other means of expanding bilateral trade in defence items and defence manufacturing supply chain linkages, taking advantage of the amended provisions of the Government of India's 'Make in India' scheme.<sup>20</sup>

Of special mention in this regard is the bilateral affirmation to prioritise co-production, co-development and innovation projects through the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), initiated in 2012. New Delhi and Washington have identified "pathfinder efforts" in 2015 "in principle to pursue co-production and co-development". While the first component includes four pathfinder projects, namely next-generation 'Cheel' (Raven) mini-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; roll-on/roll-off kits for C-130 aircraft; mobile, electric hybrid power sources; and next-generation protective ensemble, the second component recommends the formation of working groups to explore possible cooperation in aircraft carrier and jet engine technology-sharing and design.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the DTTI, in consonance with the first-ever country-specific India Rapid Reaction Cell (IRRC) which was established in the Pentagon in 2015, in order to expedite the overall "operational tempo" and process of co-development and co-production of hi-technology military equipment in India, would find its perfect complement in the 'Make in India' programme, and upgrade the complexion of bilateral defence cooperation. Furthermore, recognising the "increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans", the rechristening of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM), vested with the responsibility of military activities and stability in the greater Pacific region, based on "partnership, presence, and military readiness", to the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is a significant symbolism, alluding to the escalating importance of New Delhi in Washington's strategic computations. Towards its objective of ensuring a FOIP in association with "a constellation of like-minded Allies and Partners", sharing concerns of mutual security, interests and values, the USINDOPACOM envisages the implementation of a combat credible deterrence strategy against adversarial policies.<sup>22</sup>

At the second edition of the Indo-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue held in December 2019, the two sides, represented by their respective Secretary of State/Minister of External Affairs and Secretary of Defense/Minister of Defence, appraised the growing defence partnership between the two countries. They resolved to work together in this highest institutional framework to realise the full potential of the Indo-US Global Strategic Partnership. While reiterating their commitment to a "free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region", based

on the converging visions of the Indo-Pacific, the leaders upheld closer bilateral cooperation as “instrumental to promoting security and prosperity” in the region and beyond. In this context, the India-US-Japan trilateral summit meetings and the India-US-Australia-Japan Quadrilateral Ministerial meeting (in September 2019) were acknowledged as means to promote practical cooperation in infrastructure development, cyber security, counterterrorism and regional connectivity. In keeping with the vision for MDP, the leaders sought to expand military-to-military cooperation and improve the defence and security partnership as well. They particularly referred to the increasingly sophisticated cooperation between their Navies and the high level of operational interaction achieved in the MALABAR naval exercise. Besides, they applauded the establishment of the new tri-service, amphibious exercise – TIGER TRIUMPH – as a tangible demonstration of the growing scope and complexity of military cooperation between New Delhi and Washington. Taking note of these developments, the two sides further resolved to enhance cooperation between the Indian Navy and the US Navy Fleets under the US-INDOPACOM, Central Command and Africa Command.<sup>23</sup>

At the Foreign Ministerial consultations held virtually in July 2020, the two sides represented by the US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David Hale and the Indian Foreign Secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, reaffirmed their commitment to work towards developing concrete steps to strengthening the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership and ensuring a “free, open, peaceful and prosperous” Indo-Pacific, in the midst of the ongoing threats to the rules-based international order posed by China’s aggressive assertiveness. Besides, they deliberated on a host of issues pertaining to bilateral and multilateral diplomatic cooperation, maritime security and the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Their references and affirmation of the US and Indian visions of “a free and open Indo-Pacific region, where all countries can prosper”, in agreement “to work with other Indo-Pacific partners to bring these visions to reality”<sup>24</sup> further paved the way for strengthening strategic coordination between India and the US, on the bilateral and multilateral platforms, like the QUAD, in particular.

## **Conclusion**

The 21<sup>st</sup> Century has seen a significant change in the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region and a major forward stride in Indo-US alliance relations. As India embarks on the journey of self-sufficiency and self-

reliance (Atmanirbharata), pursuing technological expertise, modernisation and diversification of acquisition sources, US' quest for greater coordination with its Indo-Pacific partner facilitates this complementarity. However, the pathway of coordination is strewn with challenges as well, which need to be addressed. First, within the 'Make in India', the issues like cost-competitiveness, technology transfer and offset policies have emerged as formidable challenges to successful negotiations pertaining to defence equipment and technology cooperation. Secondly, in view of the technicalities of 'Make in India', the procurement policy that emphasises local manufacturing needs fine-tuning, failing which it will be difficult to achieve the desired result in the absence of adequate manufacturing ecosystem and dithering among some manufacturers to part with sensitive cutting-edge technology. The same holds true for the impediments under the Strategic Partnership model. Although the model attempts to declare a few private sector firms as system integrators for collaborating with foreign OEMs towards erecting a robust defence-industrial foundation, limitations have been identified with respect to execution and the dearth of institutional capacity to steer it to logical conclusion. Furthermore, the success of the offset programme would impinge on identifying and removing restrictions, in addition to extending offsets to the civil sector for implementation. Also, the apprehension emanating from pricing issues and non-adherence to specific production deadlines could tarnish the prospects of 'Make in India' in the defence sphere.<sup>25</sup> Notwithstanding these challenges, it is a necessity for India and the US to bolster and deepen maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, in addition to enlarging the prospects of intelligence cooperation, in order to further ensure strategic and tactical alignment. While India's MDP status and DTTI have provided the prospects of the US industry for preferential treatment on acquisitions on the one hand and India is expected to get access to major packages of technology, on the other, these avenues should not be regarded as merely providing a privileged route for Indian acquisitions from the US industry. Although major sales of US platforms such as military transport aircraft, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, assault rifles, and potential future acquisitions of drones, fighter jets, and naval utility helicopters have taken place, joint co-production and co-development projects should be encouraged and initiated between the two sides. Besides, the two countries should work towards enhancing interoperability and pave the way for consideration of long-term projects in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance and advanced technology for ground combat vehicles.<sup>26</sup>

It follows from the discussion above, that the concurrence of Indo-US

concerns regarding the security, openness/ freedom and accessibility of the Indo-Pacific, is a demonstration of their resolve to deter China's hegemonic ambitions in the region and maintain the much-desired peace, security and balance of power. The two countries have converged on the maritime domain in their endeavour to uphold and sustain the liberal norms of international order, particularly the regional maritime order. As the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region are in a state of transformation, maritime collaboration between India and the US is evidently set to traverse an upward trajectory, committed to securing the basic tenets of a liberal order.

## References

- [1] *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, Washington D.C.: The White House, pp. 45-46, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf> (accessed on December 5, 2020)
- [2] Narendra Modi's Keynote Address at the 17th Asia Security Summit, June 1, 2000, Singapore: International Institute for Strategic Studies, <https://www.iiss.org/sld/documents/narendra-modi-sld-18.pdf> (accessed on December 5, 2020)
- [3] *The US Vision for the Indo-Pacific Region*, January 30, 2020, Washington D.C.: Washington Foreign Press Center, <https://www.state.gov/the-u-s-vision-for-the-indo-pacific-region-2/> (accessed on December 7, 2020)
- [4] *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, n. 1, p. 46
- [5] *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 2018, Washington: Department of Defense, pp. 4-5, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf> (accessed on December 7, 2020)
- [6] "Indian Navy – Net Security Provider to Island Nations in Indian Ocean Region: Anthony", October 12, 2011, New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=76590> (accessed on December 7, 2020)
- [7] *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy*, 2015, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence – Navy, pp. 10-11
- [8] Ajay Banerjee, "To Counter China, India to have 56 New Ships, Submarines", *The Tribune*, December 4, 2018
- [9] *Defence Procurement Procedure 2 016: Backgrounder* (2016), 2016, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, p.2, <http://www.mod.nic.in/writereaddata/Background.pdf> (accessed on December 7, 2020)
- [10] *Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy*, August 3, 2020, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, pp. 8-11, <https://ddpmod.gov.in/dpepp> (accessed on December 7, 2020)

## Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific Region...

- [11] "India Firms up \$130 billion Plan to Enhance Military Capability", *The Hindu*, September 10, 2019
- [12] Sameer Patil, "A Defence-Industrial Agenda for India" , July 2020, p. 14, [https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Defense-Industrial-Agenda-for-India\\_sameer-Patil\\_Final.pdf](https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Defense-Industrial-Agenda-for-India_sameer-Patil_Final.pdf) (accessed on December 7, 2020)
- [13] Aman Thakker and Arun Sahgal, "U.S.-India Maritime Security Cooperation", October 8, 2019, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 4, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-india-maritime-security-cooperation> (accessed on December 9, 2020)
- [14] "India and the United States Sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement/LEMOA", August 30, 2016, New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mbErel.aspx?relid=149322> (accessed on December 9, 2020); Dinakar Peri, "LEMOA Fully Operational Now", *The Hindu*, September 8, 2018
- [15] Shubhajit Roy, "Explained: BECA, and the Important Foundational Pacts of India-US Defence Cooperation", *Indian Express*, November 3, 2020
- [16] Sandeep Unnithan, "Signing COMCASA is Significant Milestone in Cementing Indo-US Ties", *India Today*, September 9, 2018
- [17] Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, September 6, 2018, New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=186956> (accessed on December 9, 2020)
- [18] Dinakar Peri, "COMCASA will Help India Track China's Indian Ocean Moves Better", *The Hindu*, September 7, 2018
- [19] Sushant Singh, "COMCASA: Why US, India Can't Connect", *Indian Express*, June 27, 2018
- [20] Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, September 6, 2018, n. 17
- [21] Joint Statement during the Visit of the President of USA to India, January 25, 2015, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, [https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24726/Joint\\_Statement\\_during\\_](https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24726/Joint_Statement_during_) (accessed on December 9, 2020)
- [22] "US Indo-Pacific Command Holds Change of Command Ceremony", May 30, 2018, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1535776/us-indo-pacific-command-holds-change-of-command-ceremony/> (accessed on December 9, 2020)
- [23] Joint Statement on the Second India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, December 19, 2019, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32227/Joint+Statement+on+the+Second+IndiaUS+2432+Ministerial+Dialogue> (accessed on December 10, 2020)

Mohor Chakraborty

- [24] Kanishka Sarkar, "India, US Hold Bilateral Talks, Look Forward to 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue Later this Year", *Hindustan Times*, July 8, 2020
- [25] Tridib Chakraborti and Mohor Chakraborty, *India's Strategy in the South China Sea*, 2020, London: Routledge, p. 123
- [26] Aman Thakker and Arun Sahgal, "U.S.-India Maritime Security Cooperation", n. 13, p.5