

The Covid-19 Pandemic and the United Nations Security Council

Aloka Dutta

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been unable to promote or facilitate multilateral cooperation in dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak. This is worrying given its relevance as a principal organ of the United Nations (UN) that could enable or constrain international cooperation and given the need for such cooperation in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The failure of the UNSC to respond adequately to the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the historical limits of the UNSC as a forum for international cooperation. It also suggests that highlighting and debating UNSC reforms are not sufficient or even productive ways to move forward, especially in the context of the challenges that pandemics and climate change represent for global cooperation. It is far from clear if the UN system can change the global structures on which it was built.

Keywords: International cooperation, COVID-19, United Nations Security Council, United Nations, WHO

Introduction

As much as it is a global health tragedy, the COVID-19 pandemic is the interlocking of multiple crises of national public policy and global governance. Although medical sciences have developed solutions to deal with COVID-19, how those solutions are chosen and implemented is a matter of power, economic, and social relations. Politics and governance explain the readiness and responses of governments, societies, and international organizations. The outbreak of COVID-19 has revealed strains on global governance, and seemingly nowhere more so than at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has failed to respond adequately to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis or even to show leadership in international crisis management. This failure might not be surprising given the historical limits of and recent tensions at, the UNSC. It is nevertheless worrying given the relevance of the UNSC as a

principal organ of the United Nations (UN) that can enable or constrain international cooperation and as the world's authority in the use of force and matters of war and peace. The UNSC is the only UN body that has the power to make legally binding decisions for member states and, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to enforce these decisions through sanctions or the use of military force. This makes it the UN's most powerful organ and forum for international cooperation. As such, its activities and associated politics can tell us much about the state of the relationships between its members—notably the permanent five with veto powers—and thus about the possibilities for cooperation and for mounting successful and coordinated global health responses.

During the first half of 2020, the UNSC was deeply divided in dealing with or acknowledging the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international peace and security. On 23 March 2020, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for an “immediate global ceasefire” in order “to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight of our lives.”¹ The initiative was premised on the idea that wars allow diseases to spread while reducing local and international abilities to respond to their impacts. A global health pandemic, then, might exacerbate pre-existing conflict dynamics around the world.² Guterres' call was an opportunity to support peace processes during an unprecedented international health crisis. That was the theory. Through this call for a global ceasefire, Guterres showed leadership, but the UNSC faltered. It ended up passing Resolution 2532 on 1 July; by then, however, the momentum had been lost. The practical effects on conflict zones has thus been nil.³ This failure to support Guterres's initiative was largely the result of tensions between the permanent five, with the United States–People's Republic of China (PRC) blame game taking centre stage.

While several experts and international organizations projected that COVID-19 would impact conflict dynamics and produce instability, its effects have so far been limited.⁴ For the UNSC, Guterres' call for a ceasefire was nevertheless a missed opportunity to pause hostilities, to strengthen UN diplomacy in peace processes, and to promote international cooperation.

COVID-19 is and will be a long-term challenge with serious consequences, including for the UNSC's aspirations to face “non-traditional” security challenges. Immediate and mid- or long-term effects on economic growth, on supply chains, and on food security may prove disruptive and might induce conflict and instability.⁵

The Covid-19 Pandemic and the United Nations Security Council

COVID-19 has also highlighted the historical and structural limits of the UN as an institution of international cooperation. The pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing trends, notably rising geopolitical rivalries and the differing visions and inequalities in the relations between the UNSC and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). It has also exacerbated pre-existing tensions within the UNSC, especially between the United States and the PRC, and arguably accelerated the erosion of American clout in the UNSC. The COVID-19 “test” might reflect a larger trend found in the crises of multilateralism, but it also underlines the necessity of global cooperation and thus the need for finding ways to reinvigorate such cooperation within or despite the UNSC. The COVID-19 pandemic is only the beginning. There will be more pandemics, and there is climate change.

The latter has not gone away, and COVID-19 might prove to be a wake-up call for reinventing and reinvesting in global cooperation mechanisms. As COVID-19 shows, however, such challenges demand long-term planning and commitment and not reactive ad hoc crisis management—the latter being the UNSC’s usual *modus operandi*. The obstacles are multiple, but not impossible to surmount or avoid. COVID-19 will likely sustain several global dysfunctions and tensions for years to come, but it also presents an opportunity to reimagine global order, for better or worse. Yet, that reimagining will most likely need to be done outside or despite the UNSC, given that the UN organ was never construed to call into question or transform the status quo that it sustains, especially the power of its veto members.

The UNSC and the Covid 19 Crisis

In Chapter V of the UN Charter, members of the UN “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”⁶ The statement leaves open the question of what constitutes a threat to “international peace and security.”

This flexibility was part of the design of the UNSC as an adaptable political decision-making body. The founding members of the UN “wanted a Security Council for all contingencies,” one that was capable of responding “to a theoretically unlimited range of possible threats at a time and in a manner of its choosing.”⁷

In practice, however, the permanent members have used this flexibility to avoid any obligation to act on any of these possible threats.⁸ In addition, the dynamics of the Cold War at the time further limited the range of security threats to be discussed at the UNSC, sidelining pandemics even though the 1946 preamble of the World Health Organization (WHO) constitution had acknowledged the link between health and security.⁹ At the turn of the century, it was the increased attention given to “non-traditional” or transnational threats such as climate change, pandemics, terrorism, and cyber-attacks that brought pandemics back to the UNSC agenda.¹⁰ At the UNSC in 2000, the United States argued that human immunodeficiency viruses/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) constituted a “critical security threat in Africa.” As a result, Resolution 1308 was passed, but it was limited to recognizing and expressing concern “at the potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel” and requesting that the secretary-general “take further steps towards the provision of training” for preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS.¹¹ It was a compromise reached after several member states questioned the competence of the UNSC in matters of global health.

In 2014, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa led to both a much stronger response and the UN’s first emergency health mission—but only after the initial failure of the national governments and the WHO. In a letter addressed to the UNSC and UN General Assembly,¹² Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon cited the need to pair the WHO’s “strategic perspective with a very strong logistics and operational capability”¹³ to establish the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) operation. The UNSC immediately supported the decision with Resolution 2177. The resolution had 130 co-sponsors and determined that the West African epidemic constituted “a threat to international peace and security.”¹⁴

Taking the Ebola epidemic to the UNSC was an acknowledgement of the deficiencies of the regional and WHO responses, of the severity of the perceived threat posed, and of the need for an exceptional intervention. It also stirred up international cooperation, including the deployment of the US 101st Airborne Division to Liberia. According to Einsiedel and Malone, UNMEER was “a testament to the focused, high-intensity leadership of the United States.”¹⁵

The UNSC response to the 2014 Ebola crisis provides a stark

contrast to the case of COVID-19. And yet, early and clear warnings were also ignored until Ebola threatened the stability of the affected countries and cases showed up in the United States. When the WHO and affected countries proved incapable of dealing with the outbreak, the secretary-general forced the creation of UNMEER.¹⁶ For critics, instead of being a testament to United States leadership, Ebola demonstrated the asymmetries in the North–South politics of global health emergencies, presenting “Africa as a disease-ridden continent” and Ebola as “a crisis of security for the West” that seemed to put Africans “in the same category as politically motivated terrorists.”¹⁷

Certainly, Ebola and UNMEER showed the WHO’s dependency on the resources and interests of powerful states. The WHO has prioritized the interests and the protection of states from the Global North, partly because it has worked on the assumption that disease contagion management and responses are more likely required in the Global South, where “fragile states” and thus the principal beneficiaries of its health cooperation activities are supposed to be.¹⁸ COVID-19 exposed the working limits of the assumption as it struck harder and faster in the Global North, to then spread everywhere. Perhaps more fundamentally, the WHO was weak and underfunded by design, with only 20 per cent of its US\$2.5 billion annual budget guaranteed and free of the strings of donors. Recognizing these historical limits at WHO reform talks in Geneva in August 2020, the French and German delegations circulated a joint paper that emphasized the need to strengthen the organization, expressing concerns about its insufficient financial resources, lack of legal powers, and excessive external influences.¹⁹ The weaknesses—that is, the failings of the rules, the procedures, and the mechanisms of global health governance—reflect the underlying ambivalence of states “to transferring substantial authority to an international body in matters of potentially high political and sovereign importance.”²⁰ It is in the context of the construction of these systemic constraints and of competing state priorities that the WHO has struggled to assert its authority and to incite global cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic.²¹

As such, whether one talks of the Ebola crisis and UNMEER or of COVID-19, the international politics of global pandemics are emblematic of what Michael Barnett calls the sacrificial practices of the liberal international order: a “hierarchy of humanity [that]

translates into the relative value of human lives and the determination of whose suffering matters more than others, the effects of which often work through the market and are especially visible during pandemics.”²² Barnett argues that all “international orders demand their sacrifices” and that the liberal order “has a difficult time recognizing its dead ...[as it is] built around the belief in humanity and progress, in which all lives are equal and deserving of equal care” and everyone shares the “duties and responsibilities” of alleviating “unnecessary pain and suffering.”²³ Unlike the Ebola crisis, however, COVID-19 arguably challenges the international order. It also challenges, according to Barnett, how the “discipline [of International Relations] chooses to conceptualize international order”²⁴.

The UNSC and COVID-19

At the UNSC in 2020, global health cooperation could have begun with stronger support for the secretary-general’s call for a global ceasefire. Warring parties in eleven countries responded positively to the secretary-general’s proposal: (some) parties to conflict in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Libya, Myanmar, the Philippines, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen welcomed calls to stop the fighting. While “the actual number of conflict actors that have picked up on the ceasefire idea is a little slippery,” had the UNSC endorsed the appeal, it could have compelled warring parties and given momentum to peace talks.²⁵ At the very least, it could have been a powerful symbolic gesture and support for the multilateral management of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis.

In contrast to this vision, the UNSC embarrassed itself over what should have been, in the end, a limited resolution that carried little to no risk for the permanent five. Negotiations over a supportive UNSC resolution were protracted largely due to PRC–United States–Russia differences. The United States and Russia were concerned about the ramifications of a global ceasefire for their respective counter-terrorist operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. A much more important obstacle was the PRC–United States disagreement over whether to include a reference to the WHO, which turned into a petty blame game between the American and Chinese governments.²⁶ The position of the then Trump administration made clear that it had abdicated the established United States position of global leadership, and that it conceived

The Covid-19 Pandemic and the United Nations Security Council

of the UN system as constraining instead of advancing United States interests. Instead, the Trump administration used COVID-19 for partisan politics in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election. It blamed the PRC and the WHO for the global outbreak, announced in July that it would leave the WHO in 2021, and “stymied any multilateral response at the G-7, G-20, United Nations, and WHO.”²⁷ Throughout, while the PRC worked hard to deflect international criticism of its handling of the outbreak of COVID-19, it consistently failed to offer a compelling narrative or rationale for Chinese global leadership. During months of deliberation over the COVID-19 response, both countries succeeded only in demonstrating their inability or unwillingness to lead the UN system.²⁸

Ultimately, it took over three months to compose Resolution 2532. France and Tunisia, penholders to the resolution, worked hard to make it happen. The resolution recognized that COVID-19 “is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” and demanded a ceasefire and a humanitarian pause for “at least 90 consecutive days.” The ceasefire did not apply, however, to military operations against the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and associated groups.²⁹ Resolution 2532’s call for a global ceasefire is a historical first, but it will be quickly forgotten as the call went largely unanswered.³⁰

Historically, since 1945, the UNSC has always been fraught with fractures, tensions, and conflicting priorities between its five permanent veto members, with arguably a hiatus under United States leadership in the 1990s. In the twenty-first century, frictions again became apparent in the lead-up to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. The global financial crisis of 2008–2009, geopolitical power shifts, unending wars or invasions (Libya, Syria, Crimea, Mali, Ukraine, Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan), and the rise of populist and right-wing nationalist movements and governments all have produced and exacerbated stresses on multilateral organizations and practices. Yet, the failure of the UNSC to respond to COVID-19 reflects not only the politics of the moment but also the inequities that are built into the organ. Specifically, the permanent seats and veto powers were “designed to transform a wartime alliance into a big power oligarchy” that does not guarantee efficiency but durability.³¹ Or, in the words of Richard Haass, “the major powers get the UN they want, not the one the world needs.”³²

The COVID-19 diplomatic debacle also exposes the structural

problems that arise because of the centrality of the UNSC within the UN system. In particular, the UNSC's failure to support the secretary-general's call and (perhaps more fundamentally) to coordinate a global response to the pandemic, highlights the inequalities built within the UN system. One issue is the relationship between the UNSC, the secretary-general, and the UNGA. On 2 April 2020, the UNGA followed in the footsteps of the secretary-general by voting on a resolution reaffirming its commitment to global solidarity and multilateral cooperation to fight COVID-19 and by calling upon the UN system to mobilize a coordinated global response. Subsequent resolutions (74/274 of 20 April, 74/306 and 74/307 of 11 September) and the special session on COVID-19 of 3–4 December 2020 emphasized the need for a collective response to the pandemic, contrasting sharply with the internal politics of the UNSC. Under Charter rule, the secretary-general and the General Assembly have the authority to call upon the UNSC to fulfill its primary responsibility. In addition, the secretary-general's authority, under Article 99, can be used to bring matters to the attention of the UNSC, while the General Assembly could rely on its "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of 1950 to overcome a UNSC veto.³³ Both options, while not without challenges and political risk, do not necessitate reforming the UNSC but could bring greater compliance with the principles and purposes of the UN system and force the UNSC to act.

While such options might seem unlikely in the short term, the UNGA December special session suggests the potential of these kinds of responses and that they might become unavoidable in light of the long-term economic impacts of the coronavirus.³⁴ As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to spread, notably in the Global South, political struggles over global health cooperation, distribution of medical resources and expertise (from masks to vaccines), economic rescue packages, recovery and reconstruction, and so on, will exacerbate patterns of global inequality,³⁵ potentially causing instability and armed conflict. Years of progress in vaccination, literacy, reducing malnutrition, and reducing child mortality rates are at risk of, and have already suffered, major setbacks.³⁶ And when the global economy goes into depression, the inequalities inherent in systems of development aid, humanitarian assistance, and global political economy will most likely be increasingly challenged by Global South countries at the UNGA or through various UN agencies.

Giving the Nelson Mandela lecture, Secretary General Guterres did not mince words: “COVID-19 has been likened to an x-ray, revealing fractures in the fragile skeleton of the societies we have built. It is exposing fallacies and falsehoods everywhere: The lie that free markets can deliver healthcare for all; the fiction that unpaid care work is not work; the delusion that we live in a post-racist world; the myth that we are all in the same boat. Because while we are all floating on the same sea, it’s clear that some are in superyachts while others are clinging to drifting debris.”³⁷ COVID-19, as the precursor of larger shocks and as the “x-ray” of historical and current structural inequalities, will be the biggest test for the UN system, for the relevance and legitimacy of the UNSC, and for reimagining international order and cooperation.

Conclusion

Examining the international politics of COVID-19 through the lens of the UNSC, one can conclude that much rests on the shoulders of United States president-elect Joe Biden and his new administration. A change in leadership at the White House will certainly transform the political dynamics of the UNSC but not necessarily PRC–United States relations. Moreover, a new United States administration will offer no solution to the multiple crises of multilateralism that preceded the Trump presidency if it sticks to previous policies, if all it can offer is some better idea about the benefits of a United States-led, pre-COVID-19 or pre-Trump, liberal international order. It is, after all, that liberal international order that has led us to where we are today. There is no going back to “normal” or to some pre-COVID-19 condition, partly because the coronavirus will continue to kill and other viruses will come, and partly because the world has already changed. The magnitude and course of that transformation remain to be seen, but, most importantly, claims about change must be handled with care. Some will claim that everything has changed to make sure that nothing changes, that power structures and relations are sustained.

The COVID-19 debates at the UNSC underline the construction of an international order and UN system that are built upon and reproduce inequalities and structures in which, to use the words of Secretary-General Guterres, “the legacy of colonialism still reverberates.”³⁸ In this context, and considering the time frame needed to respond to pandemics and climate change, is it too radical to consider the possibility that the UNGA could again become a site to challenge the legacies of colonialism and its associated inequalities as it did in 1974 with its

Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order? Can we reimagine the world? International Relations theory is bad at imagining a world beyond or different from the dichotomies of international war and international cooperation, of chaos and order, of political realism and idealism.³⁹ In light of the failures of the UNSC to deal with COVID-19, and in the context of the bigger challenge that climate change represents, debating UNSC reforms would be a waste of time if it is to simply reproduce the same conceptualization and workings of the international order. It is far from clear if the UN system—as a whole that includes the ideals of the Charter’s preamble—can challenge and change the global structures on which it was built. But one thing is clear: the UNSC is not where one will find the seeds of change, new ways to reimagine the world, or alternatives for encouraging global cooperation. Advocating for a mere tinkering of the international structures from which our major problems arise is insufficient. We need to be more radical in our thoughts and actions.

References

- [1] United Nations, Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Appeal for Global Ceasefire, Statements, 23 March 2020, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-03-23/secretary-generals-appeal-for-global-ceasefire> (accessed March 2021).
- [2] United Nations, Security Council, Letter Dated 30 July 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2020/765, 30 July 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2020_765.pdf (accessed). See also Timothy Sisk, “COVID-19 and armed conflict: What we know, and why we should worry,” Political Violence at a Glance, 23 April 2020, <http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/04/23/covid-19-and-armed-conflict-what-we-know-and-why-we-should-worry/> (accessed 20 July 2021).
- [3] “How COVID-19 gave peace a chance, and nobody took it,” The Economist, 5 May 2020, <https://www.economist.com/international/2020/05/05/how-covid-19-gave-peace-a-chance-and-nobody-took-it> (accessed 28 May 2021).
- [4] Richard Gowan, “COVID-19 and conflict,” Sustainable Goals, 23 October 2020, <https://www.sustainablegoals.org.uk/covid-19-and-conflict/> (accessed 7 June 2021).
- [5] “Brief: Food security and COVID-19,” The World Bank, Washington DC, 15 October 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/food-security-and-covid-19> (accessed 7 June 2021).

The Covid-19 Pandemic and the United Nations Security Council

- [6] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 24.1, <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art24.shtml>(accessed 4 May 2021).
- [7] Edward C. Luck, “A council for all seasons: The creation of the Security Council and its relevancetoday,” in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, et al., eds., *The United Nations SecurityCouncil and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 62–63.
- [8] *Ibid.*, 63.
- [9] Frank P. Grad, “The preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization,” *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 80, no. 12 (2002): 981–984.
- [10] Sebastian von Einsiedel and David M. Malone, “Security Council,” in Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, eds., *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2018), 152–156.
- [11] United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1308 on provision of training on issues related to HIV/AIDS prevention for peacekeeping personnel, S/RES/1308, 17 July 2000, <https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F897CD0E6CC680DA85256D3B006A37D3> (accessed 4 June 2021).
- [12] United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Identical Letters Dated 17 September 2014 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, A/69/389-S/2014/679, 18 September 2014, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2014_679.pdf (accessed 4 June 2021).
- [13] United Nations, Security Council, 7268th meeting, S/PV.7268, 18 September 2014, 3, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/spv_7268.pdf (accessed 4 June 2021).
- [14] United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2177, UN Doc., S/RES/2177, 18 September 2014, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_RES_2177.pdf (accessed 4 June 2021).
- [15] Einsiedel and Malone, “Security Council,” 155–156.
- [16] “The politics behind the Ebola crisis,” International Crisis Group, *Africa Report 232*, Brussels, 2015, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/232-the-politics-behind-the-ebola-crisis.pdf> (accessed 6 June 2021).
- [17] Adia Benton and Kim Yi Dionne, “International political economy and the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak,” *African Studies Review* 58, no. 1 (2015): 223–236. 18. Sarah E. Davies, “Securitizing infectious disease,” *International Affairs* 84/2 (2008): 295–313;

- and Simon Rushton, "Global health security: Security for whom? Security for what?" *Political Studies* 59 (2011): 779–796.
- [18] Andreas Rinke and Stephanie Nebehay, "Exclusive: Germany, France want more funding, power for WHO as part of sweeping reforms" Reuters, 19 August 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-who-reform-exclusi-idUSKCN25F1TT> (accessed 17 June 2021).
- [19] Gian Luca Burci, "Health and infectious disease," in Weiss and Daws, eds., *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 683.
- [20] See: Sara E. Davies and Clare Wenham, "Why the COVID-19 response needs International Relations," *International Affairs* 96, no. 5 (2020): 1227–1251.
- [21] Michael Barnett, "COVID-19 and the sacrificial international order," *International Organization*, Online Supplement (2020): 2. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081832000034X>.
- [22] *Ibid.*, 16
- [23] *Ibid.*
- [24] Richard Gowan, "What's happened to the UN secretary-general's COVID-19 ceasefire call?" *International Crisis Group*, 16 June 2020, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/whats-happened-un-secretary-generals-covid-19-ceasefire-call> (accessed 17 July 2021).
- [25] For a detailed summary of the negotiations, see "Security Council resolution on COVID-19," *What's in Blue, Insights on the Work of the UN Security Council*, 30 June 2020, <https://www.whatsinblue.org> (accessed 14 July 2021).
- [26] Daniel W. Drezner, "The song remains the same: International relations after COVID-19," *International Organization*, Online Supplement (2020): 9. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000351>.
- [27] Colum Lynch, "WHO becomes battleground as Trump chooses pandemic confrontation over cooperation," *Foreign Policy*, 29 April 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/29/world-health-organization-who-battleground-trump-taiwan-china/> (accessed 28 June 2021).
- [28] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2532, S/RES/2532, 1 July 2020. [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2532\(2020\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2532(2020)) (accessed 4 June 2021)
- [29] Richard Gowan and Ashish Pradhan, "Salvaging the Security Council's Coronavirus response," *Commentary, International Crisis Group*, 4 August 2020, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/salvaging-security-councils-coronavirus-response> (accessed 28 July 2021).
- [30] Luck, "A Council for all seasons," 83.

The Covid-19 Pandemic and the United Nations Security Council

- [31] Richard Haass, “The UN’s unhappy birthday,” Project Syndicate, 10 September 2020, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/united-nations-75th-anniversary-little-to-celebrate-by-richard-haass-2020-09> (accessed 14 June 2021)
- [32] Mona Ali Khalil, “Reforming the UN Security Council,” Together First Report, 2020, available at: https://www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/0008499_TFR_UN_FINAL.pdf (accessed 28 June 2021); and Dominik Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and war: The Uniting for Peace resolution,” in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, et al., eds., *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 154–174.
- [33] Adam Tooze, “The normal economy is never coming back,” *Foreign Policy*, 9 April 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/09/unemployment-coronavirus-pandemic-normal-economy-is-never-coming-back/> (accessed 28 June 2021). See also, in this issue, Shahar Hameiri, “COVID-19: Is this the end of globalization?” *International Journal* 76, no. 1 (2021).
- [34] See, in this issue, Stephen Brown, “The impact of COVID-19 on development assistance,” *International Journal* 76, no. 1 (2021).
- [35] David Wallace-Wells, “Bill Gates on the pandemic: ‘You hope it doesn’t stretch past 2022,’” *Intelligencer*, 14 September 2020, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/09/bill-gates-hopes-covid-19-pandemic-doesnt-stretch-past-2022-interview.html> (accessed 15 June 2021)
- [36] United Nations, Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Nelson Mandela Lecture: “Tackling the Inequality Pandemic: A New Social Contract for a New Era,” Statements, 18 July 2020, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-07-18/> (accessed 14 June 2021).
- [37] *Ibid.*
- [38] R.B.J. Walker, *After the Globe, Before the World* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).